Solon the Athenian, the Poetic Fragments

MARIA NOUSSIA-FANTUZZI

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By

Maria Noussia-Fantuzzi

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CONCORDANCES TO PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} = 1 D.^{3} = 13 B.^{4}
2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–3 W.^{2} = 2 D.^{3} = 1–3 B.^{4}
3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} = 3 D.^{3} = 4 B.^{4}
4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} = 4.1–3 D.^{3} = –B.^{4}
5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b–c W.^{2} = 4.4–8 D.^{3} = –B.^{4}
6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} = 4.9–12 D.^{3} = 15 B.^{4}
7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2} = 5.1–6 D.^{3} = 5 B.^{4}
8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} = 5.7–10 D.^{3} = 6 and 8 B.^{4}
9 G.-P.^{2} = 7 W.^{2} = 5.11 D.^{3} = 7 B.^{4}
10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2} = 6 D.^{3} = 28 B.^{4}
11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2} = 7 D.^{3} = 19 B.^{4}
12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} = 10 D.^{3} = 9 B.^{4}
13 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} = 11 D.^{3} = 12 B.^{4}
14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2} = 9 D.^{3} = 10 B.^{4}
15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} = 8 D.^{3} = 11 B.^{4}
16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2} = 12 D.^{3} = 25 B.^{4}
17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2} = 13 D.^{3} = 23 B.^{4}
18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2} = 14 D.^{3} = 24 B.^{4}
19 G.-P.^{2} = 14 W.^{2} = 15 D.^{3} = 14 B.^{4}
20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2} = 16 D.^{3} = 16 B.^{4}
21 G.-P.^{2} = 17 W.^{2} = 17 D.^{3} = 17 B.^{4}
22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2} = 18 D.^{3} = 22 B.^{4}
23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2} = 19 D.^{3} = 27 B.^{4}
24 G.-P.^{2} = 26 W.^{2} = 20 D.^{3} = 26 B.^{4}
25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2} = 21 D.^{3} = 29 B.^{6}
26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} = 22.1–4 D.^{3} = 20 B.^{4}
27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2} = 22.5–6 D.^{3} = 21 B.^{4}
28 G.-P.^{2} = 18 W.^{2} = 22.7 D.^{3} = 18 B.^{4}
29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} = 23.8–12 D.^{3} = 32 B.^{4}
29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} = 23.1–7 D.^{3} = 33 B.^{4}
29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} = 23.13–21 D.^{3}; (vv. 4–5 and part of vv. 6–7 = 34 and 35 B.^{4})
30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} = 24 D.^{3}; (vv. 3–21 + 31.6–7 G.-P.^{2} = 36.1–21 B.^{4}; vv. 22–27 = 37 B.^{4})

31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} = 25 D.^{3}; (vv. 6–7 = 36.20–21 B.^{4})
32 G.-P.^{2} = 38 W.^{2} = 26.1–5 D.^{3} = 38 B.^{4}
33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2} = 26.6–7 D.^{3} = 39 B.^{4}
34 G.-P.^{2} = 40 W.^{2} = 26.8 D.^{3} = 40 B.^{4}
35 G.-P.^{2} = 30 W.^{2} = 27 D.^{3} = 30 B.^{4}
36 G.-P.^{2} = 41 W.^{2} = –D.^{3} = 41 B.^{4}
37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2} = –D.^{3} = 43 B.^{4}
38 G.-P.^{2} = –W.^{2} = –D.^{3} = –B.^{4}
39 G.-P.^{2} = 30a W.^{2} = –D.^{3} = –B.^{4}
°40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2} = D.^{3} = 31 B.^{4}

ABBREVIATIONS

CA J.U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford 1925).
CEG P.A. Hansen, *Carmina epigraphica Graeca saeculorum VII–V a. Chr. n.* (Berlin–New York 1983).
CPG E.L. Leutsch–F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum* (Göttingen 1839–1851).
DELG P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots* (Paris 1968–1980).
FGE D.L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge 1981).
FgrH F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin 1923–1930; Leiden 1940–1958).
GHI R. Meiggs–D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1988^2).
GLP D.L. Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, I (London 1942).
GVI W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, I (Berlin 1955).
IEG M.L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati* (Oxford 1989–1992^2).
IG *Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin 1902–).
LfgrE *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1955–).
LIMC *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich 1981–1997).
LSJ H.G. Lidell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones, R. McKenzie, and P.G.W. Glare, *A Greek-English Lexicon, with Revised Supplement* (Oxford 1996^9).
PCG R. Kassel–C. Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci* (Berlin–New York 1983–).
PEG A. Bernabé, *Poetarum epicorum Graecorum testimonia et fragmenta*, I (Leipzig 1987).
PMG D.L. Page, *Poetae melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962).
PMGF M. Davies, *Poetarum melicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, I (Oxford 1991).
POxy *The Oxyrhynchus papyri* (London 1898–).
RE A. Pauly–G. Wissowa–W. Kroll, *et al.* (eds.), *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart/Munich 1893–1980).

SGO	R. Merkelbach–J. Stauber, *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten* (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1998–)
SH	H. Lloyd-Jones–P. Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Berlin–New York 1983).
SLG	D.L. Page, *Supplementum lyricis Graecis* (Oxford 1974).
TrGF	R. Kannicht–S. Radt–B. Snell, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Göttingen 1971–Göttingen 2007).
VS	H. Diels–W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1951–1952^{6}).

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

SOLON'S LIFE

In contrast with many archaic poets, we possess relatively detailed information about Solon's life, from sources outside of his own poetic works. Especially rich are the biographical details presented in the principal sources for the fragments: Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius. Furthermore, references to Solon in Herodotus, Aristophanes, and fragments of other comic poets, though meager, are not rare.[1] Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the reliability of these ancient authorities given the ancient biographers' deeply entrenched tendency to infer details about the lives of the poets from the poetry itself[2] or to give information which may simply represent interpretative embellishments and/or conjectures. It is reasonable, therefore, to consider much of our biographical information on Solon to be suspect.

These suspicions seem even more well-founded when we consider how difficult it is for us to ascertain which documentary materials the ancients were able to consult for information about Solon and the Athens of his time, beyond the poems of Solon himself. Moreover, a corpus of legendary traditions had been widely circulated, probably already by the sixth century and certainly by the fifth, which made Solon out to be a sort of culture hero. These traditions elaborated on Solon's intellectual ability (confirming his image as one of the panhellenic "Seven Sages") as well as on his political and legislative activity in order to establish his position as

[1] Martina 1968 offers a full collection of the ancient sources on Solon. A synthesis of the ancient references to the life and work of Solon is in Oliva 1988. On Solon in Herodotus, Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius see Domínguez Monedero 2001, 156–207, and 208–210 on Solon in other sources: commedians, Isocrates, Androtion, Plato, Demosthenes, Aeschines, etc. On historical sources and scholarship see Almeida 2003, 1–69; Nawratil 1942 on Solon in Herodotus; Gehrke 2006 on Solon in the *Athenaion Politeia* and de Blois 2006 on Plutarch's Solon. Detailed literary analyses on the reception of Solon include: Noussia 2003 on Solon in Cratinus, Telò 2004 and 2007 on Solon in Eupolis, Bakola 2008 on Aristophanes as refashioning the Solonian *persona* of the one-man civic reformer. On the reception of Solon in Christian authors see, e.g., Morelli 1963 and Ugenti 1983.

[2] Cf. Fairweather 1974 and 1984; Lefkowitz 1981, vii–xi.

the founder of Athenian democracy.[3] Yet the range of accomplishments which these legendary traditions attributed to Solon are also applied to other personalities who enjoyed a similar reputation.[4]

Solon lived between the second half of the seventh century BC and the first half of the sixth, but we lack precise dates for his birth and death. According to Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 14.2 f.),[5] he was still alive when Pisistratus became tyrant, and he attempted to thwart the event himself; following the account of Phanias (fr. 21 Wehrli = Plut. *Sol.* 32.3; cf. Cadoux 1948, 122), Pisistratus became tyrant during the archonship of Comeas (561/60), and Solon supposedly died less than two years after this, during the following archonship of Hegestratus in 560/59 BC.[6] Diogenes Laertius (1.62) further elaborates that Solon's death occurred on Cyprus when he was eighty years old (on the tradition of his death at Salamis see Cratinus, *PCG* 246; *Anth.Pal.* 7.87). Other details are likewise uncertain; for example, a point which Plutarch (*Sol.* 32.4) himself regards with scepticism is that after Solon's death his ashes were scattered on the island of Salamis.[7] If the reliability of Diogenes' information about Solon's death in Salamis, and thus also about his age, were not highly dubious (it is the precise age which can also be reconstructed from the last distich of fr. 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}), we would be able to pinpoint the date of Solon's birth to 640/39 BC.

Aeschines (1.25) and Demosthenes (19.251) speak of a commemorative statue erected in the square of Salamis in Solon's honor,[8] and Diodorus Siculus (9.1.1) and Diogenes Laertius (1.62) claim that Salamis was Solon's native deme; this information,[9] however, may represent a marginal embellishment inspired by Solon's involvement in the war for Salamis' liberation and fr. 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–3 W.^{2}

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3 On Solon as the father of Athenian democracy see Introd. chap. 3, n.5.

4 Shapiro 1996, for instance, compares Solon with Theseus and finds parallelisms in the traditions about these two founding heroes, which by the Classical period were to some extent interchangeable. See also Thomas 1989, 207.

5 Aristotle's authorship of *Ath.Pol.* is disputed by modern historians, but I will conventionally refer to Aristotle as its author throughout the book.

6 Phanias of Eresus fr. 21 Wehrli contradicts Heraclides Ponticus' (fr. 148 Wehrli) indication that Solon died a long time after the beginning of Pisistratus' tyranny. The latter information seems less reliable. Cf. Cadoux 1948, 104–106; Davies 1971, 324; Rhodes 1976.

7 It is found as early as Cratinus. See Linforth 1919, 308 f.; Freeman 1926, 194; Legon 1981, 128.

8 See further the Introd. ad 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–4 W.^{2} and 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}

9 According to Lavelle 2005, 274 n. 193, it is not likely that Solon would have reached the high Athenian offices he did as a Salaminian.

Solon's father was Execestides;[10] his family boasted of royal blood from the Athenian king Codrus and could thus claim descent from Neleus and Poseidon himself. His mother's name is unknown, but according to Heraclides Ponticus (147.1) she was cousin to the mother of Pisistratus.[11] Later sources report that Solon also had a brother called Dropides, who was the father of the Critias named in fr. 22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2}, and so belonged to the same family line from which both Critias, a member of the Thirty, and Plato would eventually descend. In this case as well, however, we are likely dealing with an inference based on fr. 22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2} and the relevant testimony of Plato: cf. Introd. ad loc. The detail that Solon was, in his origins, of ancient noble stock, but that in terms of wealth he belonged to the middle class, is reported with unanimity by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 5.3 (cf. also *Pol.* 1296a18–20) and Plut. *Sol.* 1.2; but this element of his biography was probably also invented. It is significant that the fragments from the poems which *Ath.Pol.* and Plutarch quote to support this assertion do not in fact support it, but rather show only that Solon criticised both the advantaged and the disadvantaged and claimed to be advancing himself as a mediator between the factions of the rich and poor (5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b–c W.^{2}).[12]

As to Solon's life as a politician, one might easily say, using the words of Freeman,[13] that "up to the time of his legislation his story is interwoven with the history of Athens; after his legislation history moves without him. Before, nothing happened in which he had no share; after, he is enwrapped in a haze of glory, but he stands apart, effecting nothing, and the story of his life dissolves into a mass of legends, either based on inferences drawn from his poems, or invented in the endeavor to connect him with the other great names of the period".

Although Athens had not been amongst the first Greek cities to engage in colonial expansion, episodes like the conquest of Sigeum (north of Troy) toward the end of the seventh century,[14] and the contest with Megara for the island of Salamis in the Saronic gulf, which dates back to the end of the seventh century, demonstrate a change of attitude within the city. Athens' desire to possess Salamis is not itself "colonial",

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[10] The sources agree on this name. Only Philocles, an obscure author mentioned by Plutarch (*Comp. Sol. et Public.* 1.1), calls Solon's father Euphorion.

[11] On some sources which made Solon and Pisistratus lovers see Lavelle 2005, 194–198.

[12] Cf. Davies 1971, 322–324 and 334f., and comm. ad 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b–c W.^{2}

[13] Freeman 1926, 179.

[14] Cf. Herod. 5.95.

since the island is so close to Athens, but the impetus is an important sign of the city's desire to establish maritime contact with the wider world. Solon probably played a primary role, both politically and militarily, in the struggle for Salamis (see Introd. ad 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–3 W.^{2}). It remains unclear, however, whether he was involved in the first event that is well-documented in the internal political history of Athens, namely Cylon's attempt to establish a tyranny with the aid of his father-in-law Theagenes, tyrant of Megara. According to Plutarch, Solon persuaded the Alcmaeonids, who were accused of sacrilege for encouraging the stoning of Cylon's followers, to face justice (the Alcmaeonids were then supposedly exiled from Attica for a period of time[15]). If Solon was also associated with a purification of Athens by Epimenides of Crete (as Plut. *Sol.* 12 affirms), that event will have happened some time later than the Cylonian affair, but his involvement is most likely a fiction.[16] The question of Solon's advice to the Amphictyonic League to resist Cirrha and his participation as commander of an Athenian army in the First Sacred War for Delphi against the Cirrhans between 595 and 585 BC is also controversial.[17]

The traditional date of Solon's archonship with powers of διαλλακτής "arbiter" between the opposite political factions is 594/93,[18] but the relationship between this and all, or part, of his legislation has been the subject of lively debate amongst historians. The ancient sources do not expressly distinguish between Solon's archonship and his νομοθεσία, "legislation", which therefore seem to have coincided. Nevertheless, Aristotle in *Ath.Pol.* 14.1 dates the "promulgation (θέσις) of laws" by Solon to 592–591,[19] and the way in which Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 6–9 and 10.1) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 14.3–16) present Solon's reforms suggests that he enacted

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[15] On the implausibility of the testimonia concerning Solon and the judgment of the Alcmaeonids, cf. especially Podlecki 1984, 141.

[16] See Rhodes 1993, 83.

[17] See also ad 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2} According to Plutarch, Evanthes of Samos claimed that Solon was the commander of the Athenians, but according to the Delphic sources, the general of the Athenians was Alcmaeon. In Pausanias' account of the war (10.37.7), Solon diverted the course of the river Pleistos from Cirrha, hoping to defeat the Cirrhans by thirst, and when this strategy turned out to be unsuccessful because the obsieged had enough reserve water, he added hellebore to the water of the river and let it flow, thus instigating a widespread poisoning of the Cirrhans and facilitating the conquest of the city. But the historicity of the entire Sacred War in question here is in fact quite uncertain: cf. Càssola 1980 and Davies 1994.

[18] A date attested only by the Hellenistic historian Sosicrates, but reconcilable with the traditional lists of archons: cf. Cadoux 1948, 93–99 and McGregor 1974.

[19] This may however be an error of Aristotle's, or of one of his sources: cf. Rhodes 1993, 201.

them on two separate occasions, privileging first the economic measures, and only afterwards thinking of constitutional legislation.[20] Despite the possibility that the νομοθεσία did not coincide with the archonship,[21] we can still take the date of the archonship itself as certain in light of recent re-examinations of the documentary evidence, which have shown the traditional dating to be perfectly in line with all of our other testimonia.[22]

At the end of his political activity, Solon supposedly attempted to obstruct Pisistratus' seizure of power as tyrant—Aristotle already attests to this (*Ath.Pol.* 14)—but explicit references to Pisistratus are absent from those surviving fragments of Solon which may, more or less overtly, allude to the dangers of tyranny (fr. 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}; cf. frr. 13 and 15 G.-P.^{2} = 12 and 11 W.^{2}).[23]

Far less definite (and not only in respect to their chronology) are the other events of Solon's private life. In particular, we can identify one or two periods of travelling abroad.[24] Attestations to the voyages Solon made as a youth are more uncertain, and may simply represent inferences from 10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2} (a description of a location on the Nile delta) and 11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2} (Solon returning from Cyprus). It is possible that Solon embarked on such travels for economic reasons, or perhaps out of curiosity and a desire to learn about different people and places: the first explanation reappears among the usual motivations for mobility that characterized eighth-century colonization; the second explanation

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20 Even if, as Rhodes 1993, 164 observes, it may very well be that the original logical distinction between the constitutional and economic reforms had been erroneously read as vested with a *chronological* significance as well; this error of perspective would then have been further consolidated over time.

21 In 1888, Case proposed to assign to 594/93 BC only the archonship and the *seisachtheia*, i.e. the economic reforms, and to lower the date of the legislative reforms to 570 BC. Hammond 1940 = 1973 places the *seisachtheia* in the year of Solon's archonship and the *nomothesia* in 592/91 BC; Hignett 1952, 316–321 maintains that Solon's entire legislative activity (*seisachtheia* included) would have occurred toward the end of the third decade of the sixth century (for a very similar position see Sealey 1960, 159). Analogously Miller 1968 and 1969 has also suggested lowering the date of Solon's archonship to 573/72 BC, and the period of the *nomothesia* to the years between 573 and 570 BC, considering the traditional date of 594/93 BC to have been deduced *a priori* in order to make Solon's life conform to the temporal sequence suggested by fr. 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}

22 I refer in particular to McGregor 1974.

23 Cf. Introd. ad 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2}; also esp. Rhodes 1993, 202; Podlecki 1987, 9. For a detailed re-examination of the chronology of the tyranny of Pisistratus (first attempt: 561/60 BC, second: 557/56 BC; definitive grasp of power: 546/45 BC), cf. Rhodes 1976 and 1993, 191–198.

24 On the problem, cf. the Introd. ad 10 and 11 G.-P.^{2} = 28 and 19 W.^{2}

would have served to enhance the image of Solon as one of the Seven Sages.[25] In any case, Herod. 3.139 also attests to the possibility that both of these motivations determined the fondness for travel which is evident in the Archaic period.

The sources agree on the point that Solon left Athens immediately after completing his legislative work[26] (the beginning of this ἀποδημία "time abroad" is usually dated to the archonship of Eucrates: 592/91 BC),[27] when he had been assured that his laws were immutable for a certain period of time—one century, according to Aristotle and Plutarch, or one decade, according to Herodotus.[28] Questions of duration aside, even this last detail about Solon's life causes some serious doubts, since we are told that Lycurgus, too, voluntarily distanced himself from Sparta in order to prevent any change being made to his newly laid legislation (cf. Plut. *Lyc.* 29): thus we may be simply dealing with another of the stereotypes that characterize the legends surrounding the lives of archaic legislators.[29]

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[25] E.g. Thales, too, was proud of his commercial capabilities: cf. Cicero, *divin.* 1.49, 111 f.

[26] Only Diog. Laert. 1.50 connects Solon's departure abroad with Pisistratus' rise to power.

[27] Various modern scholars are in favor of a later chronology for both the *nomothesia* and the beginning of Solon's *apodemia* (between the end of the '70s of the sixth century and the beginning of the '60s): cf. esp. Hignett 1952; Miller 1969; Markianos 1974; see, above, n. 21. In any case, the traditional chronology still enjoys the greatest consensus: for a defense of it cf. e.g. Rhodes 1993, 120–122 and Wallace 1983.

[28] For an hypothesis about the genesis of this discrepancy between the sources, cf. Piccirilli 1977: Herodotus would have levelled out the two, probably different, durations of time given in his sources (one century for the validity of the laws, ten years for Solon's time abroad), and put the first on par with the second, i.e. the only one in which he was interested.

[29] Cf. Szegedy-Maszak 1978, 207 f.

CHAPTER TWO

SOLON THE SAGE

Along with Thales, Pittacus and Bias, Solon consistently appears on the otherwise highly variable lists of the Seven Sages. The list of intellectual exemplars, almost all of whom lived during the sixth century BC, is first attested by Plato, *Prot.* 343a–b;[1] over the next centuries accounts of intellectual and practical discoveries, maxims, and model behaviors attributed to the Seven Sages were constantly enriched and elaborated upon. Our most detailed version occurs in Diogenes Laertius' Book 1 and illustrates how later ages constructed the archaic intellectual as a sort of "master of truth".[2] These "masters of wisdom" often expressed themselves in poetry, or at least also in poetry (a few verses are attributed to nearly all of the Seven Sages).[3] They also showed a predilection for apophthegmatic conciseness, generally dedicated themselves to politics, and cultivated a peculiar *sophia* that synthesised technical ability, practical life experience, and "pure" wisdom.

Recently, R. Martin[4] has pointed out that the performance of wisdom was the most constant and distinctive feature of sage-behavior, since all of them committed themselves to spreading this wisdom or expertise via public performances that showcased their histrionic talents and biting eloquence. As performers of wisdom, the Sages combined action and humorous verbal utterances, which were later associated with Cynic sage performance, and in particular with Diogenes of Sinope (as the anecdotes which are found in the sixth book of Diogenes Laertius show): for instance, among the various maxims of the wise men, nos. 181, 187, 213 or 216 Martina are attributed to Solon;[5] while the highly paradoxical

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[1] On Plato and the list(s) of the Seven Sages see Busine 2002, 29–36. According to Fehling 1985, this would have been Plato's invention; that this idea goes back to the archaic period is the opinion of Snell 1954; Rösler 1991; see also Busine 2002 who refutes Fehling's opinion.

[2] On which see Detienne 1996.

[3] The titles of their works are found in Diog.Laert. The exception is Myson.

[4] Cf. Martin 1993.

[5] For Solon's deeds and maxims as part of the group see Martina 1968, 58–115; cf. also Paladini 1956 and Jedrkiewicz 1997, 74–77.

sense of the statement enhanced by its brevity and the memorability of its punchline may recall the Cynic χρεῖαι, nevertheless the relevance of the performative aspect is greater for the Cynics than for any of their 'precursors':

> 181 Martina = Stob. 4.22b.64
> ⟨Σόλων⟩ συμβουλεύοντος τινὸς αὐτῶι κατὰ τῶν μὴ γαμούντων ἐπιτίμιον τάξαι 'χαλεπόν' εἶπεν 'ὦ ἄνθρωπε, φορτίον ἡ γυνή'.
>
> 187 Martina = Maxim.Conf. *Serm.* 39.632
> Σόλωνος. Σόλων ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, εἰ γήμηι, ἔφη· ἐὰν μὲν αἰσχρὰν γήμηις, ἕξεις ποινήν· εἰ δ'ὡραίαν, ἕξεις κοινήν.
>
> 213 Martina = *Gnomol. Vat.* p. 188, 509 Sternbach
> ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν οὐ τεκνοποιεῖ ἔφη· 'διὰ φιλοτεκνίαν'
>
> 216 Martina = Arsen. *Viol.* p. 510 Walz
> Σόλων ἐρωτηθεὶς, διὰ τί τὴν τύχην καθημένην οὐ γράφουσιν, εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐχ ἕστηκε.

These anecdotes are amusing displays of wit in their own right; if they illustrate something, this is not the personality of the specific sage, but that his wisdom is of a type that can cover a wide range of fields and can be applied to real life situations like the ones in the examples above. From this perspective, it is not accidental that the same sentence was often attributed to multiple "Sages", as Diogenes Laertius (1.41) himself observed.

Solon possessed all of the typical characteristics of the archaic sage to the utmost degree: in particular, his work as a poet is likely the most genuine poetic activity of the Sages, while one might easily suppose that verses ascribed to others of the Seven Sages (in particular to Periander or Anacharsis) are legendary reconstructions. The views attributed to many of the Seven Sages surely represent a sort of "collective thought", in the sense that they reflect motifs of Delphic wisdom[6] or Hesiodic poetry, translating traditional, practical teachings into an aptly memorable form.[7] It is therefore unwise to connect specifically or only to Solon the various elements of ethical thought that can most easily be related to the situation at Athens, or to think that they reflect the strategies and activities of Solon the historical person. For instance the maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν, which is attributed to Solon in Stobaeus and Diog. Laert. 1.63, is

[6] The connection with the sanctuary at Delphi and its ideology is first explicitly stated in Plato, *Prot.* 343b. See also n. 9 below.

[7] Cf. Santoni 1983, 95–97.

also attributed to Pittacus in *Anth.Pal.* 9.366 and to Chilon in Plutarch, *Conv. sept. sap.* 163d. In light of the clear affinity between Solon's ethical poetry and political 'program', however, it would also be unwise to understate the exemplary role that Solon's poetry and political activity might have had for the other Sages, or for the later biographical recreations of their activity.

It seems that Solon was one of the most clearly drawn and well-documented figures of the canon of the Sages, and may have played a leading role in "constructing" the other members of this very canon; however, we cannot exclude the possibility that this tradition operated "backwards" to some extent, and over time attributed many superfluous details, maxims and anecdotes to the figure of Solon (especially during the period of the creation and expansion of the myth which celebrated him as the founding father of Athenian democracy[8]).

Excluding the more obvious and later trappings of the legend, such as those that concern Solon's meeting with the other Sages in Delphi[9] (e.g. Plato, *Prot.* 343a) or elsewhere within a Panhellenic framework (Diog.Laert. 1.40; Plut. *Sol.* 4), or for that matter, Solon's friendship and correspondence with some of the other Sages (Anacharsis, Thales, Periander, Myson, Epimenides),[10] the most ancient anecdote portraying Solon as an exemplary wise man of archaic Greece and paying very little, if any, attention to his political activity and reforms in Athens is the well-known legend of his encounter with Croesus in Sardis.[11] A narrative of this encounter already occurs in Herod. 1.29–33,[12] and thus predates even our first testimonies of the canon of Seven Sages.[13] Herodotus' emphasis on the encounter between Solon and Croesus as taking place within the institutional framework of *xenia* testifies to the fifth century

[8] Cf. Mossé 1979b. Thus the question of the origin of sentences like no. 142 Martina = Plut. *Sol.* 14.4 τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ, which cannot be said to have been transmitted for any other purpose than the political one, is hard to settle.

[9] On which see Tell 2007, who outlines in great detail the role that Delphi played in facilitating the circulation of *sophia* and contributing to the figure of the Sage.

[10] Cf. Martina 1968, 67–77.

[11] Plut. *Sol.* 27.1 already doubted the historicity of the anecdote, which has been discredited by modern scholars primarily for chronological reasons (cf. e.g. Wallace 1983, 86–89); indeed it is extremely unlikely (though perhaps not totally impossible) that Solon was still alive when Croesus became king of Lydia. The format of the story of Solon and Croesus will serve as model for later writers for the encounter of wise man and tyrant: Gray 1986, 120.

[12] And later in Diod. Sic. 9.26 f.; the source is Ephor. *FgrH* 70F181.

[13] Herodotus does not seem to be familiar with the notion of the Seven Sages: see Brown 1989; Busine 2002, 17.

interpretation of the ability of *sophoi* to travel and participate in intellectual exchanges. The strong connection between *xenia* and the dissemination of wisdom presents this ability of *sophoi* to travel and participate in intellectual exchanges as being contingent upon their utilization of the formal channels of interaction established through the *xenia*-system.[14] Another formal channel for the dissemination of wisdom is the institution of the symposium. Displays of wisdom are a central theme of works in the *symposion*-tradition, as is shown—despite its lateness—by the testimony of Plutarch's *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*;[15] there Aesop is included in the circle of the Seven Sages, along with Solon, Periander and the others. But already in the middle comedy poet Alexis, *PCG* 9 Solon is represented discussing symposiastic *topoi* with his non-Athenian interlocutor (Aesop?): in the case of our unique surviving fragment, the practice of drinking mixed wine at the Athenian symposia (which is called Ἑλληνικὸς πότος to distinguish it from the barbaric way of drinking pure wine). Moderation as a feature of the wise Solon and as a celebrated sympotic value would fit well the moralistic content of middle comedy.

To return to Herodotus' extented narrative of Solon's encounter with Croesus, the account centers on Solon's precept that man's happiness can only be judged in death. When the Lydian king, who had ostentatiously showed off his treasures to Solon, (κελεύσαντος Κροίσου τὸν Σόλωνα θεράποντες περιῆγον κατὰ τοὺς θησαυροὺς καὶ ἐπεδείκνυσαν πάντα ἐόντα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὄλβια), asks Solon who ought to be considered the happiest man, Solon fails to name Croesus, as Croesus himself had expected, and names instead an Athenian man called Tellus. After leading a contented life, Solon explains, Tellus had the good fortune to die in a victorious combat for his fatherland (Τέλλωι τοῦτο μὲν τῆς πόλιος εὖ ἡκούσης παῖδες ἦσαν καλοί τε κἀγαθοί, καί σφι εἶδε ἅπασι τέκνα ἐκγενόμενα καὶ πάντα παραμείναντα, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ βίου εὖ ἥκοντι, ὡς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτη ἐπεγένετο). Next Solon identifies two young, unknown Argives, of "sufficient wealth" (βίος τε ἀρκέων ὑπῆν), Cleobis and Biton,[16] to whom Hera granted the opportunity to end their lives while sleeping in her temple immediately after they had performed a feat of enormous physical strength amid the applause of

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[14] Tell 2007, 270.
[15] On which see Jedrkiewicz 1997, 74–77; Mossman 1997, 119–140.
[16] On which see Lloyd 1987; Crane 1996, 73.

their fellow citizens. Solon's truth that only the man who dies well is truly happy, since one must look to the end of life[17] in order to judge someone as blest, is one that Croesus will recall in the face of the adversities he will later meet, especially in the wake of the catastrophic attack on the Persian king Cyrus that will bring his rule to an end *c.* 546.[18] This anecdote[19] presupposes Solon's role as an exemplar of archaic wisdom (σοφίη), and thus Herodotus testifies to the beginnings of a legend that will crystallize slowly but steadily.[20] Herodotus makes no mention of Solon's poetry in this context, though in 5.113 he refers to Solon's poetry for his host Philocyprus of Cyprus. Pelling[21] and Kurke[22] aptly remark that in telling Croesus about Tellus and about Cleobis and Biton, Solon deploys a variety of Greek civic ideals in order to contrast them with Croesus' own self-estimation: values which center on parenthood, on a simple sufficiency, on a good death in the service of one's *polis* (the case of Tellus) or one's family and the gods (the case of Cleobis and Biton). Solon ranks Tellus first because Tellus is a model citizen for the *polis* and Solon is the most fitting person to place him first. As for Cleobis and Biton, they die young and childless, i.e. without ensuring the continuation of their *genos* in Argos, but represent an exemplary case of devotion to the ethical values of loyalty to family and moderation, which are most suitably defended by Solon the wise sage.

The happy experiences related in Solon's speech imply the opposite circumstances—the death of one's own children, the removal of wealth and sufficiency, and the danger of a long life (contrast Cleobis and Biton) with the risk of a bad death (contrast Tellus)[23]—the very things which Croesus himself will suffer, first in the Atys-Adrastus episode, and then in the aftermath of his attack on Cyrus. At the moment of his meeting with

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[17] Thus the name "Tellus" is fit for the man who after a happy existence ended his life with a good death in the service of his country.

[18] This is the most likely date, but it is not completely certain: a later date has recently been championed by N. Kokkinos, *SCI* 27, 2009. Croesus will enjoy a fine reputation, at least in the fourth century. According to ps.-Plato, individual Greeks would refer to Croesus and Solon together as men who had combined wisdom and power (*Epist.* 2.311a).

[19] Similarly Diod. Sic. 9.26 reports that Croesus had once invited the Sages to meet at Sardis, or at least had associated with some of them.

[20] Busine 2002, 17.

[21] Pelling 2006, 146 f.

[22] Kurke 1999.

[23] Cf. Pelling 2006, 147.

Solon, however, Croesus still demonstrates "a ludicrously naïve pride in his accumulated wealth and shows he has no feeling for the proper rhetoric of wealth", as Crane[24] has pointed out.

Herodotus certainly adds details to the story that resonate with his own ideology (the concept of the "jealousy of the gods", τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες, 1.32, or the emphasis on eye-witness knowledge[25] in regard to wealth and, more generally, to the conclusion of every matter, εἴ τινα ἤδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον 1.30, ἐπειρώτα τίνα δεύτερον μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἴδοι, 1.31, ὅς τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεὶς τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε, 1.33). Nevertheless, the principal points that characterize the Herodotean Solon have their roots in the poetry that was transmitted under Solon's name. Views that have been identified as authentically Solonian in Herodotus include his criticism of excessive wealth (see the correction of πάντα ἐόντα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὄλβια, which encapsulates Croesus' idea of good fortune, to πολλά τε καὶ ὄλβια (1.30.2 ~ 1.31.1) in Solon's description of Tellus as well as the moderate statement βίος τε ἀρκέων ὑπῆν for Cleobis and Biton in accordance with frr. 1.7 ff. G.-P.^{2} = 13.7 ff. W.^{2}, 6.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 15.3 f. W.^{2}, 18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2}), which in itself is not unrelated to Solon's affirmations about the usefulness of well-being (cf. fr. 1.7 G.-P.^{2} = 13.7 W.^{2}); likewise the emphasis on life's uncertainty (fr. 1.63–70 G.-P.^{2} = 13.63–70 W.^{2}), the uselessness of wealth in the face of death (fr. 18.1–10 G.-P.^{2} = 24.1–10 W.^{2}), and the assertion that the limit of human life should be seventy years (Herod. 1.32.2: cf. fr. 23.17 f. G.-P.^{2} = 27.17 f. W.^{2})[26] are all positions expressed in Solon's own poetry. Herodotus' portrayal of Solon may also echo his poem on the ten ages of man, although if we doubt the authenticity of Solon's poetic fragments (cf. below, Introd. chap. 4), we cannot rule out the possibility that "his figure's reference to seventy years caused the poem to be attributed to him".[27] While both sequences of *post hoc/propter hoc* are equally plausible in theory, the latter position is greatly weakened if we acknowledge that the numerical concept of seventy[28] is not the only point of contact with the poem on the ages (fr. 23

[24] Crane 1996, 81–84.

[25] Herodotus is a *histôr*, a term that etymologically means "the one who has seen," and thus "knows" the truth.

[26] Cf. also Miller 1963, 89; von Fritz 1967, 217 f., Santoni 1983, 134–138; Chiasson 1986; Erbse 1992, 12 f.; Duplouy 1999, 8; Harrison 2000, 36–38.

[27] As remarked by Stehle 2006, 105 n. 71.

[28] "For I set the limit of a man's life at seventy years" (1.32).

G.-P.[2] = 27 W.[2]). Both the poem and Herodotus represent Solon as someone who perceives life as admitting of quantitative measure. Furthermore, the arithmetical operations and computing that Solon is presented as doing[29] in Herodotus not only fit the poem on the ages[30] but are also at home in sixth century Athens and its pressing issues of property, debt, and commerce (in fact, this kind of numerical quantification is typical of Solon's political/legislative activity, which addressed an astonishing range of social concerns in such quantitative terms[31]). Herodotus has to sketch a Solon who is faithful to his poetry in the encounter he describes in order to obtain a certain verisimilitude and authority, and it is more likely that he draws on the poems rather than the other way around in light of the quality of the overlapping (and lack thereof) between Herodotus' account and Solon's poetry. The historian seems to choose carefully what to adopt from the poems for his own image of Solon, and this image is not the prevailing one which the Solonian poems convey—in other words, Herodotus appears to select from Solon's poems the wisdom of an almost apolitical sage, whereas Solon's poems mainly involve the ethical and/or political message of a statesman, which may include the sage's general wisdom, but with a quite specific and consistent focus on the ethos of the citizens and the troubles of the Athenian *polis*.

According to Crane's[32] fitting description, "the 'truth effects' which Herodotus elicits here render his narrative more plausible and distract from the subtle ways in which he manipulates the traditional authority of Solon—even (or especially) a patently fictionalized Solon". The time and duration of ὄλβος are a common preoccupation in the archaic world in general and in Solon's poetry more specifically. Therefore the subtle way in which Herodotus manipulates the defining characteristics of ὄλβος in the narration is especially interesting; he ascribes to Solon a specific ideology of this word—that mere wealth does not constitute

[29] "In these seventy are days twenty-five thousand and two hundred, if we count not the intercalary month. But if every second year be lengthened by a month so that the seasons and the calendar may rightly accord, then the intercalary months are five and thirty over and above the seventy years: and the days of these months are one thousand and fifty; so then all the days together of the seventy years are seen to be twenty-six thousand two hundred and fifty; and one may well say that no one of all these days is like another in that which it brings" (1.32).

[30] See further in the comm. ad 23 G.-P.[2] = 27 W.[2]

[31] Falkner 1995, 159; Crane 1996, 75. Cf. also Plut. *Sol.* 25.4 on the legislator's interest in the calendar.

[32] Crane 1996, 76.

real ὄλβος and that no man can be called ὄλβιος until after his death—a concept foreign to the intellectual lexicon of Solon himself but in line with views expressed elsewhere by Herodotus. In fact, the idea of ὄλβιος expressed in Solon's poetry seems much more similar to that of the Herodotean Croesus.[33] Munson[34] has remarked that the Herodotean Solon and other characters who either speak to or are themselves kings establish a connection between calamity and greatness[35] rather than between calamity and wrongdoing. Herodotus reelaborates the Solonian theme of the instability of good fortune by emphasizing the randomness in the reversal of human fortune and the amorality of divinity, which goes after those with great possessions.[36] These two points contradict what we know from the poems, but are delivered in a language which is, for the most part, disguised as Solonian:

> For he who is very rich is not more blest than he who has but enough for the day, unless fortune so attends him that he ends his life well, having all good things about him. Many men of great wealth are unblest, and many that have no great substance are fortunate. Now the very rich man, who is yet unblest, has but two advantages over the fortunate man, but the fortunate man has many advantages over the rich but unblest man: for the latter is the stronger to accomplish his desire and to bear the stroke of great calamity; but these are the advantages of the fortunate man, that although he be not as capable as the other to deal with calamity and desire, these are kept far from him by his good fortune, and he is free from deformity, sickness, and all evil, and happy in his children and his comeliness. If then such a man, in addition to all this, shall also end his life well, then he is the man whom you seek, and is worthy to be called blest (1.32.32–42).

Solon famously opposed both types of riches described in this text—abundant wealth and that which consists in only having whatever is needed in everyday life—paradoxically equating them to each other (fr. 18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2}). Herodotus' term ἐπιθυμίη is not found in Solon, but the concept is implied by his statements on rich men who cannot be satiated (fr. 1.73 G.-P.^{2} = 13.73 W.^{2}; cf. also fr. 5.3 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.2 W.^{2}): clearly, according to Solon, the man who has what suffices for his daily

33 Cf., again, Crane 1996, 81.

34 Munson 2001, 185.

35 In this sense the Croesus episode has been cited as plausible evidence that Herodotus bears a resemblance to Athenian tragedy.

36 Cf. Munson 2001, 184.

needs is exempt from experiencing desires that he cannot fulfill.[37] It is interesting to note that the word ἄτη 1.32.6 (×2) does not occur elsewhere in Herodotus, whereas it is commonly used in Solonian poetry in connection with men seeking riches (especially by unjust means) and the calamity this behavior brings (calamity as a result of individual wrongdoing or miscalculation[38]). The Herodotean Solon thus tactfully and aptly reinterprets the Athenian Solon by laying far less stress upon individual guilt and by moving away from the specific desire (of wealth), which haunts Solonian Athens, to the general ἐπιθυμίη, which befits the specific circumstances of the lavisly rich and therefore doomed Lydian ruler.

[37] Munson 2001, 184 notes that the word ἐπιθυμίη "suggests an irrational impulse leading to self-detrimental action, which in the *Histories* is typical of monarchical rulers. An allusion to the personal guilt connected with the opportunities that power affords therefore intrudes surreptitiously in Solon's interpretation of the instability of fortune".

[38] See further in the comm. ad 1.13, 68, 75; 3.34 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.13, 68, 75; 4.34 f. W.^{2}

CHAPTER THREE

SOLON THE POLITICIAN AND LEGISLATOR

Solon's poetry constitutes our oldest concrete evidence for archaic *nomothesia* "legislation". Various literary sources cite a number of Solon's laws, at least some of which are demonstrably authentic.[1] Furthermore Solon's name appears on the list of great legislators found in Aristotle's *Politics* (1273b27–1274b28).[2] It is thus possible, in principle, that at least the core of the ancient information we have about Solon's legislative work is historically sound, and predates Hellenistic biographical elaborations.

Many Greek cities of the classical period attributed the entire corpus of their laws (or at least part of it) to archaic legislators, who had served as temporarily elected tyrants, often called αἰσυμνῆται. Usually charged with the task of resolving a crisis, they had responsibilities similar to those of Solon when he was named archon and διαλλακτής "reconciler" in Athens.[3] The characterizations of the most ancient of these archaic legislators—especially Lycurgus in Sparta, Zaleucus in Locri Epizephyrii, Charondas in Catana, Pittacus in Mytilene, Androdamas of Rhegium (among the cities of the Chalcidian peninsula)—embody a complicated blend of historical facts and invention that served to mythicize the specific legislator, but which also adhered to conventional biographical topoi. These topoi were formed of anecdotes providing evidence of the legislator's virtue and of his travels to learn about other societies; they told of a crisis in his city that needed resolution and described his role as mediator between factions and resolver of the crisis; often they report on criticism that surfaced in the wake of his legislative work, or his departure from the city in order to prevent changes to his laws, etc.[4]

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[1] Even without the optimism of Ruschenbusch 1966, 57 f., who believes that Solon's "code" was in no way altered until it began to be systematically updated in 411 BC. On the principles underlying Ruschenbusch's collection, see Scafuro 2006, 179 who adds a third category consisting of laws with a Solonian kernel to the two categories (genuine/spurious) of Ruschenbusch's collection.

[2] Hölkeskamp 2005 argues that Solon's laws amount to a collection and not to a code.

[3] Cf. Romer 1982.

[4] Cf. especially Szegedy-Maszak 1978; on Solon's "theoric" departure from the city of Athens, see ad 10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2} and the bibliography cited there.

When confronted with these fictional reconstructions, we must proceed with the utmost caution and acknowledge the possibility that the historical truth of Solon's reforms was enriched with conventional and/or mythicizing biographical details, especially during the fourth century, when his work began to be used in a propagandistic way and he was made out to be a sort of "father" of Athenian democracy.[5] Today we know that some of the laws attributed to Solon cannot have been authored by him, even if the corpus of Solonian legislation did exist in concrete and documented form until the classical period, as we can assume from the evidence provided by a set of objects known as ἄξονες or as κύρβεις;[6] it

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[5] Solon was already some sort of exemplary figure in 410 (Lys. 30.2), and in 403 (Andoc. I *Myst.* 83; cf. 81 f.). Ruschenbusch 1958, notes that only 4 citations of Solon's laws occur in the 75 speeches of Attic orators predating 356 BC, while there are 32 citations in the 64 speeches dated to after 356 BC. Cf. Mossé 1978, 1979 and 1996; Hansen 1989a; Szegedy-Maszak 1993; Fantuzzi 2010 (on the fortune of the "myth of Solon" in Isyllus' paean, a fourth-century inscription from Epidauros). Hignett 1952, 2–8 argues that the end of fifth century was the time when Solon came to be regarded as the founding hero of Athenian democracy.

[6] It is a fact, as maintained by Rhodes 2006, 251 that Solon's *axones* survived long enough for a transcription to be made. The *axones* seem to have been rotating woodblocks inscribed *boustrophedon* on four sides, while the *kyrbeis* were stelae made out of stone or bronze that came to a point on top (cf. Hansen 1975 and Wyatt 1975). There were multiple series of *axones* which were numbered progressively (there were at least two *axones* of Draco and Solon must have produced a separate series starting with no. 1, since Plut. *Sol.* 24.2 cites his first *axon*); the *kyrbeis* were not numbered progressively (cf. Stroud 1979, 42 and Immerwahr 1985, 126 f.). The *axones* and the *kyrbeis* would have been preserved in Athens (first on the Acropolis, then on the βουλευτήριον according to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, *FgrH* 72F13; first on the Acropolis then in the prytaneum and agora according to Pollux 8.128; the *kyrbeis* were in the royal *stoa*, according to Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 7.1; cf. Robertson 1986), until at least the fourth century, the period during which Aristotle or his school produced a commentary on them in five books (we cannot be sure that the later commentaries, by Hermippus of Cyrene in the third century BC and then by Asclepiades of Myrlea, Didymus and Seleucus, grammarians who lived between the first century BC and the first century AD, still referred directly to the Solonian *axones*: cf. Ruschenbusch 1966, 47–52). Otherwise, the laws believed to be Solonian remained in effect until nearly the end of the fifth century, when, starting in 410 BC, they were recopied onto stelae in the agora, with a number of updates that adapted them to the changed circumstances of the time. It is usually thought that Cratinus, *PCG* 300, speaking of the *kyrbeis* of Solon and Draco as those "on which they now toast our barley", was implying that by that time they were held in such low esteem so as to be materially or metaphorically dismantled; we should not, however, ignore the hypothesis of Robertson 1986, 148–153, who believes that Cratinus simply meant that barley was toasted according to the regulations about sacrifice set forth on the *kyrbeis*. Various theories have been advanced as to the difference between *kyrbeis* and *axones*—assuming, as we now usually do, that there was indeed a difference (Ruschenbusch 1966, 32–38; Andrewes 1974, e.g., were inclined to think there was not. Rhodes 1993, 132 also believes that the two were different names applied to the same sets of objects). Dow 1953–1957,

now seems certain that in the fourth century laws that were thought to date back to Solon and were still referred to as "laws of Solon" had in fact been radically reformed and updated over the course of the fifth century.[7]

Solon was not in fact the first historical legislator of Athens: he was preceded in that role by Draco (traditional date: 621/20 BC). Solon's laws[8] would have replaced Draco's, with the exception of the laws on homicide.[9] It is difficult to say just how complete "Draco's code" was; nevertheless, apart from the legislation on "blood crimes", it is generally considered not to have been very comprehensive.[10] Many of the oldest legislative initiatives in the Greek *poleis* came about as the result of a specific crisis,[11] and in the case of Draco the determining crisis seems to have been the blood spilled in connection with the coup attempted by Cylon (on which cf. below, fr. 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2}).[12] It is also possible that Draco's laws (as was the case for most other ancient legislators) amounted to little more than to codify a set of old customs that oral tradition had already converted into norms well-established in the city's collective memory (or in the memory of the *mnemones*/*hieromnemones*, the living registers and guardians of the customs according to sacred and profane law).[13] Draco himself would have acted in response to a general desire to safeguard the oral laws from attack, or to avert the risk that this oral legislation might be "updated" in a way that would result in its distortion, much as Pisistratus

31 and Connor 1988, 185–188, e.g., supposed that the former's content was sacrificial law, while the *axones* contained laws on other matters (coll. Aristophanes of Byzantium, fr. 410 Slater = *FgrH* 241F37b). The difference may, however, lie between two diachronically differentiated sets of objects. According to Stroud 1979 and Robertson 1986, 156 and 168, the *axones* contained Solon's original legislation, while the *kyrbeis* were later copies that dated to the first half of the fifth century. According to Immerwahr 1985, on the other hand, the *kyrbeis* were the originals and were later copied onto the *axones*.

7 Cf. Clinton 1982, 29–34.

8 On the question what Solon's laws included see the discussion in Hansen 1989a, 83–85; Ruschenbusch 1966, 26; Rhodes 2006, 251 f.

9 As Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 7.1 says. There are only a few testimonia, however, concerning Solon's legislation on homicide which lead us to believe that the juridical norms regarding blood crimes evolved after Draco.

10 Cf. e.g. Thomas 1995, 71.

11 Cf. e.g. Eder 1986, 273–275 and Hölkeskamp 1992b, 74 f.

12 The common idea that Draco's homicide laws were, at least in part, a response to the Cylonian affair has been challenged by Gagarin 2008, chap. 4.

13 Cf. e.g. Camassa 1988; Robb 1994, 99–124; Thomas 1995, 62–71. If it could be considered historically reliable, the famous testimony about the laws of Charondas sung at symposia (dating back to Hermippus: cf. Introd. ad °40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2}) would be particularly illuminating for the uncertain phase of this transition from oral to written laws.

tried to avoid rhapsodic revision of the Homeric poems by providing a standard record for the Panathenaic festival.[14]

In Solon's case as well, some kind of crisis may have led the Athenians to solicit his legislation: at the root of the initiative was most likely a rising tension in the city between the rich and the poor that was born from the dependence of the poor upon the rich as well as from the arrogance of the nobility. Although these factors, cited in the fragments of Solon as well as by Aristotle[15] and Plutarch, are unlikely to have been the only ones contributing to the crisis, they were probably exploited and thereby magnified by the rivalries within the aristocratic clans, whose reciprocal equilibrium had perhaps been destabilized by Cylon's attempted *coup*, as well as by the ensuing (although temporary) elimination of Cylon's supporters and the Alcmaeonids from the political scene.[16]

It is not difficult to argue that, in many of Solon's directives about public and private behavior, detectable anthropological traces have survived (cf. below and Introd. to fr. 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}) that we might naturally connect to a substratum of oral legislation.

Nevertheless, perhaps because Solon's work postdates (though only slightly) the first set of legislative provisions drawn up by Draco, Solon himself had the opportunity to draft a "code" of laws that, while falling short of the sort of totality and coherence that we might associate with such an undertaking,[17] was nevertheless more substantial than anything attributable to other legislators working between the end of the seventh and the beginning of the sixth century. Solon's legislation included not only penal law, but also provided for an extensive and significant recon-

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[14] Many modern historians give credit to Solon's propaganda (cf. e.g. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}) against the violence of the aristocrats, whom he claimed were usurpers of what was right, a theme which, following Hesiod, is often found in the poetry of the sixth century (cf. Donlan 1973). These historians believe that the legislative distortions came from the aristocrats themselves, and that the emerging classes would have wanted to block them: see most recently, e.g., Hölkeskamp 1992a, 104 f. Another rather different hypothesis has been advanced, according to which the initiative to promote fixing preexisting oral laws in written form would have come from the aristocrats themselves, who wanted to solidify these laws in their own favor during a period when societal changes were putting them at risk: cf. Eder 1986. Nor should we ignore that at the root of the need to write legislation was the dynamic of differentiation, i.e. the growing necessity of different *poleis* to define and fix the individual aspects and particular traditions of their own "oral laws" during the age of colonial expansion: cf. Hölkeskamp 1992a, 94–99 and 1992b, 66–72.

[15] Cf. Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 2.1, 5.1, 9.1, and below.

[16] Cf. especially the seminal contribution of Ellis-Stanton 1968.

[17] Cf. Hölkeskamp 1992b, 55–57 and 2005 (which correctly argues that Solon's legislation probably amounted to a series of laws, rather than to a code); Thomas 1995, 71.

figuration of the governmental structure. Aristotle recognized this difference, and drew a clear distinction between the other archaic legislators and Solon and Lycurgus, both of whom he considered to be "makers of not only laws, but also of the constitution of the πολιτεία": cf. *Pol.* 1273b32–1274b28. Nor was Solon unaware (at least *a posteriori*) of the ambitious scale of his legislative work when, in fr. 30 G.-P.[2] = 36 W.[2], he introduced a brief summary of social laws with the interrogative question, "Those aims for which I called the public meeting—which of them, when I stopped, was still to achieve?" (tr. M.L. West 1993a, vv. 1 f.), concluding with the declaration: "These things I did in power, blending strength with justice, carried out all that I promised. I wrote laws for all, for high and low alike, made straight and just" (tr. West 1993a, vv. 15–20).

Solon's code was represented by at least 16, and perhaps 21 or more, *axones* on which his laws were inscribed (one *axon* could have at least eight laws on it[18])—these amounted to a little less than one thousand lines and a total of about 45,000 characters, i.e. nearly triple the text of the other most ancient code (better) known to us, that of Gortyn.[19] As far as we can tell, these *axones* contained regulations ranging from legal procedure to penal code, from laws on hereditary inheritance to legislation concerning funerals, religious practice, as well as behavior in the individual, domestic and public spheres.[20]

Modern historians (following *Ath.Pol.* and Plutarch) have usually classified the corpus of Solonian legislation under the two categories of "economic" and "constitutional" law.[21] The most important initiative ascribed by the ancients to Solon was to divide the citizens into four classes (τέλη) on the basis of income,[22] and to accordingly establish the criteria of their eligibility for public office.[23] The wealthiest class was that of the

[18] Rhodes 2006, 256 and n. 66.

[19] Cf. Immerwahr 1985, 126.

[20] See also above n. 6.

[21] But we must allow that he could have enacted some laws which do not fit into these categories. See p. 41.

[22] A growing number of scholars believe that were no specified qualifications for the classes other than the *pentakosiomedimnoi* (e.g. Foxhall 1997 has argued that the qualifications given for the *hippeis* and *zeugitai* would make the three higher classes an elite minority), or that these qualifications are the product of later speculation (Rhodes 1997, 4; Rosivach 2002).

[23] This is not unanimously accepted by modern historians. Mossé 1979b, 430–433 does not accept the connection between political rights and property classes. See also Raaflaub 2006.

πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι, i.e. those whose property yielded 500 *medimnoi*[24] of wheat (or *metretai*[25] of oil or wine[26]) or more, enough to feed 100 people for a year.[27] Next were the ἱππεῖς "horse-owners", who had an income of at least 300 *medimnoi*, enough to feed 60 people for a year.[28] Third were the ζευγῖται "owners of a pair of oxen" (or those who were "yoked" in ranks, i.e. hoplites?[29]), whose income was 200–300 *medimnoi*, enough to feed more than 30 people for a year.[30] Last[31] came the θῆτες "wage-earners", those who were at least originally unable to afford armor. This last class must have constituted the great majority of the population,[32] and would have ranges "from those with a tiny scrap of garden to substantial kulak-like landholders, and the odd hoplite".[33] These parameters are likely to have already existed in pre-Solonian Athens,[34] but Solon defined them in precise quantitative terms and sanctioned the divisions by law; it is possible that he further distinguished the *pentakosiomedimnoi* from the highest of three already-existing classes,[35] or inherited a system where the qualifications for those classes were not specified.[36] Only the *pentakosiomedimnoi* could serve the office of Treasurer of Athena, and they alone—or, more likely, they and the ἱππεῖς—could assume the archonship. It is difficult to tell which offices were open to the *zeugitai*, but it is clear that the *thetes* at least enjoyed the right to vote in the assembly (and in the *eliaia*, if the latter was distinct from the assembly, cf.

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[24] Each *medimnos* is equivalent to about 52 liters, or 40 kilograms of wheat.

[25] This is equivalent to about 39 liters.

[26] Both Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 7.4) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 18.1) explain that this fixed measurement applied to both liquid and solid products.

[27] Calculation by Foxhall 1997, 130.

[28] Cf. Foxhall 1997, 130.

[29] Cf. Whitehead 1981. But the equalization of hoplites and *zeugitai* has been recently challenged by van Wees 2001, 47–55 and Schwartz 2009, 141–143.

[30] Cf. Foxhall 1997, 130; van Wees 2001, 47f. See also Rosivach 2002, 37f. For the discrepancy between their name and their elevated economic status, see van Wees 2006, 361–367.

[31] According to van Wees 2006, 376 they formed the 85 % of the population while the three other classes represented the richest 15 % or so.

[32] As Rhodes notes *per litteram* this depends on accepting the view of Foxhall and van Wees. If we reject the authenticity of the qualifications for the classes other than *pentakosiomedimnoi*, then the *thetes* may not have been such a high proportion of the population.

[33] Cf. Foxhall 1997, 131.

[34] The parameters were largely connected to the reality of agrarian society; according to some they originally had a religious character and designated the classes based upon their different duties during public religious festivals.

[35] Rhodes 2006, 253 and n. 38 with further bibliography.

[36] Rhodes 2006, 253 and n. 39 with further bibliography.

below); perhaps the θῆτες had voting rights even before Solon, and in any case neither Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 7.3, *Pol.* 1274a15–21) nor Plutarch (*Sol.* 18.2) ascribes to him the introduction of this right. The immediate impact of these reforms on the management of power can hardly be termed "democratic" (cf. 7 and 8 G.-P.^{2} = 5 and 6 W.^{2}), since the most important public duties were still reserved for just the really wealthiest citizens, the majority of whom were already nobles, the Eupatridai. Nevertheless, Solon's reforms probably marked a turn toward timocracy, although without major disruption to the preceding aristocratic regime, because he granted access to the political power to those with sufficient wealth regardless of land-ownership, thus opening doors to the emerging *nouveaux riches* whose origins lay outside of the landed γένη of the Eupatridai.[37]

Additionally, according to both Plutarch (*Sol.* 19.1) and Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 8.4 and 21.3), Solon set up the βουλή "council" of Four Hundred, which was made up of one hundred members from each of the tribes of Attica and which, according to Plutarch, had the task of preliminarily examining the proposals that were to be discussed in the popular assembly (προβούλευσις). Some modern historians have raised doubts as to whether Solon himself introduced this council, which may have anticipated Cleisthenes' βουλή of Five Hundred;[38] however in recent years confidence in the historicity of the Solonian institution has been the prevailing scholarly position.[39] It is clear that Solon's institution of the *boule*, if it did in fact take place under Solon's legislation, demonstrated

[37] Cf. Foxhall 1997, 129.

[38] Among others, Beloch and De Sanctis, and more recently, Hignett 1952, 92–96 and Sealey 1976, 120f. question the historicity of the Solonian *boule*. The oldest testimony for the existence of this Council may be the institution of the analogous Council of Four Hundred established by the oligarchic constitution of 411 BC. According to Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 31.1), this was introduced in compliance with the tradition of the fathers (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια)—but it may also have been a propagandistic reconstruction on the part of the oligarchs, which was later reinvoked by supporters of the democracy, for whom the council would have been seen as a precursor to the Clisthenic *Boule* of Five Hundred. Two other possible epigraphic attestations are quite uncertain (in *GHI* 14 it is not clear whether or not we should read the word *boule* and the inscription comes from the end of the sixth century; the "popular" *boule* mentioned in a Chian inscription from the first half of the sixth century, *GHI* 8, may have been a parallel to the Athenian one, but again this is only an hypothesis). As to the *boule* that, according to Herod. 5.72 and Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 20.3, opposed Cleomenes I after his ousting of the Alcmaeonid Clisthenes, this may in fact be the Council of the Areopagus, not the *Boule* of Four Hundred.

[39] Cf. e.g. Rhodes 1972, 208f.; De Laix 1973, 13–17. See also ad 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}

a bold reform of the structure of the State's aristocratic constitution, since members of all census classes (except for the *thetes*) were allowed to participate in this Council. Doubts have also been raised about whether Solon introduced the *thetes* in the ἐκκλησία, the popular assembly, which is recorded by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 7.3 and Plut. *Sol.* 18.2. Hignett, e.g., has maintained that the *thetes* would have entered the popular assembly only later, with Clisthenes (cf. also Griffith); but I agree with Rhodes[40] that the Homeric Thersites proves that even the humblest class would never have been excluded from the assembly. Instead of being the first to open the assembly to the *thetes*, Solon may have strengthened this council by giving it a probouleutic capacity independent of the Areopagus and perhaps by permiting it to hold regular meetings.[41] The Areopagus, by contrast, was made up exclusively of ex-archons, and therefore by representatives drawn only from the two highest census classes. In any case, this elite council of ex-archons[42] preserved its role intact until 462, when Ephialtes transferred a large part of the powers of the Areopagus to the Council of Five Hundred: according to Plut. *Sol.* 19.2, Solon thought that "the city with its two councils, riding as it were at double anchor, would be less tossed by the surges, and would keep its populace in greater quiet" (this image of the double anchor was employed, according to some, in one of Solon's iambic poems, and the poetic character of this image makes this hypothesis quite plausible[43]).

In Aristotle's opinion, one of Solon's reforms which had an especially democratic nature ("the one which is said particularly to have contributed to the power of the masses," Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 9.1[44]) was the right to appeal (ἔφεσις) a sentence passed by magistrates in a tribunal; the generic name for this appellate body was the δικαστήριον, or "tribunal" used by both Aristotle loc.cit. and Plut. *Sol.* 18.3 writing on the

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[40] Hignett 1952, 117 n. 23; Griffith 1966, 121; Rhodes 1972, 204–211 and 1993, 140 f., 154.

[41] Cf. also Masaracchia 1958, 164 f.

[42] This was also considered a Solonian institution by some of the ancients, e.g., Plut. *Sol.* 19.3. Nevertheless both Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 3.6, 4.4, 8.2) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 19.4 f.) believed that it pre-dated Solon.

[43] Cf. e.g. Freeman 1926, 79, n. 1 and Wade-Gery 1933, 24 n. 1; for a different view cf. Hignett 1952, 93 and Hansen 1989a, 98 n. 121.

[44] As Andrewes 1982, 389 notes, it is true that the great power with which later Athenian courts of justice were endowed originated in this very institution of *ephesis*. See also Osborne 1985, 41–44.

topic of *ephesis*, but is defined more specifically as ἠλιαία[45] in a text of a νόμος κλοπῆς, which appears to date back to Solon's laws (15b and 23c Ruschenbusch). The term *eliaia* is also found in inscriptions from Doric cities where it has the sense "assembly", and it has been frequently thought that this tribunal was not an autonomous law-court, but rather that it was constituted by a special judicial session of the *ekklesia* as a whole.[46] But *eliaia* does not always have the sense of general assembly of the people (it certainly designates an assembly of the members of a *phratria* in a Delphic inscription), and there is no strong evidence to support its identification with a juridical session of the *ekklesia*.[47] Also, in some contexts the word *ephesis* was used to denote the right to appeal to the *eliaia* against the sentence given by a magistrate[48] when a disputant was not satisfied; the *eliaia* would have then given a second judgment in agreement or disagreement with that handed down by the magistrate[49] (this ability to appeal against the magistrates' decisions was certainly in the background of a legal inscription from Chios, dated 575–550, which may have been imitating Solon's constitution[50]). Alternatively, in other contexts *ephesis* was not a free initiative of the disputant, but a necessary and automatic procedure which was utilized when the sentence of a magistrate exceeded the maximum penalty set by Solon's laws for the crime at hand (in this sense *ephesis* would be the precedent for the procedure which took place in the fourth century, when it is clear that magistrates had the authority to impose fines up to a certain limit and that their sentence was final in most minor cases, but that they had to refer to a court if they wanted to impose higher penalties).[51] In any case, the institution of *ephesis* showed that the relationship between disputant and judge was contractual and that the only authority actively working

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[45] The word should be written with a smooth breathing in Attic, despite its most common spelling: see Wade-Gery 1958, 173 n. 4 and Dover 1968 ad Aristoph. *Nub.* 683.

[46] Cf. Hignett 1952, 97; Rhodes 1972, 168; MacDowell 1978, 30; Ostwald 1986, 10–12.

[47] As tentatively demonstrated by Hansen 1981–1982, 29–39 = 1989b; cf. however Rhodes 1979, 104 (which is more sympathetic in his commentary to *Ath.Pol.*) and Ostwald 1986, 10f. n. 29. However, Hansen 1981–1982 = 1989b keeps the possibility open that Solon's institution of the *eliaia* and public lawsuits were both fourth-century inventions.

[48] Not an appeal against all or most of the Areopagus' sentences: cf. Rhodes 1993, 161; Ostwald 1986, 12–14.

[49] Cf. Wade-Gery 1958, 173; MacDowell 1978, 30–32.

[50] Cf. Ostwald 1969, 161f.

[51] After Wilamowitz 1893, I.60 n. 29, cf. Hignett 1952, 97f.; Ruschenbush 1961, 1965, 1968, 78–82; Harrison 1971, 72–74.

together for the citizen was that of the *polis*, as expressed by the popular law courts.[52] Furthermore, these popular courts clearly had the duty of filling in the many gaps that remained in the Athenian legal system after Solon's legislative operation.[53]

Another initiative taken by Solon to the same end would have been the institution of the εἰσαγγελία. According to Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 8.4 the Areopagus, *inter alia*, "tried those charged with conspiring to dissolve democracy (ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου), under the law of denunciation (εἰσαγγελία) which Solon enacted to deal with them". Certain details of this report, primarily the anachronistic modernism of the expression ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου, which presupposes the equivalence of *demos* and state, and thus the idea that the state is a democracy, have led some scholars, particularly M.H. Hansen,[54] to suggest that the law of denunciation which was granted to the Areopagus dates to Cleisthenes rather than Solon. However, setting aside Aristotle's anachronistic formulation, the "guardianship of the laws" (νομοφυλακεῖν) must have been a power granted to the venerable assembly of the Areopagus even before Solon's reforms, and there is no reasonable basis for doubting that Solon passed a law that was roughly equivalent, although less complex, than those granting the power of "denunciation" to the *eliaia* or the *ekklesia*[55] in the fifth and fourth centuries. One plausible course of action for Solon would have been to extend the ability to initiate a denunciation to all citizens as well as establishing the right "for everyone who wanted (τῶι βουλομένωι) to take legal action on behalf of the injured party" (Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 9.1).[56]

In any case, this very principle was correctly presented by Aristotle, ibid., as one of the three most "democratic" parts of Solon's constitution—the other two being the cessation of loans made against one's own person (for more on this see below), and the right to *ephesis*, which was discussed above. By making it possible not only for the family of the victim but also for everyone to prosecute someone who was believed to have done something wrong (at least for a certain range of serious offences), Solon showed an awareness that wrong-doing was harmful to the community as a whole.[57]

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[52] Cf. Paoli 1976, 218 f.
[53] Cf. Ruschenbush 1957; Ostwald 1986, 5 f.
[54] Cf. Hansen 1975, 17–19.
[55] The most thorough rebuttal of Hansen's skepticism is Rhodes 1979, 103–106.
[56] Cf. Ostwald 1986, 7–9.
[57] Cf. MacDowell 1978, 53 f.

The most important evidence for Solon's socio-economic provisions appears in Solon's own account of his work in fr. 30 G.-P.² = 36 W.² For a long time this text has been read by modern scholars in the wake of the interpretations of Aristotle and Plutarch, for whom Solon's principal socio-economic measures consisted primarily of the cancellation of debts, the abolition of debt-bondage or debt-slavery,[58] and currency devaluation. A schematic outline of the problems which Solon set out to tackle, according to these two authors, (the account of Diog. Laert. 1.45 is much more anecdotal) is as follows.

> Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 2.1–3
> After this there was strife for a long time between the notables and the masses. For the Athenians' constitution was oligarchic in all other respects, and in particular the poor were enslaved to the rich—themselves and their children and their wives. The poor were called dependants (πελάται) and sixth-parters (ἑκτήμοροι) since it was for the rent of a sixth that they worked the fields of the rich. All the land was in the hands of a few, and if the poor failed to pay their rents both they and their children were liable to seizure. All loans were made on the security of the person until the time of Solon: he was the first champion of the people. The harshest and bitterest aspect of the constitution for the masses was the fact of their enslavement, though they were discontended on other grounds too: it could be said that there was nothing in which they had a share. (trans. Rhodes 2002)

> Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 4.5
> As has been stated above, loans were on the security of the person, and the land was in the hands of a few. (trans. Rhodes 2002)

> Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 6.1
> And he made a cancellation of debts (ἀποκοπή), both private and public, which the Athenians call the Shaking-off of Burdens (σεισάχθεια), since by means of it they shook off the weight lying on them. (trans. Rhodes 2002)

[58] There is a difference between outright debt-slavery, where the creditor becomes the owner of the debtor, and debt-bondage, which is the non-permanent status that arises when a debtor pledges his personal services or those of a third person under his control as security for his debt; a loan made upon the security of the body would in principle grant the creditor the right to seize the debtor in case of default, thus making him a permanent slave: cf. Harris 2002. Harris has seen in 30.8–15 G.-P.² = 36.8–15 W.² proof that the Athenians sold abroad as slaves could not be debt slaves, since there is no evidence that debt slavery authorized the creditor/master to sell the debtor outside of Athens (this is an *argumentum ex silentio*, however, and it is based on evidence from the classical age; moreover, it was precisely Solon who may have introduced the rule forbidding Athenian citizens from being treated as real slaves and being sold abroad, and, if so, the practice must have been customary in his age).

Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 9.1
The following seem to be the three most democratic features of Solon's constitution: first and most important, the ban on loans on the security of the person (trans. Rhodes 2002)

Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 12.4
Again, on the cancellation of debts (ἀποκοπή), and on those who were previously slaves and were freed by the Shaking-off of Burdens, he says [Aristotle goes on to cite Solon's frr. 30 and 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 and 37 W.^{2}] (trans. Rhodes 2002)

Plutarch, *Sol.* 13.4f.
All the common people were in debt (ὑπόχρεως) to the rich. For they either tilled their lands for them, paying them a sixth of the increase (whence they were called Hectemorioi and Thetes, θῆτες), or else they pledged their persons for debts and could be seized by their creditors, some becoming slaves at home and others being sold into foreign countries. Many, too, were forced to sell their own children (for there was no law against it), or go into exile, because of the cruelty of the money-lenders.

Plutarch, *Sol.* 15.2f.
[the Athenians' traditional ability to cover up even the ugliness of things with auspicious and kindly terms was used first by Solon] when he called his cancelling of debts a "disburdenment". For the first of his public measures was an enactment that existing debts should be remitted, and that in the future no one should lend money on the person of a borrower. Some writers, however, and Androtion is one of them, affirm that the poor were relieved not by a cancelling of debts, but by a reduction of the interest upon them, and showed their satisfaction by giving the name of "disburdenment" to this act of humanity, and to the augmentation of measures and the purchasing power of money which accompanied it. For he made the mina to consist of a hundred drachmas, which before had contained only seventy-three,[59] so that by paying the same amount of money, but money of a lesser value, those who had debts to discharge were greatly benefited, and those who accepted such payments were no losers. But most writers agree that the "disburdenment" was a removal of all debt, and with such the poems of Solon are more in accord [Plutarch goes on to cite fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, vv. 6f. and 11–14].

Many modern historians have insisted on the potentially distorting influences fourth century Atthidographers may have exerted upon Aristotle in particular, influences that would have led him to view Solon's reforms through the lens of contemporary states of affairs.[60] In particular, the

[59] Rhodes 1993, 164 with n. 16 thinks that 73 in Plutarch's text is an error for 70.

[60] For the notion that the Aristotelian *Constitution* and the *Atthis* of Androtion reflect the political philosophy of post-Periclean Athens, cf. Sealey 1960, 160; Fischer 1973; Huxley 1972; on debt as a serious problem in fourth-century Athens, cf. Mossé 1973.

Attidographer Androtion, as attested by Plut. *Sol.* 15.2 f. quoted above, in *FgrH* 324F34 minimized the importance of Solon's socio-economical reforms, interpreting Solon's *seisachtheia* as merely a reform of currency involving a reduction of the interest charged on debts, τόκων μετριότης, at variance with Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 6.1 quoted above; Philoch. *FgrH* 328F114; Plut. *Sol.* 15.2. Such a discrepancy between two almost contemporary historians, Androtion and Aristotle, could only take place, if already in the fourth century there was no standard account of Solon's economic reforms.[61] The testimonies never clearly ascribe the term *seisachtheia* to Solon[62] and none of the fragments attributable to Solon provides evidence that he ever presented himself as acting on the initiative considered by Aristotle and Plutarch to be key to his reforms. The *seisachtheia* was thought to solve the problem of the *hectemoroi* ("those of one-sixth" is usually interpreted either as "those who pay rent in the form of one-sixth of the land's produce" or, more improbably, "those who keep for themselves one-sixth of its produce"[63]). The technical term *hectemoros* could have existed in Solon's times, but it is not likely to have been used in his poetry. It is more possible that *seisachtheia* is a Solonian word, because of the metaphorical quality of both parts of the compound, ἄχθος "burden"/"toil", and σείειν "shake off", here "get rid of", which could potentially belong to the realm of poetic language (Mülke's[64] rejection of the term seems hypercritical of the linguistic appropriateness). But I agree with Linforth[65] that it is unlikely that Aristotle and Plutarch would have failed to cite the context in which these terms appeared, given that Solon's poems were the principal source for them, as they are for us,[66] and the authors appear to cite Solon's poems whenever possible

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[61] Cf. Day and Chambers 1962, 13 and 76.

[62] This might seem to be the case in Plut. *Alex.fort.* 2.343c–d, but then again the plural καλοῦσιν "they call", which is used by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 6.1, to introduce the term, suggests that it was not found in the texts of Solon himself.

[63] The first sense (cf., e.g., Hesych. *Lex.* ε 1716 Latte) of the word is almost universally accepted; the second is attested by Eustath. ad Hom. *Od.* 19.28 (1854.32 f.), quoting as his source an "anonymus rhetorical lexicon"; discussions of the contractual forms can be found in Rhodes 1993, 90–97; Lotze 1988; Manville 1990, 11–16; Schils 1991; Stanley 1998. Alternatively, Cataudella 1966, 7–23 proposes a practice of breaking debt payments down into installments, and imagines that the *hectemoroi* were people who would have paid off one-sixth of their debt every year with agricultural products.

[64] Mülke 2002, 375 f.

[65] Linforth 1919, 269–271.

[66] Martínez 1995 has recently tried to extract a Solonian trimeter from Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 12.4, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν, by making two emendations which are required by the meter: ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ τὴν σεισαχθίην. However, one must use great

(Aristotle never claims to make use of documentary material, such as official decrees or the texts of laws, on the subject of Solon's reforms—although this fact does not mean, that this sort of material was not at his disposal[67]). In his poetry Solon generally presents and defends his own political paradigm in ideal terms and avoids elaborating in detail upon positions that might provoke a negative reaction;[68] nor does he presesent legislative solutions in technical terms, which would have been confined to the prose text of his laws (cf. Introd. ad °40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2}). Otherwise, the point Solon supports most thoroughly in fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} (cited above)—the abolishment of the slavery for Athenian citizens, despite the fact that the determination of this sort of slavery for debts or other exigencies is left vague by Solon himself (cf. below)—has been correctly considered to be one of the vital and determining aspects of his reforms, in the sense that this initiative gave birth to the strong Athenian ideology about the rights of citizenship. Consequently, it provided the conspicuous lower-middle Athenian social class with a strong motivation to join the rest of the citizenship, and distinguished it from the mass of foreign slaves, to whom, in purely economic terms, they might otherwise have been similar.[69]

Confronted with the scarcity of other information about the political situation that Solon supposedly confronted and resolved, not to mention the danger of any *argumentum ex silentio*, we have no choice but to accept the testimonia provided by Aristotle and Plutarch. But these ancient sources admit of various interpretations from modern scholars and have been subjected to many different readings over the years. At the beginning of the sixties, three principal interpretive threads could be distinguished:[70]

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prudence when reconstructing Solonian verses on the basis of sequences in Aristotle and Plutarch (cf. Introd. ad 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}), and using the Ionicizing suffix of nominal composition -ιη instead of the Attic -εια would fit the language of Solon's elegies more than the linguistic features of his iambic and trochaic fragments (cf. Introd. ad 29–29^b, 30–31 G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 and 36–37 W.^{2}).

[67] Cf. Stroud 1979, who is very optimistic about the survival of early documents and their use by later writers.

[68] Cf. on this last point David 1985.

[69] Cf. e.g. Finley 1982, 116–119, 156–166; Ober 1989, 62 f.; Manville 1990, 132 f.; Raaflaub 2004, 50–53.

[70] Cf. Càssola 1964. The following is a summary of what scholars believed in the past, since few people now believe that large or small land-holdings in Attica were ever inalienable.

1. The theory of inalienable aristocratic ownership of land and hereditary slavery.[71] All land would have been divided between 200 or 300 proprietors who belonged to aristocratic families and whose ownership of the property was inalienable.[72] This land was tilled by farmers, whether slaves or hereditary clients, who depended upon the aristocrats for their livelihood. Later, some of these clients would have become privileged *hectemoroi*, who retained five-sixths of their allotted land's produce for themselves. The right to cultivate this land was granted in exchange for the other one-sixth, which they owed to their patrons—but to signal that the land actually belonged to an Eupatrid, an ὅϱος "boundary stone" was set upon it, and the *hectemoroi* remained at risk of lapsing back into debt-bondage if they ever failed to hand over the agreed fraction of the land's produce. Solon's *seisachtheia* would have consisted in removing the ὅϱοι, signs of aristocratic property, causing land that had first belonged to Eupatridai to become the property of the ex-*hectemoroi*.
2. The theory of alienable small property.[73] Before Solon's time there was a class of small landholders who, over the course of the serious economic crisis at the end of the seventh century,[74] were compelled to borrow money and thus incurred a great deal of debt (e.g. because small properties were divided among many heirs upon the death of the father, their productivity was progressively reduced). As collateral these small landholders would have offered their own persons as well as those of their family members as security (debt-bondage). When no longer capable of paying their debts, they fell to the mercy of their creditors, who could either sell them as slaves or force them to work as dependents on the land they had once owned; *horoi* thus symbolized their status as dependent farmers. Solon's reforms would have prevented these small landowners from incurring debt in the future and offering themselves as a security, and they also would have freed those in debt-bondage at the time. However, as E.M. Harris has recently emphasized, Solon did not abolish

[71] This was originally proposed by Fustel de Coulanges, followed e.g. by Ferrara 1960; Forrest 1966, 147–160; Manville 1990, 107–123; contested in a particularly incisive way by Bourriot 1976, 727 ff.

[72] Inalienable, as Manville 1990, 112 suggests, not because any law dictated, but because various elites wanted to preserve their holding for use of their own family members.

[73] Cf., e.g., Wilamowitz 1893, I.56–59 and De Sanctis 1975, 247–252.

[74] On which cf., e.g., French 1956.

debt-bondage, which continued to be practised in Athens into the classical age, but in all probability he simply prohibited permanent debt-slavery.[75]

3. The theory of inalienable small property.[76] In order to borrow money, small landholders would have mortgaged their land (perhaps with a kind of fictitious sale-resale, the πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει, whereby the debtor retained nominal possession of the property), which gave the creditor full rights to the land's produce over the lifetime of both the debtor and his descendants (if the debtor could not pay off the debt during his own lifetime). Moreover, if the debtor regularly failed to supply the results of his cultivation of the soil, his creditor could sell him into slavery. *Horoi* therefore indicated that the land they stood on was mortgaged. Solon would have abolished debts and liberated the debt slaves, or else he would have made property inalienable, restructuring mortgages so that they were based upon proprietorship of the land itself and not upon the actual person of the debtor.

Thus the majority of modern scholars in the last century have seen in Solon's reforms an alleviation of the widespread debt contracted on actual people, which had come into being as a result of an economic crisis in Attica at the end of the seventh century.

Forms of borrowing involving the possibility of slavery were not impossible in Solon's time. In the Homeric world, slaves were captured in war or were won in targeted raids made by Phoenecian or Taphians.[77] The concept of debt-slavery does not appear to be documented in Homer. However, it might have become more widespread in the seventh century: slaves are mentioned in Draco's laws on homicide which are dated around 620,[78] and Aristotle and Plutarch seem to attest to Solon's elaboration of laws which prohibited people from contracting mortgages upon a person or his family members.[79] Finally, debt-bondage also continued to exist later in Gortyn and elsewhere.[80]

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[75] Harris 2002.

[76] Especially by Woodhouse 1938, 42–66; those holding similar positions include Lewis 1941, 144–150; von Fritz 1940 and 1943; Fine 1951, 167 ff.; Hammond 1961, 83–91.

[77] A survey of literary documents concerning slavery from raids can be found in Harris 2002, 427 f.

[78] Cf. Grace 1973.

[79] Cf. Ruschenbusch 1966, F69a and b.

[80] Cf. e.g. Lintott 1982, 27. It seems, however, that post-Solonian Athens actually represented an exception to this widespread practice: cf. Millett 1991, 78.

In recent decades, however, some historians have begun to argue that the problem of slavery during Solon's time need not be the result of purely economic pressure (debts). First of all, debts may not have been a relevant cause at all in provoking the enslavement of Athenian citizens. Harris[81] and Lewis,[82] e.g., have identified the citizens of fr. 30.8–15 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8–15 W.^{2} as slaves who were seized and sold in the course of raids by powerful aristocrats.[83] Furthermore, in a society with a very marked social stratification, debt-slavery might also have represented the lowest level of dependence on the rich into which a person of a low rank might either fall or find himself a member from birth. In an archaic society, factors such as control over the cultivation of soil and the power of social stratification could be more important than debts and credits.

Therefore, the status of the *hectemoroi* was not necessarily the consequence of debt. Rather, debt incurred between individuals of unequal wealth and power could simply have been the concrete expression of the onerous, semi-"feudal" nature of clientship dependency.[84] In these terms, "enslavement" would be nothing more than the result of the deterioration of voluntary agreements between small farmers and long established powerful patrons.[85] Various suggestions have been proposed to define the possible origins of this voluntary submission. For example, the farmers who worked "communal land", or at least land only nominally owned by the rich during the ninth and eighth centuries, may have paid a part of the soil's produce to those men, who in exchange defended the land from abuses of power by maintaining order and also expanded the area of tillable land.[86] This voluntary submission might deteriorate, e.g., when the rich tried to intensify production for the burgeoning market created by the new wealth of maritime trade, and thus demanded a greater percentage of the farmers'[87] harvest; or when rivalries among aristocratic families intensified, compelling them to use their own resources and estates in a

[81] Harris 2002.

[82] Lewis 2004, 26 f.; 2006, 119.

[83] Cf. ad 30.9–11 G.-P.^{2} = 36.9–11 W.^{2}

[84] Cf. Finley 1982, 156 f. 268 n. 33 (the date of the original French version of Finley's seminal work on debt-slavery, however, is 1965), and more recently Murray 1993, 181–184.

[85] Cf. Andrewes 1982, 378; Gallant 1982, 123 f.; Murray 1993, 190–194.

[86] This was the influential suggestion of Càssola 1964, 49–51. Harris 1997, 107–110 has recently reshaped this interpretation, and proposed that one should consider the tribute by farmers as a mafia-style submission that was made in exchange for protection.

[87] Cf. Andrewes 1982, 377–382; now also Forsdyke 2006, 341–346.

more intensive way and thus to exploit more recklessly the *hectemoroi* or even to plunder public communal resources; at the same time the great new opportunities presented by colonization and trade may have caused the status of the debt bondsmen to seem worse than it actually was, increasing their desire to free themselves.[88] Alternatively, enslavement may have been a form of bondage to the Athenian state: according to Rihll,[89] Athens may have rented plots of public land to individuals, and it is possible that rules concerning the share-cropping contracts between individuals and the state were made measureably harsher by Draco. Since the *hectemoroi* pledged their persons or their dependants' persons to the state (standing as collateral for their exclusive use of "enslaved" public land), as soon as they became indebted they would have been subject to ἀτιμία, exclusion from public affairs (this is an especially conjectural point in Rihll's reconstruction). When the sixth-parters were not able to surrender a portion of their produce as a rent to the state, they either fled abroad or they could legally be sold into slavery. Solon would have passed an amnesty law allowing these citizens to come back to Attica and to regain citizen rights, uprooting the *horoi* and thus giving all the *hectemoroi* the land they happened to be renting at the time.

After all, despite his emphasis on debt-bondage, Aristotle himself concludes his description of the difficult conditions endured by subordinate common Athenians with the phrase: "they were discontented on other grounds too: it could be said that there was nothing in which they had a share" (*Ath.Pol.* 2.3 cited above). In substance Aristotle provides a more general interpretation of the difficult conditions faced by the Athenians and explains that these were worsened by the fact that some of the citizens were exempted by participation (μετέχειν) in wealth, justice, and political management.[90] Nor can it be the case that, when Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 2.1) says "the poor were enslaved to the rich—themselves and their children and their wives", he means that all the poor were concretely reduced to debt slavery: he was either being hyperbolic, or using the verb δουλεύειν in a broad sense to designate a complex range of forms of subordination, not all of which were necessarily material,[91] and forms of permanent humiliation, which were exacerbated from time to time by the

[88] Cf. Raaflaub 2004, 47 f.
[89] Rihll 1991, 116–127.
[90] On the excessive predominance of a single group as a key-motif of social disorder in Aristotle, cf. Cohen 1995, chap. 2; Introd. ad 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, and ad 3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}
[91] Cf. Beringer 1985, 52; Schils 1991, 80.

aristocrats' excesses of *hybris*.[92] Plutarch (*Sol.* 13.4 cit.) also maintained a certain degree of ambiguity in this direction: ὑπόχρεως has the meaning "indebted", as well as the more general "obliged"/"obligated". Finally, neither Aristotle nor Plutarch offers a precise account of which factors would have determined the transformation of the "poor" into the state of being πελάται and ἑκτήμοροι.[93] Aristotle simply says that the *hectemoroi* did not own their own land, and both Aristotle and Plutarch claim that the *hectemoroi* offered their own persons as security when they went into debt. An uncertain perspective therefore emerges from the analyses of Aristotle and Plutarch, which has occasionally caused scholars to think that Aristotle himself used different and contradictory sources in constructing his account of Solon's age and which should lead us to reconsider the importance that is usually accorded to the idea that borrowing and debt caused the crisis which Solon resolved.

Recently, the traditional interpretation of the *horoi* as markers of mortgaged land has also come into question. First of all, the traditional interpretation clashes with both Aristotle's and Plutarch's preliminary remarks that the *hectemoroi* did not own their own land; nor is there any archaeological or linguistic evidence that attests to the existence of mortgage *horoi* before the fourth century.[94] Scholars have now even begun to doubt whether contractual mortgages existed at all during the archaic period. Aristotle and Plutarch may have offered this interpretation of *horoi* in order to connect Solon's removal of the *horoi* with his liberation of enslaved citizens, possibly in the wake of fr. 30.6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 36.6–9 W.^{2}, where these two initiatives seem linked and linkable to what was later called the *seisachtheia*.

It is also clear, however, that fragment 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} in particular makes no explicit mention of debts, and that it is through logical inference that the slavery about which Solon speaks in vv. 8–15 is thought to be debt-slavery or debt-bondage, and that the "enslaved" land of v. 7 is mortgaged land. Even Solon's mention of the "poor" who were sold as slaves abroad in fr. 3.8–15 G.-P.^{2} = 4.8–15 W.^{2} occurs in a context where Solon's criticism of the *hybris* of the rich is once again emphasized; above all these verses constitute a denunciation of the

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92 Cf. in particular Lewis 2004 and 2006, 108–130.

93 As remarked by Link 1991, 16.

94 The first literary attestation of the term used in this sense is Isae. 6.36, with which the first epigraphic attestation is coeval: *IG* II^2 2654. On fourth-century mortgage *horoi*, cf. Fine 1951 and Finley 1982.

consequences of social injustice rather than a detailed reference to contractually defined debt or to Solon's legislative interventions concerning personal slavery.

It is also uncertain whether or not Solon is actually referring to "debts" in fr. 30.11 G.-P.^{2} = 36.11 W.^{2}: while the London papyrus has (ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ) χρειους, the Berlin papyrus reads (ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ) χρεων. If we agree with the theory of debt-bondage or debt-slavery, then we interpret the last word of the Berlin papyrus variant as the genitive plural of χρέος "debt" and ἀναγκαίη as the epic form of the more common noun ἀνάγκη: "because of the necessity/pressure of debts". Nevertheless, the most recent editions of Solon, following the London papyrus, print χρειοῦς with circumflex, i.e. the genitive of χρειώ "necessity", and understand ἀναγκαίη as an adjective = "compulsive/dire": for χρειώ meaning to compel someone to do something unwanted, cf., e.g., already Hom. *Il.* 10.172 μάλα μεγάλη χρειὼ βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς. This second text of the London papyrus is probably correct, since the construction has many parallels: Gentili and Prato, after Campbell 1967, 252, cite χρειοῖ ἀναγκαίηι in Hom. *Il.* 8.57 (in reference to the motivation of the Trojans who are fewer but who want to engage in battle since they have to defend their wives and children; cf. also *Il.* 11.150 φεύγοντας ἀνάγκηι and *Od.* 19.73 ἀναγκαίη γὰρ ἐπείγει, Odysseus' justification for being a beggar), and Ap. Rhod. 3.988 χρειοῖ ἀναγκαίηι (the motivation behind Jason's kneeling and asking Medea for her help).[95] Nor do I see how one can think that here χρειώ = χρέος, as Defradas 1962, 63 does on the basis of χρέος occasionally meaning "need". Thus the notion that the "necessity" of the exiles in Solon's text is really necessity brought about by debt—a notion which many modern historians, and before them Plut. *Sol.* 13.5, seem to take for granted ("many were compelled to run away from the city διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα τῶν δανειστῶν") is certainly possible in light of the text of the London papyrus, but it is only conjectural:[96] any other physical compulsion (hybristic abuses of power by the rich, for instance) or ethical compulsion (such as humiliation caused by the loss of civic rights) would also be plausible—although we might expect the former in light of this word's

[95] For evidence of the idiomatic quality of the expression, see Dion. Hal. *Ant.Rom.* 5.66.3; Gal. *anatom.admin.* 2.522.12 f., 2.590.16, 4.313.3 f.; Opp. *Cyn.* 1.83; Greg. Naz. *de se ipso, PG* 37.974.1; Athanas. *Epist. Cast. PG* 28.888.26; John Chrys. *studio praesent. PG* 63.490.8; Procl. *Hymn.* 7.52.

[96] Cf. Schils 1991, 81.

Homeric usage.[97] As for the variant of the Berlin papyrus, it is possible that a gloss, suggested by the way Aristotle introduces the quotation, has entered into the text in place of the genuine reading.

Regarding the *horoi* which Solon claims to have uprooted in fr. 30.6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 W.^{2}, various modern scholars have sought to replace the traditional interpretation that read these *horoi* as indicators of mortgaged land, connecting them to the problem of debt. According to Càssola[98] the *horoi* mentioned in Solon are boundary stones, as they are in Homer (*Il.* 12.421, 21.403–405, also 22.489; two inscriptions dating from around 500 BC also record the existence of an *horos* of the Athenian agora[99]). Solon himself seems to have meant them in this way in fr. 31.8 f. G.-P.^{2} = 37.9 f. W.^{2}, when he defines himself metaphorically as a "pillar" imposed between two opposing factions: until the seventh century, one part of Attica would have been made up of private allotments of land, and another of land which was public or the property of temples. This "non-private" land, for which Càssola cites evidence dating back to the Mycenaean period (although there is almost no mention of it by the ancient historians), would have been available to all citizens for use as pasture-land, while the arable land may have been divided into small temporary partitions entrusted to the individual citizens who cultivated it. But sometime before Solon's legislation, the rich had managed to acquire ownership of some of these public lands (a fact which, according to Càssola explains fr. 3.11–13 G.-P.^{2} = 4.11–13 W.^{2}), and had erected *horoi* in them to demonstrate this ownership. The poor, whose livelihood depended upon cultivation of the public lands that had been entrusted to them in earlier times, would have found themselves unexpectedly working for the rich essentially as hired hands (cf. λατρεύειν of fr. 1.47 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.47 f. W.^{2}). If those poor laborers happened to sink into destitution, they were forced to borrow money from the rich, offering themselves as collateral and entering into slavery if they failed to pay off their debts.[100]

Other hypotheses, which are rooted in similar skepticism about the traditional interpretation of *horoi* as "mortgage markers" have arrived at different conclusions, and although none of these new approaches has yet met with broad acceptance, the common difficulty that scholars have had

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97 Cf. Schreckenberg 1964, 61–65.

98 Cf. Càssola 1964, 42 ff. and 1973.

99 Thomson and Wycherley 1972, 117–119.

100 For the most part Link 1991, 19–25, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993, and van Wees 1998a, 17–23 and 2006, 378–381 seem to be in tune with Càssola's interpretation.

with Aristotle's and Plutarch's interpretation is apparent in each of them. For example, it has been suggested that the *horoi* were boundary-markers on land that belonged to small landholders; the rich would have swallowed up this land by removing the *horoi*, which Solon himself then "re-raised" in order to restore the original small properties.[101] More recently, the rather tenuous conjecture has been proposed that the illegal *horoi* removed by Solon did not stand upon Attic land, but rather that these were the boundary markers standing on the territory in the area of Eleusis which had belonged to Megara, and which Solon had conquered.[102] Much more plausibly, it has been suggested that the *horoi* were boundary-markers on land reserved for the Eupatridai, and that the removal of these boundary-stones would have signaled the liberation of the land they had delimited, and thus the elimination of a symbol of division between rich and poor.[103] Similarly, Harris[104] has suggested that the *horoi* of fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} are merely a metaphorical image symbolizing the ideal "boundaries" between the opposing classes of rich and poor, and that they are meant to be seen as agents of *stasis*: with the *seisachtheia* Solon would have stopped the payment of money to local lords for protection, thus checking these *horoi* once for all.[105] Developing Harris' approach, Gallo[106] also supposed that the *horoi* were metaphorical, but he argued that they referred to the unalterable ties of the *hectemoroi* to their land, whom he suggests to see as a sort of "rural slaves" analogous e.g. to the Helots of Sparta: thus the *horoi* checked by Solon would have been the hereditary ties that these *hectemoroi* had to the land.

From the great variety of historical interpretations concerning the reforms that were connected to the uprooting of the *horoi*, we can at least arrive at a safe conclusion: in both fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} (retrospectively) and others poems (especially the programmatic fr. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}), we are lacking explicit references to Solon's economic initiatives. It thus

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[101] So Cataudella 1966, 76–83. But ἀναιρεῖν = "to (re-)raise", although not impossible, is a very rare meaning of the word, whereas the meaning "to eliminate" is extremely common; furthermore, Solon says that the *horoi* were "embedded" in the earth, not lying on it (cf. Will 1969, 110–112).

[102] Cf. van Effenterre 1977 (see especially p. 103), followed and elaborated by L'Homme-Wéry 1996 and 2000, 23–28; there is a brief but effective criticism of the conjecture in Mülke 2002, 378 f.

[103] Cf. Ober 1995, 100–105 and 2006, 448–453; for the symbolic value, see also Blaise 1995, 31 f.

[104] Harris 1997, 103–107.

[105] Some criticism of this hypothesis can be found in Ober 2006, 446 n. 7.

[106] Gallo 1999.

is possible to assert that the practical details of economic reform do not appear to have been of great interest to Solon. It was much more important for Solon to present himself as the resolver of a *social* crisis that had arisen from the *hybris* of the rich, during a time when the poor suffered severe subjugation; we have no evidence that Solon had any desire to solve, whether through debt-cancellation or reduction, an economic crisis that itself determined the widespread indebtedness of the poor.

The intense attention that Solon directed towards social, rather than economic, concerns is also reflected in his set of regulations concerning public and private behavior.[107] By contrast with the paucity of evidence regarding the economic sphere, Solon's social prescriptions appear to have been exceptionally detailed: e.g. slaves were not allowed to exercise in the palestras or practice pederasty; a widow had to seek out a new husband from among the relatives of her deceased husband; a wife could not bring more than a certain number of garments as her dowry; the husband of an ἐπίκληρος ("heiress") had to have intercourse with her at least three times a month; no one was allowed to speak ill of the dead, nor even of the living when near public or religious buildings; sons were compelled to support their elderly fathers on the condition that their fathers had educated them in a trade; in wills one did not necessarily have to leave one's possessions to family members, but one could bequeath them to friends provided that certain coercive measures or witches had not interfered with the dying man's final wishes; at funerals it was illegal for women to tear their clothing or beat their breast, and it was not permitted to mourn a foreigner (which impeded the use of hired mourners: cf. at fr. 27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2}), etc.

Nowadays the minutiae of these prescriptions seem exceedingly fussy: it has been said, for example, that if Solon really did enact all of these regulations, the Attica of his time might have turned into "a Greek version of George Orwell's *1984*".[108] Certainly some of these laws seem to be later hyper-primitivistic inventions (although it is best not to underestimate the lack of coherence and, in truth, the primitive nature of the conventions of the oral laws which Solon set down in writing). But in any case, the original motivation, which we can assume lies beneath this mass of legislation, shows beyond any doubt that Solon devoted serious efforts to the regulation of both public and private behavior.

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[107] As has been shown well by Samuel 1963.

[108] So Robb 1994, 128.

Finally, the social impact of the *seisachtheia* initiative is obvious. We do not know whether the term itself goes back to Solon, and its meaning is anything but consistent among the various testimonia: some understand it to be a reduction of the interest charged on debts, τόκων μετριότης (at least Androt. *Atthis*, *FgrH* 324F34, and Plut. *Sol.* 15.3 quoted above), others as the total cancellation of debts χρεῶν ἀποκοπή (so e.g. *Ath.Pol.* 6.1; Philoch. *FgrH* 328F114; Plut. *Sol.* 15.2 quoted above).[109]

Less obvious is the social significance of Solon's reform of the monetary system, which both Aristotle and Plutarch, as well as Androtion, present in connection with the *seisachtheia*. This reform would have consisted in an "increase" ((ἐπ)αύξησις) in the system of measures,[110] whereby the μνᾶ, which was previously equivalent to 70/73 drachmas conforming with the "Pheidonian" system (itself said to date back to Pheidon, the semi-mythical legislator of Argos, and usually thought to be the same as the Aeginetan system), became equivalent to 100 lighter drachmas as Plutarch implies (and Androtion's interpretation presupposes; *Ath.Pol.* implies that the drachma remained constant and the mina became heavier). The "increase" of the mina from 70/73 to 100 drachmas may have been brought about by an effective increase of the mina while the drachma remained unchanged, or, as seems more likely, by the devaluation of the drachma (from the Aeginetan measure of about 6.2 grams to the Euboean measure of about 4.3 grams) while the mina remaining unchanged (another evidence of Solon's anti-Aeginetan bias?[111]). Androtion's explanation of the relationship between the two initiatives is very deterministic, essentially reducing the first to a consequence of the second by arguing that Solon's reform of the system of measures made it such that debtors witnessed their debt decrease by about 30 %, without causing harm to their creditors—though how this might have actually worked, not to mention how creditors might have tolerated seeing a reduction in the purchasing power of the capital repaid to them by their debtors, is difficult to say.

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109 For a more detailed summary, cf. Asheri 1969, 12 and Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 186 ff.

110 Cataudella 1966, 131–175 is alone in the claim that ἐπαύξησις should be understood as "proliferation", that is as the introduction into the Athenian economic system of other weights of the *drachma* besides the Phidonian one first in use, i.e. of the Aeginetan and future Attic drachma.

111 Cf. Figueira 1993, 60–86.

Much more significantly, it is now thought that currency was not yet minted at Athens during Solon's time, but that it first appeared in Aegina around 580/560 BC, and only came to Athens at some point in the middle of the sixth century.[112] While we cannot rule out entirely the possibility that coinage may have already been in use by Solon's time (it appears that electrum coins were in circulation in Lydia by the second half of the seventh century[113]), both archaeological evidence and numismatic history lead us to believe otherwise. If, however, uncoined silver was already circulating in Athens as an exchange-good, Solon may have altered the system of measures according to which this silver was valued.[114] Androtion's interpretation, by contrast, was formulated from a fourth-century perspective, according to which debt-cancellation was already widely considered to be a radical democratic move. His error would have been facilitated in part by the equivalent nomenclature of pre-monetary units of measure and subsequent Athenian currency (the mina and the drachma).[115]

Thus not only is Androtion's explanation anachronistic, but some scholars have even asserted that the entire account of Solon's reforms of measures/currency is an aetiological invention of the fourth century intended to explain the difference between Attic and Aeginetan *mnai*.[116] If we decline to partake of such complete skepticism,[117] we might consider that Androtion at least hit the mark in linking the two initiatives, as Aristotle (*Ath.Pol.* 10) does when he presents them both as "social/popular initiatives" (δημοτικά) of Solonian legislation. Likewise, according to various modern historians, the reform of measures and their adjustment to a standard would have served to stimulate the commercial activity of the middle class (which at that time was more widespread in the Euboean and Corinthian commercial centers than in Athens), or at least that price controls would have served to resolve a difficult social situation at a moment when the stalemate in the war with Megara for

[112] Cf. e.g. Wallace 1962.
[113] Cf. Kagan 1982 and Parise 2000, 41–67.
[114] Cf. Andrewes 1982, 379 and 382–384.
[115] Cf., e.g., Asheri 1969, 12 and 98–104 and Rhodes 1993, 165–169.
[116] Cf. Crawford 1972.
[117] As Rhodes 1993, 168 suggests doing. Rhodes 2006, 256 notes that Solon was already credited with measures and weights in 403 BC, and it is likely enough that his economic legislation did include some provision for standard measures and weights.

Salamis did not allow for commercial expansion.[118] Finally, it may even have resulted in an indirect diminution of the measures of capacity by which citizens' membership in census classes was calculated, thereby providing more Athenians with the opportunity to assume public office.[119]

118 Cf. French 1957.
119 As suggested by Creatini 1984.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOLON'S SONGS, OUR SOLONIAN POEMS, AND THE *THEOGNIDEA*

This chapter focuses first on the question of the transmission of the poems and to a lesser degree on the question of Solon's first-person poetic *persona*. A second part then examines the diverse distichs and poems that appear in the *Theognidea* and whose attribution to named authors cast doubts on the oftern assumed priority of the *Theognidea*. The chapter is thus concerned with the question of the so-called "doublets" ("Solonian" and "non-Solonian" doublets), though not with the kind of conceptual borrowing by which Theognis reformulates ideas found in the "Solonian" ideological system of the *meson* or 'middle'[1] (e.g. *koros* in ll. 693 f. or 605 f.; the excesses of *koros* and of *hybris* in ll. 39–59, 541 f., 603 f., 1103 f., where the reuser of such poetry proclaims himself a champion of the *meson* through his re-purposing of this/these tradition(s) in the *Theognidea*).

1. *The Background: Recent Contributions on the Transmission of Solon*

The transmission of Solon has received little scholarly attention since Linforth's cursory remarks in 1919, which focus mainly on Solon's iambic and trochaic verses. Linforth took a traditionalist view that "the poems must have come down through the years substantially in the form in which they were originally composed, and they were a clear and intelligible voice out of the past";[2] he thus concluded that "it seems almost necessary to believe that Solon's poems were recorded in writing by himself. Many of them, being occasional and in the nature of apologies for his own acts, would hardly have survived in the popular memory alone. Dissatisfied as they were with the results of Solon's reforms, the Athenians

[1] On the idea of the middle in the *Theognidea* see, for instance, Levine 1985, 180–184.
[2] Linforth 1919, 4.

would not naturally have committed to memory, or encouraged their rhapsodists to commit to memory, the poems which Solon wrote in his defense".[3]

After almost a century of scant interest, two recent appraisals of the problem have called into question Linforth's confident assessment, drawing similarly sceptical conclusions, though from different perspectives. Lardinois[4] has argued that there are good reasons to doubt the authenticity of at least part of the collection of fragments preserved under Solon's name. He contends that older elegiacs were adapted and inserted in Solon's poetry and that, just as many traditional Greek sayings came to be ascribed to him, poems of other (later or lesser-known) authors were attributed to Solon, although he himself composed only some of these poems and few, if any, of these sayings.[5] In this, the early history of Solon's work would resemble that of Homer or, within the genre of elegy, Tyrtaeus, Simonides and Theognis,[6] all examples of authoritative authors to whom works of later/lesser poets were assigned. Solon's elegies would have been transmitted in primarily orally contexts through the fourth century BC, either in sympotic performances or recitations at the Apatouria by young Athenian boys.[7] These boys learned his elegies by heart, which would lead to slight variations whenever they reperformed them at symposia or taught them in turn to their sons. Even if Solon's poems were written down as early as the sixth or fifth century, they would still have continued to change and to develop. As a result, each of these early recorded texts of Solon would differ more or less significantly from the others. The variations that we find in early citations of Solon's poems arise from the authors' differing memories of the poems or their relience on different written records of Solon's poetry. In sum, Solon's elegies, as oral poems, would have changed their identity in every performance including the wholesale incorporation of poems from

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[3] Linforth 1919, 9 f.

[4] Lardinois 2006.

[5] Lardinois 2006, 16. On our very meager evidence of Athenian poetry before Thespis, see Herington 1985, 81 f.

[6] In the case of Simonides we have a part of the corpus which had been infiltrated by alien material: On the question of the authenticity of the Simonidean epigrams see Molyneux 1992; in the case of Tyrtaeus there is no reason to suppose large scale misattribution. 'Theognis' is an unusual case and will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

[7] For the performance of elegy at festivals see Nagy 2010, who argues that elegiac poetry could have been performed at festivals like the Panathenaia.

various other sources: our text of Solon's elegies is therefore not a record of the poetry composed by the historical Solon in the early sixth century.

Stehle also offers a similar verdict in her study of the poems' transmission.[8] She argues that the *persona* of the poet is too abstract, repetitive, detached, and isolated to be a true reflection of how the real Solon responded to specific and shifting situations in a period of turmoil. Further, Stehle contends, the poems do not appear to fit comfortably into a sixth century performance context. As she explains, the *persona* of the political poems is a specialized representation of Solon presented by a limited number of sources (mainly *Athenaion Politeia*, Demosthenes 19, Plutarch, then Diogenes Laertius and Diodorus) while the other poems preserved under Solon's name do not contribute anything of significance or touch on the themes of the political poems. Stehle thus focuses her study on the political poems (3–9, 12, 14, 15 and °40, 29–31 G.-P.^{2} = 4–11 and 31–37 W.^{2}), which she considers pseudo-epigraphic[9] and sees the collection and the *persona* it creates as the product of a time when intellectual and political speakers were busy creating documents to illustrate the past.[10]

From a distance of ninety years which have revolutionized our understanding of the performance and transmission of archaic Greek poetry, Linforth's view is tendentious and need not detain us here. Lardinois' and Stehle's more recent assessments of the integrity and authenticity of the Solonian corpus pose more significant points for discussion, since, though in some respects speculative, they are based on the evidence of the text itself and its probable performative context(s).

In particular it is certainly right to draw attention to the mobility of proverbial sayings and their capacity to attach themselves to Solon.[11] But it is dangerous to generalize on the basis of such non-specific formulations. The attribution of generic sayings to one or more than one person is a different phenomenon from the attribution of verses with specific reference to the political situation of late sixth-century Athens. In fact, Solon's elegies contain fewer of the generic statements which could have

[8] Stehle 2006, 102.

[9] Stehle 2006, 109. See also the concessions she makes on p. 110.

[10] Stehle 2006, 110.

[11] On Solon and proverbs in the poems see also in the comm. ad 25 and 35 G.-P.^{2} = 29 and 32 W.^{2}

most easily been ascribed to Solon (or to almost every other wisdom figure). Of Solon's elegies, fragments 2–3 G.-P.^{2} = 1–4 W.^{2}, including 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} and 22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2}, are specifically addressed to an Athenian audience; among the iambic fragments also frr. 29a.1 and 6 G.-P.^{2} = 33.1 and 6 W.^{2}; 30.8 and 10 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8 and 10 W.^{2} have references to the names Solon, Athens, and Attic.[12] Together with Rhodes and Blaise,[13] I think it is more probable that the poems which address a particular and specific situation in Athens were by Solon than that they were pseudo-epigraphic compositions by some later writer adopting the *persona* of Solon, as Stehle suggests.[14] We cannot rule out, of course, the possibility that some non-Solonian poetry found its way into the poetry of Solon (this seems, indeed, to be the case of fr. 40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2} which, however, was also signaled by the ancients as dubious, and reveals quite patent signs of inauthenticity).[15] But we have no evidence to suppose large-scale misattribution, since the poems preserved under Solon's name are not vexed by the same problems of origin we find in the case of the corpus of 'Theognis'. In other words, there is nothing to indicate that Solon is only one poet among many represented in his corpus. Within the *Theognidea* we find sequences of two or three songs on the same topic connected in various ways so that each new statement cleary reflects on the preceeding one (the so-called "catene simposiali" or sympotic agonistic poems).[16] These variations on a theme have the appearance of successive (sympotic) interventions by different anonymous poets in an inherited tradition, rather than with the coherent work of a single poet.[17] However, there is no analogous sequential patterning that would lead us to believe that the whole corpus of Solon or even a large amount of his poetry is likewise composed by subsequent nameless poets. In this sense it is rightly noted[18] that we do have a coherent, persuasive self-presentation of Solon in the poems.[19] It is of course entirely plausible that in the archaic and early classical periods Solon's poetry circulated in oral form through iterated performance. It is also possible (if unprovable) that

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[12] See also below about the iambic fragments and their *persona*.

[13] Cf. Rhodes 2006, n. 28 and Blaise 2006, n. 48; Stehle 2006.

[14] Stehle 2006 for the political poems preserved under Solon's name.

[15] See further in the comm. ad loc.

[16] On the sympotic chains see Reitzenstein 1893; Vetta 1984; 2000; Colesanti 2001.

[17] Cf. also Collins 2004, 115.

[18] As Stehle 2006, 80 remarks, though she considers this the result of a fabrication.

[19] On the considerable consistency with which archaic lyric *personae* are generally characterized, see also Morrison 2007, 61–67.

some if not much of Solon's poetry was actually composed orally, that is, that elegiac and lyric poetry often began as a kind of autoschediastic or semi-autoschediastic composition in the context of a *symposion* before being refined.

At this point it becomes necessary to examine more closely the notion of orality and the manuscript readings of Solon's poetry that would reflect this performance tradition. As Gentili[20] and Nagy[21] have argued, there is a genuine distinction between variant manuscript readings stemming from errors or deliberate changes in the process of writing copies of previous manuscripts on the one hand and, on the other, variant manuscript readings reflecting a performance tradition that is still alive in a given culture. It is important to recognize that these two kinds of changeability represent two different phenomena.[22] The former category is known to include all sorts of emendations, interpolations, corrections, omissions, alternative wordings, scribal errors, and other inaccuracies characteristic of manuscript transmission. To the latter category belong variations, contractions, and expansions that orally-delivered poetry undergoes over time in the process of re-composition during performance. In an extempore oral narrative tradition of the sort hypothesized for Homeric epic, the text is constantly recreated in performance and the concept of a definitive version does not exist. If we apply this model to Solon, the text as we have it would be only one of the numerous variants and different versions of Solon's poems that circulated in archaic Greece.[23]

But there are many reasons why the text of Homer is not a good parallel for that of Solon. First of all, the performance occasion of the two poets' work differs significantly: if we agree that the most probable primary location of performance of Solon's poetry (including the 'political' poems) is the symposium,[24] his restricted, homogeneous audience

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[20] Gentili 1988, appendix I.

[21] Nagy 1996, 10.

[22] See on this also Finkelberg 2000, 4.

[23] Lardinois 2006 thus proposes that, when dealing with elegiac fragments, scholars should not resort to the tools of textual criticism commonly used in evaluating literary works: the variations between the elegies of Solon and the *Theognidea*, and in the citations of Solon's elegies by different testimonies could represent distinct variations of orally transmitted poems which should not allow us to conflate these divergences into one composite form (what classical scholars would judge to be the better text) but the elegiac fragments should be printed with all their variations.

[24] Bowie 1986 makes a very strong case for a sympotic origin for all but extended narrative elegy; see also Bowie 1990 on martial elegy. Differently West 1974, 10–14; Fowler 1987, 102 f. Nagy 2010 for performance at festivals like the Panathenaia.

would have been quite different from the broad audience of rhapsodes at festivals. Secondly, the textual variation[25] of Solon's text exhibits important differences from the two Homeric epics, both of which tell a continouous narrative. Narrative is well suited to oral re-composition, because a narrative poem possesses an intrinsic structure of cause and effect. As Minchin[26] points out "because narrative is connected discourse—a song path (cf. *Od.* 8.481)—its sequence of cause and effect leads itself to memorization and recall ... A storyteller may collapse or expand event sequences, omit details, or incorporate a new episode. He may make any or all of these changes, intentionally or unintentionally, but as long as he leaves undisturbed the song-path which is at the heart of the narrative, his listeners will recognize it as the same story". It follows then that an oral epic song, a coherent narrative with its sequence of cause and effect, cannot be a good parallel for elegy (except when elegiac poetry engages in narratives about the *ktisis* of a city). Furthermore, when elegiac poets do re-purpose and revise the work of other poets, the text is far more stable than the epic analogy would suggest; when discussing elegy, I think that is more appropriate to speak of a memory that reproduces with, minor variations, a fixed poem regardless of the form in which that poem was encountered than to call this creative memory or an art of composition that reinvents the tradition. In other words, we have to distinguish between what is possible in principle and what best describes the actual instances of which we know. Solon's fragments 7.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 5.1 f. W.^{2} (preserved by Aristotle and Plutarch), 15.1–4 G.-P.^{2} = 11.1–4 W.^{2} (preserved by Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius) and 22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2} (preserved by Aristotle, Plutarch, and Proclus) have been taken as examples of variations which may reflect distinct versions of the same poem.[27] Comparison has been made to a passage from the *Theognidea* (1a, b below) and a Homeric epigram preserved in the so-called *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* and in the *Vita Homeri Herodotea* (2a, b below) which represent different versions of the same lines within

[25] It is of course true that what will be claimed for the variants in Solon is also true for many Homeric variants which are of little moment. But in Homer many other variants are also extended and substantial and this does not seem to be the case with Solon. On the formulaic expressions in archaic elegy see Giannini 1973.

[26] Minchin 1996, 6 f.; Minchin 1999 on the difference between narration and description. See also Lord 1985, esp. p. 53. Giordano-Zecharya 2003, 81 asserts that in ethical-political elegy we have "*memoria rerum* in modo e per motivi analoghi alla memoria epica".

[27] Lardinois 2006, 23. Stehle 2006 is not concerned with the question of textual variants.

the same manuscript tradition and within two different manuscript traditions, respectively. Both latter passages provide examples of one or more lines offered as alternative(s) to other lines, and the difference between the two versions is always pretty clear: e.g., in the examples (1a) and (1b) from the *Theognidea* the variation of the pentameter (v. 40) shows "enough freedom of variation to include a diametrically opposed sentiment"[28] as well as an effort to retain close correspondence in the structure of the two pentameters.

(1a) Theogn. Version A 39–42
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκηι ἄνδρα
  εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης.
ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἵδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δέ
  τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.

(1b) Theogn. Version B 1081–1082b
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκηι ἄνδρα
  ὑβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ἡγεμόνα στάσιος·
ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἵδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δέ
  τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.

Similarly, in 2a–2b the statements are also quite different; each is a plausible answer to the question about what is the more majestic thing, but the changes lead to important divergences in meaning:

(2a) Version A (from the *Vita Herodotea* 425–429):
ἀνδρὸς μὲν στέφανος παῖδες, πύργοι δὲ πόληος,
ἵπποι δ' ἐν πεδίωι κόσμος, νῆες δὲ θαλάσσης,
χρήματα δ' αὔξει οἶκον· ἀτὰρ γεραροὶ βασιλῆες
ἥμενοι εἰν ἀγορῆι κόσμος τ' ἄλλοισιν ὁρᾶσθαι.
αἰθομένου δὲ πυρὸς γεραρώτερος οἶκος ἰδέσθαι.

(2b) Version B (from the *Certamen* 281–285):
ἀνδρὸς μὲν στέφανοι παῖδες, πύργοι δὲ πόληος,
ἵπποι δ' αὖ πεδίου κόσμος, νῆες δὲ θαλάσσης,
λαὸς δ' εἰν ἀγορῇσι καθήμενος εἰσοράασθαι.
αἰθομένου δὲ πυρὸς γεραρώτερος οἶκος ἰδέσθαι
ἤματι χειμερίωι ὁπότ' ἂν νείφῃσι Κρονίων.

To these examples of lines built as alternative(s) to other lines we could add the doublets from the *Hymn to Apollo* (vv. 146–150) reported by Thucydides 3.104 (3a, b):[29]

[28] As Collins 2004, 119 puts it.
[29] On the variants of ll. 146–150 as well as of ll. 73–82 and 136–138 see most recently Sbardella 1999.

(3a) *Hymn to Apollo*
ἀλλὰ σὺ Δήλωι Φοῖβε μάλιστ' ἐπιτέρπεαι ἦτορ,
ἔνθα τοι ἑλκεχίτωνες Ἰάονες ἠγερέθονται
αὐτοῖς σὺν παίδεσσι καὶ αἰδοίηις ἀλόχοισιν.
οἱ δέ σε πυγμαχίηι τε καὶ ὀρχηθμῶι καὶ ἀοιδῆι
μνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν ὅταν στήσωνται ἀγῶνα.

(3b) Thucydides
ἀλλ' ὅτε Δήλωι, Φοῖβε, μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφθης,
ἔνθα τοι ἑλκεχίτωνες Ἰάονες ἠγερέθονται
σὺν σφοῖσιν τεκέεσσι γυναιξί τε σὴν ἐς ἀγυιάν·
ἔνθα σε πυγμαχίηι τε καὶ ὀρχηστυῖ καὶ ἀοιδῆι
μνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἀγῶνα.

These examples too provide alternative readings involving different but equally admissible sentiments, which can hinder an attempt to construct a critical edition in terms of a fully accomplished written text. In such cases, in fact, we cannot resort to the tools commonly used in evaluating literary works; in other words, we cannot judge what is the better (correct) text in sense and grammar.[30] Variants like κράτος in the case of 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2} cited by Plutarch (in the place of γέρας by Aristotle) or πυρρότριχι of 22 G.-P.^{2} = 22a W.^{2} cited by Aristotle (instead of ξανθότριχι by Proclus), produce texts that are at least *to some degree* different; the variants, however, are not demonstrably authentic, because they may have been introduced selectively by Plutarch and Aristotle (that is, they are not distinct from the respective readings of Aristotle and Proclus).[31]

It is not only possible but probable that Greek audience(s) in the archaic and classical period primarily encountered lyric, elegiac and iambic poetry through performance, and that the dissemination of small scale archaic poetry was predominantly if not exclusively oral.[32] However, interpretative problems commence when we conclude that this was the exclusive mode of preservation. For this assumption fails to explain, for instance, why we have texts of poets such as Solon or Alcaeus, whereas we have lost the vast majority of popular poetry. It would seem that folk poetry belonged to a category of texts that did not enjoy any kind of protection and as a consequence largely disappeared, because the various Greek communities did not have any interest in preserving it (sympotic

[30] Gentili 1988, Appendix I has defined such alternative readings as *adiaphoroi* because they do not compromise the formal correctness of poetic diction within the specific text.

[31] Compare for instance the variations Lardinois 2006, 22 cites for the nursery rhyme *A Little Cock Sparrow*.

[32] It has been suggested for Alcaeus by Rösler 1980, 77–91; MacLachlan 1997, 139 f.

songs which were not reused by the community continually).[33] The survival to the Hellenistic period of corpora on the scale of the major archaic lyric, elegiac and iambic poets is easier to understand if a written text existed, either held by the family, perhaps reflecting in turn an interest on behalf of the *polis* in its preservation, or by some other concerned party (we also hear of copies of poems reserved in sanctuaries[34] and we can assume, but not prove, that the γένη of the various poets possessed a copy[35]). Although no one can avoid the assumption that Sappho, Alcaeus, Solon were diffused in oral form[36] up to the mid to late fifth century (significantly, no book market seems to have emerged by this point[37]), this was not necessarily the only form in which these works existed. Moreover, although it is conceivable that archaic poetry circulated in oral form before it was committed to writing, the view that the oral "text" *always* precedes and is the origin of the written text is likely to be wrong in the case of the major archaic, elegiac and iambic poets. In the context of the symposium we have evidence that precisely worded compositions could accompany oral poetic improvisation.[38] In the archaic age it was quite possible to conceive of a song as a text at least in the sense of being a fixed structure of words, as Solon himself makes clear in fr. 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} when he asks Mimnermus for the *metapoiesis* of a single word of his poetry.[39] The fixity of such "texts" does not exclude some degree of ongoing recomposition in each elegiac performance.[40] But the hypothesis of a highly fluid text for Solon within continuing civic performance[41] creates problems. If we are to believe in an ongoing re-composition of

[33] Cf. Rossi 2000, 170–173 who adds other categories of texts not preserved.

[34] See Herington 1985, 45 f.; Cerri 1991.

[35] See Herington 1985, 46.

[36] On one aspect of the process of diffusion of Sappho and Alcaeus see Nagy 2007, who argues that the songs of Sappho and Alcaeus became citharodic concert pieces in, e.g., the court of Polycrates in Samos and, later, at the festivals and symposia of the Athenians.

[37] Giordano-Zecharya 2003, 78 f. adds the fact that writing is not attested either in the performance or the enjoyment of lyric poetry, nor for its verbatim memorization.

[38] See Vetta 1984, 124–126.

[39] Ford 2002, 154 who also cites Plato, *Prot.* 339a–347a with the long portions of Simonidean ode which are then analysed with close attention to verbal detail. For sympotic practices involving challenges of textual quotation, we could also quote Athenaeus 10.458a–d, who describes the recitation of Homeric hexameters or trimeters that start and end on the same letter of the alphabet (*alpha, epsilon, eta, iota, sigma, omega*).

[40] See the specifications by Nagy 1996, 40.

[41] On re-performances in fifth century Athens see also Herington 1985, 49 f. Nagy 1990b offers an extended critique and argues for a more sophisticated way of understanding fluidity vs. fixity in performance traditions.

the poems of Solon,[42] it becomes hard to understand which version(s) the Athenian boys in the fifth century could have sung[43] at the Apatouria festival,[44] as mentioned by Plato, *Tim.* 21.b.6 f. (τὰ Σόλωνος πολλοὶ τῶν παίδων ᾔισαμεν).[45]

As for Solon's iambic and trochaic verses it is well to remember that simply we do not know whether and when iambic poetry allowed for the narration of personal experience or operated with fictive *personae*.[46] West's[47] claims about the iambic "mask" (especially with regard to the figure of Lycambes in Archilochus) may well apply to Solon as well, i.e. the speaker of the iambics is not the real Solon projecting himself into his poetry, but a fictional *persona* made up by later poets seeking to conjure up the image of the ideal reformer and to thereby criticize in this way their own times.[48] Whether or not Lycambes was just a mask (and the hypothesis has in fact been contested[49]), some evidence is needed before we turn a genuine, verifiable *historical* figure into a wholly fictional, generic one. After all Solon's iambic and trochaic verses show fewer variations than his elegies and would therefore seem to represent a more stable collection of poetry[50] (though this may stem from the fact that

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42 Lardinois 2006, 19 f.

43 On the singing of early elegy see, e.g., Herington 1985, 31–36 and 192 f.; Bowie 1986, 14 and n. 7.

44 Lambert 1998, 152–178. The Apatouria, was the festival on the third day of which (Κουρεῶτις) the Athenian fathers introduced their sons to the phratry and enrolled them in its ranks.

45 I understand the adjective νέα as referring to the poems' introduction to the festival. Differently Stehle 2006, 103 f. Outside these performative contexts, other occasions seem to have demanded that performers learn poems verbatim: the singing of a paean by a whole encamped army, for instance, in Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.4. See Pelliccia 2003.

46 Lardinois 2006, 25–28.

47 West 1974, 22–39.

48 Lardinois 2006, 27 f.

49 Carey 1986. See also Brown 1997, 40 f.

50 An exception, however, seems to take place in fr. 31.6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 37.6–9 W.^{2} οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ' ἐπαύσατο, / πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα. / ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίωι / ὅρος κατέστην, which has been read (by Lardinois 2006, 25; similarly Wilamowitz 1893, II.310: see Introd. ad 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W) as an alternative ending to fr. 30.22–27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.22–27 W.^{2} οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον / ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥνδανεν τότε, / αὖτις δ' ἃ τοῖσιν οὔτεροι φρασαίατο, / πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ' ἐχηρώθη πόλις. / τῶν οὕνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος / ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος: in fourth century Athens two or more versions of fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} may therefore have been supposed to exist, with different endings. But the plural τούτων of 31.8 G.-P.^{2} = 37.8 W.^{2} is difficult to explain as belonging to the end of 30.22–27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.22–27 W.^{2}, since the fragment centers on the nomothetic "I" of Solon up to v. 22a where we have the hypothetical comparison of Solon to another man

we have less of one category and more of the other). More importantly, there is far more specificity in the iambic fragments regarding the poetic *persona*:[51] this *persona* is not merely a reforming politician but one who claims to have set free the earth, restored those who were sold abroad, set free others, and made laws (fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}). He is someone who could have been tyrant (frr. 29–29^b, 30, 31 G.-P.^{2} = 32, 33, 34, 36, 37 W.^{2}), who found himself alienated from those who expected more (frr. 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2}; also in the elegiac fr. 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}) who found himself in the "middle" (frr. 30, 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36, 37 W.^{2}). We could suppose, with Stehle, that this *persona* is a later fiction, a variegated product (what she calls "configurations of Solon which belonged to different groups and served different interests"[52]). Stehle is right to remark that Herodotus does not mention Solon's political activities and Thucydides totally omits him, but the larger problem with this reconstruction is the far broader claim that the political poems make their first appearance in the fourth century spawned by debates over democracy. However, on the model of oral re-composition, the inverse should in fact hold: the further back we go in time, the greater variation we should expect to find and the further we go forward in time, by contrast, the less there should be that Solon did.[53] The most fluid period for the creation of generic or fictional 'Solons' should be not the fourth century, but the sixth.

2. *Solon in the* Theognidea

A separate but related question to the problem of "Solonian" doublets in the *Theognidea* is the panhellenism of archaic poetry. Solonian motifs on the crisis in the *polis* or the threat of civil strife—in particular the greed of the nobles and the relationship between the *hybris* of the powerful and the city's ruin—became the object of reformulations and intense reuse within the Theognidean corpus, and so proved "legible" outside

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in power and his dealings with the *demos*. Yet, the image of 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} explicitly requires the "I" of Solon and two groups opposing each other of which only one group (the *demos*) is mentioned both in 30 and 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 and 37 W.^{2} Further, fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} lacks a reference to a plural "they", and the gen. τούτων of fr. 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} would thus make no sense in fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}

[51] Of course, this *persona* is cognate with other *personae* who exist in other historical contexts, including the *persona* of Theognis.

[52] Stehle 2006, 105.

[53] Cf. Nagy 1990b, 150 for Homer.

the particular context of early sixth-century Athens and acquired a panhellenic relevance.[54] This fact leads us to question whether the historical Solon's poetry was, in a way, already beyond-individual, and therefore represented a generalizing synthesis of traditions. If so, such a synthesis would have already effectively obliterated local specificity by privileging life experience, poetic images and world-views that were both reusable and reused by other practitioners of the genre, and creating an image of the poet that was already stereotypical.[55] If so, we should replace Solon with "Solon"[56] and think of a multiply-authored body of poetry that was unified in its ideological character but not in terms of its date.

But despite its "panhellenic" use in the *Theognidea*, Solon's poetry has various elements indicating that it was composed by a specific individual, and was intended for a specific group of real people set in a specific historical context.[57] One indicative example is the pervasiveness of the image of *horos* (as concrete "boundary" or metaphorical "limit"). On the one hand, this idea recalls the importance that the demolition of the *horoi* has in Solon's political work on land-ownership (cf. fr. 30.4–6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.4–6 W.^{2}); on the other hand, it proves to be a constant of Solon's political objectives, namely his effort to define the respective roles, limits, and rights of individual citizens as well as the different Athenian social groups, and should thus also be understood as a metaphor

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[54] For the concept of "panhellenic poetry" and Panhellenism cf. especially Nagy 1990a, 52–115.

[55] Studies in the last decades have emphasized (perhaps excessively) the polymorphism of the "I" in archaic Greek lyric, and have shown just how reckless it is to take for granted an overlap between the narrating "I" of a text of archaic lyric/elegy and that of the historical poet, who would have always spoken of himself subjectively: the archaic poet occasionally donned "masks" and roles different from the authorial "I", and at times recounted in the first person speeches or stories of others that both did and did not agree with his own thought and experience (the loss however of the poetic context has caused ancient, and especially modern interpreters confronted with the fragmentary nature of the surviving text, to lose awareness of these different narrative levels, and to see every "I" as belonging to the author). Moreover, the author regularly adapted his "I" to the different performance contexts of specific genres, and so had a strong tendency to present himself in accordance with stereotypes (Hipponax as a cursed or destitute poet, Archilochus as an unconventional and anti-aristocratic mercenary, etc.): cf. Rösler 1985; Gentili 1990; Slings 1990; Bonanno 1995; Morrison 2007, 36–102.

[56] To use the helpful formulation of Raaflaub 1996, 1041. See also Stehle 2006.

[57] Of course the figure of Solon existed in a performance tradition and this tradition did evolve beyond the "original" historical context.

of the middle political space that Solon himself occupied in the conflict between the opposing parties (31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}).[58] Additionally, fr. 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} (cf. also the Introd. ad loc.) presents a set of motifs that recall those found in the programmatic poems, and in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} in particular, a fragment whose sharp Athenian characterization is evident from the outset (see commentary ad loc.): the slavery of the Athenians to which Solon put an end is briefly mentioned in 3.22–25 G.-P.^{2} = 4.22–25 W.^{2}, as is the restoration of Dike whose violations are described in fr. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, and above all Solon's ability to ἁρμόζειν straight right both to the rich and to the poor (19 f.), all of which may be seen as the effect of making everything ἄρτια with each other, which was the first and the last result expected of Eunomia in 3.32, 39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32, 39 W.^{2} Similarly consistent is the motif of *hybris* and denunciation of excessive pursuit of wealth: this motif is most forcefully developed in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, but represents a theoretical premise of Solon's politics that resurfaces time and again in his condemnation of the κόρος displayed by the aristocrats (cf. 3.9 and 5.2–5 G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 and 4c W.^{2}), but which is also rampant among members of the *demos* and thus something which Solon considered to be a risk inherent to Athenian society (8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2}). Finally, Solon's habit of presenting reactions of blame in direct quotation seems to be a rather personal feature of his poetry (not only in tetrameters, see also the elegiac fr. 2.4 G.-P.^{2} = 2.4 W.^{2}) and occupies a role which is substantially more prominent than we find in archaic elegy and *iambos*. If the essential characteristic of an authorless tradition or a multiauthored body of poetry is the comprehensive collection of variants, formulations of accepted standards derived from heterogeneous sources (hence tropes and ideas that do not originate in a specific individual, but are attributed to him over the course of tradition, especially the predominantly oral tradition of the sixth century), this definition does not seem to fit the work of Solon.[59] Although the moralizing aspect of his poetry secured him a panhellenic audience,[60] Solon's distinctive formulation of ideas reveals him to be more idiosyncratic and self-conscious.

[58] Cf. Manville 1990, 126–156; Raaflaub 1996, 1041.

[59] For other heterogeneous *corpora* like the *Pseudo-Phocylidea* see most recently the remarks of Hubbard 2007, 203 f.

[60] Solon's panhellenic appeal, second only to Theognis, is confirmed by his reuse by Herodotus on which see further in chapter two.

Five of the thirty extant elegiac fragments of Solon correspond literally in one or more of their lines to elegies of the *Theognidea*. It has recently been argued[61] that we do not know the exact relationship between Solon's fragments and the *Theognidea*, but that in Lardinois' words, "Theognis may have borrowed these lines from Solon or Solon from Theognis or the material in both may derive from a common source of some generic and (previously) anonymous elegiac couplets".[62] Although the suggestion has undeniable appeal, it is open to serious objections, even if we accept a date for Theognis around 600–590 BC "which therefore allowed for the possibility of direct competition between Solon and Theognis".[63] Analysis of the poems derived from Solon in the *Theognidea* cannot be separated from that of the poems derived from Mimnermus and Tyrtaeus, whose works are also represented there and whose chronology demands that 'Theognis' be considered the derivative text. Most of the attributable elegiac texts in the *Theognidea* contain significant variations from the versions known to us from other sources, but such variants are analogous to those between *lectiones priores* and *alterae*[64] of the corpus (which in most cases cannot be explained simply as mistakes of the manuscript tradition). There seems therefore to be no justification for treating the appearance of Solon's poetry in the *Theognidea* any differently than we do that of the other two elegists.[65] Our extant evidence allows us to identify the following quotations of Solon: 1.71–76 G.-P.^{2} = 13.71–76W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 227–232, 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 153 f., 1.65–70 G.-P.^{2} = 13.65 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 585–590, 18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 719–728, 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 315–318, 17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 1253–1256. Of Mimnermus in the *Theognidea* the instances are: fr. 1 G.-P.^{2} $\approx$ 5.1–6 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 1017–1022, Mimn. 12 G.-P.^{2} = 7 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 795 f.; of Tyrtaeus: Tyrtae. 9.13–16 G.-P.^{2} = 12.13–16 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 1003–1006, Tyrtae. 9.37–42 G.-P.^{2} = 12.37–42 W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 933–938.

Of the examples regarding Solon, I will first discuss the case of fr. 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2} and *Theognidea* 153 f.

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[61] Lardinois 2006. See also Irwin 2006a.

[62] Lardinois 2006, 18.

[63] Cf. Irwin 2006a, 63 n. 82 citing further bibliography on Theognis' chronology.

[64] Ferrari 1989, 37; Colesanti 2001, 464. The definitions *lectio prior* and *lectio altera* to indicate a poetic statement (of a distich in its smallest length) and its doublet belong to Carrière 1948, 48, based on their respective positions in the *sylloge*.

[65] As Irwin 2006a, 56 seems to advocate.

a) Solon
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι.

b) *Theognidea* 149–154
Χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκωι ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν,
Κύρν'· ἀρετῆς δ' ὀλίγοισ' ἀνδράσι μοῖρ' ἕπεται.
Ὕβριν, Κύρνε, θεὸς πρῶτον κακῶι ὤπασεν ἀνδρί,
οὗ μέλλει χώρην μηδεμίην θέμεναι.
Τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῶι ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώπωι καὶ ὅτωι μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι.

My interest in this discussion is less to examine how the poet's point of view differs in the two passages or to isolate the specific significance of the variations, but to identify the mechanisms of transmission and re-use that are at work. Most scholars argue, for instance, that *Theognidea* 153 f. appears to have been taken from a longer poem by Solon[66] and then made to fit its new context: as Highbarger[67] notes "to Theognis it is not primarily the degree of wealth but the character of its possessor that counts. The opposite view is presented by Solon v. 2; Theognis has changed and adapted Solon's words here to cohere with his own peculiar point of view". The alternate hypothesis, that Solon altered the expression to suit his poem, is improbable for a number of reasons: the distich 153 f. in the *Theognidea* is the last in a string of three passages which center on the connection between κακὸς ἀνήρ, ὕβρις, and χρήματα, ὄλβος, with ἕπεται of 150 standing symmetrically at the beginning of the series and at its end, ἕπηται of 152. The distinction in 154 between the two human types, a κακός and someone with a non ἄρτιος νόος, is a new element in the progression introduced at its closure and thus not developed in the sequence—as Ferrari[68] points out, it is difficult to understand its relevance. We could perhaps advance Ferrari's argument a bit further. ἄρτιος is a word Solon is fond of: it occurs at 3.32, 39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32, 39 W.^{2}, then in 5.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.4 W.^{2} and 8.4 G.-P.^{2} = 6.4 W.^{2}, and has a specific significance within his broader ideological program (cf. ad 3.32), whereas

[66] In this I differ slightly from Blaise 2006, 128–131, although I fully agree with the rest of her conclusions. She states that nothing can prove that the primary poem has been composed by Solon himself. I prefer to think that since the poem has come down to us under the name of Solon, its authenticity must be presumed until it is proved otherwise, i.e. it is a pseudo-epigraphic poem.

[67] Highbarger 1929, 345.

[68] Ferrari 1987, 189.

it occurs only once again in Theognis (the adjective is never attributed to νόος in epic). Furthermore, in the Solonian context, being ἄρτιος is the quality of those who can work in harmony with others in society (hence Solon's first distich at 8.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.1 f. W.^{2}), whereas in Theognis the point of the absence of νόος ἄρτιος is not developed. All in all, it seems safe to conclude that two detachable lines from a larger poem ascribed by *Ath.Pol.* to Solon have found their way into the *Theognidea*, and not the other way round.[69] And therefore, although it is salutary and may well be right in many cases[70] to consider the diversity of readings as arising from oral reperformance, the derivative status of the "Theognis" text remains certain.[71]

The second example is Solon 1.65–70 G.-P.^{2} = 13.65–70 W.^{2} and Theogn. 585–590.

a) Solon
πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
  πῆι μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
  ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,
τῶι δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσι,
  συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

b) *Theognidea* 585–590
πᾶσίν τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
  πῆι σχήσειν μέλλει πρήγματος ἀρχομένου.
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὐδοκιμεῖν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
  εἰς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν·
τῶι δὲ καλῶς ποιεῦντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα τίθησιν
  συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

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[69] Arguments about style also favor attributing the distich to Solon. The metaphorical use of τίκτω in the meaning 'to generate, to produce' is not attested in epic or early elegy. The distich's image of κόρος giving birth to ὕβρις endows the lifeless with a sort of biological life and is an example of what constitutes actualization/vivification and personification; this emphasis on the visual has another parallel in the image of the δημόσιον κακόν jumping over the high fence of a private *oikos* in the Eunomia fragment, which is a further example of both *energeia* and personification in Solon: on imagery in Solon, see Introd. chap. 5.

[70] Lardinois 2006.

[71] These sympotic snapshots have been studied by Vetta 1980, XXVII–XXXI; 1984; 1992, 196–199; 2000, who has illustrated the ways in which variations are determined by the specific reuse of the verses and can be intentional (for gaining a special effect) or unintentional (misremembering).

The most striking changes[72] in the *Theognidea* are εὐδοκιμεῖν in place of εὖ ἔρδειν and καλῶς ποιεῦντι[73] for κακῶς ἔρδοντι, which cancel the otherwise close symmetry of Solon's verses 67 f. and 69 f.[74] A "small moralist", comments van Groningen,[75] used some lines of Solon to express a favorite idea of his: the damages of thoughtless ambition and the reassuring consequences of virtue. The first line of the piece in the *Theognidea*—on the uncertainty of the future—offers some hint as to why the piece is found after the distich 585 f. on the uncertainty of the future despite its loose connection to the context. Yet, the passage in the non-Theognidean source (Solon) is clearly embedded organically in the larger argument of the poem.

Solon 1.71–76 G.-P.² = 13.71–76 W.² = *Theognidea* 227–232, as in the example above, concerns a large portion of poetic text:

a) Solon
πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·
  οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον
διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
  κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὤπασαν ἀθάνατοι
ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπόταν Ζεύς
  πέμψηι τισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

b) *Theognidea* 221–234
Ὅστις τοι δοκέει τὸν πλησίον ἴδμεναι οὐδέν,
  ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μοῦνος ποικίλα δήνε' ἔχειν,
κεῖνός γ' ἄφρων ἐστί, νόου βεβλαμμένος ἐσθλοῦ·
  ἴσως γὰρ πάντες ποικίλ' ἐπιστάμεθα·
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλει κακοκερδείηισιν ἕπεσθαι,
  τῶι δὲ δολοπλοκίαι μᾶλλον ἄπιστοι ἄδον.

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72 Cf. Ferrari 1989, 25–28. σχήσειν μέλλει in the Theogn. 586 reverses the order of the two terms in Solon, a phenomenon we see again in the reuse of Mimn. 1.5 G.-P.² = 5.6 W.² in the *Theognidea*: see Colesanti 1998, 213 f. Some small deficiencies in balance in the stylistic fabric of the piece in the *Theognidea* are observable. Ferrari notes the absurdity of the initial statements with πᾶσιν and οὐδέ τις ("there is risk in every action and no one knows, when something starts, how it is going to turn out") now that in the Theognidean reworking of the thought the man who acts well can expect to be successful (589 f.). Some incongruency is also remarkable in v. 590. How can a man who acts well be at risk of ἀφροσύνη and in need, therefore, of divine release from it?

73 See Ferrari 1989, 26 n. 40 for a criticism of West who emends mss. καλῶς to κακῶς.

74 Solon's opposition of the action of the man who tries to act rightly (εὖ ἔρδειν) and of the man who acts badly (τῶι δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι) synthesizes human behavior with respect to divine acts which grant the first one with calamity and success to the second.

75 van Groningen 1966, 235.

Πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνθρώποισιν·
οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμῶν πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι. τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς γίνεται ἀφροσύνη,
ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεύς
πέμψηι τειρομένοισ', ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Ἀκρόπολις καὶ πύργος ἐὼν κενεόφρονι δήμωι,
Κύρν', ὀλίγης τιμῆς ἔμμορεν ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ.

As in the previous cases, there is no obvious reason to doubt that the *Theognidea* borrowed from Solon, and not vice versa. The verses in the *Theognidea* are incorporated into a string of three elegies on the theme of ἀφροσύνη (see ἄφρων 223, ἀφροσύνη 230, κενεόφρονι, 233)[76] which recasts Solon's sequence πλοῦτος—κέρδεα—ἄτη as χρήματα—ἀφροσύνη—ἄτη.[77] The different perspective of the *Theognidea* is marked at 221–232 by the intentional *metapoiesis* of the text of Solon.[78] Lardinois explains the differences "by assuming an oral tradition behind the two versions. Such an oral tradition would have generated, over time, two or more distinct versions of the same poem, which different authors could cite. In other words, the version found in the *Theognidea* shows us one way these elegies were remembered in the classical period and the citations of Solon in Aristotle show another way".[79] Again, however, the appeal to oral transmission for the diversity of readings should not obscure the fact that the *Theognidea* shows clear marks of derivative use of the text. In other words, the citation of Solon in the *Theognidea* may be better understood as an example of how Solon's poem was creatively reused in the classical period rather than how it was remembered (accurately or less accurately, in a better or worse way in comparison with Stobaeus who preserves the whole Solonian poem[80]). It is true that van Groningen has called the passage in the *Theognidea* more logical[81] than Solon's text: the rich are insatiable; material possessions result in folly and from folly there is revealed ruin, which now one man, now another

[76] See also Ferrari 1987, 191 f.
[77] Already Highbarger 1929, 346.
[78] On which see Ferrari 1989, 27–30 and 1987, 191 f.
[79] Lardinois 2006, 19 f.
[80] van Groningen 1966, 92 considers all the variants in these verses of the *Theognidea* (with the exception of τειρομένοις) better and more ancient than the readings of Stobaeus. See already the criticism of Ferrari 1987, 191 f.
[81] van Groningen 1966, 92.

has it, whenever Zeus sends it to wretched men / to men who are overwhelmed with it.[82] But some problems are left out by this summary: if no limit of wealth has been revealed to humans, why does the question arise concerning satisfaction in its pursuit? How does wealth become ἀφροσύνη?[83] Although a statement like 'foolishness leads to ruin' may be easy to construe, we are not provided with a context in which to understand the other statements. Such interpretative problems emerge within the *Theognidea* as a result of the process of excerption, whereas the Solonian text is clarified by its larger context.

Irwin[84] has recently offered two (interrelated) reasons for distinguishing Solon's presence in the Theognidean corpus from that of Mimnermus and Tyrtaeus: 1) the textual variation in the cases of Mimnermus and Tyrtaeus are non-existent or attributable to a demonstrable shift in the ostensible themes to which the lines applied; 2) in certain of Solon's verses found in the *Theognidea* the variations are of considerable relevance and occur around a consistent theme: the possession of wealth and its relationship to moral behavior.[85] But in fact the features that characterize Solon's appearance in the *Theognidea* seem to me to display exactly the same 'demonstrable shift' which Irwin ascribes to the reuse of the other two elegists in the corpus, in that texts are reshaped to fit a new context with consequent adjustment of meaning. As the passages are incorporated into a new setting,[86] they are reworked to suit[87] the theme which the verses are intended to describe (with relative artistic succes within the extemporaneous character of their reperformance). On the other hand, if we consider these variations in terms of oral transmission, I see no reason for giving more importance to the reworking of certain verses of Solon in "Theognis". And if the Solonian citations in the *Theognidea* are not 'treated' in a different way from those of the other two elegists, we should not prioritize their theme (over the phenomenon itself of their

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[82] The adjective may be ornamental to the noun ἄνθρωποι or better proleptic according to van Groningen 1966, ad loc.

[83] Similarly Irwin 2006a, 61.

[84] Irwin 2006a, 56 and n. 60.

[85] This is not always true. In the case of Sol. 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} reused in the *Theognidea* 315–318, apart from the slight variation πολλοὶ *τοι* πλουτοῦσι for πολλοὶ *γὰρ* πλουτοῦσι that renders the sequence autonomous, the passage is identical.

[86] Colesanti 1998 analyses the 'imperfections' in the *Theognidea* 1003–1006 regarding Tyrtae. 9.13–16 G.-P.^{2} = 12.13–16 W.^{2} and attributes them to the extemporaneous character of their (re)performance.

[87] Highbarger 1929, 344.

quotation) in order to postulate a distinction. The example of Tyrtaeus 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} in the *Theognidea* 933–938[88] is illuminating for the environment of the symposium.

Tyrtaeus 9.37–42 G.-P.^{2} = 12.37–42 W.^{2} is relevant here:

a) Tyrtaeus
πάντες μιν τιμῶσιν, ὁμῶς νέοι ἠδὲ παλαιοί,
 πολλὰ δὲ τερπνὰ παθὼν ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην,
γηράσκων δ' ἀστοῖσι μεταπρέπει, οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
 βλάπτειν οὔτ' αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει,
πάντες δ' ἐν θώκοισιν ὁμῶς νέοι οἵ τε κατ' αὐτὸν
 εἴκουσ' ἐκ χώρης οἵ τε παλαιότεροι.

b) *Theognidea* 933–938
Παύροις ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος ὀπηδεῖ·
 ὄλβιος, ὃς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἔλαχεν.
πάντες μιν τιμῶσιν· ὁμῶς νέοι οἵ τε κατ' αὐτὸν
 χώρης εἴκουσιν τοί τε παλαιότεροι.
γηράσκων ⟨δ'⟩ ἀστοῖσι μεταπρέπει, οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
 βλάπτειν οὔτ' αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει.

As Colesanti[89] notes, the passage demonstrates the competent reuse of a known text in combination with verses which either derive from another source or have been created extemporaneously. Of particular interest, is the *Theognidea's* distortion of the verses' original sequence.[90] The parallel presence of ὁμῶς νέοι before the bucolic diairesis in 37 and 41 of Tyrtaeus has caused a sort of a mnemonic *saut du même au même* in which a symposiast singing Tyrtaeus passed from 37a πάντες μιν τιμῶσιν, ὁμῶς νέοι to 41 πάντες ... ὁμῶς νέοι and then proceeded to recite the syntactically connected v. 42. This mistake is encouraged by the fact that both 37 and 41 start with πάντες. In the text of the *Theognidea* the distichs are not embedded organically in the argument of the distich (933 f.) which precedes them and there is no indication as to whom the pronoun μιν designates, whereas in Tyrtaeus 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} it clearly refers to the warrior who is the subject of the poem.

If we reject the proposition that the elegiac poems of Solon, and of Mimnermus or Tyrtaeus, for that matter, and the *Theognidea*, in which they are excerpted, were freestanding compositions which circulated

88 The instance of Mimn. 1.3–5 G.-P.^{2} = 5.1–6 W.^{2} and Theogn. 1017–1022 is similarly complex: see Ferrari 1989, 20 f.; Colesanti 1998, 213 f.

89 Colesanti 2001, 485 f.

90 There is also a small variation in the *Theognidea* 936 χώρης εἴκουσιν τοί τε παλαιότεροι from the original text of Tyrtaeus, l. 42 εἴκουσ' ἐκ χώρης οἵ τε παλαιότεροι.

independently with equal authority or in identical conditions, we will only be able to account for the presene of these poems in the *Theognidea* by reconstructing its history with a view to better understanding the nature of the corpus.[91] The inescapable fact, noted long ago by Husdon-Williams, is that the Theognid corpus is unique in extant archaic Greek poetry in as much as it is a compendium built around a core of poetry by a (presumably) historical figure which was then enlarged through the accretion of diverse distichs and poems, some anonymous, some derived from named authors, with a resultant incoherence. The compedious nature of the corpus and the sometimes demonstrably derivative nature of the material in the *Theognidea* cautions against assigning priority to the *Theognidea* in cases where we have two archaic versions of the same lines. This is especially true for those fragments which have little obvious context within the *Theognidea* but whose non-Theognidean source forms part of a larger argument.

[91] Reconstruction of the location of origin of the compilation can only be speculative. For a recent attempt see Vetta 2000, esp. p. 131. For Vetta the *Theognidea* is in substance a compilation that could only be made in Athens at the end of sixth century, by virtue of the will of a powerful *genos* (the Alcmaeonids), interested in Theognis (because of the similarity in the stories of interruption of power etc. that both shared, and hence their affinity to Theognis' world-view). See also Collins 2004, 115.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOLON'S IMAGERY (SIMILE AND METAPHOR)

Homer's epic poems give clear evidence to the fact that, in an oral culture, the tradition as such cannot "survive abstractly but only as a paradigm of doings".[1] Mythological examples (*paradeigmata*) and parables (which are used less frequently than the paradigmatic story) are deployed within the poems as confirmation of right "doing". Personifications, yet another mode of materializing of an idea or a (kind of) action, produce an effect similar to that of the paradigmatic stories. Homer presents a series of graphic personifications within his epics, amongst which the most notable may be the paradigms of Ate and the Prayers in *Il.* 9.502–512 and of Ate in *Il.* 19.91–136. The latter instance, Agamemnon's story about Ate in *Il.* 19 of how Ate can delude even Zeus, provides a good illustration of the exemplary nature of personification which here depicts a mistake similar to Agamemnon's own (l. 95 f.).[2] Agamemnon selects this example because it illustrates his argument that mistakes such as his are common, if not unavoidable, and that he therefore should be forgiven. Agamemnon's personification of Ate is paradigmatic, because it exemplifies a phenomenon in the human world by means of the actions of the gods.

In the *Iliad* each paradigmatic story provides motivation for action in the context of the narrative: for instance, in book 24, the parable of the Urns of Zeus (*Il.* 24.527–533) appropriately makes the point that human suffering is universal and unavoidable. This fact is illustrated by the mixture of good and evil fortune that attends Achilles' father, Peleus and Priam. Since both have had their share of good luck, and are now receiving their share of bad, there is no point for Priam to mourn; rather he must heed Achilles' advice. The action to which Priam is thus incited—to let his sorrow lie still in his heart because there is no advantage to be gained from excessive grief over human suffering—fits the context that is about to be featured in the narrative: the performance of funeral rituals for Hector (ll. 582–590). When, later in *Il.* 24.601–612, Achilles wishes to

[1] Havelock 1963, 172. Also reported in Andersen 1987, 10 f.

[2] For the story of Ate and the Prayers in the situation of Hom. *Il.* 9 see the reservations of Hainsworth 1993, 128.

induce Priam to eat, he seeks to persuade him by means of the example of someone else (in this case Niobe) who was in a similar situation and yet took part in the very activity (namely eating) which Achilles councels.[3] The story of Niobe functions as a paradigmatic precedent which justifies the actions of Priam and Achilles.

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In the context of early elegy, Solon's avoidance of myths or references to the past is striking.[4] Rather than employing divine abstractions[5] in the manner of Homer (or for that matter Hesiod), Solon uses imagery (similes and metaphor) from the world of nature[6] to articulate the conceptual framework at the center of his ethical/political system: cf. 1.14 f. G.-P.² = 13.4 f. W.²; 1.18–24 G.-P.² = 13.8–24 W.²; 3.35 G.-P.² = 4.35 W.[7] To paraphrase Fränkel,[8] Solon's similes couch the abstract in sensory pictures. The brief comparison[9] of *ate* with fire (ll. 14 f.), an image that is found, with some frequency in Homer[10] as well as in the same line-final position,[11] offers insight into how Solon's style is differentiated from that of Homer. Solon avoids a long allegorical account and instead opts for a well-known, straightforward image (the vehicle) which generates emotion and catches the essence of the object being described (the tenor). In this simile, rather than constructing a detailed illustrative picture, the poet draws a simple and direct comparison between a single quality shared by the *comparandum* and the *comparatum*: from a familiar phenomenon (fire), the simile moves to an abstract one (*ate*), and the conceptual movement of *ate* is thereby made intelligible through its similarity

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3 Braswell 1971, 24. Held 1987.

4 Cf. Sider 2006, 339 n. 41.

5 West 1966b, 33, notes "in Hesiod's time it was not understood what abstractions are. They must be something; they are invisible, imperishable and have great influence over human affairs; they must be gods".

6 See also Noussia 2006 for a more detailed discussion of these similes.

7 See in the comm. for a more detailed analysis of these passages.

8 Fränkel 1997, 104 on Homer.

9 I leave aside similes that belong to the ordinary speech such as simple comparisons in which similes cannot be called illustrative: 30.17 G.-P.² = 36.17 W.² ἔρεξα καὶ διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην. Cp. also the short simile in 29b.5 G.-P.² = 34.5 W.²

10 On the repertoire of fire similes in Homer see Scott 1974, 28; Homeric fire similes can exemplify the rage of the warrior, gleaming objects, and anger. On the growth of plants as appropriate for visualizing *hybris* see Michelini 1978; Nagy 1985, 61.

11 Anhalt 1993, 131 notes that the word λύκος in the wolf simile of fr. 30.27 G.-P.² = 36.27 W.² is reserved for the last position in the line for effect.

to the fearful spreading of fire whose capacity for quick and disastrous movement is known from everyday material reality. One detail is highlighted (the power of its destruction, insignificant at first but grievous in the end, l. 15), which goes straight to Solon's persuasive aim: to scare his listeners. Differently from most of Homer's naturalistic similes, in which vividness of details is the main objective, Solon adopts naturalistic images as means of persuasion, an area in which epic most often resorts to mythological paradigm.

In the same Solonian poem, far more important than *ate* is the concept of Zeus' punishment of the unjust. The idea of the god's action is described by the long simile of a spring storm in ll. 18–24, familiar to the audience from their experience of everyday understanding of the weather.[12] The relationship between the source domain and the target domain of the simile is elucidated through a brief narrative of six verses which incorporates a number of pertinent details in connection with the action of the wind: the stirring up of the sea-floor, the destruction of the fields, the clear sky which comes back to view as the wind clears the clouds.[13] The accumulation of specific descriptions creates a most vivid, and hence most terrifying image, which, much like Homer's similes, invites its listeners to further expand on the picture in their imaginations.[14] As in Homer, Solon's similes are more than occasional grace notes. Like the storm that it describes, the simile of the spring gale is introduced abruptly: it is as syntactically unexpected as Zeus' punishment is to humans (ll. 16–18). Further, its lengthy sentences are remarkable in a poem in which sense units usually conform to single-, part-lines or couplets; here ll. 18–22 form a single period, as if the irresistibility of the storm/Zeus' power were reflected in the relentless syntax of the simile. Fränkel[15] notes that "if similes merely aided the imagination which envisaged things concretely, they would generally fall back on the very well known". In addition to being an effective means of visualization, these Solonian similes are powerful enough to supersede the argument.[16]

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12 See also Noussia 2006, 139–142.

13 See in the comm. ad loc.

14 In connection to the extended simile in Homer, Minchin 2001, 38 f. notes that it "maps itself more concretely over what is now an event-sequence, and through it the poet encourages the listener to envisage the scene and to complete the comparison, as he, the poet, wished it to be seen". This remark fits well the strategy of Solon in this poem.

15 Fränkel 1997, 104.

16 See also Martin 2006, 163 f.

In fact, use of a simile permits the poet to dwell on a subject for longer;[17] as a form of repetition the simile further emphasizes the concept under discussion and encourages increased understanding.[18]

In both tone and content, Solon's similes are well matched to the world of the poem's action.[19] They do not surprise the listener as can many of Homer's similes, such as those linking war to the domestic sphere of women or children;[20] nor do Solon's images transport us to a world distant from the narrative action, as do those Iliadic similes which compare war to naturalistic scenarios and/or rural activities. Rather we find a predictable relationship between *comparatum* and *comparandum*, that produces a simple and straightforward analogy between source domain and target domain. However, Solon's similes are not thereby devoid of emotion.[21] The audience's fear of a destructive fire or storm promotes the transfer of that emotion from the vehicle to the target domain, and thus enhances the memorability of Solon's warning.[22] In fact, because they are familiar and verifiable phenomena, Solon's images and metaphors from the world of nature are particularly well suited as explanatory models for unfamiliar concepts. And because they are connected with the experience of the audience, they are an effective means of persuasion and can also create the auxiliary impression that the concepts to which they are compared likewise operate according to known forces of the nature.

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Because of their overwhelmingly visual nature, similes are a good way for a poet to introduce variety into his song.[23] The similes in the *Iliad*, in particular, are designed to assist in highlighting individuals and their actions (e.g. a hero's entrance in the scene) in a narrative which lacks the greater variety of images and situations found in the *Odyssey*. Solon spotlights himself three times with similes and once with the metaphor of the shield, impressing upon the audience the significance of his actions: 7.5 f. G.-P.[2]

[17] Observed by Fränkel 1997, 104 in connection to Homeric simile.

[18] Cf. Minchin 2001, 33.

[19] This also holds true for the other meteorological images connected with political situations analyzed in Noussia 2006.

[20] On which cf. Porter 1972, 16 f.

[21] Emotion (fear of a wild creature) is involved also in the short iambic simile which compares Solon to a wolf; a simile made especially memorable by its unexpected juxtaposition of terms (see below).

[22] Minchin 2001, 30.

[23] See Scott 1974, 120 f.

= 5.5 f. W.², 30.20–22 G.-P.² = 36.20–22 W.², 30.27 f. G.-P.² = 36.27 f. W.², 31.6–9 G.-P.² = 37.7–10 W.² (metaphor and simile together). These self-descriptive similes combine poetic strategy with an acknowledgement of the political necessity of his actions, and thus neatly fuse Solon's dual roles as a lawgiver and as a poet.[24] Anhalt[25] deftly observes that all of the similes and metaphors of which Solon is the tenor are unusal in some conspicuous way. These images, in contrast to the similes from the natural world, are unexpectedly—at times paradoxically—bold or striking. These similes cannot simply be intended to help the audience to understand an unknown situation (i.e. Solon or his actions) by means of a known reality. In terms of information theory,[26] the more predictable an item, the less information it carries. Unconventional comparisons, therefore, are rich in information because of their novelty and their unpredictability. A distinctive, striking or bizarre comparison will catch the attention of the listener, and hold it. In other words, whereas some of Solon's similes and images (mainly the naturalistic ones) create a concrete understanding of concepts, the similes and metaphors that Solon uses in connection to his own conduct have a different function.

Linforth,[27] for instance, comments that the images of the shield and the boundary stone are respectively a little vague and inharmonious. They may seem straightforward, but only until one tries to visualize them precisely.[28] As Stehle[29] explains, these images do not generate intimacy between the speaker and his audience. Instead they demand the audience's intellectual scrutiny if sense is to be made of them.[30] And it is this mental stimulation, more than the clarification of Solon's political activity, that is the real goal of this special category of similes.

Solon's similes might be distinguished between the "characterizing" and "dramatic". To the latter category belongs the image of the wolf among the dogs in fr. 30.26 f. G.-P.² = 36.26 f. W.² As scholarly analyses have emphasized (see comm. ad loc.), Solon seems to have purposefully chosen to depict himself as an animal not included amongst the

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[24] On the combination of these two qualities see also Anhalt 1993; Martin 2006.

[25] Anhalt 1993.

[26] Goatly 1997, 165 f. reported by Minchin 2001.

[27] Linforth 1919, 180 and 195.

[28] As Anhalt 1993 remarks about the metaphor of the shield; but it is equally true of the other images in which Solon and his actions comprise the tenor.

[29] Stehle 2006, 98.

[30] Cf. Anhalt 1993.

warrior-animals of Homer, the lions or the wild boars. The wolf connoted a radical alienation from the human world, especially when figured in isolation and the image represents Solon as a sort of *pharmakos*. Wolves were also connected to the archaic Greek ideas of cunning and (somewhat paradoxically) straightforwardness, and their hunting practices were thought to reflect an egalitarian social structure in which victims were shared εἰς ἴσα. What part of his political character or behavior does Solon communicate by comparing himself to a wolf? Instead of once again explaining why he did not meet with a broad enough approval, and ended up being without supporters (and thus characterizing himself once again), in this simile the only specific message Solon conveys is that of his isolation, dramatized by the single wolf opposed to the pack of dogs surrounding him: he is alone, and his enemies are many.

Solon shows his gift for striking images in fr. 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} As is noted in the commentary, it seems right to understand the cream as wealth rather than as the aristocracy (an interpretation which requires a position more generous than anything Solon says about them elsewhere). This brings the Solonian image much closer to that of the despot found from Homer onward. The style in this section is remarkable. Besides the striking series of images, here Solon moves rapidly through this series of images in an almost Pindaric manner, presenting a complex situation from multiple angles by using different images to bring out the intersecting aspects. The mixed metaphor[31] in the last distich creates a striking and memorable paradox in the unexpected juxtaposition of ὅρος with μεταίχμιον: the μεταίχμιον, the area between the armies, is meant to be crossed; there is no boundary marker which can separate them.[32]

Another bold metaphor characteristic of Solon's self-representation is that of himself as a shieldbearer in fr. 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2} The image is an unexpectedly complicated refashioning of standard military behavior: normally shields are used for protection against an enemy, but Solon is a figure who shields both sides, a paradox in terms of the heroic ideology of fighting and primacy in warfare. Yet the paradoxical quality reinforces Solon's unique impartiality. The imagery effectively proclaims his equal distance from the fighters, which is a vital quality for an arbitrator.

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[31] Loraux 1984, 206 observes that Solon characterizes his position as an *adynaton*.

[32] See also Stehle 2006, 97 f. on the precariousness of such a position between armies.

In Solon, as in Homer,[33] the poet sets the audience the task of evaluating the similes for themselves. This is a strategy of internal evaluation, whereby the poet requires his listeners to draw their own conclusions on the basis of the material he conveys. Solon invites his listeners to engage in this activity of internal evaluation either emotionally (through appeal to a sentiment) or cognitively. The mediated approach (through the appeal to the intellect) which is required for those similes which spotlight his actions in Athens demonstrates the importance that Solon places on human *noos*, an emphasis evident elsewhere even when similes are not employed.[34]

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The main rhetorical features of Solon's imagery can be most clearly discerned through comparison with the very different features and strategies which characterize Tyrtaeus' poetry.[35] Solon's rhetoric plays on the role of the unexpected or the paradoxical, especially in description of his own innovative behavior, and he often highlights a single detail for didactic impact (instead of pursuing the vividness of *enargeia*). Tyrtaeus, by contrast, leads his audience to 'recognize' or remember the images which he proposes as belonging to a shared tradition which he presents or reconstructs as inherited from the past (compare the frequent references in frr. 1a.12, 8.1, 10.16 G.-P.^{2}= 2.13, 11.1, 19.8 W.^{2} to the Spartans' descendance from Heracles, and in particular the emphatic mention in 1a.12 G.-P.^{2} = 2.13 W.^{2} that Zeus *gave* the state to the descendants of Heracles). Tyrtaeus wants the Spartans to remember certain things and to accept certain ideas that are part of their cultural heritage, while rejecting or abandoning others—to accept, for instance, the heroic principle that being killed in battle at a young age is better than growing old to see children and grandchildren. In his poems, Tyrtaeus does not 'discover' an ethical code that needs to be justified, but rather evokes,[36] in celebratory form, one that is pre-established and already highly esteemed within the com-

[33] The use of this strategy in Homer is well analyzed by Minchin 2001, on which I draw.

[34] See in particular the comm. ad 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}

[35] The mythological *exemplum* in Tyrtaeus 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} will not concern me here since such uses are totally lacking in Solon's surviving poetry.

[36] Cf. Jaeger 1966, 107: "the poems of Tyrtaeus in language, meter, and mood are Homeric through and through, and especially so in their austere emphasis on the life of the spirit. They are generals' addresses from Homer, transposed into the present and freed from their nexus, but preserving the ideal code in form and content".

munity.[37] The posture is well illustrated by Tyrtaeus' description of the example and the exemplary ethic of "the fathers of our fathers" during the first Messenian war: see fr. 4 G.-P.^{2} = 5.4–8 W.^{2}:

> ἀμφ' αὐτὴν δ' ἐμάχοντ' ἐννέα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη
> νωλεμέως αἰεὶ ταλασίφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
> αἰχμηταὶ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες·
> εἰκοστῶι δ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ πίονα ἔργα λιπόντες
> φεῦγον Ἰθωμαίων ἐκ μεγάλων ὀρέων.

> For nineteen years the spearmen fathers of our fathers fought ever unceasingly over it (i.e. Messene), displaying steadfast courage in their hearts, and in the twentieth year the enemy fled from the high mountain range of Ithome, abandoning their rich farmlands.

Tyrtaeus aims to remind the listeners of what the poet wishes they would remember, which in this specific case is the heroic ethos of a noble death. He is not trying to persuade them of new ideas but to (re-)connect the audience with the old beliefs that remain true. His task is thus not to advertize or defend his beliefs, but rather to keep them alive in the spirit of the group to which the poet himself also belongs (e.g. 10.13f. G.-P.^{2} = frr. 10.13 f.W.^{2}; 10.19–21 G-P.^{2} = 19.11–13 W.^{2}).[38] Tyrtaeus' fragments thus reflect a strategy that produces group-involvement, a fact reinforced by the poet's desire to invoke—or better, recreate—a sort of interpersonal link between himself and his listeners.[39]

In 1966 Dawson[40] noted that Tyrtaeus' editors seemed more interested in the presumed ineptness of his Homeric imitations than in the reason for which the imitations were made. In refutation of the charge of 'ineptitude', Prato[41] explored how Tyrtaeus would at times reconstruct Homer by amplifying passages with participial forms so as to concentrate a series of 'quadretti' or tableaux, in the space of a few lines, adding evocative details to their frames with frequent use of particles like δέ, οὐδέ, μηδέ, etc. Prato also noted that the phenomenon of concept-repetition was a

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[37] Cf. Luginbill 2002, although he may overstate Tyrtaeus' proximity to mainstream Greek thought; van Wees 1999 on the way in which the Spartan authorities responded to the seventh-century crisis in Sparta.

[38] It has already been observed that the first-person plural with which Tyrtaeus so often expresses himself is not fictitious, in the sense that it does not simply demonstrate the author's solidarity with the group to which he *pretends* to belong. Rather, it represents an authentic 'we' who partake in the same social category as the group the poet is addressing. Cf. Tarditi 1983; Quattrocelli 2006.

[39] A point which differentiates Tyrtaeus from Solon and Callinus. Cf. Lavelle 2005, 269 for the exhortations of Callin. 1 G.-P.^{2} = 1 W.^{2}

[40] Dawson 1966, 40.

[41] Prato 1968, 53*, 60*.

helpful way to emphasize and highlight the poet's central precepts, or to increase the vividness of an image or idea. He argues that, far from being an inept redundancy, the doubling-technique employed by Tyrtaeus is, in the end, meant to achieve greater *expressiveness*.[42] These strategies allow Tyrtaeus to present his listeners, through a linear succession of snapshots or thoughts, with a series of concepts intended to express the traditional, inherited presuppositions and consequences of heroic combat and death. In a certain sense, Prato provides a response to Dawson's crux when he says that these series of images are meant to strike a note of familiarity with Tyrtaeus' audience. The main technique through which Tyrtaeus achieves this goal was the deployment of realistic and minute detail in order to achieve *enargeia* (vividness). The description of warriors poised to attack in fr. 8.21–34 G.-P.^{2} = 11.21–34 W.^{2}, for example, produces just this effect:[43]

ἀλλά τις εὖ διαβὰς μενέτω ποσὶν ἀμφοτέροισι
στηριχθεὶς ἐπὶ γῆς, χεῖλος ὀδοῦσι δακών,
μηρούς τε κνήμας τε κάτω καὶ στέρνα καὶ ὤμους
ἀσπίδος εὐρείης γαστρὶ καλυψάμενος·
δεξιτερῆι δ' ἐν χειρὶ τινασσέτω ὄβριμον ἔγχος,
κινείτω δὲ λόφον δεινὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς·
ἔρδων δ' ὄβριμα ἔργα διδασκέσθω πολεμίζειν,
μηδ' ἐκτὸς βελέων ἑστάτω ἀσπίδ' ἔχων,
ἀλλά τις ἐγγὺς ἰὼν αὐτοσχεδὸν ἔγχεϊ μακρῶι
ἢ ξίφει οὐτάζων δήϊον ἄνδρ' ἑλέτω,
καὶ πόδα πὰρ ποδὶ θεὶς καὶ ἐπ' ἀσπίδος ἀσπίδ' ἐρείσας,
ἐν δὲ λόφον τε λόφωι καὶ κυνέην κυνέηι
καὶ στέρνον στέρνωι πεπλημένος ἀνδρὶ μαχέσθω,
ἢ ξίφεος κώπην ἢ δόρυ μακρὸν ἔχων.

Come, let everyone stand fast, with legs set well apart and both feet fixed firmly on the ground, biting his lip with his teeth, and covering thighs, shins below, chest, and shoulders with the belly of his broad shield; in his right hand let him brandish a mighty spear and let him shake the plumed crest above his head in a fearsome manner. By doing mighty deeds let him learn how to fight and let him not stand—he has a shield—outside the range of missiles, but coming to close quarters let him strike the enemy, hitting him with long spear or sword; and also, with foot placed alongside foot and shield pressed against shield, let everyone draw near, crest to crest, helmet to helmet, and breast to breast, and fight against a man, seizing the hilt of his sword or his long spear.

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[42] Prato 1968, 60*-61*. [my italics]

[43] Other icastic scenes in Tyrtaeus include: the warrior of fr. 10.13 G.-P.^{2} = 10.3–10 W.^{2}, or frr. 7.21–27 G.-P.^{2} = 10.21–27 W.^{2} Cf. also fr. 9.10–20 G.-P.^{2} = 12.10–20 W.^{2}, which acutely describes Tyrtaeus' ideal warrior; see also Tarkow 1983.

As Adkins notes,[44] Tyrtaeus here reminds the warriors of things which they already know, and places before their eyes a representation of their very selves that exhibits both psychological depth and rhetorical effectiveness. In other words, Tyrtaeus is playing on the emotions of his listeners, appealing through visual details to experiences that go without saying—their own. Both Prato, cited above, and Adkins,[45] come close to hitting the mark in their analysis of this fragment. But their assertions are slightly over-generalizing. The images and details "testify" to Tyrtaeus' own competence when it comes to certain aspects of daily life, an understanding of which is also shared by his audience. This competence then allows him to establish the very self-identification which his poetry seeks to produce in its audience: in these scenes, thanks to the use of the *enargeia* of the true warrior's behavior and the techniques of doubling[46] and repetition (whether simple or conceptual[47]), Tyrtaeus provides memory-triggers that in turn act as stimuli for the emotions. The effect of these strategies is to generate identification and emotional intimacy between author and audience through the common bond of tradition and experience.[48] In the battle scene of fr. 11 just cited, for example, the detailed representation of the warrior's resistance would have been recognizable as partaking in a code of conduct[49] that was commonly accepted by its culturally homogenous audience of brave warriors. As part of this process, familiar details are used to solicit emotional responses from his listeners, constructing an indissoluble link with other members of the group by means of references to places, ideas, acti-

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[44] Adkins 1985, 84.

[45] Adkins 1985, 84–86 where however one can discern an unmethodical oscillation between consideration of details as otiose in some cases and rhetorically effective in others.

[46] See Prato 1968, 61* for a list of examples.

[47] See Prato 1968, 61* for a list of examples. Cf. also Jaeger 1966, 126 for word-for-word repetition.

[48] Tannen 1989, 16, and especially 134–166, has shown how images evoke certain scenarios, and how these scenarios in turn form the basis for a better understanding of the images, since the people who inhabit them are engaged in activities that would have been both culturally and personally significant. Even the images' details, Tannen has emphasized, have their importance. Because they are specific, yet familiar, to the author and his public, they establish a certain type of intimacy between the two—the intimacy of recognition.

[49] Cf. also fr. 10.31 W.^{2} For the attitude see Hom. *Il.* 11.408–410 (Odysseus) οἶδα γὰρ ὅττι κακοὶ μὲν ἀποίχονται πολέμοιο, / ὃς δέ κ᾽ ἀριστεύῃσι μάχῃ ἔνι, τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ / ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἤ τ᾽ ἔβλητ᾽ ἤ τ᾽ ἔβαλ᾽ ἄλλον.

vities, objects, and eventually by promoting the men's more passionate participation in the group. The audience could thus demonstrate its allegiance to the group (both political and social) to which its members belonged, as well as its devotion to the ideals which this group cultivated.[50]

But this is not the only component of Tyrtaeus' poetics of description. The elegiac couplet inherently demonstrates a strong rhythmic affinity to the hexameter,[51] and this affinity makes elegy especially receptive to epic effects of various kinds. At least three of Tyrtaeus' fragments preserved by *P.Berol.* 11675, with battle as their theme, seem to have developed similes of a Homeric sort.[52] These similes, which are almost absent from the other surviving fragments of Tyrtaeus,[53] elevate the contemporary struggle to the level of the heroic encounter and suggest a continuity between the two worlds. Present circumstances are seen through the lens of the past which provides the norm and the pattern for Tyrtaeus' world: he creates a contemporary epic, and celebrates contemporary men in aspirational heroic terms.

Quite differently from Tyrtaeus, Solon struggles to construct a new ethical framework in both the private and civic sphere; his eunomia can only selectively share in and perpetuate the values of the tradition. As Nagy[54] remarks "the *exemplum* demands a mentality of the unchanging, of adherence to the model" (even if myth is changeable over time). For the author of an ideological reform, paradigms from the past, indeed the past itself, could be of little help.

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[50] See Roisman 2003, 128: "for courage to be counted as virtue, it had to be cultural, not natural".

[51] For the relevant structural and functional differences between hexameter and elegiac *distichon* see now Nagy 2010.

[52] Fr. 10B col. 1, 35–44 G.-P.^{2} = 20.7–15 W.^{2} with a simile resembling the one of the race-course of *Il.* 22.162–166 used in Achilles' pursuit of Hector around the walls of Troy; fr. 10C col. 1, 77–80 G.-P.^{2} = 23.14–16 W.^{2} with a comparison which seems to be concluded in ἴκελοι of l. 16; fr. 10B col. 2, 51–53 G.-P.^{2} = 21.5–7 W.^{2} where the repetition of ἀργεσ[τ "clearing", referring to the south wind of Hom. *Il.* 11.306, may have implied a simile in which the scattering of the enemy was perhaps compared to the clearing effects of the wind.

[53] The exception is fr. 5 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι, / δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες ἀναγκαίης ὕπο λυγρῆς / ἥμισυ πάνθ' ὅσσων καρπὸν ἄρουρα φέρει.

[54] Nagy 1992, 326.

Editorial Note

A few words about transliteration and translation: I have in general used the familiar anglicized forms in transliterating Greek names—for example Socrates instead of Sokrates, Achilles instead of Akhilleus. I have usually referred to the standard Oxford Classical Texts. Archaic elegiac authors are quoted from B. Gentili and C. Prato, *Poetae elegiaci*, I–II, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1988–2002, iambic authors from M.L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati*, I–II, 2nd ed., Oxford 1989–1992. In translating from Greek I have generally consulted both older and more recent Loeb Classical Library translations, and made use occasionally of other existing translations.

TEXT

FOREWORD

The text which follows is based on the edition by B. Gentili and C. Prato, though I diverge from them at several points.[1] The last four decades have seen two complete and one partial edition of Solon's fragments. The fact that Christoph Mülke's recent revision of the manuscripts of Solon's "political fragments" yielded, for all its meticulousness, very little new information, is a good indication that a fourth inspection of the manuscripts is not an urgent task for the current Solonian scholarship. My apparatus is therefore drawn from the recension documented in the editions by Gentili-Prato^2, West^2, and Mülke and is intended merely to support my commentary. I omit all variants which appear to be obvious mistakes but have tried to provide a satisfactory record of the variants concerning the vocalism and dialectisms of Solon's language, since I have often dealt with this debatable issue in the commentary.

[1] They are discussed in the commentary.

1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}

Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένωι·
ὄλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε καὶ πρὸς ἁπάντων
ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν·
εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν,
τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.
χρήματα δ' ἱμείρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι
οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε Δίκη.
πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν.
ὃν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
οὐκ ἐθέλων ἕπεται, ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτηι·
ἀρχῆς δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης γίγνεται ὥστε πυρός,
φλαύρη μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνιηρὴ δὲ τελευτᾶι·
οὐ γὰρ δὴν θνητοῖς ὕβριος ἔργα πέλει,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾶι τέλος, ἐξαπίνης δέ
- ὥστ' ἄνεμος νεφέλας αἶψα διεσκέδασεν
ἠρινός, ὃς πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτοιο
πυθμένα κινήσας, γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον
δηιώσας καλὰ ἔργα, θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν ἱκάνει
οὐρανόν, αἰθρίην δ' αὖτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν·
λάμπει δ' ἠελίοιο μένος κατὰ πίονα γαῖαν
καλόν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν—
τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἑκάστωι
ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος,
αἰεὶ δ' οὔ ἑ λέληθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν
θυμὸν ἔχει, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη·
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὁ δ' ὕστερον· οἳ δὲ φύγωσιν
αὐτοί, μηδὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιοῦσα κίχηι,
ἤλυθε πάντως αὖτις· ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω.
θνητοὶ δ' ὧδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε,
† ἐν δηνην † αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει,
πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὖτις ὀδύρεται, ἄχρι δὲ τούτου
χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.
χὤστις μὲν νούσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέηισι πιεσθῆι,
ὡς ὑγιὴς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·
ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ
καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων·
εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται,

κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ.
σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὁ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλᾶται
ἐν νηυσὶν χρήιζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν
ἰχθυόεντ' ἀνέμοισι φορεόμενος ἀργαλέοισιν,
φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος·
ἄλλος γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ' ἄροτρα μέλει·
ἄλλος Ἀθηναίης τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω
ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν ξυλλέγεται βίοτον,
ἄλλος Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθείς,
ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος·
ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων,
ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,
ὧι συνομαρτήσωσι θεοί· τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως
οὔτε τις οἰωνὸς ῥύσεται οὔθ' ἱερά·
ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες
ἰητροί, καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος·
πολλάκι δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος,
κοὐκ ἄν τις λύσαιτ' ἤπια φάρμακα δούς·
τὸν δὲ κακαῖς νούσοισι κυκώμενον ἀργαλέαις τε
ἁψάμενος χειροῖν αἶψα τίθησ' ὑγιῆ.
Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,
δῶρα δ' ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.
πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
πῆι μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,
τῶι δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσι,
συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.
πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·
οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὤπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεύς
πέμψηι τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Testes: Stobaeus 3.9.23, III.351.5–355.7 Hense; Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 6.11.1 (1); Crates Theb., *SH* 359.1–2 (1–2); Plutarchus, *Sol.* 2.3 et *Publ.* 24.7 (7–8); Aristoteles, *Pol.* 1.1256b31, Plutarchus, *cupid.divit.* 524e, Basilius, *adulesc.* 9.103, p. 58 Boulenger = 9.20, p. 126 Naldini (unde Gnomol. cod. Marc. 496 f. 115[r]) (71); Theognis 227–232 (71–76) et 585–590 = Stobaeus 4.47.16, V.1006.12–1007.6 Hense (65–70).

6 δεινὸν Stob.; πικρὸν Voss.gr. O9 13 ἄτη Stob. codd. potiores, ἄτηι recc. 16 δὴν Gesner, unde aliquot recc.; δὴ Stob. S 22 αὖτις corr. Bach; αὖθις Stob. S ἔθηκεν Stob. codd. plerique; ἔδωκεν Vallicell.gr. E21 f. 213[b] 23 κατὰ πίονα Stob. codd. plerique; κατ' ἀπείρονα Paris.gr. 1985[2] et Schowii B 27 οὔ ἑ corr. Hermann; οὔτι vel οὔτε Stob. 28 πάντως Stob. codd. plerique; πάντων Regin.gr.

146 f. 9ᵛ; παντὸς Ven.Marc. IV 29, unde Trincavelli 29 ἔτεισεν corr. Hiller et Hense; ἔτισεν Stob. οἷ Voss.gr. O9, Trincavelli (οἱ S); εἰ Vallicell.gr. E21; ἦν recc. 31 interpunct. corr. Wyttenbach et Gerhard; post ἤλυθε vel πάντως distinguunt codd. αὖτις corr. Brunck (αὖθις Wyttenbach); αὐτίκ' S ἀναίτιοι recc.; ἀναίτια S, Trincavelli 32 ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω Paris.gr. 1985[2], Schowii C; ἡγεμόνων ὀπίσω S 33 νοέομεν West; νοεῦμεν S 36 τερπόμεθα S post corr., Voss.gr. O9, Trincavelli; τρεφόμεθα S ante corr. 42 πάντως corr. Gesner; πάντων S 45 φορεόμενος West; φορεύμενος S 46 οὐδεμίαν corr. Schneidewin; οὐδεμίην Voss.gr. O9, Regin.gr. 146, aliique recc.; οὐδὲ μίην S 48 μέλει corr. Gesner et recc. aliquot; μένει S 50 ἔργα δαεὶς Paris.gr. 1985[2], aliique recc.; ἔργαλαεις Voss.gr. O9[1], ἔργαλα εἰς S, ἔργαλα εἰν Trincavelli 51 Μουσέων Turnebus; Μουσάων S 55 πάντως plerique codd.; πάντα Paris.gr. 1985 supra lin., Regin.gr. 146 57 ἔργον plerique codd.; ἔργα Voss.gr. O9, Paris.gr. 1985[2] 59 γίγνεται Voss.gr. O9; γίνεται S, Trincavelli; ἔσσεται Schowii B 60 κοὐκ ἂν Paris.gr. 1985, Regin.gr. 146; καὶ οὐ κἂν S (καὶ οὐκ ἂν Voss.gr. O9) 62 χειροῖν Trincavelli, recc.; χεροῖν S, Voss.gr. O9 66 πῆι vel πῇ vel ποῖ Theogn. (et Theogn. ap. Stob.); ἧι vel ᾗ S, Trincavelli; τί Voss.gr. O9 χρήματος Stob.; πρήγματος Theogn. 67 εὖ ἔρδειν Stob.; εὐδοκιμεῖν Theogn. 69 κακῶς (-λ- supra -κ- man.rec.) ἔρδοντι S; καλῶς ἔρδοντι Voss.gr. O9, Trincavelli; καλῶς ποιεῦντι Theogn. (καλὸν ποιοῦντι Theogn. ap. Stob.) περὶ πάντα Stob.; καλὰ πάντα Theogn. ap. Stob. δίδωσι Stob.; τίθησιν Theogn. 70 ἀγαθήν Stob.; ἀγαθῶν Theogn. ap. Stob. 71 ἀνδράσι κεῖται Stob.; ἀνθρώποισιν Theogn. Plut. 72 ἡμέων Stob.; ἡμῶν Theogn. 73 διπλασίως Stob. S; διπλάσιον Theogn. 74–75 κέρδεα—ἀθάνατοι / … αὐτῶν Stob.; χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς γίγνεται (vel γίνεται) ἀφροσύνη / … αὐτῆς Theogn. 75 ὁπότε Theogn.; ὁπόταν Stob. S 76 πέμψηι Stob. codd. recc., Theogn. A; πέμψει Stob. S et Voss.gr. O9, Theogn. rell.codd. τεισομένην corr. Hiller et Hense; τισομένην Stob. S; τειρομένοις Theogn. ἄλλοτε ἄλλος Theogn. p; -τε τ' ἄλ- Stob. S, Theogn. AO

2 G.-P.[2] = 1–3 W.[2]

Αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος
κόσμον ἐπέων ᾠδὴν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος.

*

εἴην δὴ τότ' ἐγὼ Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινήτης
ἀντί γ' Ἀθηναίου πατρίδ' ἀμειψάμενος·
αἶψα γὰρ ἂν φάτις ἥδε μετ' ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο·
"Ἀττικὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν."

*

ἴομεν ἐς Σαλαμῖνα μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου
ἱμερτῆς χαλεπόν τ' αἶσχος ἀπωσόμενοι.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 8.1–2 (1–2); Diogenes Laertius 1.47 (3–6 et 7–8); Plutarchus, *Praec. pol.* 813f (3–4); schol. ad Demosth. 19.251, 2.81 Dilts (7–8); Apostolius sive Arsenius 6b, *Paroemiographi Gr.* II.463.20–21 Leutsch-Schneidewin (7–8).

3 Σικινήτης Diog. N (*Monac.gr.* 159); -νίτης Plut. *Praec.* 4 ἀμείψασθαι Diog. F 6 Σαλαμιναφετῶν corr. Vossius et Hermann; σαλαμίναφετων Diog. B; Σαλαμῖν' ἀφέντων Diog. F et P post corr. 8 ἀποσόμενοι Diog. plerique codd.; -σάμενοι Diog. B, schol. Dem., Apost.

3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}

Ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται
   αἶσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων·
τοίη γὰρ μεγάθυμος ἐπίσκοπος ὀβριμοπάτρη
   Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη χεῖρας ὕπερθεν ἔχει·
αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίῃσιν
   ἀστοὶ βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,
δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἑτοῖμον
   ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας
   εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίηι

*

   πλουτέουσιν δ' ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι

*

   οὔθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων
φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν ἐφ' ἁρπαγῆι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,
   οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα,
ἣ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
   τῶι δὲ χρόνωι πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη.
τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσηι πόλει ἔρχεται ἕλκος ἄφυκτον,
   ἐς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην,
ἣ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὕδοντ' ἐπεγείρει,
   ὃς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην·
ἐκ γὰρ δυσμενέων ταχέως πολυήρατον ἄστυ
   τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικέουσι φίλαις.
ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμωι στρέφεται κακά· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
   ἱκνέονται πολλοὶ γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπήν
πραθέντες δεσμοῖσί τ' ἀεικελίοισι δεθέντες.

*

οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἑκάστωι,
   αὔλειοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,
ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἕρκος ὑπέρθορεν, εὗρε δὲ πάντας,
   εἰ καί τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῶι ἦι θαλάμου.
ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει,
   ὡς κακὰ πλεῖστα πόλει Δυσνομία παρέχει,
Εὐνομία δ' εὔκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει,
   καὶ θαμὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας·
τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ,
   αὐαίνει δ' ἄτης ἄνθεα φυόμενα,

εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
πραΰνει, παύει δ' ἔργα διχοστασίης,
παύει δ' ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, ἔστι δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά.

Testes: Demosthenes 19.254–256 (codd. sec. MacDowell 2000).

13 ἀφαρπαγῆι FQY; ἐφ' ἁρπαγῆι recc. 15 ante σύνοιδε in QPRLp intrusit δ' ἔληθε vel λέληθε 16 ἀποτεισομένη corr. Hiller; -τισομένη vel -τισαμένη codd. 18 ἐπεγείρει vel -ειν plerique; ἐπαγείρειν Y 22 φίλαις corr. Bergk; φίλους vel φίλοις codd. 25 δεθέντες P post corr. MnVg δοθέντες potiores plerique 27 ἔτ' F; ὅτ' plerique 28 πάντως rec.; πάντων vel πάντας plerique 29 καί anon. in marg. Aldinae Lessingii (= Reg.gr. 102), f. 220r; εἴ γέ vel ἤ καί codd. ἧι θαλάμου corr. Schneidewin; ἢ θαλάμωι codd. 34 τραχέα λειαίνει plerique; τραχέα δ' ἰαίνει Q

4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}

Γιγνώσκω καί μοι φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν ἄλγεα κεῖται,
  πρεσβυτάτην ἐσορῶν γαῖαν̣ [Ἰ]α̣ονίας
κλινομένην

Testes: Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 5.1–2.

1 γιγνώσκω corr. Blass, alii; γινώσκω Aristot.   3 κλινομένην agnovit Wilcken; alii legerant καινομένην (unde et καιομένην)

5 G.-P.² = 4c & 4b W.²

5A
Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 5.3 … παραινῶν τοῖς πλουσίοις μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν· [5 B sequitur]. καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει (scil. Solon) τοῖς πλουσίοις· διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῆι τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοικέναι φησὶ *τήν τε φ[..] ..[..] ..ṭιαν* (*φιλοχρηματίαν*, coll. Plut. *Sol.* 14.3) *τήν ϑ' ὑπερηϕαṿ[ί]αν*, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστώσης.

*

5B
ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσ̣αντ̣ες̣ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ,
οἳ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἠ]λ̣άσατε,
ἐν μετρίοισι τί̣θ̣εσ̣θε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια τα[ῦ]τ̣' ἔσεται.

Testes: A) Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 5.3; B) Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 5.3; Plutarchus, *Sol.* 14.1 (1).

[ἠ]λ̣άσατε suppl. Postgate

6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2]

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεί,
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 3.2; Theognis 315–318 = Stobaeus 3.1.8, III.5.9–13 Hense; Demetrius Cydon., *Epist.* 44, 115.19 Cammelli (2–3a); Plutarchus, *inim. util.* 92e (2–3a); *tranquill. animi* 472d (2–4); *prof. virt.* 78c (2–4); Basilius, *adulesc.* 5.45, 48 Boulenger = 5.11, p. 98 Naldini (2–4). 4 respicit Thomas magister, *regis offic. PG* 145.449a.

1 γὰρ Plut.; τοι Theogn.; om. Stob. πλουτέουσι West; πλουτεῦσι Plut. codd. omnes praeter S; πλουτοῦσι plerique et Plut. *Sol.* S   2 (γ') αὐτοῖς Plut.; αὐτοῖς Basil.; τούτοις Theogn., Stob.   3 αἰεί Plut. *Sol.* C, Theogn., Stob., Basil.; ἐστι Plut. alias 4 ἄλλοτε ἄλ- plerique; ἄλλοτε τ' ἄλ- Plut. *Sol.* S, Theogn. A

7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}

δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ,
τιμῆς οὔτ' ἀφελὼν οὔτ' ἐπορεξάμενος·
οἳ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·
ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἴασ' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

Testes: Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 11.2–12.1; Plutarchus, *Sol.* 18.5.

1 γέρας Aristot.; κράτος Plut. ἀπαρκ̣ε̣ῖ Aristot.; ἐπαρκεῖ Plut.

8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}

δῆμος δ' ὧδ' ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕποιτο,
μήτε λίαν ἀνεθεὶς μήτε βιαζόμενος·
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώποις ὁπ̣όσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι.

Testes: Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 12.2; Plutarchus, *Publ.* 25.6 (1–2); Theognis 153–154 (3–4); Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 6.8.7 (3). 3a tamquam proverbium citant vel respiciunt multi (Aristoteles fr. 76.1 Gigon; schol. ad Pind. *Ol.* 1.89e, 2.173a, 13.12e (Hom. ?): 1.37, 1.102, 1.359 Drachmann; *Paroemiographi Gr.* I.308.4–5, II.218.3–4, II.774.1–2 Leutsch-Schneidewin).

1 δ' Aristot.; om. Plut. 2 λίαν plerique; λίην Plut. S βιαζόμενος Aristot.; πιεζόμενος Plut. 3 γὰρ … πολὺς Aristot.; τοι … κακῶι Theogn. 4 ανθρωποισοπ̣ρ̣οσοις Aristot.; ἀνθρώπωι καὶ ὅτωι Theogn.

9 G.-P.[2] = 7 W.[2]

ἔργμασι⟨ν⟩ ἐν μεγάλοις πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν χαλεπόν.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 25.6.

10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2}

Νείλου ἐπὶ προχοῇσι Κανωβίδος ἐγγύθεν ἀκτῆς.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 26.1.

προχοῇσι plerique; προχοαῖσι S

11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2}

νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν Σολίοισι πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ᾽ ἀνάσσων
τήνδε πόλιν ναίοις καὶ γένος ὑμέτερον·
αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ ξὺν νηὶ θοῆι κλεινῆς ἀπὸ νήσου
ἀσκηθῆ πέμποι Κύπρις ἰοστέφανος·
οἰκισμῶι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶιδε χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι
ἐσθλὸν καὶ νόστον πατρίδ᾽ ἐς ἡμετέρην.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 26.3–4; *Arati Vit.* I = schol. ad Arat. vetera p. 7.14–24 Martin (1–4).

2 ναίοις Plut.; δύοις *Ar. Vita*

12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}

ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἠδὲ χαλάζης,
βροντὴ δ' ἐκ λαμπρῆς γίγνεται ἀστεροπῆς·
ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται, ἐς δὲ μονάρχου
δῆμος ἀιδρείηι δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν.
λίαν δ' ἐξάραντ' ⟨οὐ⟩ ῥάιδιόν ἐστι κατασχεῖν
ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρή ⟨περὶ⟩ πάντα νοεῖν.

Testes: Diodorus Siculus 9.20.2 (versus omnes), 19.1.4 (3–4); Diogenes Laertius 1.50 (1–4); Apostolius sive Arsenius 6.93c, *Paroemiographi Gr.* II.390.8–11 Leutsch-Schneidewin (1–4); Plutarchus, *Sol.* 3.6 (1–2).

1 πέλεται Diod.; φέρεται Diog. (χεῖται Φ), Apost. ἠδὲ plerique; ἠὲ dub. West χαλάζης Diog. BFΦ; θαλάττης vel θαλάσσης Diod., Diog. P. 2 λαμπρῆς plerique; λαμπρᾶς Diod., Plut. γίγνεται Diog. rec. vulg.; γίνεται rell. (γείνεται Diog. B) 3 ἐς plerique; ἐκ Diod. 9 μονάρχου plerique; τυράννου Diod. 19 ἀιδρείηι Diod. 9 et 19 R^2, Diog. P^2, Q, Φ; ἀιδρίηι vel ἀιδρίη vel ἀιδρύη Diod. 19 praeter R^2 et Diog. P^1, F; ἀίδρις ὢν Diog. B^2, Apost. 4 δουλοσύνην plerique; δουλοσύνης Diod. 9 ἔπεσεν plerique, -σαν Diod. 19 5 λίαν δ' ἐξάραντ' ⟨οὐ⟩ ῥάιδιόν corr. Schneidewin (sed λίην); λείης δ' ἐξέραντα ῥάιδιον Diod. 9 6 ⟨περὶ⟩ Dindorf

13 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2}

ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράσσεται· ἢν δέ τις αὐτὴν
μὴ κινῆι, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτη.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 3.6.

14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}

δείξει δὴ μανίην μὲν ἐμὴν βαιὸς χρόνος ἀστοῖς,
  δείξει ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης.

Testes: Diogenes Laertius 1.49.

15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2}

εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δι᾽ ὑμετέραν κακότητα,
μὴ θεοῖσιν τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε·
αὐτοὶ γὰρ τούτους ηὐξήσατε ῥύματα δόντες
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην.
ὑμέων δ᾽ εἷς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπεκος ἴχνεσι βαίνει,
σύμπασιν δ᾽ ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος·
ἐς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὁρᾶτε καὶ εἰς ἔπος αἰόλον ἀνδρός,
εἰς ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε.

Testes: Diodorus Siculus 9.20.3; Diogenes Laertius 1.51–52; Plutarchus, *Sol.* 30.3 = Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 1.23.1 (7, 5, 6), 30.8 (1–4); Nicetas Choniates, *hist.* 1.584.16–20 Van Dieten (1–4).

1 λυγρά plerique; δεινά Diog. ὑμετέραν Diod. V, Diog. F, Nic.; ἡμετέρην Plut. U; ὑμετέρην plerique 2 μὴ θεοῖσιν Diod., Plut. S; μή τι θεοῖς Diog., Plut. Y, Nic. τούτων plerique; ταύτην Diod. μοῖραν Diod., Diog.; μῆνιν Plut., Nic. 3 ῥύματα Diod., Plut.; ῥύσια Diog. 6 χαῦνος Plut.; κοῦφος Diod., Diog. 7 ἔπη αἱμύλου Plut.; ἔπος αἰόλον Diod., Diog. 8 γιγνόμενον Diog. B^1; γινόμενον plerique

16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2}

ἔσθ' ἥβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄνθεσι παιδοφιλήσηι,
μηρῶν ἱμείρων καὶ γλυκεροῦ στόματος.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Amat.* 5.751 b; Athenaeus 13.602e (2); Apuleius, *Apol.* 9 (2).

ἱμείρων om. Plut.

17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2}

ὄλβιος, ὧι παῖδές τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός.

Testes: Theognis 1253–1254; Plato, *Lys*. 212d–e; Hermias in Platon. *Phaedr*. 231e (p. 38.14 Couvreur); Ps.-Lucianus, *Amor*. 48 (1).

1 ὄλβιος plerique; ὄλβιοι Herm. codd. aliquot ὧι plerique; ὧ Herm. φίλοι plerique; νέοι Ps.-Luc. 2 καὶ … ἀλλοδαπός Plat., Herm; θηρευταί τε κύνες καὶ ξένοι ἀλλοδαποί Theogn.

18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2}

ἶσόν τοι πλουτέουσιν, ὅτωι πολὺς ἄργυρός ἐστι
καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία
ἵπποι θ’ ἡμίονοί τε, καὶ ὧι μόνα ταῦτα πάρεστι,
γαστρί τε καὶ πλευραῖς καὶ ποσὶν ἁβρὰ παθεῖν,
παιδός τ’ ἠδὲ γυναικός, ἐπὴν καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀφίκηται,
ὥρη· σὺν δ’ ἥβη γίγνεται ἁρμοδίη.
ταῦτ’ ἄφενος θνητοῖσι· τὰ γὰρ περιώσια πάντα
χρήματ’ ἔχων οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀίδεω,
οὐδ’ ἂν ἄποινα διδοὺς θάνατον φύγοι οὐδὲ βαρείας
νούσους οὐδὲ κακὸν γῆρας ἐπερχόμενον.

Testes: Theognis 719–728 = Stobaeus 4.33.7, V.798.13–799.4 Hense; Plutarchus, *Sol.* 2.3 (1–6).

1 πλουτέουσιν West; πλουτοῦσιν codd. ὅτωι Theogn. (ὧιτε vel ὧτε Plut.); ὅσοις Stob. 3 μόνα ταῦτα Plut.; τὰ δέοντα Theogn.; τάδε πάντα Stob. 4 πλευραῖς Theogn. et Stob.; πλευρῆι Plut. 5 ἐπὴν καὶ ταῦτ’ Plut.; ὅταν δέ κε (vel καὶ) τῶν(δ’) Theogn. et Stob. 6 ὥρη, σὺν δ’ ἥβη Theogn. et Stob.; ἥβη, σὺν δ’ ὥρη(ι) Plut. ἁρμοδία Stob. SM, (-δίη Schneidewin), Theogn. A (ἁρμονία Stob. A et Plut.); ἁρμόδιος vel ἁρμόδιον Stob. codd. rell., Theogn. O

19 G.-P.^{2} = 14 W.^{2}

οὐδὲ μάκαρ οὐδεὶς πέλεται βροτός, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ
πάντες, ὅσους θνητοὺς ἠέλιος καθορᾶι.

Testes: Stobaeus 4.34.23, V.833.9–11 Hense.

20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2}

γνωμοσύνης δ᾽ ἀφανὲς χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι
μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μοῦνον ἔχει.

Testes: Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 5.81.1 unde Theodoretus Cyrrh., *Graec. affect.* 1.73 p. 123 Canivet.

2 πάντων Clem.; πάντα Theod.

21 G.-P.^{2} = 17 W.^{2}

πάντηι δ’ ἀθανάτων ἀφανὴς νόος ἀνθρώποισιν.

Testes: Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 5.129.5–6; Eusebius, *Praep.Evang.* 13.13.57.
πάντη Clem.; πάμπαν Eus.

22 G.-P.² = 22ª W.²

εἰπέμεναι Κριτίαι ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν·
οὐ γὰρ ἁμαρτινόωι πείσεται ἡγεμόνι.

Testes: Proclus in Platon. *Tim.* 20e, 1.81–82 Diehl; Aristoteles, *Rh.* 1.1375b 31; comm. anon. ad loc. = *Comment. in Arist. Gr.* 21.81.15 Rabe (1).

1 εἰπέμεναι Procl. (εἰπέμεν Procl. N); εἰπεῖν μοι Aristot.; εἰπεῖν τῶι comm. Κριτίαι Aristot. et comm.; Κριτίηι Procl. ξανθότριχι Procl.; πυρ(ρ)ότριχι Aristot.; τῶι πυρ- comm.

23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}

Παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἐὼν ἔτι νήπιος ἕρκος ὀδόντων
    φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρῶτον ἐν ἕπτ' ἔτεσιν.
τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέσηι θεὸς ἕπτ' ἐνιαυτούς,
    ἥβης ἐκφαίνει σήματα γιγνομένης.
τῆι τριτάτηι δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων
    λαχνοῦται, χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης.
τῆι δὲ τετάρτηι πᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος
    ἰσχύν, ἧι τ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς.
πέμπτηι δ' ὥριον ἄνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἶναι
    καὶ παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεήν.
τῆι δ' ἕκτηι περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,
    οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμν' ἐθέλει.
ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἑβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος
    ὀκτώ τ'· ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη.
τῆι δ' ἐνάτηι ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ
    πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη.
τὴν δεκάτην δ' εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο,
    οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἐὼν μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου.

Testes: Philo Alexandr., *Opif. mundi* 104, 1.36.8 Cohn (codd. M, AB, FG, H, unde Par. 1834 = *Anecdota Paris.* 1.46 Cramer (cf. West, ed.) et *Paroemiographi Gr.* II.626.4–627.4 Leutsch-Schneidewin); Clemens Alexandr., *Str.* 6.144.3–4 (cod. L); Anatolius, *Περὶ δεκάδος* 37 Heiberg (codd. M, H); Apostolius 14.94.

3 τελέσηι plerique; τελέσει Phil. MABH, Clem., Anat. M 4 ἐκφαίνει Phil. (sed δὴ φαίνει M; δὲ φαίνει Paris. 1843); δὲ φανείσης Clem.; δ' ἐφάνει Anat. H; δ' ἐφάνη Anat. M σήματα plerique; σπέρματα Clem. γιγνομένης Phil. M; γινομένης Phil. AB, Clem. (sed -μένων), Anat.; γεινομένης Phil. FGH et Paris. 1843 5 ἔτι Emperius et Bergk, ἐπὶ codd. 7 πᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος Clem.; παῖς τις ἐν ἑβδομά(δεσ)σιν ἄρ- Phil.; παῖς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδεσιν ἄρ- 8 ἧι τ' Par. 1843 et Anat.; ἥν τ' Clem.; ἥ τ' vel ἡ τ' plerique 9 ὥριον plerique; ὥρη vel ὥρηι Phil. AB 10 εἰσοπίσω Clem.; ἐξοπίσω plerique 12 οὐδ' ἔρδειν ... ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα plerique (ἐν δ' ἔρδ- Par. 1843), οὐδ' ἐσιδεῖν ... ἔργα μάταια Clem. -α θέλει omnes; ἐθέλει Apost. 13 μέγ' ἄριστος Phil. M, Clem.; μετ' ἀρίσταις rell. 14 τ' Mangey; δ' codd. omnes ἀμφοτέρων Clem.; -ότερον vel -ότερα rell. (ἀμφο, supra scr. τρ Anat.) 15 μαλακώτερα plerique; μετριώτερα Clem. 16 γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη plerique; σῶμά τε καὶ δύναμις Clem. 17 τὴν δεκάτην Phil. M; τῆι δεκάτηι rell. δ' εἴ τις—ἵκοιτο rell. (δ' om. Phil. H; δὲ ὅστις Anat.); δ' ὅτε δὴ τελέσηι θεὸς ἕπτ' ἐνιαυτούς Clem. 18 ἐὼν ... ἔχοι vel ἔχει rell.; ἔοι ... ἔχων Anat.

24 G.-P.^{2} = 26 W.^{2}

ἔργα δὲ Κυπρογενοῦς νῦν μοι φίλα καὶ Διονύσου
καὶ Μουσέων, ἃ τίθησ' ἀνδράσιν εὐφροσύνας.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Amat.* 5.751e, *Sol.* 31.7, *Sept.sap.conv.* 13.155e; Hermias in Platon. *Phaedr.* 231e (38.14 Couvreur); *P.Hercul.* 1384, fr. 1 (*Hercul. vol.* ed. altera 11.52).

1 δὲ plurimi; τὰ Herm. 2 Μουσέων (cum crasi) West; -σῶν *P.Hercul.*; -σάων Plut. U, Herm.

25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2}

… πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί.

Testes: Ps.-Plato, *iust*. 374a; schol. ad loc. (402 Greene).

26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}

ἀλλ᾽ εἴ μοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι πείσεαι, ἔξελε τοῦτο,
μηδὲ μέγαιρ᾽, ὅτι σέο λῷιον ἐπεφρασάμην,
καὶ μεταποίησον, Λιγυαιστάδη, ὧδε δ᾽ ἄειδε·
'ὀγδωκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου.'

Testes: Diogenes Laertius 1.60.

1 καὶ νῦν Thiersch; κἂν νῦν codd. τοῦτο B, F ante corr.; τοῦτον F post corr., P 2 σέο West; σεῦ codd. λῷιον ἐπεφρ- Boissonade (λῷιον ἐφρ- Florent Chrestien); τοῖον ἐπεφρ- codd. 3 Λιγυαιστάδη Diels (Λιγυαστάδη Bergk), ναιγιαστάδη vel α(ι)γιασταδί codd.

27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2}

μηδέ μοι ἄκλαυτος θάνατος μόλοι, ἀλλὰ φίλοισι
καλλείποιμι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Publ.* 24.5; Stobaeus 4.54.3, V.1113.8–10 Hense; latine transtulit Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.117, respexit *sen.* 73.

1 ἄκλαυτος van Herwerden; ἄκλαυστος codd.   2 καλλείποιμι Gesner, καλλίπ. Stob., ποιήσαιμι Plut.

28 G.-P.^{2} = 18 W.^{2}

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Testes: Ps.-Plato, *Amat.* 133c; schol. ad loc. (110 Greene); Plutarchus, *Sol.* 2.2 et 31.6.

Proverbium citant vel respiciunt multi: Plato, *Lach.* 188b, 189a, *Resp.* 536d; Cicero, *sen.* 26, 50; Val.Max. 8.7 ext. 14; Dio Chrys. 18.1 (2.251.5 von Arnim); Tatianus, *adv. Graec.* 35 (37.17 Schwartz); schol. ad Soph. *Ant.* 711; Ioannes Sic. ad Hermog. *Rhet.Gr.* 6.201.17 Walz; Suid. γ 246 (1.523.16–17 Adler); Psellus, *oper. daemon.* 14 Boissonade; *Paroem.Gr.* (passim).

πολλὰ plurimi, πάντα Tat., schol. Soph.

29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2}

εἰ δὲ γῆς ἐφεισάμην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίας ἀμειλίχου
οὐ καθηψάμην μιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος,
οὐδὲν αἰδέομαι· πλέον γὰρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω
πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 14.8–9.

2 βίας corr. Hartung; βίης codd. 4 αἰδέομαι West, αἰδεῦμαι codd.

29^{a} G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2}

οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ·
ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο.
περιβαλὼν δ’ ἄγραν ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἐπέσπασεν μέγα
δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ’ ἁμαρτῆι καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς·
ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν
καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν,
ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κἀπιτετρῖφθαι γένος.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 14.9–15.

1 ἔφυ plerique, ἔφυς S (sed ς eras. S^{1}) 4 θ’ vulgo edd., τε S, δ’ Y, supra script. S ἁμαρτῇ, ἁμαρτῆι vel. ἁμάρτη codd. 5 ἤθελον Xylander, ἤθελ(ε)ν codd. 7 ἀσκὸς S, αὐτὸς Y (et S in marg.)

29b G.-P.2 = 34 W.2

οἱ δ' ἐφ' ἁρπαγαῖσιν ἦλθον· ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεάν,
κἀδόκ[ο]υν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὑρήσειν πολύν
καί με κωτίλλοντα λείως τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον.
χαῦνα μὲν τότ' ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δέ μοι χολούμενοι
λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρῶσι πάντες ὥστε δήιον,
οὐ χρεών· ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα, σὺν θεοῖσιν ἤνυσα,
ἄλλα δ' οὐ μάτην ἔερδον, οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος
ἁνδάνει βίαι τι [ῥέζ]ειν, οὐδὲ πιεί[ρ]ας χθονός
πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοιρίαν ἔχειν.

Testes: Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 12.3; Plutarchus, *Sol.* 16.3 (4–5); Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 28.137, II.184.29–185.4 Keil (6b–7a).

1 οἱ δ' corr. Richards (prob. West); οἳ δ' plerique edd. 4 χαῦνα plerique; χάρμα Plut. S 6 γὰρ εἶπα plerique; ἄελπτα Aelius Arist. 8 ῥέζειν suppl. Keynon (.ẹ[.]ν Aristot. pap. Lond., deest Berol.) πιεί[ρ]ης suppl. West (πιεί[ρ]ας Gentili-Prato), πιεί[.]ας Aristot. pap. Lond., deest Berol.

30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον
δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐν δίκηι χρόνου
μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγώ ποτε
ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας,
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.
πολλοὺς δ᾽ Ἀθήνας, πατρίδ᾽ ἐς θεόκτιτον,
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀναγκαίης ὕπο
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ᾽ Ἀττικὴν
ἱέντας, ὡς ἂν πολλαχῆι πλανωμένους,
τοὺς δ᾽ ἐνθάδ᾽ αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἤθη δεσποτῶν τρομεομένους,
ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα. ταῦτα μὲν κράτει
ὁμοῦ βίαν τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας,
ἔρεξα καὶ διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην,
θεσμοὺς δ᾽ ὁμοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κἀγαθῶι,
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην,
ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ᾽ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών,
κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήμων ἀνήρ,
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥνδανεν τότε,
αὖτις δ᾽ ἃ τοῖσιν οὕτεροι φρασαίατο,
πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἤδ᾽ ἐχηρώθη πόλις.
τῶν οὕνεκ᾽ ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόμενος
ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος.

Testes: Aristoteles, *Ath.Pol.* 12.4–5; Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 28.138, II.185.5–186.21 Keil (3–27); Plutarchus, *Sol.* 15.1–2 (16) et *Sol.* 15.5–6 (6–7, 9 partim, 11–14).

9 ανηγαγον Aristot. pap. Berol. ([.] γ̣ηγαγον Lond.); ἀπήγαγεν/ἀπῆγεν Plut. 11 χρειουςφυγοντας Aristot. pap. Lond.; χρεωνφυγοντα Aristot. pap. Berol.; χρησμὸν λέγοντας Aelius Arist. 13 δουλίην Aristot.; δουλείην Plut. cod. S; δουλείης Aelius Arist. 14 τρομεομένους West; τρομευμένους codd. 15–16 κράτει vel κράτη ὁμοῦ Aelius Arist. codd. ASUQ[1] (κρατηομου etiam Aristot. pap. Berol.); κρατεεινομου Aristot. pap. Lond. 16 βίην Aristot. pap. Berol., Plut.; βίαν Aristot. pap. Lond., Aelius Arist. ξυναρμόσας Aelius Arist. codd. T et suprascr. Q; συν- plerique 18 θεσμοὺς δ᾽ Aelius Arist.; θεσμους τε (θ add. supra lin.) Aristot. pap. Lond.; θεσμον (δ add. supra lin.) Aristot. pap. Berol. 24 αὖτις Aristot. pap. Berol. (αυ..σ Lond.); αὖθις vel αὖθι Aelius Arist. 26 ἀλκὴν … ποιεόμενος West; ἀλκὴν … ποιούμενος Aristot., ἀρχὴν … κυκεύμενος Aelius Arist. 27 π̣ο̣λ̣λ̣α̣ισ̣ι̣ν̣ Aristot. pap. Lond. (deest Berol.); πολλαῖσιν Aelius Arist.

31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}

δήμωι μὲν εἰ χρὴ διαφάδην ὀνειδίσαι,
ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὔποτ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἂν
εὕδοντες εἶδον ⟨ - ᴗ - x - ᴗ - ᴗ ⟩
ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες,
αἰνοῖεν ἄν με καὶ φίλον ποιοίατο.

*

οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ' ἐπαύσατο,
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα.
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίωι
ὅρος κατέστην.

Testes: Aristototeles, *Ath.Pol.* 12.5 (1–5 et 6–9 separatim); Plutarchus, *Sol.* 16.4 (6–7).

1 διαφάδην Kontos; διαφράδην Aristot. 6 οὐκ ... οὐδ' Aristot.; οὔτ' ... οὔτ' Plut. 7 πῖαρ Plut.; πυαρ Aristot. ἐξεῖλεν Aristot.; ἐξέλῃ Plut.

33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2}

σπεύδουσι δ’ οἱ μὲν ἴγδιν, οἱ δὲ σίλφιον,
οἱ δ’ ὄξος …

Testes: Pollux 10.103.

1 σπεύδουσι δ’ Casaubon; σπεῦ vel πευσῖ, σπεύσιδα vel πευσιδ’ codd.

32 G.-P.^{2} = 38 W.^{2}

πίνουσι καὶ τρώγουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἴτρια,
οἱ δ’ ἄρτον αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ συμμεμιγμένους
γούρους φακοῖσι· κεῖθι δ’ οὔτε πεμμάτων
ἄπεστιν οὐδ’ ἕν, ἅσσ’ ἐν ἀνθρώποισι γῆ
φέρει μέλαινα, πάντα δ’ ἀφθόνως πάρα.

Testes: Athenaeus 14.645f

4 οὐδ’ ἕν, ἅσσ’ ἐν West; οὐδ’ ἕνασσεν codd.

34 G.-P.^{2} = 40 W.^{2}

κόκκωνας ἄλλος, οὕτερος δὲ σήσαμα.

Testes: Phrynichus, *Ecl.* 374.

κόκκωνας ἄλλος vel κόκκωνα δ’ ἄλλος Lobeck; κόκκωνας δὲ ἄλλος codd. οὕτερος Kalinka; ἕτερος codd.

36 G.-P.^{2} = 41 W.^{2}

ῥοῦν

Testes: Photius, *Lex.* 2.136 Naber.

35 G.-P.^{2} = 30 W.^{2}

ἀρχῶν ἄκουε κἂν δίκῃ κἂν μὴ δίκῃ.

Testes: Diogenianus 2.99, *Paroemiographi Gr*. I.213.11–12 Leutsch-Schneidewin; Apostolius 4.3 = *Paroemiographi Gr*. II.310.14–15.

κἂν δίκῃ κἂν μὴ δίκῃ Diogen. K; καὶ δικαίως κἀδίκως Diogen. codd. plerique et Apost.

37 G.-P.[2] = 43 W.[2]

λιπαρὴ κουροτρόφος

Testes: Choricius Gaz., *Or.* 2.6, 29.10 Foerster-Richtsteig.

38 G.-P.[2]

ἀγρεύματα

Testes: *Συναγωγὴ λέξεων χρησίμων* cod. B α307 Cunningham.

39 G.-P.^{2} = 30a W.^{2}

τῆς δὲ τραγωιδίας πρῶτον δρᾶμα Ἀρίων ὁ Μηθυμναῖος εἰσήγαγεν, ὥσπερ Σόλων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Ἐλεγείαις ἐδίδαξε.

Testes: Ioannes Diaconus, comm. in Hermog. *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* (Rabe, *RhM* 63, 1908, 150).

°40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2}

Πρῶτα μὲν εὐχώμεσθα Διὶ Κρονίδηι βασιλῆι,
θεσμοῖς τοῖσδε τύχην ἀγαθὴν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάσσαι.

Testes: Plutarchus, *Sol.* 3.5.

45 W.[2]

Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.* 1177b31 εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. *οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν*, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι (Michael ad loc. = *Comm. in Aristot. Graeca* 20.591.14 Heylbut τινὲς μὲν Θεόγνιδός φασιν εἶναι τὴν γνώμην ταύτην, οἱ δὲ Σόλωνος).

COMMENTARY

1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}

The *Hymn to the Muses* is perhaps Solon's most difficult poem. Its content and structure have greatly puzzled and divided scholars: Is it a philosophical or an ethical poem? Is it political, apolitical or less political than poems 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}? Are there thematic differences between this and the other fragments? Does the poem express a split in Solon's thought? What about its structure?

The fact that Solon chooses to address the Muses in particular at the beginning of the poem (instead of, e.g., introducing another possible candidate for this role, such as Zeus) might be a conventional gesture in principle, but it also shows that Solon considered himself to be as much a poet as a statesman (the ethnographical evidence which Martin 2006 cites shows that the notion of the poet-politician is an entirely reasonable one). It is worth noting, however, as Anhalt 1993, 29 remarks, that Solon does not ask for individual *kleos*, the glory that develops posthumously from generation to generation (thus the Muses' task is probably not, or not only, the negative task of defending him "against the risks to which his poetry exposes him, intimately bound up as it was with his political program", as Gentili 1988, 159 f. notes; after all, Solon never expresses this fear that his glory could be victimized). The very specific content of the opening prayer (1–10) clearly has an important bearing on the rest of the poem. Yet the debate over how to interpret the connection between this prayer and the rest of the poem has been (and still is) so inconclusive that some scholars altogether dismiss the initial prayer as a conventional statement (Wilamowitz 1913, 263; Römisch 1933, 44 f.) or assume that Solon is asking the Muses to intercede with the gods on his behalf, rather than asking them to grant him wealth directly (Bowra 1958, 91; Eisenberger 1984, 11).

Anhalt 1993, 12 explains that the connection between the invocation of the preamble and the remainder of the elegy lies in the Muses' association with Memory and the relevance of Memory to the composition and transmission of the message of the poem. She argues that, whereas epic poetry draws primarily upon the Muses' knowledge of the past and present, viewing their knowledge of the future merely as a potential source of subjects for poetic recollection, here Solon is concerned with knowledge of the future, within the frame of causal connections

between past events, their causal relationships and their consequences. The result is that this particular aspect of Memory that Solon requires in a way encapsulates the poem's subject matter. Yet, even though Anhalt's analysis succeeds in tracing an organic thematic unity between the proem and the rest of the poem, such an emphasis on causality, as her analysis requires, is not completely convincing (apart from a handful of particular instances where it works very well, at 7–17). Above all, her conclusion that Memory is central to the poem is hard to accept because, in the only (although emphatic) mention of it in the poem (1), Memory is portrayed in a rather conventional picture together with Zeus as the parents of the Muses, in the wake of Hesiod's *Theogony* (more on this below).

In the same year as Anhalt, Loeffler 1993, 26 n. 7 interpreted the proem as an outline of the poetic inspiration of the narrator who gradually seeks the authority of poetic speech from the invoked Muses: the Muses would guarantee their guidance not only in the pursuit but also in finding the definition of the correct measure of wealth. Later on in 7, Solon's prayer is transformed into a wish, which finally gives way to the statement of a gnomic truth in 8b: in place of a reference to Mnemosyne and the Muses, the poet substitutes the affirmation of truths which are universally acknowledged. According to this analysis, as the emancipation of the narrator progresses the Muses gradually fade into the background and concede to the narrator their place at the beginning of his line of argument, which makes use of and is strengthened by an appeal to these truths (8 to the end). Loeffler concludes that an analogous movement can be observed in the proem of Hesiod's *Works and Days*. However, it is already clear that in the opening verses Solon is not praying for poetic inspiration. Furthermore, the formulation of the second hemistich of 2 points away from Loeffler's assumption that the reverence for the Muses is just a strategical means of achieving authoritativeness.

In the wake of Loeffler's insistence on the strategical and not the genuine character of Solon's invocation to the Muses, a more radical step in this direction is taken by Stoddard 2002, 152, who explained this invocation as "ironic". She maintains that this prayer served to instruct the audience about the mindset it depicts, in order to show that it is a dangerous trap for mortals. Stoddard bases her argument on a reading of 33–76 as Solon's advice to the audience not to strive after wealth and the poet's statement that even "wealth from the gods" is always potentially dangerous (74–76). These statements would in turn problematize the prayer for wealth at the beginning of the poem. According to Stoddard, ll. 1–6 exemplify the sort of acquisitiveness against which the rest of

the poem is directed, since the speaker of the prayer would erroneously or purposely (and certainly emphatically) confuse ὄλβος with χρήματα and πλοῦτος, thus revealing his ἀφροσύνη—as she points out, ὄλβος normally signifies a concept of prosperity that is broader than moderate material wealth, and Solon uses the term in this sense in 17 G.-P.² = 23 W.² By making this equation or confusion, the ironic *persona* of the prayer would reveal that he is already suffering from κόρος, the dangerous delusion that makes men insatiate of wealth and keeps them from realizing when they have enough—an affliction that finally leads them to ἄτη. Solon discards the ironic *persona* at 33 and expresses himself with his own voice on the notion that wealth can set one on the path to destruction and ruin. The poet would be rejecting Hesiod's lesson to strive after "just" wealth and riches "from the gods", maintaining that it is precisely the men who strive to do everything right that fall into great and grievous ἄτη, because of human lack of foresight and the inability to see the proper limitation of wealth (67–76) which inevitably leads to greed. There are many difficulties in this interpretation of the poem; above all is the fact that the reader is given no hint that the opening prayer is not meant to be taken seriously—compare Pind. *Pyth.* 3, which makes it clear that the poet's opening prayer is only a hypothetical possibility. Solon certainly rejects Hesiod's optimism about the efficacy of righteous hard work and is skeptical about man's ability to determine the kind of action that is proper in the eyes of the gods. But he portrays an overall coherent account of δίκη, in his belief that wealth deemed to be just by the judgment of Zeus (i.e. objectively good) could be free from retribution and thus secure (or permanent, as Solon sees it: 9 f.) and that retribution stems from gains which are insatiable (and thus unjust). Since precariousness is a condition of humanity clearly emphasized in the central part of the poem, one would expect Solon to appeal seriously to his patron goddesses to guide his own actions—after all, these goddesses, who have the memory of past events and knowledge of the future, are the best possible reference point for securing guidance in this direction. Therefore, the gesture of the prayer is most likely prompted by a real reverential attitude towards the gods, and can hardly contain ironical undertones. Last but not least, Stoddard's focus on the first six lines overlooks the thoughtful refinement of the initial request in lines 7 f., which may pose a problem for an ironizing view of the opening.

The way in which the proemium relates to the following 26 verses has also been deemed problematic by Colesanti 2003, 110. He assumes an analytical approach (see below) and proposes that 1–6 constitute a

separate elegy, more precisely a separate sympotic hymn, which would have been placed before 7–32 in collections of Solonian elegies, and was therefore put together with them by Stobaeus or someone else, because of the assimilation of ὄλβος with χρήματα at a time when sympotic practices—such as the placing of separate sympotic hymns at the beginning of poetic collections—were no longer understood. He bases his objections on the claim that 7–32 deal with wealth, but the elegy contains no mention of the δόξα ἀγαθή of 4. One could argue against this, together with Stoddard 2002, 156 that since there seems to be no negative side to δόξα ἀγαθή, which the poet defines as being sweet to friends and intimidating to enemies (5 f.), "the speaker does not have to specify, e.g., that he wishes to have only the positive manifestation of this blessing".

In my opinion, in order to account for the isolated mentioning of δόξα ἀγαθή and in general for the connection between the initial prayer and the rest of the poem, we should take into full consideration the dynamics of the associations which Solon establishes by echoing the *Theogony* invocation in his prayer. In *Theog.* 94–97 (cf. also *HHom.* 25), Hesiod closely equates kings with poets in their verbal and intellectual skills by placing both under the Muses' (and especially Calliope's) protection: the Muses grant the flowing of a sweet voice to both kings and poets (81–84 and 96 f.) in language that resembles the description of the Muses' own singing in the halls of Zeus (39 f.). The dynamics that Hesiod establishes between kingship and poetry consist of the comparable motivations, methods, aims and achievements of the two functions (cf. also Duban 1980, 8); these dynamics also support the view that, apart from being the traditional adjuvant of the oral poets, memory also played a role in archaic judicial decisions in that it was utilized when choosing from the body of inherited rules what best applied to each case (cf. Roth 1976, 336–338; Havelock 1963, 109 had already defined Hesiod's age as "precisely that in which poet and politician overlap each other's roles", contra Laks 1996, 85 and Murray 2004, 369). Stress is placed upon the calming and soothing effects that the two vocations have in common. The poet has these effects because of his ability to make one forget his sorrows and bring respite from anguish (*Theog.* 103). With the gift of the Muses, ἱερὰ δόσις (*Theog.* 93), Hesiod's kings decide disputes with straight judgments (85 f.): cf. Duban 1980, 15 and Murray 2004, 369 who notes that this is the only time we hear of the Muses bestowing their gifts upon a recipient who is not a poet, nor is it the gift of poetry that they bestow. Solmsen 1954, 7 points out that Hesiod draws a picture of the

kings in which they hand down straight verdicts and they do so by means of persuasion, which is in opposition to the *Iliad* passage from which the poet borrows the phrase (δια)κρίνειν θέμιστας (16.387 f.): in that passage crooked judgment is imposed and it is imposed βίαι. Differently, the kings whom Hesiod has in mind in the *Theogony*, instead of imposing judgments, rely on their gift of gentle persuasion to settle the disputes, and thus appeal to reason (on eloquence from the Muses for bards and kings, cf. Thalmann 1984, 139–143). In fact, it seems to be the case that Hesiod's good kings settle disputes and quarrels of the community (85–92) with such truly divine efficiency that the disputants actually forget their grievances and are ready to accept their verdict cheerfully—however, "as everybody knows, Hesiod himself, when he became litigant and had his case decided by the kings, was in a far from cheerful mood": Solmsen 1954, 13. Solmsen is surely right in pointing out that there is nothing left in the *Works and Days* of the atmosphere of cloudless serenity and idyllic mood that surround the function of the kings in the *Theogony*; but the king's prominence as Zeus' counterpart on earth is also visible in the latter Hesiodic poem: he is under the special protection of Zeus (Zeus-nourished: 82) and the Muses also honor him (81); the king has the "gift" of speech from birth; the Muses behold the king when he is born (82) and the λαοί are spectators of his reasonable judgments (84 f.); they seek his favor like a god with soothing reverence, and he stands out among the assembled people (91 f.).

The lexical similarities (analyzed in the commentary below) between Solon's prayer and the Muses' proem of the *Theogony* support the idea that Solon regards his own function as being comparable in some ways to the performance of the convincing king and poet (cf. also Blaise 2005, 36 f. who characterizes the opening prayer of the poem as a remark on the nature of political power and postulates a continuity of thought between 1 and 3 G.-P.^{2} = 13 and 4 W.^{2}). However, if we try to understand Solon's attitude against the background of the Hesiodic tradition, some striking differences quickly emerge. On the whole, Solon advances the Hesiodic equation of kings and poets to fit the present conditions of his own world. The remarks of Gentili 1988, 159 f. are relevant to this issue. He states that Solon is aware that a poet who is directly involved in political affairs will acquire enemies as well as friends (ll. 5 f.), thus endangering the very foundations of his social and economic security. The image Solon creates for himself as 'judge' is thus much more realistic than Hesiod's. There the function of the kings was so amazingly effective that the disputant parties actually forgot their grievances and were ready

to accept the verdict cheerfully; and the people exhalted the king like a god. It looks as though Solon endorses the possibilities that Hesiod leaves out of this account. The ties of φιλία or enmity mentioned in 5 f. exist in the context of the *polis*; the enmity Solon refers to naturally follows from clashes in the human community of which he is a part. Unlike the Hesiodic king, who does not relate to the community because he is above it as Zeus' counterpart on earth, Solon is concerned with his relationship to the community and asks always to have a good reputation in the eyes of men (3 f.). To ask for a good reputation is still to ask for authority and prominence but of a different sort than Hesiod's king. Blaise 2005, 36 also thought that Solon might be asking to have the authority of a king-judge who brings about in the society a clear division between just and unjust, and who retributed the latter with punishments comparable to the payments which Zeus inevitably asks for from the malefactor. But the suggestion that Solon asks to have the authority to operate as a king-judge perhaps imports too much from Hesiod in the poem, since it is an idea that the poem seems to make nothing of.

Since we cannot date the poem securely within Solon's career, and therefore we know nothing of his standing at the time, and because of the absence of any elements of *deixis*, fr. 1 is obviously set apart from those poems which deal with the situation in Athens before and after the reforms. Nevertheless, Solon's construction of his authority in Athens turns out to be more carefully concrete than Hesiod's, both in comparison to the idyllic picture of cloudless serenity that surrounds the function of the kings in the *Theogony* and the darker one of the kings' passing judgments in the *Works and Days*. Framing political activity in the context of a general ethical scheme certainly meets the ideas of archaic morality. As Thomas 1995, 121, remarks "any sensible attempt to justify or initiate reform would be in terms morally acceptable to the citizens and thus would indeed embody or develop certain ideas of archaic morality". The power to make oneself respected by one's friends and feared by one's enemies, as well as presenting some moderate ὄλβος as a sort of requisite of one's power, are clearly geared towards a social function of the poem (the moderation and righteousness of wealth will be also under the control of the fellow citizens, no less than of Zeus), and seem to be precisely the essential components of a successful human and of political behavior/life in archaic morality. The integration of poetry and politics in the opening prayer also parallels the divine-human structure of the poem as a whole, as Anhalt 1993, 31 aptly remarks.

The first part of the poem (1–32), in which divine justice dominates and appears to govern human affairs, and the second part (33–70), where the outcomes of human action seem to be depicted as being largely determined by the unpredictable (and even capricious) power of fortune (μοῖρα), create an apparent contrast in the structure of the poem; 67–70, in particular, quite surprisingly seem to reverse the initial faith that the narrator had expressed in divine justice at the beginning of the poem. There is also, consequently, some abruptness in the transition from the first part, which reveals a world of safety, to the second, where uncertainty is overwhelming (see 33–62). Furthermore, the main topic of the first part of the poem is radically different from the topic of the second: according to a distinction suggested by Römisch 1933, 27–37, the first part is centered around the issue of τίνειν (culminating in two statements of truths at 16 f. and 25b–28, the latter followed by the exemplification/consequence of 29–32), the second around the issue of ἔρδειν (culminating in the two statements of 43a and 63 f., the latter followed by the exemplification/consequence of 65–70). Such great contrasts, or at least cases of almost *non-sequitur* of the thought thread, has at times appeared so irreparable as to lead some twentieth century scholars to doubt the poem's authenticity or unity. Perrotta 1924, 256–260 for instance considered 11 ff. to be an apocryphal expansion of the poem's first ten verses—the only ones which would have been written by Solon himself (and thus the only ones to which Crates' well-known poem would refer: see below). On the other hand, Puccioni 1957, 118 is inclined to consider only the first thirteen lines to be authentic, or to think, as also suggested by Hommel 1964 = 1972, that the lengthy elegy is a conflation, produced by Stobeus or at least in his style, of two separate elegies (1–32 and then 33–76) which Solon had composed at different points in his life. These separate elegies would thus correspond to different ideologies: the elegy of 33–76, which is youthful and inspired by the traditional pessimism concerning the caprices of fortune, would have been written prior to Solon's political engagement (Linforth 1919; Jaeger 1966); the one of 1–32 would belong to a more mature and conservative expression of the poet's new faith in the existence of a divine order (Hommel 1964 = 1972). Colesanti 2003, 93–115, also argues for the existence of separate poems by Solon (1–6, 7–32, 33–76), which were combined in the course of the transmission after an elimination of intermediate lemmata of the type Σόλωνος, or τοῦ αὐτοῦ in cases of multiple citations in Stobaeus, or because they were anthologized together by Stobaeus or one of his sources. Colesanti's 2003 thesis is that it is not likely that a poet would defend two contrasting

concepts in the same composition (the contrast would be between 7–32 which are dedicated to righteous wealth and 33–76 where the theme of destiny which acts randomly prevails), whereas it is not impossible that the same poet would have developed two opposite themes in distinct elegies. But he admits that the separate elegies, if united, do follow a certain thematic logic since both sections treat richness and justice. And his remark that 71–76 should suffice for a claim that even this elegy refers to righteous justice renders his whole thesis that there are three separate poems even less demonstrable.

In attempts to remedy such excesses of analytical rationalism, other scholars have preferred to consider the poem as an example of a specific form of archaic logic (a position adumbrated by Wilamowitz 1913, 265 and H. Fränkel 1924 = 1960, 70 f.; see also Linforth 1919, 105–108). In this form main ideas would not be expressed at one time and in a direct way, but multiple times from diverse (but often intertwining) points of view. The end result is an effect that may seem repetitive, aimless, and at times even contradictory to modern readers. Lattimore 1947, 162 writes about a progression of thought in which each successive stage is an expansion, revision, or illustration of the preceding stage, all in a series of interconnected ideas generated by and from each other. Likewise, van Groningen 1958, 94–97 believes that the poem is an example of the type of archaic composition labeled as "entrelacement": this structure is produced when the poet is presented simultaneously with a number of inseparable ideas whose equal importance and complexity renders it difficult for him to treat each one of them in depth before moving on to the next. He then identifies four core themes at work in the poem: a. desire for wealth; b. just acquisition which results in abiding wealth, namely a gift from the gods; c. the idea that human fortunes are variable and unpredictable; d. the existence of a divine Moira that determines such fortunes and includes divine punishment for wickedness and e. the parts of the elegy with no direct relation to the movement of these ideas (1–2, 3–6, 14–15, 69–70). Slightly differently, Vetta 1999, 93, explains the various changes with the variations and developments of motifs which are typical features of an oral composition: such features did not disturb, but rather they would have been pleasing to and expected by the audience of the poem (the members of the ἑταιρεία who were familiar with most of the issues no less than with the poet's ideas) in the context of a symposium. Loeffler 1993 also builds on Fraenkel's 'anthropological' interpretation of the frequent changes of the enunciative perspective in the elegy. She suggests that it is precisely these continuous modifications

which fill in the lack of argumentation and the apparent absence of references to a historical context by focusing on the different stances of the *persona loquens*. The speaking "I" at the beginning of the poem would thus assume an "objective" perspective in regard to the subject of his speech. Several times this objective perspective is abandoned at 33, 36, 51 f. and 72, where a human perspective is adopted while the speaker identifies himself as a member of the audience of the poem (in particular the rhetorical question of 72 f. puts the audience into the unpleasant situation of having to recognize themselves as sharing (ἡμέων) the poet's previous pessimism, while the poet seems to maintain the divine point of view that expresses the idea that there is a proper limit to personal wealth in 71).

Other scholars have endorsed the more "literary" task of pursuing a more or less principal theme, seeking instead to identify a motif that is, if not absolutely unifying, at least a relevant one around which most of the different ethical and religious considerations touched upon by the poem revolve. For Allen 1949, this theme would be the idea of wisdom, particularly wisdom as it relates to the pursuit of wealth (cf. also Wilamowitz 1913, 257–268; Büchner 1959; Spira 1981). Solon, he argues, is thus praying for knowledge of his own limits, so that in gaining wealth, he may not overstep those limits and commit an injustice (Allen 1949, 60; Manuwald 1989, 19 f., and Alt 1979, 400–402 share this view). For Matthiessen 1994, Solon's interest in the theme would have had a strong political importance, viewed in light of the historical reality of Athens. Other suggestions have included the relationship between personal responsibility and the caprice of fortune—although this is actually partly connected to divine justice, which involves punishment of the unjust as well as the redistribution of their possessions: a justice which was wrongly understood by men as being arbitrary, cf. Jaeger 1945, 141–144, although the reconciliation of divine justice with the whim of fortune is also central in Dalfen 1974, Eisenberger 1984, Christes 1986, and Pötscher 1987; the idea of divine justice itself (Masaracchia 1958); the idea of *ate*, viewed as punishment for unjust actions and later for incompetent ones (Römisch 1933, Müller 1956); and finally the opposition between the uncertainty of human knowledge and the infallibility of the gods (Maurach 1983).

In one of the recent attempts at resolving the incongruity between the first (1–32) and second part of the poem (33–76), Nesselrath 1992, advocating the interpretation of Manuwald 1989, maintains that Solon adopted diverse perspectives (divine and human) in direct succession. The two initial concepts of prosperity and good reputation, exactly

because of their general nature, led Solon to consider the series of problems correlated with the two concepts in a sort of speculative chain. Human fault and divine justice come first in the series, then, after 33 (where it is no coincidence that he introduces the use of the first person plural and the subject becomes "we mortals") Solon is expanding upon the observation at 29–32, where the many, apparently undeserved, setbacks turn out actually to be divine punishment for the faults of our predecessors. From that point he then moves into a decidedly human perspective in light of which he scrutinizes the limits imposed by fortune on the results of human action. In other words, after formulating the theodicy of Zeus, who inevitably punishes the unjust acquisition of wealth (the theodicy with which the personality of the author identifies most directly, cf. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}), Solon passes, in the second part of the poem, from the empirically weak presupposition of a divine agency to the stronger and more widely accepted view that all things in life are uncertain. In this role ('role playing' was a common stance of the composers/performers of elegiac and iambic poetry) Solon arrives at his observation on the uselessness of gains at 74 f.—a consideration that bears paraenetic consequences similar to those of his initial theodicy, although these final lines offer no explicit advice or admonition. In practice, the result is a reaffirmation of the opportunity to pursue justice, but this reaffirmation turns out to be reinforced at the end of the poem by the previous unprejudiced analyses of behavioral patterns and of the outcomes of human action, taking its cues from a shared awareness of the fact that the distribution of fortune and misfortune does not always seem to be just: cf. Sicking 1998, 7–18, and comm. ad 71–76. This idea of a change of focus (as opposed to an inconsistency) of perspective, as it is defined by Nesselrath, seems in itself to summarize scholars' insistence upon and extreme difficulty in finding a dominant theme in the poem. It also seems to include the oralistic/structuralistic readings of Lattimore, Fränkel, Loeffler, which motivate the apparent incoherency of Solon's thought progression through an anthropological appeal to nonmodern logic.

Important thematic differences certainly exist between poems 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, the other long argumentative poems of Solon. Lewis 2006, 77 f. in one of the most recent analyses of the poem, claims that "in contrast to poem 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, poems 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} are openly concerned with the consequences of unrighteous actions within the *polis*; poem 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} seems rather to focus on those actions as they affect

a person *per se*. There are no ἀστοί spoken of in poem 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}—and no crowds to influence our thinking—because the poem is not about the *polis*". Lewis' analysis, postulating an unbreached dichotomy between Solon's view of individual life and the *polis* in this fragment, like the similar trend of Loeffler to highlight the elements of 'objectivity' in the presentation of Solon's ideas and to underrate the relevance of its political implications, falls victim to the impulse to categorize and to go to extreme lengths in labeling the range of specific interests of the single poems. In fact, while it is correct to say, with Lewis, that the context of the *polis* is hardly ever made explicit (indeed the word *polis* is missing from the 76 verses of the poem), it is probably misleading to believe that the poem is a sort of layout of Solon's ethical system for his own private sake, as suggested by Massa Positano 1947, 19 f. and apparently also believed by some of the ancients (ὑποθήκη εἰς ἑαυτόν is the title of this poem in Diog.Laert. 1.61: compare πρὸς Φῶκον ποιήματα as a title of 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} in Plutarch). But poetry during this period is hardly ever private; since all poetry is performed, what we have is different gradations of "public". The poem must be for the benefits of others as well as for Solon himself. More refined by far, although also unsatisfactory, is to maintain, as Lewis 2006, 78 does, that everything in the poem "fits into an *oikos* (family homestead) context". The various professions, which are examples of the various ways that people can make a living (43–62), all belong to the social dimension of the *polis* and contribute to the prosperity of the community. The whole poem is thus a reflection upon wealth within a collective context with special attention to what is proper in acquiring and maintaining it (7 f., 11 f.). Solon asks for the renown of all men (4), speaks of friends and enemies and his relationship to each of them (5 f.). He also stresses in the third person types of behavior within the community which are not appropriate for him (e.g. 11 f.) but from which he does not altogether exclude himself: the temporal indication νῦν in 72 that qualifies the subject of οἵ … ἡμέων ("our contemporaries"), as Loeffler 1993, 30 has remarked, shows that the speaking "I" of the poem considers his contemporaries, or at least the group to which he himself belongs, as the actors of his description and the public of the poem. In other words, Solon clearly situates himself in a human community, and develops his ethical considerations from this perspective (for the political nature of the poem see in particular Büchner 1959, 189; also Bowra 1958, 74–78 and Alt 1979, 405). Solon is not proposing here that individuals can exist independently of the community. Rather, both the community and the individual have an

interest in individual self-restraint and in understanding the τέρμα of wealth as they grow richer (instead of growing more covetous and greedy as they did in the Athens of the poet's time). Thus, in the poem we have not only examples of men who try to make a living (through the various professions listed), but also those who already have the greatest livelihood and show twice as much zeal in pursuing wealth (72 f.), and may thus constitute a problem for society (the problem on which Solon focuses in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}). After all, Solon's political and legal measures also show his efforts to try to create an equilibrium in Athens, where δίκη stops the excesses of the citizens. Of course, 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} focuses much more openly than 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} on these specific excesses and on the specific way in which δίκη will retribute the bad citizens of Athens, whereas in 1 G.P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} the focus is more on the religious legitimation of the operation of δίκη (most significant are the analogies between the description of sin and retribution noted by Mülke 2002, 239: 1.11–13 G.-P.^{2} = 13.11–13 W.^{2} and 3.8–11 G.-P.^{2} = 4.8–11 W.^{2}, 1.72 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.72 f. W.^{2} and 3.9 G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 W.^{2}, 1.11 G.-P.^{2} = 13.11 W.^{2} and 3.10 G.-P.^{2} = 4.10 W.^{2}, 1.25–28 G.-P.^{2} = 13.25–28 W.^{2} and 3.15 G.-P.^{2} = 4.15 W.^{2}, 1.8 G.-P.^{2} = 13.8 W.^{2} and 3.16 G.-P.^{2} = 4.16 W.^{2}). Furthermore, what Solon expresses in the poem is not detached from his work as a politician and legislator, and his emphasis on *dike* points to the existence of a problem of ἀδικία. Direct references to the troublesome socio-political context of his time are missing but the theory implied in Solon's lines (regarding the rejection of unjustly acquired wealth and uncontrolled greed) may have found a sort of application in his legislation (see also Almeida 2003, 117 f.). Solon's concern with the greed of the elite is manifested in his regulations about the amount of land that an individual could acquire—at least according to Aristot. *Pol.* 1266b14–18—and in his funerary laws curbing elite display and competition—Plut. *Sol.* 21; Diog. Laert. 1.55. We cannot prove that the definition of what seems to be individual ethic in this fragment is the 'ideological' preface to Solon's political proposal, e.g., in the *Eunomia* fragment. But we have to acknowledge that it may have fulfilled well this task. In any case, Solon's intention in this poem is to scrutinize rather than criticize human beings and human behavior and thus to avoid overt polemic or didactic pronouncements. The poet reconfigures the typical asymmetric relationship presupposed by the Hesiodic kind of didactic poetry, in which the poet's didactic role places him in a position that is vertically above the addressee (ἡμέων of 72, which is inclusive of the *persona loquens*, is especially telling). Likewise, as we have seen, Solon also reconfigures the Hesiodic concept of the

good judge-king to which he aspires, but views it, foremost, in relation to the horizontal level of a human community of which he himself is a part.

1–10. Crates of Thebes, a Cynic parodist of the fourth/third century BC, chose Solon's proem in an attempt to make, through its reworking, an emphatic formulation of his Cynic ideas on wealth. Solon's text plays the role which, usually in the practice of fourth and third centuries parodic poets (above all Matro and Archestratus), was fulfilled by Homer and Hesiod, cf., e.g., Olson and Sens 1999, 9 f., 20–24, and thus this παρῳδία proves (as noted already by Radici Colace 1989, 474) that in the third century BC Solon's poem was read as a programmatic manifesto of the ideology of wealth. Moreover, by keeping Solon's formal structure intact, Crates makes the contrast between Solon's stance and his own proposal all the more clear.

Crates' text (*SH* 359) is mutilated between 4 and 5, where a hexameter is missing. Because it reworks only the proemium of Solon, scholars like Perrotta 1924 and Puccioni 1957 have taken extreme positions, arguing that Solon's original text consisted of only the first ten lines, with the rest of Solon's poem being the addition of an interpolator. At the beginning of the poem, Crates simply repeats Solon's two verses verbatim. In the subsequent verses, however, the poet's technique changes noticeably, and the reuse of the Solonian text takes the form of an ἐπανόρθωσις (on the technique of the ἐπανόρθωσις see also ad 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}). In 3 ff. Crates "adapts" the diction and meter of the Solonian poem to the Cynic ideal of αὐτάρκεια "self-sufficiency", by strikingly varying his model with the substitution of χόρτος "fodder" for ὄλβος, and by making an implicit contrast between Solon's ὄλβος which comes from the gods, and the concrete, minimalistic needs of his γαστήρ. Similarly, l. 5 corrects the archaic principle of reciprocity towards friends and enemies which is present in Solon by excluding any mention of the latter and by substituting ὠφέλιμος for γλυκύς as the behavioral attitude towards one's friends. But it is Solon's l. 7 and his idea of wealth that are largely reworked by Crates. Solon's affirmation of the acquisition of χρήματα, introduced by the verb ἱμείρω, which has strong erotic connotations, is corrected in Crates by the verb, οὐκ ἐθέλω, which not only lacks the same subtext, but is also used by Solon in l. 8 as a strongly negative specification regarding the acquisition of wealth. Differently, Crates uses a verb with strong connotations of crazy fondness (μαίομαι) to express his own personal inclination to search for the satisfaction of the most

basic needs in his life. In both cases, Solon is clearly adopted because of his option for a moderate idea of richness, and his more than moderate version of the widespread ethic principle of helping friends and harming enemies, but Crates' adaptation "precipitates" Solon's position into a sort of extreme development. The repeated emphasis on justice (7 f.), which in Solon appears with a decidedly social dimension, as part of his agenda regarding the *hybris* of the rich, and which introduced the theme of Zeus' vengeance in 7–31, is mentioned only briefly by Crates at 8. Furthermore, very differently from Solon's notion of wealth (see ad 9 f. below), the ideal πλοῦτος for the Cynics is small in quantity and moveable (εὔφορος and εὔκτητος): for a more detailed analysis of Crates' nuanced and sophisticated engagement with the literary models in this poem which include not only Solon but also Hipponax and Plato's *Phaedrus*, see Noussia 2007; Noussia-Fantuzzi forthcoming b; more generally on the antecedents of the Cynics' praise of poverty, see Desmond 2006.

1. According to Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6.11.1, Solon is imitating an invocation made by the epic poet Eumelus: *PEG* 16 Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἐννέα κοῦραι. But it may be the case that the phrase is a more widespread formula of cult ἐπίκλησις, here taken up according to the oral practice, as the parallel in the later *Hymn. Orph.* 76.1 f. Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς ἐριγδούποιο θύγατρες / Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες leads us to suspect. After all, ἀγλαὰ τέκνα (see below) is also formulaic. It is therefore difficult to tell whether the hymnal inscription of Amorgus from the imperial period, *IG* XII.7, 95 f., which begins with a line identical to Solon's, eventually plays a role in this cult tradition or, instead, whether it comes as a later example of the reception of Solon's poem.

That the Muses were daughters of Mnemosyne and/or of Zeus is widely attested, beginning with Hes. *Theog.* 52–54 and 915–917; *HHom.Herm.* 429 f.; Alcm. *PMGF* 8.9 f. and 28; adesp. *PMG* 941 = Terp. fr. °8 Gostoli; Pind. *Pae.* 6.54–58; see also Hom. *Il.* 2.491 Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο / θυγατέρες and the ps.-Herodotean *Vita Homeri* 180 κοῦραι Διὸς ἀγλαὰ τέκνα. Iconography also often presents the Muses and Mnemosyne together, at least from 450 BC onwards (lekythos att. from Syracuse: Mus. Reg. 20542, *LIMC* VI.I 629 f.), while literary and epigraphic testimonies about her cult in connection with the Muses (and Apollo) occur from only the fourth century AD (Paus. 1.2.5, 8.47.3; *LIMC* VI.1, 629). Nevertheless, an alternative tradition also existed, which is documented by Alcm. *PMGF* 5.2, col. 2.28 f. (cf. also 67) and by Mimn. 22 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, which portrays the Muses as the daughters of Gaia and

Uranus. It may be the case that Solon, in making this choice, is merely adhering to the more widespread version of the myth. But one should not entirely exclude the possibility that Solon might also wish to differentiate himself from Mimnermus, as he does, e.g., in 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2} and 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}: see ad loc. In connecting the Muses with Pieria, Solon may have followed Hesiod in another regard (cf. ad 2 below).

Given his role in the poem, it is relevant that Zeus is the father of the Muses. Furthermore, it is important for archaic poets (and especially for Solon) to maintain that they communicate the truth, and the Muses' father, Zeus, as the supreme god, holds reality and truth in his hands (as Fränkel 1975, 234 n. 34 notes). Moreover, in an age of oral and mnemonic transmission of poetic texts, both Mnemosyne—the very personification of memory—and the Muses were closely connected to the faculty of poetic improvisation, and serve to guarantee the ἀλήθεια of the song (lack of imprecision in remembering/report; cf. ad 14.2 G.-P.^{2} = 10.2 W.^{2} and 25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2}; see Bremer 1976, 161, 296–314; Hubbard 1985, 100–106; Pratt 1993, 19 f.). See also Notopoulos 1938; Setti 1958; Murray 1981, 92 ff.; Simondon 1982, 99–127; Bouvier 1988, 37–62; Rudhardt 1988, 63–79; Detienne 1996, 39–52. Indeed in Homer and in the Homeric *Hymns*, "to remember" is often synonymous with "to sing", as singing is deemed to be the best way to immortalize the *kleos* of mortals or to celebrate the greatness of the gods (cf. Moran 1975). A relevant parallel for Solon is the *skolion* of Elephantine, *PMG* 917c, centred around the "Mother of the Muses", which tries to position itself as a sympotic poem in the tradition of archaic extemporaneous poetry; cf. Ferrari 1988, 203–205 for the textual and exegetical problems posed by line 1. Especially in a text in which Solon presents himself, more than anywhere else in the surviving fragments, as a "master of truth" committed to defining the ethical concept of right measure with respect to wealth (see also ad 2 below), he must have considered traditional wisdom passed down from generation to generation (traditional wisdom viewed as history) to be a crucial point of reference for his political activities in general and for this poem in particular.

ἀγλαὰ τέκνα is not a rare verse ending in archaic epic: Hom. *Il.* 2.871, *Od.* 11.285 and 14.223; *HHom.Ap.* 14 and *HHom.* 33.2 (in other verse positions 4× in Homer and the *Hymns*); Hes. *Theog.* 366 and 644, fr. 31.2 and 4; [Hom.] *Epigr.* 4.8 Markwald, where the Muses are called κοῦραι Διὸς ἀγλαὰ τέκνα. Hes. *Theog.* 644 κέκλυτέ μευ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα (Zeus' address to the other gods) is the closest passage before Solon's time. But Solon may also have chosen the expression here

for the sake of the idea of "brilliance", inherent in ἀγλαός, which would sit well with poetry being the beautiful gift of the Muses (Mülke 2002, 245, following Treu 1975, 88 f.).

2. In Homer, the usual epithet for the Muses is "Olympian" (as below in 51), and it is Hes. *Theog.* 53 f. who first associates the Muses with Pieria. In both epic and elegy, the Muses can provide the content of the song or a stimulus to the poet (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 8.499–503; Alcm. *PMGF* 30), as well as function as eyewitnesses of past events (Hom. *Il.* 2.484–487; Mimn. 22 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}): Finkelberg 1998, 48–61, 161–191. Some scholars have considered these traditional roles to be irrelevant to Solon's specific invocation of the Muses (see e.g. Bowra 1958, 90 f. "it is remarkable that Solon should ask as much as he does from the Muses, who hardly had it in their power to grant all this"; also Linforth 1919, 106). Yet there may be many reasons behind Solon's invocation to the Muses. As Allen 1949, 63–65 and Anhalt 1993, 15–18 have remarked, in an age of oral poetry when poets were most often "teachers of truth", the Muses' supervision of poetry may also suggest that they had the power to reveal all their wisdom to Solon the man (e.g., in Hom. *Il.* 2.485). Ll. 71–76 in particular show why Solon may have felt that the Muses' superior wisdom was necessary for him to find the correct measure of richness, without which his political success would have been impossible: see below ad loc. I suggest that the patronage of the Muses may also be important to Solon because, as Hesiod explained (*Theog.* 80–97), their sphere of influence also extended to the straight (unequivocal, straight-forward) judgments of the judge-kings, since the gift of inculcating convictions and ideas not only benefits the poetic message but also makes the city-rulers who enjoy the Muses' protection capable of seductive eloquence (on the reception of this Hesiodic passage, cf. Agosti 1997; the possibility of a relationship between it and Solon's proem has been argued most notably by Harriot 1969, 48 and Matthiessen 1994, 401): see further in the Introd. above.

κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένωι: cf. Theogn. 13 εὐχομένωι μοι κλῦθι; also Theogn. 4 μοι κλῦθι; adesp. *PMG* 1018b.3 εὐχομένων ἐπακούσατ(ε); Rhian. *CA* 56 κλῦθί μοι εὐχάων; *HOrph.* 28.11 κλῦθί μου εὐχομένου = 32.15, 34.10, 49.4, 56.1 (also *HOrph.* 59.2 κλῦτέ μου εὐχομένου, and "Orph." *Lith.* 171 ὄφρα σευ εὐχομένοιο κλύοι θεός).

This initial invocation has a discrete deferential tone: the use of the dative, instead of the more common genitive, is possibly a result of this tone (cf. below). Unlike the singular κλῦθι, which is confined to prayers, κλῦτε in the plural (cf. later Aesch. *Cho.* 399, 802) is used when

addressing mortals as early as Homer, but still maintains the religious tone of the singular, as noted by Pulleyn 1997, 147.

In Homer κλῦθι and the other imperative forms of κλύειν (such as the reduplicated κέκλυθι or κλῦτε) appear invariably at the beginning of the (first line of a) prayer (*Il.* 11×, *Od.* 20×, cf. Braswell 1988, 79) and are followed by a vocative. The convention of putting these verbal forms first follows from their pragmatic function: to attract the attention of the person addressed towards the request to follow. This convention is also more or less analogous in function to longer phrases whose *verba dicendi* introduce a line that precedes a direct speech. In the lyric poets, where the use of introductory *verba dicendi* is much less frequent (cf. Führer 1967), the imperative forms of κλύειν appear not to have a fixed position, but they still frequently appear at the start of the speech (as in Anacr. *PMG* 418; Archil. 108.1; adesp. *PMG* 978b; Pind. *Pyth.* 1.90 and 4.13, fr. 78; they are not in Theogn. 4; Pind. *Ol.* 14.5 and fr. 52f.58). It cannot be ruled out that Solon intentionally moved κλῦτε from the beginning to the second half of the distich in order to emphasize the role of Mnemosyne by making her the first word of his prayer.

Κλύω, like ἀκούω, regularly takes the genitive of the person heard, and the accusative of the thing heard. In fact, Valckenaer wanted to substitute the genitive μευ for μοι codd. A dative, however, is attested by most of the mss. at least in Hom. *Il.* 24.335, *Od.* 4.767, *HHom.Ap.* 334, [Hom.] *Epigr.* 11.1 Markwald, Hes. *Theog.* 474 and [Hes.] *Sc.* 68, Theogn. 13, and in an early papyrus of *Od.* 15.172; in other passages μοι may have been overtaken by μευ in the tradition of the text, since the latter was the preferred reading, e.g., by Didymus (cf. schol. *Il.* 1.37, *Od.* 6.239, and Ludwich 1884, 1.176), and more generally the genitive μευ with κλύειν seems more recent and common than μοι. The dative may have been taken here in the double function of both a genitive and a dative, which would be an archaic heritage (cf. Wackernagel 1928, II.77 f. and Chantraine 1958–1963, II.70 § 8). But the dative with verbs of hearing could, however, also be simply an ethical dative or a dative of interest: cf. Haldane 1972, 45. Since many of the Homeric passages where μοι is best attested are formulaic celebratory and archaizing prayer-invocations (cf. Meier-Brügger 1986), we may suppose that in Solon too the dative stresses the formal-deferential tone of the prayer.

2 f. For the sequence κλῦτε … δότε, cf. [Hom.] *Epigr.* 11.1 Markwald κλῦθί μοι εὐχομένωι, Κουροτρόφε, δὸς δὲ γυναῖκα and 6.1–3 Markwald κλῦθι Ποσειδάων … δός δ' οὖρον … καὶ νόστον κτλ.

3 f. The strong enjambement between ἁπάντων and ἀνθρώπων stresses, at the level of the wording, the importance of the universality of the good repute Solon wishes to achieve; at the level of the distich, both the enjambement and the uniqueness of the verb governing ὄλβον and δόξαν (ἔχειν) emphasize the unity of the two gifts which Solon asks for. It is difficult to ascertain whether δότε is constructed with the accusative ὄλβον in 2 and the infinitive δόξαν ἔχειν in 3, or whether ἔχειν, governed by δότε, goes *apo koinou* with both δόξαν and ὄλβον (for the former interpretation see Alt 1979, 391, for the latter Mülke 2002, 245 f.; but in an oral text the progression of the discourse is privileged, and ὄλβον ... δότε is a self-sufficient phrase with which we can hardly take ἔχειν implicitly); in any case, it is significant that Solon chooses to set ἔχειν side by side with δόξαν. The idea of permanent possession which is inherent to this verb is thus unavoidably connected to the ὄλβος less strongly than to the universal "good opinion", while the adverb αἰεί placed just before δόξαν ἔχειν puts further emphasis on the exceptional duration wished for such a possession. The careful distinction between the divine and human realms and their belongings (at variance with the standard expression "men and gods" that exhaustively covers all living beings in archaic poetry: e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.338 f. and Hes. fr. 25.31: cf. Mülke 2002, 247) opposes the traditional blessing of god-sent wealth to the thoughtful definition of what is of value in the social dimension of the community.

In Homer, it is the gods in general (*Od.* 18.19) or Zeus in particular (*Od.* 4.207, 6.188, 18.273) who grant wealth or happiness to mortals; the request for ἀρετή τε καὶ ὄλβος from two different gods is first documented in the conclusions of two *HHom.* 15.9 (to Heracles) and 20.8 (to Hephaestus), which certainly cannot be included among the oldest hymns. The closest parallel for Solon's request thus seems to be Hes. *Theog.* 96 f. ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὅντινα Μοῦσαι φίλωνται (= *HHom.* 25.4 f.), which is found towards the end of the passage on the Muses as protectresses of the kings and rulers in general.

ὄλβος is ambiguous. It designates both a blessed life and material riches, although the latter sense is more common, and there are passages where ὄλβος and material "riches" are virtually undistinguishable: cf. Hes. *Op.* 320–326, 379 f., *HHom.Herm.* 379, *HHom.* 30.3–8; Anhalt 1993, 24. However, in the first line of 17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2}, for instance, ὄλβιος refers to a man who is above all successful in his pederastic loves, although from line 2 "happiness" also seems to consist of possessions which are typical of the rich or well-to-do. Here, as in the fragment mentioned above, ὄλβος means "happiness to which riches can contribute,

without, however, being its determining factor" (thus Masaracchia 1958, 204 f.; later Anhalt 1993, 25 f., and already Allen 1949, 51–53; differently Crane 1996, 79 f. who considers that the ὄλβος of Solon's prayer denotes chiefly material wealth), and δόξα refers to the perceptions he wishes others to have of the condition of his life and his civic behavior (Anhalt 1993, 29).

What Solon requested from the Muses undoubtedly involves, at least in part, material comfort, as the subsequent references to χρήματα (7) and to πλοῦτος (9) indicate, along with the material value that Solon attributes to the term ὄλβος elsewhere (8.3 and 29^b.2 G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 and 34.2 W.^{2}, *pace* Stoddard 2002, 156 who believes that the speaker of the prayer deliberately and emphatically confuses ὄλβος with mere financial wealth here: see Introd. above); cf. also *HHom.Dem.* 486–489 μέγ' ὄλβιος ὅν τιν' ἐκεῖναι / προφρονέως φίλωνται ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· / αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα / Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν, where the condition of ὄλβιος presented by the gods is used with but distinguished from the gift of the ἄφενος from Ploutos. Democr. *VS* 68B77 δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος may recall Solon directly, although Democritus makes the dual nature of his request for the right amount of both material wealth and good reputation much more explicit.

Nevertheless, Solon readily limits the general idea of material well-being, twice clearly specifying that the ὄλβος he seeks is whatever the gods see fit to grant him. Indeed, Solon's well-being also must be linked to "the reputation of being an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός"; this is the sense in which ἀγαθὴ δόξα of 4 should probably be taken, and 5 f. detail what an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός has to be. A possible parallel is Theogn. 572 πολλοὶ ἀπείρητοι δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγαθῶν "many who have not been tested have a reputation for merit" (Gerber 1999a, but the sense is uncertain; West 1993a "many imagine joys they've never known", taking δόξα to mean "hope" or "expectation"). This reputation is probably presented as a real and autonomous moral conquest in the distinctly human operation, and not only as a material consequence of well-being, according to the *cliché* that πλούτωι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ (so Hes. *Op.* 313), *pace* Allen 1949 who explains reputation as the public recognition of this general well-being (compare, e.g., Eur. *TrGF* (24)F362.16 f. ἐν τῶι πένεσθαι δ' ἐστὶν ἥ τ' ἀδοξία / κἂν ἦι σοφός τις, ἥ τ' ἀτιμία βίου; analogously also Hom. *Od.* 11.358–361). Solon stresses again, later, that although he is interested in "goods" (χρήματα, 7), these do not include those unjustly acquired (note the adversative δέ of the same line: cf. Masaracchia 1958, 205) but refer instead to those consistent with the "richness" (πλοῦτος) granted by the

gods (9). On the concept of ὄλβος in connection with Solon see also the Solon/Croesus episode in Introd. chap. 2.

The prayer to a god for "good reputation" is presented in a form comparable to that of an inscription from Metapontum (*CEG* 396, c. 525–500 BC) δὸς δέ Ϝ'ὶν ἀνθρόποις δόξαν ἔχεν ἀ⟨γ⟩αθ⟨ά⟩ν "grant him that he achieve good reputation among men": see Wachter 2002, 508 f. for an interpretation of this inscription as a "quotation" from Solon. The phrase δόξαν ἔχειν is attested in neither Homer nor Hesiod, but it is not uncommon in the archaic poets: Alcae. 72.11 f.; Tyrtae. 9.9 G.-P.^{2} = 12.9 W.^{2}; Theogn. 572. δόξα, occurs only twice in Homer (*Il.* 10.324, *Od.* 11.344), where it means "expectation" and in the adverbial expression οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης "nor otherwise than one expects". This infrequent use of this word to express a value in Homeric epic, however, is not altogether surprising. The concept of one's "reputation" among others is equivalent, at the ideological level of the πόλις, to the κλέος ("glory") which the Homeric hero strives to achieve at the price of his life, and which in most cases determines how he will be remembered by posterity: it helps to determine a man's potential for effectiveness among his contemporaries (cf. Fränkel 1975, 234; see also Anhalt 1993, 29 for the differences between an epic hero and Solon). Also noteworthy is Solon's clarification that the "reputation" he desires is one that results from earning the esteem of *all* men, namely something substantially different from the τιμή that archaic aristocrats usually pursued in their rather narrow circles of friends and companions (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 9.630 f.), nor does he desire the status afforded by membership in an illustrious *genos* which does not result from any validating achievements: see Donlan 1999, 23 f. and Donlan 2007, 37–39. Such a clarification contributes to the image Solon is trying to construct of himself (cf. especially 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}) as a politician concerned chiefly with the well-being of his fellow citizens and as a mediator of disputes between competing factions: cf. Alt 1979, 393; Vox 1983a, 517–519.

5 f. describe the possibility of a virtuous "public" action that can be combined with moderate wealth and the good reputation of an ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ; the possibilities on the level of private life are contemplated in 17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2} For this reason I agree with Hoffmann 1914, 129, Gerber 1970, 125, and Mülke 2002, 249 (in opposition to Alt 1979, 392 ff.) that ὧδε in 5 is not proleptic of the details of 6 (prospective ὧδε), but resumes the δόξα ἀγαθή of 4 (retrospective ὧδε), and this idea of δόξα would thus still be exemplified in 5 f. L. 5 describes the behavior that produces good reputation by relying on the sense of taste (cf. Sappho's

γλυκύπικρος *eros*). L. 6, drawing on the sense of sight (ἰδεῖν), describes the image that such behavior inspires in others. For a similar double sensory appeal—first to taste and then to touch—see Theogn. 301 f. and 1353. As for 6, αἰδοῖος and δεινός are frequently combined in archaic poetry in a hendiadys to express the idea of venerable authoritativeness (the first hinting at the venerability, the second at the awe of authority): cf. Hom. *Il.* 3.172, 18.394, *Od.* 8.22, 14.234; cf. *Od.* 5.88 (αἰδοῖός τε φίλος τε); αἰδοῖος, deserving of *aidos*, is used of the kings (βασιλῆες) in Hes. *Theog.* 80, 434, fr. dub. 361. For *aidos* as being equivalent to respect for authority or position, see Scott 1980, 16 f.

The hope expressed in this distich points to the principle of reciprocity that lays at the root of public and private relationships in both archaic and classical Greek society where virtue entailed helping one's friends and harming one's enemies: cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.184 f.; Hes. *Op.* 353; Sapph. 5.6 f.; Archil. 23.14 f.; Theogn. 337 f., 869–872, 1089 f.; Pind. *Pyth.* 2.83–85; cf. further Aesch. *Ag.* 608, *Cho.* 123, *Sept.* 1049, *Prom.* 978; Soph. *Ant.* 643 f.; Eur. *Med.* 809, *Her.* 585 f., *Heracl.* 881 f., *TrGF* inc.fab. F 1092; Plato, *Resp.* 332d; Dihle 1962, 13–40; Blundell 1989, 26–59. Within the original sympotic performance(s) of this poem, however, Solon's "friends" and "enemies" may have been understood by the listeners of the poem to be the particularized groups of Solon's circle of supporters or the opposing aristocratic faction(s): cf. Mülke 2002, 250; Eisenberg 1984; Oliva 1988, 72; *contra* Loeffler 1993, 34; Blaise 2005. At any rate, Solon does not desire to harm his enemies, a desire often expressed in the other authors cited above (see in particular Theogn. 869–872). On the contrary, Solon wishes to be δεινός, an object of reverential fear, to them: it is a wise expression, again well suited to a politician who wants to present himself as a balanced mediator between social parties (see the comm. on the preceding distich). In Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, when Athena proclaims that the institution of the Areopagus is the center of just but severe power, advancing the idea of a middle road between anarchy and tyranny (in terms not far from those expressed by Solon in 8.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.1 W.^{2}, cf. ad loc.), she too maintains that the citizens should have something to "fear" (δεινόν: 698) and "venerate" (σέβειν, σέβας: 690, 697, and 700); for the discourse of Aeschylus' Athena cf. Meier 1998, 298–311; on αἰδοῖος, δεινός and "good fear" in Aeschylus' *Eum.* and Plato's *Leg.* see Cains 1993, 208–214 and 373–378.

7 f. After exemplifying in 5 f. the social behavior that produces the "good reputation" introduced in 4, in 7 f. Solon returns to his request for ὄλβος

from the gods formulated in 3 and clarifies it. The distinction between "proper and god-given" and "unjustly obtained" wealth, although not found explicitly in Homer, is a motif which is not uncommon in archaic and classical thought: cf., e.g., Hes. *Op.* 320–326; Theogn. 145 f. (also 197–202 cit. below ad 9–13 and 753 f.); *skolion PMG* 890.3; Pind. *Pyth.* 5.1–4; Eur. *El.* 943 f., *Ion* 378–380, *Hel.* 903 f., *TrGF* (24)F362.11–13, (32)F419, (39)F459; Ps.-Phocyl. 5 Derron. It is also touched upon in phrases ascribed to the Seven Sages: πλούτει δικαίως, δικαίως κτῶ and πλοῦτον ἄδικον φεῦγε (cf. Santoni 1983, 113–119). Solon's reflection on the difference between righteous and unjust wealth does not seem to have a specific target in this fragment, and finds an immanent, utilitarian justification in the danger of unjust wealth from 8 onward. A consideration of the social and moral aspects of the issue of wealth, and an explicit reference to the wealth of the κακοί, which is at odds with ἀρετή, and thus unappealing for Solon, will be developed in 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2}

8. For the unpredictable delay of Δίκη cf. below 29–32, 3.16 G.-P.^{2} = 4.16 W.^{2}, and 30.3 G.-P.^{2} = 36.3 W.^{2} The closest parallel to this phrase comes from an inscription which is difficult to date, cited by Polyb. 4.33, and Pausan. 4.22.7, *Inscr. Graecae metricae* 63 Preger πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὗρε δίκην, in which, as in Solon, a gnomic aorist is used to express unavoidable certainty. Cleisthenes, a historian of the fourth/third century, maintains that the inscription comes from the tomb of Aristocrates, the Arcadian king and traitor to the Messenians during the First Messenian War (seventh century BC), but the epitaph most likely comes from a later period. Here, as with *CEG* 396 cit. ad 3 f., it is difficult to determine whether the inscription reflects an instance of the reception of Solon's elegy or just another coincidence stemming from Solon's adoption of the phraseology of popular morality.

The ethical-abstract sense of δίκη as a norm of private or public behavior emerged slowly and tentatively (although it seems firmly established in its secular sense (= δικαιοσύνη) at least in Theognis) with respect to the more concrete Iliadic meanings of "settlement of a dispute" and "punishment for an error". Still, in Hesiod we can find the personification of Δίκη as the daughter of Zeus and Θέμις ("Right") and sister of Εἰρήνη ("Peace") and Εὐνομία ("Good Governance"). The frequent references in both Hesiod (*Theog.* 901–903, *Op.* 36, 213–247, 253, 256, 259, 275 f., 281, 283) and Solon to Zeus as the god who oversees Dike's tenets imply that transgressions against Dike were offensive to the divine order itself.

It is difficult to say whether, and to what extent, the increased importance of δίκη in Hesiod and Solon, as compared to Homer, mirrors an increased level of abstraction and the rise of an internal moral compass, a higher ethical principle than the mere principle of correctness in settling disputes—this is, still in Hesiod, the most common sense of δίκη (cf. e.g. Solmsen 1949, esp. 107–123; Pearson 1962, 46; Gagarin 1973 and 1974) although already in some Homeric and Hesiodic passages δίκη means something more than the process and includes general righteousness: see Dickie 1978; Cairns 1993, 152–156 with further references. It is even more difficult to determine at what point Solon's Dike becomes a sort of immanent natural principle of socio-economic balance (rather than a proper religious idea, as it would have been in Hesiod and indeed as it seems to be in 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2]), a *dike* not unlike that of the Presocratic Anaximander, cf. 13 G.-P.[2] = 12 W.[2] This evolution in Solon's notion of Dike has been maintained with particular strength by Jaeger 1966, 89–93; see later Vlastos 1946 and 1947. Differently, Balot 2001, 86 f. considers that Solon's departure from Hesiod's religious conception of δίκη should not be overestimated: Solon would have begun to conceive of justice and injustice mainly in empirical terms, as features of the political relationship among the citizens of Athens. Another attempt at equalizing Hesiod's and Solon's ideas of Dike, which sees in the latter a different stress on the social/economical value of δίκη as the regulator of economic exchange appears in Gagarin 1974 and Havelock 1978, 256–262, according to whom Solon is merely the "organizer", for didactic purposes, of the ideas concerning justice which are already found scattered in the work of Hesiod himself (see also Matthiessen 1994, 402–407). In a perspective radically different from Jaeger's, the theological character of Dike both in Hesiod and in Solon has been stressed by Wolf 1953 = 1972, 146 ff., and Lloyd-Jones 1983, 44 f. Without understating the clear divine nature of Dike (we should not forget that, at least in our fragment, she appears to operate in symbiosis with Zeus), Solon emphasizes the unavoidable fixity of her function as a supervisor of the dynamics of sociopolitical events (cf. also 12 and 13 G.-P.[2] = 9 and 12 W.[2]). Solon's linguistic coherence in speaking about Dike denotes the consistency of her operation: see the gnomic aorist with which *Dike* is first introduced both in our verse and in 3.16 G.-P.[2] = 4.16 W.[2], and πάντως, "at any rate", a key word for Solon when he speaks of justice, also occuring at ll. 28 and 31, also 42, 55, and 3.28 G.-P.[2] = 4.28 W.[2]; see Raaflaub 1996a, 1060f. This very emphasis allows Solon to substitute a substantial certainty concerning the order guaranteed by Dike for the Hesiodic hope/trust in justice (e.g. *Op.* 217 f.).

9–32. These verses develop and explain 7 f. Solon differentiates between justly acquired wealth and ill-gotten/unjustly procured wealth by gauging its duration; proper and god-given wealth will abide whereas unjust wealth will not. This is a sort of utilitarian justification of the principle of "just measure" of wealth, which can be found as early as Sapph. 148 (later, e.g., Pind. *Nem.* 8.17 and *Ol.* 2.53–56). However, Solon also provides a more specifically ethical justification for the principle at 7 f. He also resorts to a religious agent (ἄτη 14 ~ Ζηνὸς τίσις 25) in order to ensure that unjust wealth is always punished: indeed divine co-agency seems to be the religious guarantee of the immanent mechanism that inevitably leads one from committing injustice to being affected by ἄτη ("since the wealth was acquired 'not in accordance with order' and possession did not come to the man who acquired it in a natural and unforced manner, a flaw attaches to the event which will eventually destroy everything": Fränkel 1975, 234 f.). For a similar argument where Zeus and the gods are responsible for (respectively) the solidity of righteous wealth and the punishment of the unjust profit, see Theogn. 197–208 quoted below.

The argumentative relevance of Solon's emphasis on the inflexibility of the abstract principle of ἄτη can be easily understood from a comparison with Hes. *Op.* 320–334 (quoted ad 7 f.), where the instability of unjust wealth is demonstrated through various cases of divine intervention. The balance between the presentations of righteous and unjust wealth favors the latter. Only two verses are given to righteous, god-given wealth—as if Solon assumes and/or suggests that the benefits of solid, righteous wealth are well known to everyone. In contrast to this brief treatment, the presentation of the instability of unjustly obtained wealth, which is detailed in 11–13, dwells on the frightening effects of ἄτη for twenty lines; the effects are didactically indoctrinated through the long figurative passage of 14–32.

After stating that unjust wealth does not last (11–13), Solon moves on to make two main points: a) to show the ruinous effects of ἄτη that inevitably follow, although b) ἄτη (under Zeus' supervision) may seem to operate in an arbitrary or tardy way. He does not go into detail on either point (he only offers a few words about the sinister effects of the stormy wind in 19–21; see the different strategy which Solon pursues in 3.26–29 G.-P.^{2} = 4.26–29 W.^{2}), but focuses on the casual moments of the beginning of *ate* (1–15) and especially of its end (17–25; 16 explicitly reminds the listener of the main concern of the long discussion on ἄτη, namely that unjust actions produce unjust wealth that does not last).

Finally, by highlighting how inscrutable the workings of Zeus' operations are, which do not conform to human behavior (25–30) or expectations (when the guilty person seems to have escaped Zeus' will, it turns out that on the contrary the punishment will affect his descendants, 31 f.), Solon anticipates the doubts that his audience might have about the inevitability of punishment. That the unavoidability of punishment is the goal of Solon's presentation can be easily understood through a comparison with the close parallel of Theogn. 197–208, which appears to elaborate Solon's passage closely, but leaves a reasonable possibility (death) for the guilty to remain unpunished: χρῆμα δ' ὃ μὲν Διόθεν καὶ σὺν δίκηι ἀνδρὶ γένηται / καὶ καθαρῶς, αἰεὶ παρμόνιμον τελέθει. / εἰ δ' ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέι θυμῶι / κτήσεται, εἴθ' ὅρκωι πὰρ τὸ δίκαιον ἑλών, / αὐτίκα μέν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν / αὖθις ἔγεντο κακόν, θεῶν δ' ὑπερέσχε νόος. / ἀλλὰ τάδ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπατᾶι νόον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ / τίνονται μάκαρες πρήγματος ἀμπλακίας· / ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔτεισε κακὸν χρέος οὐδὲ φίλοισιν / ἄτην ἐξοπίσω παισὶν ἐπεκρέμασεν· / ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρψε δίκη· θάνατος γὰρ ἀναιδὴς / πρόσθεν ἐπὶ βλεφάροις ἕζετο κῆρα φέρων.

9 f. For the idea that what is in contrast with divine desires will not be ἔμπεδος, cf. Hom. *Il.* 12.8 f. θεῶν δ' ἀέκητι τέτυκτο / ἀθανάτων· τὸ καὶ οὔ τι πολὺν χρόνον ἔμπεδον ἦεν (about the wall and the ditch which was erected by the Greeks around the ships without giving the gods their due hecatombs); for this epithet being used of a quality see ad 6.3 G.-P.[2] = 15.3 W.[2] The use of the particle ἄν with the subjunctive in relative clauses is the rule in Attic, but it is often omitted in Homer as well as in the elegiac poets (West 1974, 103) and regularly in our fragment: 11, 29, 30, 55, 75 f.

The image presupposed in 10 may be that of a heap of wheat, a storage jar, a mountain, or a tree: a discussion of the alternatives is in Mülke 2002, 259; Henderson 2008. Gagné 2009, 26 f. and 40 adds the possibility of πυθμήν being the "bottom of a cup" and translates here "the wealth which the gods give continually attends a man, from the bottom of the cup to its lip" (as for πυθμήν in l. 20 he explains "when Zeus shakes the bottom of the unruly, infertile sea he is shaking the cup of god-given wealth: he is spilling the sea out of its cup"). But I do not see why the traditional interpretation of πυθμήν as "bottom of the sea" can be questioned in l. 20; and κορυφή is not a word that is usually applied to a cup (*LSJ*). The contextual allusion to the symposium cup, which Gagné postulates, would, in any case, remain hidden since more obvious themes are activated by the word πυθμήν.

Analogous spacial definitions of totality are found in Hom. *Il.* 16.640 ἐκ κεφαλῆς εἴλυτο διαμπερὲς ἐς πόδας ἄκρους; Rhian. *Anth.Pal.* 12.93.10 κἀς νεάτους ἐκ κορυφῆς ὄνυχας ~ Phil. Thess. *Anth.Pal.* 9.709.4 = 3217 Gow-Page.

11. Cf. Theogn. 677 χρήματα δ' ἁρπάζουσι βίηι, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλωλεν. The mss. τιμῶσιν has been the object of numerous emendations (the most successful being Arhens' μετίωσιν; correct criticism is given by Masaracchia 1958, 212), in an attempt to define in a different way the connection binding men to pursue wealth which does not come from the gods. I agree with the most recent editions, however, (and with Römisch 1933, 5 f. and Björck 1942) that the verb τιμᾶν, "to honor", should be preserved. It seems to designate accurately the mental disposition regarding the human pursuit of wealth and perhaps implies that this misplaced honor works to the detriment of other values that are not, but should be, highly esteemed: cf. e.g. Theogn. 189 f. men who marry lowborn but wealthy women χρήματα … τιμῶσι "honor wealth" and 523 οὔ σε μάτην, ὦ Πλοῦτε, βροτοὶ τιμῶσι μάλιστα; Eur. *TrGF* (24)F354; Aristoph. *Plut.* 587; and more generally Hes. *Op.* 15 f. ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης / ἀθανάτων βουλῆισιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν (on which, see West 1978 ad loc.).

ὕβρις is the antisocial component that provokes the overvaluation of unjustly achieved wealth and yet is inherent to it: cf. Fisher 1992, 69. κατὰ κόσμον is a frequent formulaic phrase in the Homeric epic (8× *Il.*; 5× *Od.*) pointing to "order" as an unmarked, commonly shared idea—the opposite of "lack of κόσμος"—and usually qualifying *verba loquendi*. In the poem it designates the specific social discipline and economic order favored by Solon, as opposed to ὕβρις—similarly in Hom. *Il.* 2.213 f., *Od.* 8.178, 20.181 f. I interpret ὑπό as having a causal connotation (in agreement with Römisch 1933, 5 f.), and reject the suggestions, last argued by Björck 1942, of punctuating the line with a comma after τιμῶσι and interpreting both ὑφ' ὕβριος and κατὰ κόσμον as adverbially linked to the ἔρχεται of 11 (the resulting syntax would be particularly redundant).

12 f. are closely paralleled (also for the personification) by Pind. *Pyth.* 3.106 f. ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται / σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἕπηται, on which see Nagy 1990b, 279–282. For wealth that "keeps company", in addition to Sol. 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2}, cf., e.g., Hes. *Op.* 326 ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ; Bacchyl. 1.160 f. πλοῦτος … ὁμιλεῖ; Pind. *Ol.* 6.72

ὄλβος ἕσπετο, and *Pyth.* 5.1–4, where πλοῦτος "wealth" is characterized as a ἑπέτας, a "follower". The whole personification is introduced by the statement that this wealth cannot come κατὰ κόσμον and stresses the idea of a reluctant and temporary "obeying" of the overwhelming ἄδικα ἔργα inspired by *hybris* (πειθόμενος and οὐκ ἐθέλων hint at the "psychological" reluctance of wealth to follow willingly the people who have pursued and acquired it unjustly). The result is that the audience is left with the impression that this wealth is both objectively destituted of natural/structural duration, and subjectively dissatisfied with its actions—a double motivation, for it is not to be lasting.

The final three words of 12 constitute a quasi-formulaic pentameter sequence characteristic of Solon, and probably of archaic elegy in general: cf. 3.11 G.-P.² = 4.11 W.²; Theogn. 380 (ἀνθρώπων) ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθομένων (also 948 ἀδίκοισ' ἀνδράσι πειθόμενος); Fowler 1987, 45 and Giannini 1973, 38. But see ad 3.10–12 G.-P.² = 4.10–12 W.² for the possibility that l. 11 is corrupt. Solon is also fond of using ἔργμα (already in Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns) instead of the Homeric ἔργον: cf. 1.65 G.-P.² = 13.65 W.², 3.11 G.-P.² = 4.11 W.², 9 G.-P.² = 7 W.² The nominal suffix -μα denotes the resultative aspect of the action ~ "achievement" (cf. Kühner-Blass II.272): see also ad 9 G.-P.² = 7 W.² and compare to the ἔργα of 1.50 G.-P.² = 13.50 W.², where the different sense of "work in progress"/"activity" is particularly clear.

13. Also in Hes. *Op.* 220–223, Dike is led astray by the unjust sentences pronounced by corrupt judges, ἕπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν, κτλ. Solon's verse is also reminiscent of the relationship between the Λιταί ("Prayers") and Ἄτη presented in Phoenix's speech in Hom. *Il.* 9.502–512.

The choice between the two variants ἄτη and ἄτηι is not easy. The nominative, adopted by Gentili-Prato, would be better, if we could assume that ἄτη is strongly personified (see most recently Mülke 2002, 66), but this does not seem to be the case, since *ate* is presented in its material genesis and evolution in 14 f. If, on the contrary, we believe that Solon's intention is to portray the dangers of the unjust πλοῦτος, which becomes impure and unstable (whereas, on the contrary, it remains ἔμπεδος from the top to the bottom when it is righteous: 10 f.), then the dative (more commonly accepted by modern editors, and most recently by West) appears to be preferable. For parallels of μίσγεσθαι with the dative to express the idea that something loses its integrity or mixes with something else (and not necessarily the idea of "joining a group", as maintained by Linforth 1919, 231), cf. Theogn. 961 ὕδωρ δ' ἀναμίσγεται

οὔδει; Callim. *Aet.* fr. 24.3 γέλως ἀνεμίσγετο λύπηι and *Hymn.* 4.217 φόβωι δ' ἀνεμίσγετο μῦθος, probably imitated by fr. ep. adesp. 3rb.4 Heitsch γόος δ' ἀνεμίσγετο μύθωι.

The sense of ἄτη ranges from the cause of ruinous mistakes and misery consisting of "blinding" and the "malfunction of mind" to its effect of, "(irreversible or very grave) misfortune" or "ruin" to the synthesis of the two into "blinding determining utter ruin": cf. Dawe 1967; Wyatt 1982; Francis 1983; Doyle 1984; Roisman 1984; Yamagata 1991, 8–13; Neuburg 1993; Padel 1995, 167–192, 249–259. For ἄτη as the mental state, usually inflicted by the gods, characterizing a person who has lost rational control over his decisions and actions, see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.412, 3.100 (acc. to Zenodotus's text) and 164, 6.356, 16.274, 19.86–88, 24.28, *Od.* 4.261 (against ἄτη referring to an effect: *Il.* 8.237, 16.805, 24.480, *Od.* 12.372); Hes. *Op.* 213–216; in Hesiod, however, ἄτη more often designates the material consequence of this mental state: cf. *Op.* 230 f., 352, 413. The connection between *ate* and *hybris* appears first in Hes. *Op.* 213–216. However, neither in Homer nor in Hesiod is there any mention of *ate* as a punishment for *hybris* (on the contrary in Hes. *Op.* 213–216, it is one who is already afflicted by *ate* who then is weighed down under *hybris*). Nor is there any explicit mention of the famous ὄλβος—κόρος—ὕβρις—ἄτη chain known from Herodotus and fifth century tragedy. Both these conceptual associations emerge more or less explicitly here (κόρος is integrated below at 73) and in 8.3 f. G.-P.² = 6.3 f. W.² with Solon's image of biological derivation indicating their causal connection (surfeit gives birth to arrogance). On this use of genealogy to express relationships between ethical concepts in a number of archaic poets (notably Hes. *Theogony*), see Abel 1943; for an application of the genealogical metaphor in Aeschylus, particularly in the *Oresteia* see Helm 2004.

14 f. Solon does not produce an allegory nor does he have ἄτη in a personified form but instead he represents it as the natural and comprehensible action of a familiar phenomenon which can terrify (the spread of a fire) "with whose help he is able to say what could not have been said before": Snell 1953, 212; Noussia 2006, 141. Although the sudden change of subject between ἀρχὴ (scil. the beginning of ἄτη) δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ... and (ἄτη) ... ἀνιηρὴ δὲ τελευτᾶι may be understood as a *variatio* of the poet's focus in the oral style, this syntax is quite harsh, since the second subject in 15 is only implied as a genitive in 14, and has to be inferred from 13. Indeed, ἄτη has to be the logical subject of τελευτᾶι, as the *oxymoron* ἀρχὴ τελευτᾶι would otherwise hardly be acceptable (see already

Wilamowitz 1913, 259), but the clumsy ambiguity of whether φλαύρη of 15 goes with ἀρχή (the closest subject, of which φλαύρη might seem to be a qualification parallel to ἐξ ὀλίγου), or with ἄτη, can be resolved in favor of the latter alternative only by relying on the μὲν τὸ πρῶτον … δέ correlation. The change of subject taking place below at 53 f. can hardly be compared to it (*pace* Mülke 2002, 266), because in this other case the subject has to be inferred from the object of the preceding phrase (the accusative μάντιν of 53 becomes the subject of 54), and these cases of ellipsis of the subject are not uncommon in classical Greek, cf. Kühner-Gerth I.35e. Thus, in the first hemistich of 14 we should perhaps accept the correction of West 1996a, 152 to the genitive ἀρχῆς … ὀλίγης; for supporting evidence see below 59 ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης … γίγνεται and Hes. fr. 43a.61 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀλίγης, to which Bacchyl. 11.64 f. νεῖκος … ἀμαιμάκετον βληχρᾶς ἀνέπαλτο … ἀπ' ἀρχᾶς has to be added.

Analogous similes conjuring up the image of the graduality but irresistibility of the spread of the fire can be found in Pind. *Pyth.* 3.36 f. πολλὰν δ' {ἐν} ὄρει πῦρ ἐξ ἑνὸς σπέρματος ἐνθορὸν ἀίστωσαν ὕλαν, where interestingly enough the topic is Apollo's vengeance which destroys Coronis and her fellows. As a comment upon Coronis' sin Pindar speaks at 24 of a μεγάλαν αὐάταν (21–23 state the wantonness and folly of those who scorn what is within reach at home and cast their eyes far afield chasing dreams with hopes that cannot be fulfilled); see also Hom. *Il.* 11.155 f. ὡς δ' ὅτε πῦρ ἀΐδηλον ἐν ἀξύλωι ἐμπέσηι ὕληι, / πάντηι τ' εἰλυφόων ἄνεμος φέρει, κτλ.

γίγνεται (Ionic γιν-) is the only form attested in Attic inscriptions down to the end of the fourth century (Threatte 1980, I.562). Since it is attested by most or some of the mss. where it appears (γιν- is given by a part of the *paradosis* in 1.59 G.-P.² = 13.59 W.², 12.2 G.-P.² = 9.2 W.², 15.8 G.-P.² = 11.8 W.², 18.6 G.-P.² = 24.6 W.², 23.4 G.-P.² = 27.4 W.²), it should be considered an original Atticism of Solon; see, however, ad 23.4 G.-P.² = 27.4 W.²

16. οὐ γὰρ δή mss. is almost nonsensical, as οὐ … πέλει would deny the existence of the ὕβριος ἔργα, but they, and the consequent unjust richness, must exist, even if for a short span of time (see 13 f.), if Zeus' intervention is necessary to annihilate them; the attempt by Büchner 1959, 181 to suggest for πέλει the interpretation "are not up" (to the mortals) is improbable, see Mülke 2002, 270. On the contrary, οὐ γὰρ δήν Gesner (with adverbial δήν here equivalent to predicative δηναιός) is paralleled by Hom. *Od.* 20.155 οὐ γὰρ δὴν μνηστῆρες ἀπέσσονται μεγάροιο; The

phrase could also be reminiscent of some other Homeric passages with δήν or δηναιός involving intimations of the mortals' weakness vis-à-vis the gods, see *Il.* 5.407 οὐ δηναιὸς ὃς ἀθανάτοισι μάχηται, 6.130 f. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱός, κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος / δὴν ἦν, ὅς ῥα θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισιν ἔριζεν, 6.139 f. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτι δὴν / ἦν, ἐπεὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, *Od.* 5.127 f. οὐδὲ δὴν ἦεν ἄπυστος / Ζεύς, ὅς μιν κατέπεφνε βαλὼν ἀργῆτι κεραυνῶι.

17. That Zeus is the overseer of all things is a widespread motif from Homer onwards: *Od.* 13.213 f. Ζεύς σφεας τείσαιτο ἱκετήσιος, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους / ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾶι καὶ τείνυται, ὅς τις ἁμάρτηι (cf. also 17.485–488 θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι, / παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, / ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες); Hes. *Op.* 267–269; Archil. 177; Alcae. 200.10 f.; Bacchyl. 15.51; Aesch. *Eum.* 1045; Soph. *El.* 175; Aristoph. *Ach.* 435; adesp. *TrGF* F482, etc. For Zeus, or the gods in general, being responsible for the result of human actions, cf. Hes. *Op.* 333 f. (quoted above ad 9–32) and 669; Archil. 298; Semon. 1.1 f.; Alcm. *PMGF* 1.83 f.; Pind. *Ol.* 13.104, *Nem.* 10.29; Aesch. *Ag.* 1487, *Supp.* 823 f.; Eur. *Or.* 1545, *Supp.* 617, *TrGF* inc.F948; adesp. *TrGF* 621.

18–25. These verses are the longest instance of narrative suspension in the poem and this very fact highlights the importance for Solon of the description of Zeus' justice. Indeed, there is a strong logical connection between 17 (on Zeus checking the conclusion of every human action) and 25 (on Zeus' τίσις)—18–25 are hardly anything more than an example illustrating the epanaleptic τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις of 25.

Even the syntax strategically highlights the perfect overlapping of the subject of the narrative action (Zeus' τίσις) with the simile's subject (the wind dispersing the clouds). ἐξαπίνης δέ of 18 seems to be a phrase intended to introduce Zeus' action, but it is interrupted in the next line by the simile and resumed *ad sensum* by πέλεται τίσις in 25 (for this idea cf. Euphor. *SH* 415 col. ii.13, who uses the epithet λαιψηρός for Dike). But ἐξαπίνης is also frequently used by Homer (*Il.* 9.6, 17.57 f., *Od.* 12.286–290) for the wind, which is the main subject of the simile. This adverb thus emphasizes the notion that Zeus and the wind share a tendency towards sudden, unexpected action (cf. Loeffler 1993, 26 n. 8). Also αἶψα of 18, which is used of the wind inside the simile, had already been used for a stiff wind in Hom. *Od.* 12.409 f. and Hes. *Theog.* 379; cf. also ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα in Hom. *Il.* 14.17, 15.620.

As far as the length and the structure of the simile are concerned, they demonstrate the oral poet's manner of choosing the subject first and then extending it. In fact, quite traditional is the fact that the simile of 18, which seems to conclude itself quickly as is customary in elegiac poetry (already noted by Hudson-Williams 1926, 123), is then expanded into the longer dimensions characteristic of the extended Homeric simile (see Edwards 1991, 26) by means of the relative clause beginning after the first word of 19. Therefore, what Masaracchia 1958, 218 regards on the whole to be a clumsy ("non perfetto") technique in the composition of the simile must be "excused" as a mark of the oral style. It takes two and a half lines to depict the storm with its destructive effects. The description of the good weather coming back is then stated in three and a half verses. Similes using storm scenes are particularly frequent in archaic epic, cf. Hom. *Il.* 16.364–367 (again a stormy rain is used to symbolize the actions Zeus takes against crooked sentences made by judges), and 13.795–801; Hes. *Theog.* 873–880. In particular, the image closest to Solon's is in *Il.* 16.384–393 a torrential storm, which already served to illustrate the punishment that Zeus inflicts upon those who arrogantly pervert justice with their depraved decisions (in Homer that image has more points of comparison than are explicit). As Janko 1992, 365 points out, in the simile of *Il.* 16 the poet almost seems to justify Troy's demise by linking the Trojans with wrongdoing—a notion that is all the more poignant for being left oblique. In Solon, the simile of the spring wind is a direct image for Zeus operating as a λαῖλαψ, and the victims of his actions are, among the other citizens, primarily the wrongdoers. The notion that it is up to Zeus to make the sky clean and establish αἰθρίη was also in the other Homeric simile of *Il.* 16.297–302 ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὑψηλῆς κορυφῆς ὄρεος μεγάλοιο / κινήσηι πυκινὴν νεφέλην στεροπηγερέτα Ζεύς, / ἔκ τ᾽ ἔφανεν πᾶσαι σκοπιαὶ καὶ πρώονες ἄκροι / καὶ νάπαι, οὐρανόθεν δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπερράγη ἄσπετος αἰθήρ / ὣς Δαναοὶ νηῶν μὲν ἀπωσάμενοι δήϊον πῦρ / τυτθὸν ἀνέπνευσαν, πολέμου δ᾽ οὐ γίγνετ᾽ ἐρωή.

Solon's simile fulfils a precise new narrative strategy. Comparing Zeus' τίσις to a natural phenomenon implicitly ascribes to the former the characteristic of mechanical and inflexible, but unpredictable, repetition which belongs to the events of the natural world, and which was, of course, an indisputable experience shared by everyone in Solon's audience (Snell 1953, 191–226; Fränkel 1975, 228; Noussia 2006, 141–143). For a close parallel in Jewish imagery of Yahweh, cf. *Bible*, *Isa.* 44.22: "I have wiped away your disobedience like the clouds and your sins like the raincloud" (West 1997, 510 f.). Finally, the emphasis of the simile on the

end of the storm may also support Solon's intention to expose the violent work of Zeus in the most piously favorable light. Although the mentioning of *ate* might have led us to expect a dark and dramatic simile for the punitive measures of Zeus, or at least a simile that compares it to some supernatural manifestation according to Iliadic instances (on which see Blaise 2005, 27), Solon adopts a point of view which is not so different from the one employed in 12 and 13 G.-P.² = 9 and 12 W.² and he keeps his perspective "objective" (as noted by Loeffler 1993, 27). He includes a hint at the existence of the clouds of the actual storm at the beginning and at the end (18 and 24), and is not silent about the ruinous side-effects of Zeus-ἄνεμος who acts on them in 19–21. In the end, however, it is not only the storm and the wintry time of the year (cf. the specification ἄνεμος … ἠρινός) that are mentioned, but also, and most importantly, the positive result of the improved weather—when the wind dissolves the clouds and the αἰθρίη replaces them in the spring, and a stable improvement of the weather can be expected. Homer's nature similes, by contrast, usually consist of scenes either from a peaceful natural world or from the violent world of destructive nature (see Scott 1974, 100–106). In Solon, the two narrative alternatives are mingled: the effects of the destructive force of the wind occupy two and a half verses and the description of the good weather coming back is given in three and a half lines. Compare this more generally to the emphasis on the destructive effects characterizing descriptions of punishment inflicted by the gods in Hom. *Il.* 16.388–392 quoted above (storms and floods) or by Zeus himself in Hes. *Op.* 243–247 (famine and disease, sterility of women, military defeats, the loss of ships at sea) and the much greater emphasis on negativity and destruction in the storm similes of Aesch. *Sept.* 758–761 or Soph. *Ant.* 584–592 (on which see Easterling 1978).

19–22. For this order of events (the wind first disturbs the abysses of the sea then passes onto the land), Masaracchia 1958, 218 f. suggests the possible influence of naturalistic philosophy—if we can admit that, by Solon's time, theories like that of Xenophan. *VS* 21B30 οὔτε γὰρ ἐν νέφεσιν γίνοιτό κε ἶς ἀνέμοιο / ἐκπνείοντος ἔσωθεν ἄνευ πόντου μεγάλοιο … ἀλλὰ μέγας πόντος γενέτωρ νεφέων ἀνέμων τε were already in circulation. In Greece, however, it is simply a fact that storms were first seen approaching from the sea, and this may be enough to justify the sequence of scenes as described by Solon: cf. Theophr. *Sign.* 6.21.

The change between atemporal aorist and present tense verbs is not uncommon in similes, where the aorist is usually translated by the pres-

ent (cf. Sicking 1991, 36 f.), but the atemporal aorist may often be adopted instead of the present since it refers to a single or sudden occurrence, while the present implies duration or continuance (Goodwin 1889, 54 f.; Chantraine 1958–1963, II.186). According to this view, together with the aorists διεσκέδασεν of 18 and ἔθηκεν of 22, expressing the speed with which the wind achieves its results, the presents ἱκάνει (21), λάμπει (23) and ἔστιν (24) respectively designate the progress of the wind towards the sky *after* the dispersing of the clouds has been accomplished and the long duration of the reassuring sunshine (cf. ἠελίοιο μένος … καλόν: 23 f.) as well as the absence of any clouds. The Homeric use of ὥστε + a finite verb to introduce a comparison has the same effect, since this construction is usually adopted to describe a permanent idea: cf. Ruijgh 1971, 598; Diggle 1994, 322.

πόντος of 19 is given two epithets, a stylistic device which is already common in Homer (Vetta 1999, 25). Of these two epithets πολυκύμων is first attested here (later it is very uncommon; it is found in Empedocl. *VS* 31B38.3), and it is perhaps an adaptation to a displaced metrical position of the synonymous traditional second hemistich πολυκλύστωι ἐνὶ πόντωι (Hom. *Od.* 4.354, 6.204, 19.277; Hes. *Theog.* 189), resulting from Solon's tendency to combine two epithets, of which one is traditional, the other new: cf. Fowler 1987, 46 f.; on Solon's tendency to avoid the more usual formulaic epithet-noun combinations in favor of the less frequent ones, see Campbell 1967, 232; 1982, 256. ἀτρύγετος is a quite common and formulaic epithet for ἅλς, θάλασσα, and πόντος in archaic epic (6× in the *Iliad*, 12× in the *Odyssey*, 7× in Hesiod), although its meaning was debated: "unharvested", "sterile" from τρυγᾶν, or "never worn out", "restless" from τρύειν. In principle, it cannot be ruled out that Solon intended it to mean "restless" (e.g. Herodian. *GG* III.2, 284 = *EM* 167, 28) in order to suggest the idea that, despite the action of the wind, the sea seemingly remains ἀκαταπόνητος (cf. Apollonius Soph. *Lex.Hom.* 46.16 Bekker οἱ μὲν ἀτρυγέτου ἀκαταπονήτου ὑπ' ἀνέμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, κτλ.). It is also possible that the epithet was taken in the sense "bottomless" (e.g. Hesych. *Lex.* α 8165 Latte) in an oxymoronic connection with the mentioning of the πυθμήν—the wind would be described as so strong as to reach the bed of the sea, despite its being "bottomless" (the τρὺξ θαλάσσης was probably described as being stirred by the winds directed by the two Boreads, Zetes and Calais, invoked by the Athenians at the battle of Artemisium in Simon. 1a.12 G.-P.^{2} = 3 W.^{2}: see P. Parsons, ad *P.Oxy.* 3965 fr. 20.12, p. 41, and West 1993b, 3; cf. Herod. 7.189). But the interpretation of ἀτρύγετος as "sterile" seems to have been the most widespread

interpretation in the ancient world: in a passage where Solon's attention to the fertility of the tilled soil is more than likely (see below ad πυροφόρον), this meaning of ἀτρύγετος would have introduced a useful juxtaposition between the sea and the fertile γῆ. Also, in the ἀκάρπιστα πεδία "sterile plains" of Eur. *Phoen.* 210 ἀκάρπιστος is probably a gloss of the Homeric ἀτρύγετος, and πεδία, should be taken as a metaphor for the "surface of the sea", oxymoronically evoking the idea of the non-sterile plains of the earth (Euripides' allusion to the Homeric epithet ἀτρύγετος was already identified by the schol. ad Hom. *Il.* 15.27 and schol. ad *Phoen.* 210).

πυροφόρος (another uncommon epithet used by Homer for the earth: *Il.* 12.314, 14.123, 21.602, *Od.* 3.495) is not only an *epithetum ornans* here. Like the adjectives in πίονα γαῖαν of l. 23 and γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία of 18.2 G.-P.^{2} = 24.2 W.^{2} (where the "wheat-bearing" land is considered to be an example of riches), it shows that Solon's interest is not merely descriptive, but that it specifically focuses on the cultivated fields, the καλὰ ἔργα of 21, and the effects (also economic) that Zeus' punishment has upon them from the viewpoint of a society that is still mainly agrarian: cf. 18.2 G.-P.^{2} = 24.2 W.^{2}, 30.3–6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.3–6 W.^{2}, and 37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2} (see ad loc.).

Prior to Solon, the verb δηιόω, is found only in Homer, where it has the meaning of "killing brutally" (usually by ripping the enemy to pieces) or more uncommonly "tearing [enemies' arms] to pieces" (of shields: *Il.* 5.452 and 12.425; of arms: *Il.* 18.82 f.). Solon may have wanted to imply that the action of the wind has the martial fury of the Homeric heroes when it destroys the results of human labor.

Solon's καλὰ ἔργα "worked fields" is paralleled by a series of epic passages whose contexts are analogous: Hom. *Il.* 5.92 πολλὰ δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἔργα κατήριπε κάλ' αἰζηῶν (from a simile describing the effects of the Διὸς ὄμβρος), 12.281–283 καλύψηι / … καὶ πεδία λωτοῦντα καὶ ἀνδρῶν πίονα ἔργα (from a simile describing the snow sent by Zeus), 16.392 μινύθει δέ τε ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων (from a simile where the subject is the torrents swollen by Zeus as a punishment against men's injustice; see also Hes. *Op.* 409); Hes. *Theog.* 878 f. κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείριτον ἀνθεμόεσσαν / ἔργ' ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων (the obnoxious winds being the object). For the prosody of καλά see West 1974, 88.

The Solonian αἰπὺν … οὐρανόν (reused by Pind. fr. 162; Bacchyl. 3.35 f. (αἰθήρ); Soph. *Aj.* 845) has Hom. *Il.* 5.367 ~ 5.868 ~ *HHom.Ap.* 109 ("I/they went") θεῶν ἕδος, αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον as one of its models, but pre-

supposes a relevant modification of the standard wording of Homer. The Homeric formulaic system had featured both Mount Olympus and the sky as the seat of the gods, but Homer, when referring to Olympus, almost always used αἰπύς "high" or "lofty"—an epithet which is more natural for describing a mountain than the sky, which is usually called εὐρύς "wide"/"broad". Thus, αἰπὺς οὐρανός might be interpreted as an innovation of Solon that was permitted by the equation of Olympus and the sky, and thus the contamination of their respective descriptions, in the poems of Homer and not infrequently afterwards (cf. above all *Il.* 8.19–26, with Noussia 2002, 491–496; Lanza 2005, 15 f.; Kouremenos-Parassoglou-Tsatsanoglou 2006, 189–191), despite the fact that this contamination was criticized by the author of the Derveni papyrus, col. XII.3–5, and later by Aristarchus: cf. Lehrs 1865, 164–172 and Schmidt 1976, 85 f. Nevertheless, one should not exclude the possibility that, in his text of two Iliadic passages 3.364 and 15.192, Solon read the phrases εἰς οὐρανὸν αἰπύν/οὐρανὸν αἰπύν as designating the seat of the gods: this was actually the text that Zenodotus recommended for these two passages, against the vulgate εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν. In light of Solon's passage, it is thus plausible that Zenodotus relied on a part of the manuscript tradition of Homer, and thus was not maintaining αἰπύν on simply conjectural grounds (a more detailed analysis can be found in Noussia 2002).

αἰθρίην … ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν possibly results from the conflation of Hom. *Il.* 17.645 f. Ζεῦ πάτερ, … / ποίησον δ' αἴθρην, δὸς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι with the common formula θῆκεν ἰδέσθαι "made (someone) see", which is specifically used to introduce the effects of Athena's miraculous interventions (*Od.* 8.20, 18.195, 24.369). For examples of timeless aorists in similes, see West 1989a, 136 f.

The epic/Ionic αὖτις (also in 31 and 35), still attested in Sophocles and Menander, and not the later Attic form αὖθις (a scribal normalization introduced in the manuscript tradition of our verse and 30.24 G.-P.² = 36.24 W.²) must be the form in which Solon used this adverb to mean "in turn" or "again" (as we are reminded by the apparatus of Gentili and Prato, the corruption αὐτίκ' at 31 proves that the original form of the adverb most likely was without aspiration). Its frequency shows Solon's intention to stress the predictable iteration and sequentiality of some series of action/reaction events in both the divine/natural world (ll. 22, 31) and in the human world (l. 35 and 30.24 G.-P.² = 36.24 W.²).

23 f. λάμπει … μένος: cf. Pind. fr. 129.1 λάμπει μὲν μένος ἀελίου. The form πίων applies here to the feminine (i.e. is a two-termination

adjective here), a usage which rarely occurs in Greek for this adjective (but see [Hes.] *Sc.* 407 f. and Aesch. *Ag.* 820) and almost never in Homeric/Hesiodic epic, which has πίειρα for the feminine (but in *Od.* 2.56 πίονας αἶγας "goats" should be taken as feminine, cf. schol. ad loc.); this is confirmed by Kühner-Blass I.543 and Schwyzer 1939, 543. Solon himself uses the specific feminine form in 29^b.8 G.-P.² = 34.8 W.² πιείρας χθονός. Nevertheless, Solon's distinctive preference for the use, with the word "earth", of adjectives denoting the earth's fertility (cf. also 18.2 G.-P.² = 24.2 W.²) should lead us to accept the text given by all mss., and not the common Homeric formula κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν introduced by a later hand in two mss. of Stobeus. On the narrative function of πίονα, see above ad πυροφόρον (20).

καλόν of 24 is not predicative of μένος, but adverbial: Ziegler 1963, 654.

25–28. These verses conform to Solon's twofold agenda of presenting Zeus' punishment (cf. above ad 18–25) from the most positive perspective possible and as the most effective action possible. Solon emphasizes the consideration with which this intervention takes place, distinguishing it from the uncontrolled responses that are the typical results of human anger, with the effect of highlighting the fact that its complexity may excede common human parameters (= that men may be wrong in assessing the effects of Zeus' supervision). He thereby endorses a conception of the unintelligibility of the divine that is shared with epic and analogous to that which we also find for the θεὸς ἕν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος in Xenophan. *VS*21B23 = 26 G.-P.² οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα. In any case, he greatly distances his idea of the gods from the epic divinities, who like mortals (and at times even more so) are inclined to violent fury: cf. Clay 1983. This differentiation becomes especially clear through a comparison to Hom. *Il.* 16.386–393 cit. above ad 18–25, where the punitive intervention of Zeus is introduced by the phrase κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνηι (also occurring at *Od.* 5.147 for Zeus). In Hesiod, too, many of Zeus' actions are initiated by participles like χολωσάμενος/χολούμενος, with this anger being directed at men: cf. *Op.* 47, 53, 138, *Theog.* 561. Solon's Zeus does not get angry about every single action (with this statement it is possible that Solon is anticipating the objection that some sinful people may seem to have escaped his attention), but he is aware of the behavior of malefactors, and, although sometimes with delay, he exacts his vengeance on those of wicked mind—*pace* Mülke 2002, 278 who tries to interpret ἐφ' ἑκάστωι as masculine, in connection

with ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν θυμὸν ἔχει, 27, I take ἐφ' ἑκάστωι to be neuter and to mean "on each occasion", along with Campbell 1967, 237 and Gerber 1970, 126. In fact, here we may have a deliberate distinction between single action (neuter ἕκαστον) and disposition/mind (θυμός) to which the later phrase ὅστις ἀλιτρόν / θυμὸν ἔχει appears to point. Divine justice seems not to pay attention to single actions: Theogn. 204–206 οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ / τίνονται μάκαρες πρήγματος ἀμπλακίας· / ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔτεισε κακὸν χρέος, κτλ. quoted above ad 9–32—if the conjectural ἐπ' αὐτοῦ is correct—stresses the same point that someone who believes that he has escaped divine punishment has not really done so since the gods often do not punish the misdeed "at the moment of the crime". Divine justice always finds a way of being served when someone is wicked (ἀλιτρός), thanks to an infallible (οὔ ἑ λέληθε) inspection, of which διαμπερές stresses the element of continuity that may very well stand in direct opposition to its excercising judgment on every single action.

Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις: cf. Alcm. *PMGF* 1.36 ἔστι τις σιῶν τίσις, again in the context of a statement about the unavoidability of the divine punishment of human misdeeds. Solon's model for οὔ ἑ λέληθε and his way of anticipating potential doubts about Zeus' unfailing punishment is Hes. *Op.* 266–269 ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῶι βουλεύσαντι κακίστη. / πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας / καί νυ τάδ', αἴ κ' ἐθέλησ', ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει / οἵην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει. The adverbs αἰεί and διαμπερές respectively at the verse's beginning and before the bucolic diaeresis are epicizing: Hom. *Il.* 15.70; *HHom.Ap.* 485.

The choice of the word ἀλιτρός is deliberate. It was usually adopted in archaic literature for those whom the gods were believed to hate, whether this hatred was due to some offence committed against the gods or because one had espoused impious doctrines concerning them or religion in general; only in the fourth century is it used to designate people who have committed serious crimes against the state (cf. Hatch 1908, 165; Dumortier 1959, 5–20). By using this word, Solon equates unjust wealth and ὕβριος ἔργα with an impious crime against the gods, and thus also explains Zeus' attention to the people responsible for these crimes. A similar strategy is at work in 3.14 G.-P.² = 4.14 W.² οὐδὲ φυλάττονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα.

θνητὸς ἀνήρ, used here for the distinction between Zeus' action and human behavior (see also θνητοί, 33), is a frequent phrase as early as Homer (e.g. *Il.* 20.41 and 266, 24.259, *Od.* 10.306, 16.196; *HHom.* 19.33) and appears once in Hesiod (*Theog.* 967) for passages emphasizing the difference between human and divine nature or condition.

A formal model for 28 (see especially the verse end ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη) may have been Hes. *Op.* 217 f. δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα (cf. also *Op.* 333 f.). The model would be also relevant to Solon's idea, if the subject of ἐξεφάνη is Zeus' justice (τίσις, 25), as suggested by Büchner 1959, 183, or Zeus himself, as suggested by Holwerda 1963, 344. Since, however, the closest expressed or implied subject is "the evil person"—ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν θυμὸν ἔχει (with λέληθε) in 27 f. and ὁ μὲν … ὁ δ' (with ἔτεισεν) in 29, also implying ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν θυμὸν ἔχει—I agree with Mülke 2002, 280, following Gerber 1970, 126, that "the person with an evil soul" is the most plausible subject of 28. Less likely is that the subject is the ἀλιτρὸς θυμός, as suggested by Maurach 1983, 20–27.

29–32. The delay of divine punishment manifests itself in a more radical form when the fault is ancestral and the sons of a guilty father, or even the successive generations, suffer the punishment. This is a concept typical of ancient thought in general (cf. e.g. *Bible*, *Exod.* 20.5 and *Num.* 14.18) and it is consistent with Solon's strong awareness of familial solidarity: cf. Dodds 1959, 43 f. and Dover 1974, 260. In Greek literature, the motif of Zeus' vengeance spread to the transgressor's family is found in Hom. *Il.* 4.160–163 and in Hes. *Op.* 282–285, who says that whenever someone bears false witness under oath his generation will lack in glory; cf. Theogn. 199–208 quoted above ad 9–32; other examples for instance in Herod. 1.91: Croesus and 6.86: Glaucus. This concept returns with some frequency in Attic tragedy: for the idea of delayed divine punishment in general cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 58 f., 367–384, 1460 f., 1497–1512, *Cho.* 61–65; Soph. *Ant.* 1074–1076; Eur. *Bacch.* 882–895, *TrGF* 73F800, *TrGF* inc. F979 (there was also a proverb on the topic cited by Sext. Emp. *In gramm.* 287, and Plutarch dedicates an entire small treatise to the subject: *On the Delay of Divine Punishment*). For the "hereditary" nature of guilt, cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 750–771, 1186–1197, 1565 f., 1600–1602, *Cho.* 382–385, 648–651, *Sept.* 653–655, 720–791; Soph. *Ant.* 583–603, *OC* 369 f., 964 f.; Eur. *El.* 1305–1307, *Her.* 1261 f., *IT* 199–202, 987 f., *Or.* 811–818, 996–1011, 1546–1548, *Phoen.* 379–382, 1611, *TrGF* inc. F980; from the fourth century, Lys. 6.20; Isocr. *Bus.* 25; but cp. also Lysias fr. 85.19–26 Carey for a confirmation of the idea that unjust actions are paid by the guilty ones and not by their children. See Gantz 1982–1983 on Aeschylus and Sewell-Rutter 2007 on the tragedians.

Theogn. 734–740 … ἐργάζοιτο θεῶν μηδὲν ὀπιζόμενος, / αὐτὸν ἔπειτα πάλιν τεῖσαι κακά, μηδ' ἔτ' ὀπίσσω / πατρὸς ἀτασθαλίαι παισὶ γένοιντο κακόν· / παῖδες δ' οἵτ' ἀδίκου πατρὸς τὰ δίκαια νοεῦν-

τες / ποιῶσιν, Κρονίδη, σὸν χόλον ἁζόμενοι, / ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ δίκαια μετ' ἀστοῖσιν φιλέοντες, / μή τιν' ὑπερβασίην ἀντιτίνειν πατέρων represents the first clear example of criticism of the religious conception of guilt (and divine punishment) as being hereditary, in the name of the more "modern" principle of individual responsibility. Solon's term ἀναίτιοι "guiltless", however, seems to imply already an attitude similar to that of Theognis (cf. also Blaise 2005, 24). Indeed, there are other links connecting Solon's fr. 1 and Theogn. 731–752: cf. Alt 1979, 396 and n. 32. At the same time, however, Solon uses this archaic idea in order to facilitate his theodicy. As remarked by Anhalt 1993, 32, the objection that the penalty is often delayed becomes in Solon proof of the god's majesty over human irascibility, and the idea that children may pay the penalty is seen as a guarantee that the deserved punishment will not fail to appear. The result is that the existence of divine justice is proved and potential malefactors are discouraged. On this double duty of the notion of inherited guilt—it both guarantees the inevitability of punishment in a world where everyday experience shows the guilty dying unpunished and also helps to explain the seemingly inexplicable suffering of virtuous people—cf. Dodds 1951, 34, 150 f.

ἔτεισεν is paralleled by the consistent epigraphic evidence of the archaic and classical age: cf. Threatte 1996, 536–538. Mss. ἔτισεν is the standard mistake of Hellenistic and later papyri and medieval mss. of all authors, where τίσω and ἔτισα are the future and the aorist of both τίνειν and τίειν (cf. *LSJ s.v.* τείνω)—a mistake facilitated by itacism, and here, in particular, by τίσις of 25 and τίνουσιν of 31.

οἳ δὲ φύγωσι αὐτοί: cf. Theogn. 733 quoted above *αὐτὸν* ἔπειτα πάλιν τεῖσαι κακά. The variant of a single ms. εἰ δὲ κτλ., accepted by some editors up to the nineteenth century and more recently by Masaracchia 1958, 220 f., at first seems to be better (and thus may have been *facilior*) because of the following subjunctive (Mülke 2002, 281). In reality, however, it is quite misleading, since it leads us to suppose that the subject of φύγωσιν αὐτοί are ὁ μὲν … ὁ δ(έ), whereas the text, after listing those who are punished immediately and those who are punished later, clearly presupposes a third group of people who seem to be punished neither immediately nor later. The suppression of a (ἐπὶ) τούτοις *vel sim.* before οἵ, presumably to be taken as the indirect object of ἤλυθε, 31, affects the relative phrase with an anacolouthic tone, but is paralleled by the suppression of the relative accusative which is assumed to be the direct object of κίχῃ.

μοῖρα has a meaning not far from that of αἶσα in 3.2 G.-P.[2] = 4.2 W.[2]—"fate decided" by the gods (cf. ad loc.)—, and is a *vox media* (for θεοῦ μοῖρα in a positive sense cf. *HHom.Ap.* 238 and Semon. 7.104). But in this context the word is intended to resound with sinister connotations: since Homer's *Odyssey* (where the phrase is first attested), θεῶν μοῖρα had always expressed a heavy god-sent blow (cf. 3.269 and 22.413; also 11.292 θεοῦ μοῖρα), and above all μοῖρα κιχάνει/κίχει (θανάτου) had been formulaic expressions for the arrival of the fate of death in the *Iliad* (17.478, 672, 22.303 and 436) and in early elegy (Callin. 1.15 G.-P.[2] = 1.15 W.[2]; Tyrtae. 5.5 G.-P.[2] = 7.2 W.[2]; Mimn. 11.2 G.-P.[2] = 6.12 W.[2]); on κιχάνω see Ruijgh and van Krimpen 1969.

Possible models for 32 are Hom. *Il.* 20.308 καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται and Tyrtae. 9.30 G.-P.[2] = 12.30 W.[2] καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω (see also 6.12 G.-P.[2] = 10.12 W.[2] οὐδ' ὀπίσω γένεος), which however dealt with the *positive* value of glory's survival (cf. Anhalt 1993, 31): another example of Solon's innovative recontextualization of epic language, which allows him to express ideas (like this one) which Homer had not expressed in a language which still resembles the Homeric standard of sublimity.

33–62. A parallel, or potential prototype, for Solon's consideration, already analyzed by Nestle 1942, 131 f., is *Od.* 18.130–137 οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώποιο / [πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει.] / οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω, / ὄφρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρηι· / ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέωσι, / καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετληότι θυμῶι. / τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, / οἷον ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἄγηισι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. Both Solon and the Homeric Odysseus in *Od.* 18 are interested in the mutability of the human condition and thus of human thought. Nevertheless, Odysseus highlights the dependence of both on changes in circumstance as decided by the gods, whereas Solon speaks only of the inherent limits of human nature and investigates the psychology of δόξα or ἐλπίς, without stressing its opposition to divine knowledge. As remarked by Anhalt 1993, 37–40 and 56, while for Odysseus men never think that they will suffer evil in the future, for Solon men think they are doing well until they suffer something. This difference is not trivial. Between Homer and Solon there is a shift from the myopic enjoyment of actual goods lamented by Odysseus to Solon's emphasis on an optimism that may or may not have any connection with actual circumstances and fortunes. At this point in the poem, Solon's perspective

focuses much more clearly on the motivation of human behavior and its shortsightedness (later, from 53 onwards, it focuses specifically on the illusory nature of professional experience) than on the problem of divine control over the human world—a problem which had already been posed at 17, but only in specific relation to theodicy. Solon's concern at this point of the poem is thus closer to Semon. 1.1–22, who from a consideration of Zeus' power starts to check the τέλος of everything (τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος / πάντων, 1 f.), and contrasts this fact with a long description of human instability and illusion (6–22).

Solon's focus on this other pessimistic perspective about human illusions is unexpected, but there is no real break between the first part of the poem, which had focused on Zeus and divine punishment, and the more human concern prevailing in 33–62. After making the essential point that Zeus looks only at the larger picture and towards the end (17, 25–28), Solon moves on to consider the utter failure of human beings to perceive the connection between present attitudes and actions and future consequences. See also Anhalt 1993, 35: "in these lines, Solon explains that human fortunes do not determine human attitudes; rather, attititudes—particularly unshakable optimism and insatiable acquisitiveness—persist undimmed by, even in spite of, actual fortunes. As a result, they are greatly responsible for the form that human fortunes take" (see already, with slightly different nuances, Lattimore 1947, 165 f. "this brings us, via θνητῶι, to the contrasted human way, which is to look at what is immediate and not to see the end").

Furthermore, here a special narrative strategy seems to avoid the impression of illogical abruptness, so that the unreliability of man's opinions about his own future comes as a broadening of Solon's views on man's limited understanding of the unpredictability of divine revenge in 27–32. Verse 33 in particular may display another small formal token of this internal coherence: θνητὸς ἀνήρ was the subject adopted when introducing the shortsightedness of mortals concerning divine operation in 26, and now θνητοί of 33 is the subject with which Solon opens the long section of the poem where men's shortsightedness and helplessness regarding their own lives becomes the focus. Last but not least, the shift of perspective is also accompanied by a change in the stance of the *persona loquens*, which contributes to the shift. As remarked by Nesselrath 1992, 98, while presenting Zeus' theodicy against the unjust men, Solon adopts the role of an external (righteous, and thus superior or extraneous to this conflict: Loeffler 1993, 26) spectator / warner and speaks of these unjust men from a distance, adopting the third person for them (ἀνδρί: 9,

ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν: 11 etc. up to τίνουσιν: 31); but as soon as he focuses on the weakness and shortsightedness of the human condition, he adopts a different stance: he is no more the advertiser of divine power, but instead shares the perspective of the audience (Loeffler 1993, 27), speaking as a man among others, in the inclusive first person plural (θνητοὶ … νοέομεν, 33).

33–36. On θνητοί, see above. The function of ὧδε is certainly ambiguous in our text. For some scholars it is proleptic and refers to the various forms of shortsightedness that humans display in understanding their capabilities and planning their lives, as described in 36–62: so recently argued by, e.g., Dihle 1988, 27–30 and Mülke 2002, 286. For others it refers back to the shortsightedness that may lead humans to seek unjust richness (11 ff.) and to misunderstand divine operation against the unjust people (25–32): cf. e.g. Linforth 1919, 234; Christes 1986; Pötscher 1987, 76–79, 82–85; Stoddard 2002, 161. This ambiguity can hardly have been pursued by Solon, but it is a telling effect of the text as the poet structured it: Solon's intention to have this section deal with the humans' shortsightedness about themselves as a continuation of the section on the humans' shortsightness about divine operation (see above ad 33–63) produces the ambiguity of ὧδε, which appears in the transitional passage that introduces the second section of the poem.

νοεῦμεν mss. reflects the contraction of -εο- to -ευ- which is common to most dialects apart from Attic, but in Ionic inscriptions is attested only from the fourth century onwards. νοέομεν (with the synizesis of -εο-), which is West's correction (cf. West 1974, 80), should therefore be accepted (it is true that Apollonius Dysc. *Pron.* 65 records that καὶ Φερεκύδης ἐν τῆι θεολογίαι, καὶ ἔτι Δημόκριτος ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀστρονομίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπολειπομένοις συντάγμασι συνεχέστερον χρῶνται τῆι ἐμεῦ καὶ ἔτι τῆι ἐμέο, but these authors are later than Solon, and their mss., which Apollonius read, may have modernized the original orthography of the two authors). The same principle applies to φορούμενος (hence φορεόμενος) of 45 below, πλουτοῦσιν (hence πλουτέουσιν) 3.11 G.-P.^{2} = 4.11 W.^{2}, σεῦ (hence σέο) 26.2 G.-P.^{2} = 20.2 W.^{2}

The polarity of "good" and "bad" (ἀγαθός τε κακός τε) frequently appears in epic, and is usually expressed through the two terms we find in Solon: after speaking of the shortsightedness of the unjust men, he now widens his scope to include the community of mankind as a whole. A precise formal parallel in which ὁμῶς links two opposites is Hes. *Op.* 669 ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε (cp. Hes. *Op.* 3); see also e.g. Hom. *Il.*

9.319, 17.631 f., *Od.* 4.237, 392, 6.188 f., 8.552 f., 22.414 f. = 23.65 f. But in addition to this ethical sense of "good"/"bad" (which one should not ignore given the preceding context of divine punishment of the unjust), the professional value of "capable"/"incompetent" might also be at work in Solon's binary system, since it surfaces again at 69 f. (a value which, as remarked by Wilamowitz 1913, 263, fits better with the verb *apo koinou* νοέομεν). Solon's dichotomy may also proleptically hint at the nuances "healthy"/"ill", "beautiful"/"ugly", "rich"/"poor" which are detailed in 37–42 (cf. Matthiessen 1994, 391).

The first syllables of 34 are corrupt even in the most ancient ms. of Stobeus, who reads ἐνδηνην; more recent mss. have tried to correct this to δεινὴν ἣν or to δεινὴν εἷς (αὑτοῦ). Nevertheless, one can still grasp the general sense of 33 f. in spite of the corruption. All the numerous proposals for emendation put forward in the last two centuries (more than thirty or so: the most up to date collection is found in Mülke 2002, 287) have sought to reconstruct either the predicate of δόξαν as an object *apo koinou* of both νοέομεν and ἕκαστος ἔχει, or instead a verb in the infinitive for which δόξα itself would be the subject. Either method would underscore a positive expectation (fortune or duration or strength, etc.) that characterizes all of mankind's hopes for the future. None of these proposals, however, has proven worthy of actually being inserted in the text.

Verse 35 expresses the idea that one realizes that one has erred only when one encounters the negative consequences, along with a sort of pessimistic version of the idea of "realization through suffering" (πάθει μάθος). This idea had become proverbial by Plato's time (*Symp.* 222b5), although it existed already in Homer (*Il.* 17.32 = 20.198 and 23.487) and Hesiod (*Op.* 89 and 218). According to Eisenberg 1984, 14 human παθεῖν would be the materialization of Zeus' thoughtful, but sometimes late, τίσις—and the frequent human failure to achieve goals or guess about the future would be expressly opposed to Zeus' action of πάντων ἐφορᾶν τέλος (17). No clear hint in the text points to this specific identification, although I agree that in general terms (see above ad 33–62) men's shortsightedness in assessing the outcome of their actions, and thus their unexpected suffering, παθεῖν, are presented as a broadening of the statement on human shortsightedness in predicting the divine punishment of injustice.

πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὖτις ὀδύρεται κτλ.: cf. Hes. *Op.* 217 f. δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει / ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα· παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω (where human reactions are ascribed to the inexorable operation of δίκη, analogous to Solon's context) and *Op.* 89 (Epimetheus) ὅτε δὴ κακὸν

εἶχ' ἐνόησεν, where δή is equivalent to ἤδη (cf. West 1978 ad loc.); Soph. *Ant.* 615–619 ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ/πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν, / πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων· / εἰδότι δ' οὐδὲν ἕρ-πει, / πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῶι πόδα τις προσαύσηι (made by the chorus, which speaks about the reasons why men succumb to *ate*; cf. Solon's *ate* in 13 and 75).

The phrase πρίν (τι) παθεῖν (δεινόν or κακόν) must already have had an idiomatic character in Solon's time: cf. Hom. *Il.* 17.32, 20.198; Aesch. *Ag.* 1658; Eur. *TrGF* F(3)62g.3, *Cyc.* 597, *Med.* 289; Aristoph. *Pax* 608, but also Plato, *Phd.* 86b4 and *Phaedr.* 243.b.4; Xen. *An.* 2.5.5; Isocr. *Or.* 20, 14. Everyday expressions make the truthfulness of Solon's statements more readily understood. The same stylistic strategy applies to the image of the men as χάσκοντες in the next verse.

Instances of mimetic derision of the defects of others analogous to the one in 36 are frequent in 29^{a} and 29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 33 and 34 W.^{2}; in particular, the "lightness" or "emptiness" of some people's mind returns in 15.6 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} and 29^{b}.4 = 34.4 W.^{2}, and appears to be a common image in the archaic age: see Hes. *Op.* 498 quoted below; Semon. 7.110 κεχηνότος … ἀνδρός; Theogn. 490 κοῦφον … νόον; Simon. 7.11 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} κοῦφον … θυμόν; Pind. *Nem.* 8.45 κενεὰν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῦνον τέλος, *Ol.* 8.61 κουφότεραι … φρένες, and *Pyth.* 2.61 χαύναι πραπίδι παλαιμονεῖ κενεά. Here men wait with open mouths like wolves who can already taste the prey they will never catch, according to a famous proverb that, because of its obvious mocking overtones, recurs especially among the comic authors: cf. Aesop 417 Perry; Aristoph. *Lys.* 629 and *PCG* 350; Euphr. *PCG* 1.30 f.; Eubul. *PCG* 14.11; Men. *Asp.* 372; Plaut. *Stich.* 605 and *Trin.* 169; Lucian, *Gall.* 11; Aristaenet. 2.20.35; Hesych. *Lex.* λ 1396 Latte; *Suid.* λ 816 Adler; Diogen. 6.20 = *CPG* 1.273.2 f.; Tosi 1991, 411 n. 873.

One of the most common meanings of ἐλπίς was δόξα μελλόντων (as ἐλπίς was defined by Plato, *Leg.* 644c). In fact, ἐλπίς of 36 is anticipated by δόξα of 34, taken up by δοκεῖ in 39 and 42, and exemplified from 37 onwards (the same synonyms also appear in 29^{b}.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 34.1 f. W.^{2} ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεήν, / κἀδόκ[ε]ον, κτλ.). The idea that human hopes are vain and detrimental is also a widespread *topos*, which can be found as early as Hesiod, who lists ἐλπίς as one of the evils in Pandora's jar at *Op.* 96 (where it seems, however, to mean the "expectation of evil things", and not, as it does in Solon and commonly elsewhere, the "expectation of good things": cf. Verdenius 1971 and Leinieks 1984) and is a hindrance for men at *Op.* 498–502 πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνήρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μί-μνων, / χρηίζων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῶι. / ἐλπὶς δ' οὐκ ἀγα-

ϑῆ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει, / ἥμενον ἐν λέσχηι, τῶι μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἴη. The closest parallel to Solon's position (or at least what seems to be his position in these verses: cf. however 71–76) and his emphasis on "hope" as a frustrating universal mistake of evaluation behind human action (an idea without precedents: cf. Solmsen 1949, 110), is Semon. 1.3–10 quoted above ad 33–62. See also Simon. *PMG* 542.21–23 τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι / δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ/πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω and 7.10–13 G.-P.² = 20 W.² θνητῶν δ' ὄφρά τις ἄνθος ἔχηι πολυήρατον ἥβης, / κοῦφον ἔχων θυμὸν πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· / οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι, / οὐδ', ὑγιὴς ὅταν ἦι, φροντίδ' ἔχει καμάτου; Pind. *Pyth.* 3.23 ἄκραντοι ἐλπίδες; Aesch. *Pers.* 804 κεναὶ ἐλπίδες (~ Pind. *Nem.* 8.45 quoted above; Soph. *Aj.* 478, *El.* 1460); Soph. *Ant.* 615–619 quoted above; Eur. *Supp.* 479 f., *Heracl.* 433 f., *IT* 414; Thuc. 2.62.5, 3.45.4–6, 4.108.4, 5.103.1.

ἐλπίς as a negative idea—"delusive expectation"—prevails in the archaic age, although in a few cases the positive value of this *vox media* also surfaces (already clearly, e.g., in Theogn. 1135 ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἔνεστιν, it can be found in the fifth century more frequently than in the archaic age: cf. Martinazzoli 1946; Schrijen 1965; van Menxel 1983; Corcella 1984–1985; Bulman 1992 on Pindar). ἐλπίσι τέρπεσθαι was at a certain point an idiomatic phrase: cf. Achilles Tat. 5.22.8; Alciphr. *Ep.* 1.10.5.

One example of Solon's later reception, in which his precise formulation for the concept of hope resurfaces, is the epigram by Serapion, an obscure author of the *Garland* of Philip, *Anth.Pal.* 7.400.3f. = 3406 f. Gow-Page σπεύδοντες ἐς ἄλλας / ἐλπίδας εἰς τοίην ἐλπίδα λυόμεθα. The epigram seems to synthesize the Solonian idea of the vanity of hope (note its use of ἄλλος for a negative value; cp. Solonian κοῦφος) with an emphasis on the constant hustle and bustle of men, exemplified in Solon by sea-commerce at 43–46.

37–42. Ll. 37–42 and 43–62 exemplify men's capacity to delude themselves about the future—either in situations of discomfort (37–42) or more generally in regard to their professions (43–62), which Solon starts to introduce as attempts at recovering from the distress of poverty and being successful. 37–42 have been, for various reasons, suspected by scholars of being inauthentic—either on the whole (more recently by Nestle 1942, 131) or, more often, in particular 39 f.: e.g. by Bergk, Wilamowitz 1913, 260, 266; Fraenkel 1927, 256; Christes 1986, 9–11. But the linguistic and stylistic evidence for suspecting 37–41, or specifically

39 f., is scarce: cf. Friedländer 1929, 381 f.; Masaracchia 1956, 120, and below ad 39 f. In any case, the three distichs 37–42, just as they are, would eventually come to itemize three of the most topical ancient wishes concerning human welfare: cf. the *skolion PMG* 890 ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνητῶι, / δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι, / τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, / καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων, and Plato who paraphrases it in *Gorg.* 451e: οἴομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀιδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ὧι καταριθμοῦνται ἄιδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως (Plato concludes his summary after the third form of well-being, as Solon also does). Here the Platonic Socrates opposes the power of rhetoric to the traditional forms of well-being, and the traditional *technai* intended to provide them; he considers it to be the techne ensuring well-being at the highest level—and differently from the other three forms of welfare, which the *technai* of the physician, the trainer, and the money-getter are intended to ensure, the condition of "being young among his/her own friends" certainly is not achieved nor facilitated by any *techne* (as remarked by Dodds 1959, 200). It may be a coincidence that both Solon and Plato associate the practice of *technai* with the aspirations to health, beauty and wealth; furthermore, Platos' shortening of the fourfold *skolion* could simply depend upon the specific context in which he quoted it. But it is plausible that, although quoting the *skolion* of which he appears to have been fond (he summarizes it again more briefly in *Leg.* 661a), Plato re-read and shortened it in the wake of Solon, or at least from the same viewpoint from which Solon probably used and adapted the traditional lists of the forms of well-being to introduce his list of the expectations of the different *demioergoi.*

37 f. νούσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέῃισι, reused at 61 (almost a cross reference, joining the delusional hopes of the sick to the delusional self-confidence of the physician), is a common phrase in epic language: cf. Hom. *Il.* 13.667 (also with ὑπό); Hes. *Op.* 92, [*Sc.*] 43 (with ὑπό); Amynt. *SH* 43.2 (also with ὑπό). In addition, the combination of νοῦσος (Ionic-epic for νόσος) with πιέζειν may have been an Attic idiom: cf. Thuc. 2.58.2 and 7.47.2.

As remarked already by Mülke 2002, 291, human weakness in front of sickness must have been a *topos* of the archaic motif of human ἐφήμερος stability: cf. Simon. 7.10–13 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} quoted above ad 33–36 and Mimn. 8.15f. G.-P.^{2} = 2.15f. W.^{2} ἄλλος νοῦσον ἔχει θυμοφθόρον· οὐδέ

τίς ἐστιν/ἀνθρώπων ὧι Ζεὺς μὴ κακὰ πολλὰ διδοῖ. Almost all the tenses of the finite verbs in the exemplary paradigms of professions listed up to 62 are in the present tenses (with the only exception being 53–56), but in this first paradigm the gnomic aorist κατεφράσατο was possibly intended to highlight the gnomic nature of the sketches which Solon was going to provide.

τοῦτο κατεφράσατο: cf. Theogn. 430, 706 τοῦτο γ᾽ ἐπεφράσατο.

39 f. These verses involve the idea of καλοκἀγαθία, the "combination of virtue and beauty", which was typical of the fifth century, but anticipated by some Homeric hints at the synthesis of κάλλος and σωφροσύνη as an ideal of perfection (*Od.* 11.336 f.) or of ugliness and cowardice/basemindedness (e.g. *Il.* 2.216–219 on Thersites, and 3.44 f.). The δειλός is the one who is physically/ethically οὐτιδανός (cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.293) and/or socially κακός (cf. 33 above, and 6.1 G.-P.^{2} = 15.1 W.^{2}). Therefore, he cannot also be ethically or socially ἀγαθός. His false self-evaluation is made even more laughable in 40, where he believes himself to be καλός: cf. Plato, *Menex.* 246e οὔτε σώματος κάλλος καὶ ἰσχὺς δειλῶι καὶ κακῶι συνοικοῦντα πρέποντα φαίνεται ἀλλ᾽ ἀπρεπῆ, καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκφαίνει τὴν δειλίαν.

In 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} Solon meditates on the sad social changes because of which the κακοί may become rich and the ἀγαθοί poor, but he does not express the paradox that the κακοί become (even if only socially) ἀγαθοί, whereas on the contrary Theogn. 57 f. does so in order to magnify his indignation: οἱ δὲ πρὶν ἐσθλοὶ/νῦν δειλοί. Mülke 2002, 293 f. suggests that it is difficult to understand whether in Solon's mind this case of implausible expectation reflects a sort of self-delusion like that of the non-hero Thersites pretending to be ranked among the real heroes, or the pretensions of the *nouveaux riches* about whom he speaks in 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} But Solon's point of view seems too general at this point to suppose that Solon has specifically, or only, the *nouveaux riches* in mind here.

In light of the parallel Phocyl. 11 πολλοί τοι δοκέουσι σαόφρονες ἔμμεναι ἄνδρες/σὺν κόσμωι στείχοντες, ἐλαφρόν⟨ο⟩ί περ ἐόντες (where the infinitive accompanying δοκεῖν is in the present tense, as in 39, and points to a present situation rather than to an expectation), Christes 1986, 10 f. maintains that here δοκέω refers not to the subject's opinion of himself, but to the mistaken opinion that others have of him; therefore the distich should be considered spurious, because it would not deal with the theme of self-delusion, but with the trope of the contrast between being and seeming. To Phocylides' parallel it might be added that the second

hemistich of 39 also looks quite similar to Hom. *Il.* 23.470 δοκέει δέ μοι ἔμμεναι ἀνήρ/(Αἰτωλός), where δοκεῖν means "to seem" (to someone distinct from the subject)—but μοι makes that clear in the Homeric passage. I prefer to think that δοκεῖ of 39 reflects the personal construction of the verb without the dative expressing the opinion of the subject, as in the self-delusional behavior of Hom. *Od.* 18.382 καί πού τις δοκέεις μέγας ἔμμεναι ἠδὲ κραταιός; in fact, this root occurs again in Solon to denote self-evaluation, delusional or not (apart from 42, below, and δόξα of 34 above, cf. 29.4 and 29[b].2 G.-P.[2] = 32.4 and 34.2 W.[2]). I also agree with Erbse 1995, 251 that with δοκεῖ taken in this sense, 39 f. would be in tune with Solon's criticism of other delusional mistakes of self-evaluation, such as those of the soothsayer and of the physician (53–60).

The two strong epicisms of the distich should not make us suspect them. The Aeolo-Homeric form of the infinitive ἔμμεναι at 39 is fully justifiable as part of the reuse of a formulaic phrase of Homer's: apart from *Il.* 23.470 quoted above, cf. ἔμμεναι ἄνδρας or ἀνδρῶν at verse-end in *Il.* 6.488, *Od.* 6.200, 18.261. In any case infinitives in -μεναι, sometimes occur in other elegiac poets (e.g. Tyrtae. 6.1 G.-P.[2] = 10.1 W.[2]; Mimn. 8.10 G.-P.[2] = 2.10 W.[2]; Theogn. 152) and once elsewhere in Solon (22.1 G.-P.[2] = 22a.1 W.[2]).

As for the long quantity of the alpha of καλός in thesis, although occurring less frequently than in arsis, it is not unusual in archaic epic (cf. *LfgrE s.v.*) or in elegy (cf. Tyrtae. 7.30 G.-P.[2] = 10.30 W.[2] and Theogn. 257, 1336, 1369); also Friedländer 1929, 382 and above ad 19–22 with further bibliography.

μορφὴν ... χαρίεσσαν: μορφή is not an epic word to designate the bodily frame and stature, which is expressed by Homer through the words δέμας, εἶδος, and φυή (never in the *Iliad*, it occurs only twice in the *Odyssey*, and only for the shapeliness of a speech); however, μορφή can be found in Sapph. 96.21 f., 132.2 (see also "Theogn." 1259). Differently from δέμας, εἶδος, and φυή, and rather than being a *vox media* like them, μορφή in archaic poetry is usually accompanied by words belonging to the semantic sphere of κάλλος and χάρις (both in Sappho and Theognis quoted above): cf. Sandoz 1971, 55–59. If Solon perceived this specific nuance of the word, then in our context μορφή possibly focuses on the false expectation of the subject, and the litotes οὐ χαρίεσσαν points to the oxymoronic reality of his supposed handsomeness being *without* beauty. χαρίεις had already been combined with some of the older synonyms of μορφή: Hom. *Od.* 8.167 f. οὐ πάντεσσι θεοὶ χαρίεντα διδοῦσιν / ἀνδράσιν, οὔτε φυήν, κτλ.; Hes. *Theog.* 260 δέμας; Archil. 9.10 μέλεα; Tyrtae. 9.5 G.-P.[2] = 12.5 W.[2] φυήν.

41 f. For the idea that poverty may "compel" someone to do something, cf. Hom. *Od.* 17.502 ἀχρημοσύνη γὰρ ἀνώγει (the beggar to beg); Timocles, *PCG* 30.1 ἡ πενία βιάζεται (people to do indecent things); Demosth. 57.45.5 ἡ πενία βιάζεται (free citizens to do servile jobs); more generally, on βία in Solon see in 30.15b–17 G.-P.² = 36.15b–17 W.²

πενίης ἔργα to designate the toils usually associated with poverty is paralleled in Mimn. 8.12 G.-P.² = 2.12 W.² πενίης δ' ἔργ' ὀδυνηρὰ πέλει (among the possible sins of old age). Solon appears to be fond of the ἔργα-periphrasis which, although rare, appears as early as Homer (e.g. ἔργα γάμοιο *Il.* 5.429, δαιτὸς ἔργα *Il.* 9.228, βοῶν ἔργα *Od.* 10.98): cf. 3.37 G.-P.² = 4.37 W.² ἔργα διχοστασίης and 24.1 G.-P.² = 26.1 W.² ἔργα … Κυπρογενοῦς.

ἀχρήμων is new, and remains rare (later in Pind. fr. 124a.b.8; Eur. *Med.* 461, *TrGF* (40)F462.6). Solon adopted it here perhaps in order to provide a further implicit motivation behind his initial wish for righteous χρήματα at 7.

κτήσασθαι mss. has been often emended to κτήσεσθαι, after Sylburg, since infinitives expressing a time later than the governing verbs of opinion (δοκεῖ or similar) are usually in the future or aorist with ἄν. Aside from many cases where restoring the future merely involves emending alpha to epsilon, and the editors could thus easily (and most frequently did) intervene, there are some instances of aorist infinitives where emending it in order to restore the future is a particularly heavy intervention (e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 1083; Xen. *Cyr.* 4.3.15). In fact, these cases of aorists can be paralleled by the many present and aorist infinitives with ἐλπίζειν or ἐλπίς/ἐλπωρή ἐστιν, ἐλπίδα ἔχειν; otherwise in these cases the aorist may express aspect and not tense (Kühner-Gerth I.195 f.; Schwyzer-Debrunner 1950, 296; Cooper 2002, III.2535–2538). I agree with Willink 1986, 334 that in principle the evidence that some isolated δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, etc. can behave like ἐλπίζειν is unsatisfactory; but in Solon's passage our δοκεῖ, δοκεῖ of 39, and δόξαν ἔχει of 34 are practically the verbal forms corresponding to ἐλπίδες of 36, and may therefore share the variety of infinitives usually constructed with ἐλπίζειν.

43–62. The mentioning in 41 f. of the hope for financial well-being (the last of the possible objects of hope referred to in 37–42) and the short preface σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος in the first hemistich of 43 introduce a long review of human professions: sea-merchant/sailor, farmer, artisan, poet, soothsayer, physician. For the first and the third of the manual professions Solon points explicitly to the gaining of profit (κέρδος or

βίοτος) as goal of the profession, and for the second one this target may be implied (see below ad εἰς ἐνιαυτόν, 47). These are followed in order of ascending importance according to occupations of public relevance, the "profit" of which is never made explicit (although in the case of the poet we may assume that ξυλλέγεται βίοτον of 50 has to be implicitly taken ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with the farmer and the poet), whereas the intellectual assistance of the patron-god of the τέχνη is always mentioned; on ethnographic parallels which similarly emphasize hierarchical structuring, see Martin 2006; on the ways in which Solon varies each descriptive couplet regarding a profession (stanza) and how these might be arranged with others in a longer sequence, see Faraone 2008, 35–40.

For the soothsayer and the physician, Solon stresses the unreliability of the success that these δημιοεργοί "those who work for the people" can achieve for the benefit of their clients. This unpredictable "risk" (κίνδυνος, 65) balances at a social level the physical risk that the sea merchant/sailor undertakes at an individual level (46). The last section on the physician includes a sort of ring composition in which the uncertainty, as regards the benefits of his *techne*, is connected to the delusional hope of the sick for recovery—the first of the false expectations considered at 37–42 (see above ad loc. on νούσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέῃισι). The list is concluded (63–66) with a remark on the element of "risk" and unpredictability inherent in all human activities. As is clear from this outline, the relevance of the first items in the list (sailor/merchant and artisan) initially seems to exemplify the pursuit of the κέρδος/βίοτος, whose necessity Solon had made clear at 41 f.; whereas the last two professions exemplify the unreliability of the τέλος, and in their case the τέλος does not consist in the βίοτος. This difference gives us an impression of incoherence, and may be considered to be one of those sudden changes of viewpoint which are not uncommon in oral composition (cf. Mülke 2002, 296 f.). I think, however, that a better understanding of the role of σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος at 43 might lessen this apparent lack of coherence. In fact, we should consider that the first list (of men's delusions about their conditions and the future: 33–42) and the second list which immediately follows it (of human professions) are framed more broadly by 1) Solon's statement concerning the superiority of divine control of the τέλος of human endeavors (under which the impermanence of unjust wealth and the unavoidable punishment of unjust men are subsumed, 11–22), and 2) a final peroration about the overwhelming control of Moira and κίνδυνος over human undertakings, and the sad cases in which competent human attempts are rendered ineffectual by the Moira and κίνδυνος (63–

70). Within this larger frame, σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, where no specific target is detailed, may not point to the pursuit of profit in particular, although this is the immediately preceding theme and the goal of the first and third professions (see also the imitation by Theogn. 401–403 μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος / ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων· πολλάκι δ' εἰς ἀρετὴν / σπεύδει ἀνὴρ κέρδος διζήμενος, which may however be a personal re-interpretation). Rather, the verb σπεύδει may express more broadly the busy haste with which everyone pursues the most different τέλη. Indeed, all sketches of the professions drawn by Solon would certainly belong to this category of "hastening (to pursue a τέλος)", the poet of 51 f. included. Ll. 63–70 later highlight how vain this pursuit of τέλη is, given that gods or destiny grant success or failure, and humans do not have control over the results of their actions. Cf. Eur. *TrGF* (30)F391 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν χωρὶς ἀνθρώποις θεῶν· / σπουδάζομεν δὲ πόλλ' ὑπ' ἐλπίδων, μάτην / πόνους ἔχοντες, οὐδὲν εἰδότες σαφές.

Solon's catalogue of professions has as its most direct precedent Homer's list of δημιοεργοί in *Od.* 17.382–385: soothsayer, doctor, carpenter, and *aoidos*. Other shorter lists of human professions found in archaic epic include *Il.* 13.730–733, where it is either a generic "god" or Zeus who grants skill at different occupations; Pind. *Isthm.* 1.47–49, and *Ol.* 2.63 οὐ χθόνα ταράσσοντες (cf. Solon's γῆν τέμνων, 47) ἐν χερὸς ἀκμᾶι, οὐδὲ πόντιον ὕδωρ κεινὰν παρὰ δίαιταν; Bacchyl. 10.35–47 where we find the *polyptoton* ἄλλ[ος ἀλλοί]αν (a characteristic of the summary Priamel) and the final statement appears to presuppose Solon's conclusion on the κίνδυνος inherent in every profession.

43–46. On σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, see above ad 43–62. Solon's view of the practice of professions as attempts at remedying πενίη "poverty" seems crafted in close connection to the similar opinion expressed by Hesiod, specifically concerning sea trade and profit as its motivation (indeed Solon's l. 44 seems to be a collage of phrases culled from the relevant passage in Hesiod).

See Hom. *Od.* 3.301 f. πολὺν βίοτον καὶ χρυσὸν ἀγείρων / ἠλᾶτο ξὺν νηυσὶ κατ' ἀλλοθρόους ἀνθρώπους; Hes. *Op.* 630–638 αὐτὸς δ' ὡραῖον μίμνειν πλόον εἰς ὅ κεν ἔλθηι· / καὶ τότε νῆα θοὴν ἅλαδ' ἑλκέμεν, ἐν δέ τε φόρτον / ἄρμενον ἐντύνασθαι, ἵν' οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄρηαι, / ὥς περ ἐμός τε πατὴρ … / πλωίζεσκ' ἐν νηυσί, βίου κεχρημένος ἐσθλοῦ· / ὅς ποτε καὶ τυίδ' ἦλθε πολὺν διὰ πόντον ἀνύσσας, / … / οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων οὐδὲ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ὄλβον, / ἀλλὰ κακὴν πενίην; also 643–648 νῆ' ὀλίγην αἰνεῖν, μεγάληι δ' ἐνὶ φορτία θέσθαι· / μείζων μὲν φόρτος,

μεῖζον δ' ἐπὶ κέρδεϊ κέρδος / ἔσσεται, … εὖτ' ἂν ἐπ' ἐμπορίην τρέψας ἀρεσίφρονα θυμὸν / βούληαι χρέα τε προφυγεῖν καὶ λιμὸν ἀτερπέα, / δείξω δή τοι μέτρα, κτλ. In the case of Hesiod's father, as well as in Solon, πενίη indicates not poverty in the modern sense but rather an economic condition that prevents one from achieving self-sufficiency: cf. Mele 1979, 21; on Hesiod's stance in particular, see also Bravo 1977, 8; cp. also Hesiod's description of the just community whose economic self-sufficiency allows them not to risk their lives in merchant-ships (*Op.* 236 f.).

In light of the Hesiodic model quoted above, and since the verb ἄγειν often refers to the load of the ships (cf. Hom. *Od.* 10.35; Hes. *Op.* 576; Bacchyl. fr. 20b.13–16), and κέρδος commonly used in connection with the commercial mariner, consists of a load of commercial goods (cf. Hom. *Od.* 8.161–164; Hes. *Op.* 631 f. and 644 quoted above; *HHom.Ap.* 397; Cozzo 1988), the profit that the maritime trader/sailor seeks to bring home will not be the fish he catches, but the load of goods in the hold of the ship. ἰχθυόεις might lead one to think of the fisherman's profession (as Leutsch 1872, 162 maintained), but here it can be considered to be an *epitheton ornans* for πόντος, cf. ad 45 below. No doubt, ancient readers might perceive some ambiguity between merchant and fisherman in the Solonian text: cf. the specific interpretation of Serapion quoted at 36 above.

That traveling by sea means endangering one's life is a commonplace notion in the Greek perception of maritime life (cf. Fantuzzi 1983); the idea is already found in Hom. *Od.* 3.73 f. = 9.254 f. = *HHom.Ap.* 454 f. quoted below; Hes. *Op.* 682–687; Archil. 213. Maxims on the difficulties of the sea, together with an attitude of diffidence towards the professional merchant, are also attributed to Anacharsis, one of the Seven Sages: cf. Diog. Laert. 1.104. The fact that only the prospect of profit could move one to (needlessly) confront such risks would become proverbial: cf. Antiph. *PCG* 290 ~ Diogenian. 4.83 = *CPG* 1.246.1 f. (cf. also Antiph. *PCG* 100 and 149).

Ll. 43–46 have a single finite verb in 43, governing three participial phrases, each occuring in their own line (the correspondence between every syntactical unit and a single line, which is obviously pursued in these two distichs, may also have contributed to the heavy hyperbaton between ἰχθυόεντ(α) and πόντον, see below). The relationship of dependence which connects the participles with ἀλᾶται, however, is not the same: χρήιζων is equivalent to a causal subordinate to ἀλᾶται, whereas φορεόμενος of 45 is equivalent to a finite coordinate ("and thus he is

tossed"), and θέμενος has a subordinate consecutive. However, since these different syntactical nuances are not expressed, this series of undifferentiated participles provides an especially multifaceted view of the action expressed by the finite verb of 43. On the sequence of participial phrases in archaic elegy (and in 30.8–15 G.-P.² = 36.8–15 W.²), cf. Römisch 1933, 70–76; Fränkel 1955, 75 f.

Possible formal models for 43b–45 were Hom. *Od.* 5.377 ἀλόω κατὰ πόντον /, 2.370 πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον … ἀλάλησθαι, 9.82 f. φερόμην ὀλοοῖσ' ἀνέμοισι / πόντον ἐπ' ἰχθυόεντα, 3.73 f. = 9.254 f. = *HHom.Ap.* 454 f. (ληϊστῆρες) ὑπεὶρ ἅλα, τοί τ' ἀλόωνται / ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι. The epithet ἀργαλέος is formulaic in Homer for the winds (*Il.* 13.795, 14.254, *Od.* 11.400, 407, 24.110; *HHom.* 7.24 and 33.14), just as ἰχθυόεις is formulaic in Homer and the Homeric Hymns with πόντος (15×). In some (but not all) the Homeric passages ἰχθυόεις may involve the notion of sailors as the prey of the fish (cf. *LfgrE* s.v.; Létoublon 2002, 99 f.). This sense might also apply to our line, which is intended to "visualize" the dangers of the sailors, as Mülke 2002, 300 has remarked. The hyperbaton separating the noun πόντον, 43 from its epithet ἰχθυόεντα, 45 has seemed intolerable and was emended to ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθ' by Tucker 1888, 5; it has also been criticized by Wilamowitz 1913, 261 as a token of Solon's relative inexperience in handling the diction of Ionic epic; the desire to revitalize a common formulaic construction of epic language may have been the reason underlying the displacement of the word: cf. Treu 1955, 270 f. Last but not least, Solon may also have adopted the technique of keeping the second part of a phrase in suspense for emphasis, cf. Massa Positano 1947, 33.

φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς … **θέμενος** (~ Diod. Sic. 14.52.1 οὐδεμίαν φειδὼ τοῦ ζῆν ποιούμενοι) belongs to a common type of periphrases found with τίθεσθαι and verbal nouns (~ φειδόμενος ψυχῆς; see also, e.g., σκέδασιν τίθ. in Homer; λησμοσύναν, πρόνοιαν and συγγνωμοσύναν τίθ. in Sophocles, σπουδὴν τίθ. in Sophocles and Euripides, σιγὴν τίθ. in Euripides), which parallels the prose construction with ποιεῖσθαι. In particular, φείδεσθαι ψυχῆς may have already been an Ionic and Attic idiom: cf. Tyrtae. 6.14 G.-P.² = 10.14 W.²; Eur. *Her.* 1146; Isocr. *Or.* 6.105.

47 f. γῆν τέμνειν "cut the ground" is not a common expression, but it is attested in Hom. *Il.* 13.707 τέμει (scil. the ploughshare) δέ τε τέλσον ἀρούρης; elsewhere, e.g., Aesch. *TrGF* 196.4; Ap. Rhod. 1.628; *GVI* 720.1, of the second century BC; Euphor. *SH* 415.ii.18 γύας ἐτάμοντο; see also below ad καμπύλ' ἄροτρα.

The phrase may have drawn for the audience, or at least implied in Solon's mind, a connection between the movement of the farmer ploughing the field and the sailor navigating the sea, for which the image of τέμνειν the πέλαγος (or θάλασσαν or κύματα) was well established: twice in Hom. *Od.* 3.174 f., 13.88; Arion, *PMG* 939.16 f.; Pind. *Pyth.* 3.68; Bacchyl. 17.4. Compare the similar metaphor of τέμνειν the ἀήρ or αἰθήρ in the sense "to fly" in *HHom.Dem.* 383; Ibyc. *PMGF* S223(a).ii.7; Bacchyl. 5.16 f., and the explicit comparison of the metaphors of piercing the water and piercing the earth introduced by Nonnus in *Dion.* 1.93–109 (see in particular 93 κύματα τέμνων and 108 αὔλακα τέμνων).

We cannot rule out the possibility that the phrase referred not to the regular sowing or hoeing of grain fields, but the first preparation of the soil for tilling, including its "deforestation", where the broader sense of the verb, "cutting", would be activated by the root "tree" in the epithet πολυδένδρεον: cf. Vetta 1999, 100. πολυδένδρεος was already used of the ἀγρός in Hom. *Od.* 23.139 and 359. As correctly suggested by Linforth 1919, 236, we should resist the idea that τοῖσιν can be understood as being equivalent to ἄλλοις δέ, designating the workers in the ploughed field (ἄροτρα) as being distinct from the workers in the tree orchard (γῆν … πολυδένδρεον).

εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν λατρεύει has a close parallel in Hom. *Il.* 21.444 f. θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν / μισθῶι ἔπι ῥητῶι (see also *Od.* 11.356 for εἰς ἐν.), where εἰς ἐνιαυτόν = "for a year". Solon's verse presupposes the iteration of the farmer's toil year after year, and thus connotes his relentless labor (similar to the risk and hardship of the trader). However, his εἰς ἐνιαυτόν also has a factual meaning, and refers to the time that marks the completion of the agricultural year, i.e. the span beginning when the granaries are full and finishing with the subsequent harvest. In this sense the phrase is equivalent to τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν of Hes. *Op.* 561 or τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν of Hom. *Il.* 19.32, *Od.* 4.86, 10.467, 14.292, 15.230, *HHom.Ap.* 343 and *HHom.* 20.6. The simple εἰς ἐνιαυτόν can be found in the *Hymn to the Greatest Kouros* from Paleokastro 5, 15, 25 etc. (edited by West 1965, 145 f.) and in the Theran inscription *IG* XII.3.1340.2. Cf. Harrison 1927, 183, 417; Latte 1913, 47; West 1965, 156 n. 27; Beekes 1969, 142.

λάτρις means both "salaried servant" as distinct from slave (cf. at least Theogn. 302, 486, and Pind. *Ol.* 10.28) and real "slave" (as, e.g., Heracles in Soph. *Trach.* 70) or "lackey" (as Hermes is often depicted in reference to the services he provides to the other gods in tragedy: Aesch. *Prom.* 966; Soph. *TrGF* F269c.35, 269d.22; Eur. *Ion* 4). λατρεύ-

ειν, however, is probably an Attic word: Adrados 1953, 140. The combination of lexicographic evidence such as Hesych. *Lex.* λ 403 Latte λατρεύει· ἐλεύθερος ὢν δουλεύει and of the sources that define some of the humblest Athenian classes (*pelatai*, *hectemoroi*, *thetes*) as δουλεύοντες because of debts owed to the rich (e.g. Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 2.2; Pollux 3.82), has led some scholars to believe that Solon's λατρεύει does not point here to the labor of the "salaried servants" but to those Athenian citizens who had been enslaved because of their debts to wealthy landowning proprietors, such as the ἑκτήμοροι (cf., e.g., Wilamowitz 1893, II.180; Ferrara 1956, 66–71 and Cataudella 1966, 39–43); in this case, the cluster τοῖσιν … μέλει of 48 might refer to such landowners (poor farmers enslaved for debts work "for the people who, etc.", with attraction of the relative pronoun into the case of the demonstrative pronoun and the suppression of the relative itself). This interpretation may, however, err in presupposing that Solon directly reflects in these lines his legislative thought, and we cannot rule out the possibility that our text simply speaks of salaried laborers. Finally, Solon may simply be referring to the difficult work of free and non-salaried proprietors who labor as hard as "slaves" for themselves (with τοῖσιν to be taken as pointing to them "and for them …"): cf. Linforth 1919, 236 and Büchner 1959, 175. In this sense, which I favor, the second hemistich of 48 would simply be epexegetical of 47 and 48a, and constitute a paraphrasis for, simply, the "farmers" (see also above ad γῆν τέμνειν).

καμπύλ' ἄροτρα: cf. *HHom.Dem.* 308; see later Theogn. 1200f. … ἄλλοι ἔχουσι ἀγρούς /, οὐδέ μοι ἡμίονοι κυφὸν ἕλκουσιν ἄροτρον; Moschion, *TrGF* 97F6.9f. ἀρότροις ἀγκύλοις ἐτέμνετο … βῶλος, and Mosch. 2.81 ὦλκα διατμήγει σύρων εὐκαμπὲς ἄροτρον. For professions or activities as expressed synecdochically through a typical instrument and presented as being in someone's thoughts (μέλει), cf., e.g., Hom. *Od.* 1.159 τούτοισιν μὲν ταῦτα μέλει, κίθαρις καὶ ἀοιδή (~ *HHom.Ap.* 188) and 6.270f. οὐ γὰρ Φαιήκεσσι μέλει βιὸς οὐδὲ φαρέτρη, / ἀλλ' ἱστοὶ καὶ ἐρετμά, κτλ.

49f. Hephaestus and Athena, one of whose cult title was "Ergane," were divine protectors of the artisans' labors, the τέχναι, as early as Hom. *Od.* 6.232–234 = 23.159–161 ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρωι ἀνὴρ / ἴδρις, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδαεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη / τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελείει via Hes. *Theog.* 571–584 and *Op.* 59–76 (where the making of Pandora is presented as their first joint project),

up through, e.g., *HHom.* 20 and Arr. *Cyn.* 35. In Athens they were the patrons of the artisans, whose class was consequently "sacred (ἱερόν) to Hephaestus and Athena" (Plato, *Leg.* 920d). Therefore, it is not surprising that these gods enjoyed, among other things, joint cults: cf. Shapiro 1995, 1–3. The largest temple of Hephaestus in Athens, on the hill Theseion, from 343 BC hosted the cult-statues of the god and Athena Hephaesteia standing near each other on the same basis (cf. Brommer 1978, 75–89). The two gods sat next to each other in the group of the Twelve Gods on the eastern frieze of the Parthenon. Both of the most important festivals in honor of Hephaestus, the Chalkeia and the Hephaestia, also left substantial room for the celebration of Athena (for the Chalkeia see especially Soph. *TrGF* 844; Parke 1977, 92 f.).

The common epithet of Hephaestus is κλυτοτέχνης (6× in Homer, *Hymns*, Hesiod; see also κλυτοεργός *Od.* 8.345 and κλυτόμητις *HHom.* 20.1). Solon's epithet πολυτέχνης, which emphasizes the versatility rather than the "fame" of Hephaestus, is only attested after Solon in Orph. *Arg.* 585, but the nominal compound πολυτεχνία is attested in Attic and in the *koine* from [Plato], *Alc. II* 147a5 onwards (Poseidonius, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch). Solon's isolated adoption of πολυτέχνης, which is not determined by metrical needs, may simply result from the combination of Homer's common epithet κλυτοτέχνης with Hephaestus' rarer epithets πολύμητις (*Il.* 21.355) or πολύφρων (*Il.* 21.367, *Od.* 8.297, 327), or reflect an otherwise unknown Attic cult title of Hephaestus. This last idea seems especially attractive since the cult of Hephaestus was either introduced to the city at a relatively late age, or remained effaced for a while by the dominant cult of Athena; in any case, it is first attested at Athens only in an inscription of 421, cf. Delcourt 1957, 197 f. As the Troad and the northeast Aegean islands appear to have been two of the oldest cult sites of this god, it has also been suggested that Athens adopted his cult around 600 BC, when the city gained control of Sigeion (cf. Robertson 1996, 64). Or, if the cult of Hephaestus already existed in Athens by that date, the new strong contacts between Athens and Sigeion may well have reinforced its relevance in the city around 600 BC. On the cults of Solonian Athens, see Shapiro 1996.

ἔργα δαείς: for the participle cf. προδαείς in Hom. *Od.* 4.396. But the whole phrase sounded epic: cf. Hom. *Od.* 20.72 ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη δέδαε κλυτὰ ἐργάζεσθαι; *HHom.Aphr.* 14 f. (Athena) παρθενικὰς … ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θεῖσα ἑκάστηι, *HHom.* 20.2 f. ὃς (scil. Hephaestus) μετ' Ἀθηναίης γλαυκώπιδος ἀγλαὰ ἔργα ἀνθρώποις ἐδίδαξεν; Hes. *Op.* 63 f. Ἀθήνην/ἔργα διδασκῆσαι, fr. 43a.71 ἣ]ν ἔργα

διδάξατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη; cp. Hom. *Od.* 7.110 f. δῶκεν Ἀθήνη / ἔργα τ' ἐπίστασθαι περικαλλέα καὶ φρένας ἐσθλούς. These models intersect with χειροῖν ξυλλέγεται βίοτον, a phrase which appears to be more recent, but becomes idiomatic in later Attic poetry: cf. Hom. *Od.* 3.301 βίοτον ἀγείρων; Soph. *TrGF* F 555.8 f. χειρὶ … πο]ρσύνειν βίον; Eur. *El.* 81 βίον … ξυλλέγειν; *TrGF* (18)F286.14 χειρὶ συλλέγοι βίον; Plato, *Leg.* 9.36c βίον … συλλεγόμενος (also Dorotheus 346.26 βίον συλλέγοντας). Also ξυν- (later συν-) of ξυλλέγεται appears from the inscriptions to be common in Attic down to the last quarter of the fifth century. There are, however, a few early cases of συν- in Attic inscriptions (cf. Threatte 1980, I.553); therefore editors usually do not emend Ionic συν- to ξυν-, but accept ξυν- where it is the form of the *paradosis*.

51 f. Archil. 1.2 Μουσέων ἐρατὸν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος is quite similar; rather than a specific allusion (the relative chronology would be impossible to establish) we may consider the similarity to be the result of a common ideology in poetic activity. There is a close parallelism of the way in which both artisans and poets are presented as practitioners of what they have been taught by the gods—by Athena, Hephaestus and the Muses. This may be a hint at the traditionally competitive relationship between these two classes of intellectuals (on which, see Finkelberg 1998, 100–130, Steiner 2001, and Ford 2002, chap. II.4 and II.5). Despite the fact that apprenticeship to patron divinities was common, I agree with Schweitzer 1963, I, 44 (*pace* Philipp 1968, 66 f.), that Solon seems to favor the poets: the competence in σοφίης μέτρον, although it is probably subordinated to the teaching of the Muses, makes the poet's activity (if not its genesis) slightly more autonomous than the ἔργα that are directly inspired in the artisans by Athena and Hephaestus.

The lack of a finite verb makes the syntax of the distich unclear. We might assume that 52 is a brachylogical nominal phrase where ἐπιστάμενος = ἐπιστάμενος ἐστί: cf. in particular Hom. *Od.* 4.231, which, in an account of the Egyptians' knowledge of the medical profession, says that ἰητρὸς δὲ ἕκαστος ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων / ἀνθρώπων, paraphrazed by the scholiast ad loc. as "every Egyptian doctor is competent (ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν) above all mankind" (modern commentators on Homer usually take the line in a different way, as meaning "everyone is a doctor, expert above all humankind"). A set of four nominal phrases with participles is also paralleled in Hom. *Od.* 11.606–608 (as indicated

by Bergk). This interpretation, however, leaves the poet with no business and no task, whereas each one of the other professions listed by Solon hastens towards a τέλος (see above ad 43–62). Alternatively, some critics have emended διδαχθείς to διδάχθη (Grotius; δῶρ' ἐδιδάχθη Boissonade) or to δέδεκται (Hartung), both of which give a sense to the line that is subject to the same kind of objections. In a drastic measure, a lacuna of a distich after 52 has also been postulated (after Bergk, doubtfully, and E. Rohde apud Hense's ed. of Stobaeus, see e.g. Müller 1956, 14 n. 1), or 51 f. have been athetized (so Allen 1949, 55 n. 12). The most likely solution is to take ξυλλέγεται βίοτον of 50 *apo koinou* with both the artisan and the poet (after Wilamowitz 1913, 261). In this case, however, χεροῖν, although naturally joined to the verb, ought to be taken with it only in reference to the artisan. Furthermore, because of this verb, Solon should be thinking of the professional hired poets; since he does not seem to have been one of them, he would then exclude himself from the category of the poets, which seems strange (e.g. to Gladigow 1965, 16). But Solon may have thought of himself as a politician/teacher of wisdom to his citizens (cf. 3.30 G.-P.^{2} = 4.30 W.^{2}), who only occasionally expressed himself in verse (as he seems to suggest in 2.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 1.1 f. W.^{2}), and as an amateur user/producer of poetry at the symposium for his own pleasure and for the sake of the other symposiasts, and thus distinguished himself from the hired professionals of poetry, such as wandering rhapsodes or choral poets (on whose specific professional dimension, cf. Kraus 1955, 78).

μέτρον σοφίης is not attested before Solon, but has a precedent in the similar phrase ἥβης μέτρον, which occurs 10× in Homer, Homeric Hymns and Hesiod to designate the full growth of youth. It can, however, be found at least twice between the sixth and fifth centuries BC, in Theogn. 876 τίς δ' ἂν ἐπαινῆσαι μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης, and in the Attic inscription *CEG* 82.3 [ἄκ]ρως μὲν σοφίας μέτρο[ν ἐπι]στάμενος, of about 450–425 BC. Although the inscription seems to be modelled on the precise words of Solon, in both passages the "(perfect) measure of σοφίη" does not have the same meaning as it does in Solon, but rather the phrase expresses the ethical principle of individual perfect wisdom and seems to be in tune with the sense of other expressions of Solon, such as γνωμοσύνης δ' ἀφανὲς … μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μοῦνον ἔχει of 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2} After all, defining a virtue's "perfection" as μέτρον is not at all surprising in Solon, given that the concept of gnoseologic "measure" is a constant in his ethical-political thought—cf. the appeal in 5.4 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.3 W.^{2} to soothe the arrogance ἐν μετρίοισι: the just measure of riches is precisely what one loses sight of when one fails to identify their τέρμα,

see below l. 71. But it would be wrong to infer from this, with Gladigow 1965, 16–20, that σοφίη here is synonymous with γνωμοσύνη of 20.2 G.-P.^{2} = 16.2 W.^{2}, or with the ability in thought/wisdom and speech of 23.13–16 G.-P.^{2} = 27.13–16 W.^{2}, and thus that Solon ascribes to the poet the ability to achieve perfect gnoseologic control over the reality of things in a sort of anticipation of the Heraclitean ἁρμονίη ἀφανής (cf. ἀφανές of 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2})—the achievement of this control would be the τέλος of the poets. First of all, there is no lexical evidence that σοφίη can be synonymous with γνωμοσύνη or νοῦς, as Mülke 2002, 304 remarks; the case of "Pigres", 1.2 G.-P.^{2} = 4.[1] W.^{2}, where the Muse is addressed πάσης πείρατ' ἔχεις σοφίης is different, since there the Muse is a goddess; also the subject of Sol. 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2} would be the θεός, according to the testimony. As for "Pind." *FGE* 583 Ἡσίοδ', ἀνθρώποις μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης and the "Tabula Iliaca" *EG* 1093.2 μάθε τάξιν Ὁμήρου, / ὄφρα δαεὶς πάσης μέτρον ἔχῃς σοφίας, which seems to be a combination of Solon and "Pigres", they are too late to be informative about the meaning of Solon's σοφίη.

Finkelberg 1998, 168 offers a new reading of Solon's μέτρον as meaning the specific combination of the hexameter and the pentameter employed in the genre of elegy and sees in the poet a new consciousness of his meter. In our fragment Solon qualifies the σοφίη he ascribes to the poets as ἱμερτή, "pleasurable", thus defining the specific kind of "knowledge" of the poet, who from Homer onwards (e.g. *Od.* 8.44 f.) is often presented as providing the τέρψις of pleasurable entertainment to his audience or adding to the audience's enjoyment in the pleasurable occasions (feasts) where most of the poetic genres were performed: cf. Finkelberg 1998, 88–99; Kannicht 1996, 68–99. It is preferable to think that σοφίη signifies, in a more general meaning, the poet's knowledge as being inclusive of both intellectual loftiness and technical competence, since this meaning is more likely to be expected in the work of a poet who aims to give his fellow citizens a means of ethical and political orientation. This sense of the word was not attested in Homer (in its only Homeric occurrence, at *Il.* 15.412, the term had been used of the carpenter's craft) and appeared for the first time in *HHom.Herm.* 483 and 511 (where it is used of the music) and Hes. fr. 306 (where it is used of the citharist Linos, son of the Muse Urania): cf. Maehler 1963, 66 f. Later the term is often used for designating the knowledge of the poet or the Muses (cf. Theogn. 770, 995; Ibyc. *PMGF* S151.23; Pind. *Ol.* 1.116, 9.38, *Pyth.* 1.12, 4.248, 6.49, *Isthm.* 7.18; Bacchyl. 10.39), and σοφός = "poet" is standard in fifth century drama (cf. Saïd 2007).

53–56. μάντιν ἔθηκεν … Ἀπόλλων ~ Hom. *Od.* 15.252 f.; for ἀνδρὶ κακὸν … ἐρχόμενον: cf. Hom. *Od.* 20.367 f. νοέω κακὸν ὔμμιν/ἐρχόμενον, τό κεν οὔ τις ὑπεκφύγοι οὐδ᾽ ἀλέαιτο with Nagy 1983.

Both ἔθηκεν and ἔγνω of 54 are gnomic aorists, as proved by Mülke 2002, 306 with reference to the conjunctive συνομαρτήσωσι in the following relative, since the subjunctive is indeed the mood of the conditional relatives whose antecedent clause is in a primary tense: cf. Goodwin 1889, § 533.

The epithet ἑκάεργος, usually meaning "he who works from afar" (cf. *LfgrE* s.v.), was already frequently used in combination with ἄναξ for Apollo in Homer (3×) and the Homeric Hymns (6×); see also Tyrtae. °14.1 G.-P.[2] = 4.[1] W.[2] The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that Solon intends to juxtapose the divine capacity to intervene from afar with the human limitations of soothsayers (τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον, used of the god-sent κακόν, would stress the distance between divine and human worlds): the mortals could thus only recognize, not prevent, the "disaster that comes from afar". The relative at the beginning of 55 is usually taken with the "soothsayer" introduced in 53, where συνομαρτήσωσι has the positive sense of "to attend"/"to help". I think that the relative may depend instead on either ἀνδρί (as suggested by Büchner 1959, 177) or, more probably, κακόν of 54, which happen to be the closest nouns. The evil that the soothsayer cannot avoid would be that which the gods have already decided to "escort" (to its target) or that which affects the man whom the gods have decided to "prosecute": when they "attend" the evil or the man who is its target, in so doing they render it impossible to resist. For ὁμαρτεῖν in the sense of joining something else in an aggressive action, cf. Hes. *Op.* 676; for the sense of aggressively "pursuing", cf. again Hes. *Op.* 196. Indeed it is unclear why Solon would have to stress yet again the indispensability of divine assistance (as we must interpret it, if συνομ- refers to the gods; *pace* Lewis 2006, 87 who translates it as the verb συμμαρτυρέω to "witness corroboratively" of 30 G.-P.[2] = 36 W.[2]), since he has already said at 53 that it is Apollo who bestows the soothsayer with his gifts—nor is it easy to understand why Solon should speak in general of "the gods", after his precise reference to Apollo. Instead, the double explanation of "evil" as being a will of the gods and fatal (μόρσιμον, 55) will be addressed again in the distich 63 f., where disaster and fortune are portrayed as being sent to humans by Moira and as being "gifts from the gods".

55 f. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.858 f. Μυσῶν δὲ Χρόμις ἦρχε καὶ Ἔννομος οἰωνιστής· / ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρύσατο (cp. Solon's ῥύσεται) κῆρα μέλαιναν (see also *Il.* 2.830–834); Eur. *Heracl.* 615–617 μόρσιμα δ' οὔτι φυγεῖν θέμις, οὐ σοφί/αι τις ἀπώσεται, ἀλλὰ μάταν ὁ πρό/θυμος ἀεὶ πόνον ἕξει; later, e.g., Ap. Rhod. 2.816 f. … Ἴδμονα, μαντοσύνῃσι κεκασμένον, ἀλλά μιν οὔ τι / μαντοσύναι ἐσάωσαν, ἐπεὶ χρεὼ ἦγε δαμῆναι, 4.1502–1504 αὐτῶι ἐνὶ ἤματι Μόψον / νηλειὴς ἕλε πότμος, ἀδευκέα δ' οὐ φύγεν αἶσαν / μαντοσύναις· οὐ γάρ τις ἀποτροπίη θανάτοιο.

Here Solon is likely hinting at the two methods of divination which were most widespread among the ancients, i.e. ornithomancy, based on observations of the flight of birds (οἰωνός), and hieromancy, based on observations of the entrails of the victims of sacrifices (ἱερά). The two are found together (along with other forms of divination) e.g. in Aesch. *Prom.* 488–492. But it is also possible that only the first subject refers to actual divination, while the second "indicates the ritual acts by which one attempts to ward off a forewarned event": Vetta 1999, 101.

57 f. πολυφάρμακος "knowing many drugs or charms" was already a general epithet of doctors in Hom. *Il.* 16.28. The medical god Paieon is depicted in the act of spreading "drugs" at *Il.* 5.401 = 5.900, 11.515 and 830 (according to Hes. fr. 307.2, he "knows drugs for every thing").

The participial phrase (Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες) can be in apposition to ἄλλοι, but in the context of the elegy it is better to interpret it as an anticipated apposition to the specific ἰητροί. The meaning would then not be "others, who practice the work of Paieon, are doctors, and yet …" but "others are doctors who practice the work of Paieon, and yet …": it makes sense to think that Solon is emphasizing not the possibility of failure for doctors in general, but for those who are the true heirs of Paieon (and thus are expected to be more successful). As was the case with the skilled soothsayer, who is fallible despite his gift from Apollo, so too the skilled doctors who carry on Paieon's craft do not have control over their results. The physician is thus understood to be a paradigm of actions in which success or failure do not depend upon one's merits or are in contrast with them. The reference to the professional skills in the cases of the seer and the physician thus puts more emphasis on the irresistible strength of fate, Μοῖρα = Τύχη: see Noussia 1999, 9–14. The same sequence of prophecy and medicine occurs in Empedocl. *VS* 31B112.10–12.

καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος: "even though/and also they achieve nothing". Cf. *HHom. Dem.* 150 οἷσιν ἔπεστι … κράτος; also Hom. *Od.*

17.496 εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρῇσιν τέλος ἡμετέρῃσι γένοιτο, Theogn. 164 τέλος δ' ἔργμασιν οὐχ ἕπεται, 640 βουλαῖς δ' οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος, 660 θεοὶ … οἷσιν ἔπεστι τέλος.

59–62 exemplify the progressively heightened contrast between complete failure and dramatic success, both equally unpredictable and beyond mortal control. As a paradigm of unpredictability of the success, a seemingly miraculous/magical form of a cure may be highlighted, where the patient becomes healthy "straightaway" (αἶψα, 62) when touched by human hands: cf. Kosak 1999, 101. According to some interpreters, the divine-magical curative powers of the hands would have been passed on from the medical god Asclepius/Paian to his pupils (cf. Weinreich 1909, 35), and Solon's text includes a reference to the magical practices often found in ancient healing practices such as cures through incantation or invocations of the daimons out of the body of the ill person. More specifically, the phrase ἅπτεσθαι χειροῖν has been interpreted as referring to a cure by hypnosis, (a magnetic treatment carried out by rubbing and laying the hands on the body, where the physician's touch had mesmeric effects), possibly due to Egyptian or Eastern influences on Greek medicine (cf. Headlam-Knox on Herodas 4.18). However, Cordes 1994, 22, correctly pointed out that magical practices were expensive and required considerable preparation, in contrast to the swiftness of recovery expressly underscored by Solon's αἶψα. Furthermore, it seems that the Greek texts attributed only to Ἀσκληπιός or to Παιήων the magical effect of the healing touch, and not to a human representative of the god's art (*pace* Weinreich 1909, 35). Since Solon appears only to be concerned with the human aspects and limitations in the professions, it is improbable that he refers to the magical and divinely induced touch of the physician which sometimes fails to cure. Rather, Solon is speaking of the soft healing touch of the physician in everyday medicine, which later became idiomatic in the phrase παιωνία χείρ (Aesch. *Supp.* 1066, Soph. *Phil.* 1345 f., Aristoph. *Ach.* 1223, Magn.med. *Anth.Plan.* 16.270.4, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 14.55.5) and was often ridiculed in the epigrams (e.g. Lucil. *Anth.Pal.* 11.113 and 114.5). Pind. *Nem.* 3.53–55, *Pyth.* 3.47–53 and 4.270–272 clarify that this touch would have been no more than the μαλακά "gentle" touch of the physician in applying the medecines which favor the patient's recovery—a gentle touch which would have been originally taught by Cheiron to Asclepius (cf. also Instone 1996, 164).

The use of the adverb αἶψα in Solon's verses is thus not a hint at magic. Hippocrates often uses a formula "doing these things (the sick

one) was suddenly cured", where the verb is always accompanied by the same kind of adverbs (τάχιστα, ἐν τάχει, εὐθύς) which give emphasis to the swiftness of the cure (e.g. *Int.morb.* chaps. 20, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 42, 54; for a more thorough treatment of the problem, see Noussia 1999). Here Solon would be anticipating these formulas—or possibly resuming old primitive formulas, paralleled in Egyptian and Assyro-Babylonian medical texts, which Hippocrates would also have adopted: cf. Di Benedetto 1986, 151 f.

61 f. For κυκώμενον cp. Archil. 128.1 θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε (of a disturbed soul). For ἅπτεσθαι + plural dat. of χείρ, Hom. *Il.* 20.468; for the structure of 62, Hom. *Il.* 11.392 ἀκήριον αἶψα τίθησι.

63 f. The opposition ἐσθλόν/κακόν (already common in Homer; at ending of the verse in *Il.* 9.319 κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός; Theogn. 369 κακοὶ ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλοί) generalizes the two possible opposite results of the intervention of the human physician over the patients; these had been described in 59–62 as uncontrollable and almost randomly independent of the ability of the physician himself. At the same time, the two possible outcomes of the physician's work are connected—via this opposition—to the inevitability of the gods' supreme authority over human affairs. Ll. 65–70 generalize the same uncontrollability of the results of human actions in light of the more immanent principle of "risk". The double τοι of 63 and 65 mark out this binary generalization: τοι is a particle often used with proverbs or general reflections, to point out the applicability of a universal truth to the special matter at hand: Denniston 1954, 542.

Precedents for Solon's idea cannot be found earlier than Hes. *Theog.* 904–906 Μοίρας θ', … / Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἵ τε διδοῦσι / θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε. Different in my opinion is the case of μοῖρα = destiny of death in Hom. *Il.* 6.488 f. μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν, / οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται, *pace* Mülke 2002, 313, who believes that this passage is the model of Solon's 63 f. In fact, Moira is not given the role of allotting prosperity or hardship in Homer, where she or other personifications of destiny still mainly have the role of spinning the length of one's life; death is the end point, so *a fortiori* Moira also determines one's inescapable fate of death (Dietrich 1965, 194–204), whereas Zeus is responsible for allotting good or bad events to human life (cf. Erbse 1986, 218–224, 273–284): see *Il.* 24.527–530 δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει / δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων· / ὧι μέν κ' ἀμμείξας δώηι Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, / ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῶι ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῶι, *Od.* 4.236 f. θεὸς ἄλλοτε ἄλλωι / Ζεὺς ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε διδοῖ, 15.488 f. ἦ τοι σοὶ μὲν παρὰ καὶ κακῶι ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκε / Ζεύς. In this part of the poem, which is concentrated on the human dimension, Solon seeks a certain degree of almost secular "abstraction" in his presentation of extra-human manipulation of human action. He omits any mention of Zeus, speaks of the gods in the plural, thus using what seems to be a more impersonal mode of reference (see below), and focuses on the results of divine intervention (or κίνδυνος, in 65 f.) at the level of practical human action and the human self delusion of 33–42.

Indeed it is true that, in principle, Μοῖρα of 63 does not necessarily coincide with the autonomous divinity of Hes. *Theog.* 904–906 quoted above, and may take up μοῖρα θεῶν of 30 (so Mülke 2002, 313, after Wilamowitz 1931, I.354, according to whom μοῖρα of our line would express a similar idea to δῶρα θεῶν of 65). But in fact τὰ μόρσιμα of 55, Μοῖρα of our verse and θεοί/θεός at 64 and 69 seem to be nearly synonymous, and overlap in part with the profane idea of κίνδυνος at 65 (cf. also Noussia 1999, 10–13): we should not rule out the possibility that Solon anticipated the fifth century synonymous usage of θεός/θεοί on the one hand and the terms belonging to the notion of "destiny" (e.g. δαίμων) on the other to express an impersonal divine agency in control of human affairs: cf., e.g., François 1957, 119–138; Barrett 1964, 371 ad Eur. *Hipp.* 1111–1114; Carrière 1965, 15–19 (for the different Homeric use, Erbse 1986, 259–273).

Solon's silence about Zeus is not casual. Some critics (e.g. Lattimore 1947, 168; Cordes 1994, 22) maintain that the τέλος over which the doctor would have had no control has to be implied as belonging to the same Zeus of whom Solon had said that πάντων ἐφορᾶι τέλος at 17. If, however, there is a connection, it is left implicit. The affirmation of Zeus' control over the τέλος of things in the theodicy of the first part of the poem had been centered primarily on the far more sublime role of Zeus as the exactor of punishment for human injustice. But in this second part of the poem Solon's principal interest consists of human actions—their motivations and limitations, and interactions with the superior power(s) of destiny-gods-κίνδυνος: Moira's action is expressed in 63, the unvoidability of gifts from on high in 64, the way in which κίνδυνος functions in 65, while 66 and the end of 65 describe how κίνδυνος impinges upon human action.

The way in which Solon speaks of the limitations of the medical profession suggests a few analogies with fifth century discussions centered on the same theme: see in particular chaps. 4–6 of *On the medical art*, ascribed to Hippocrates: differently from Solon, without denying the importance of fate on the success of cures, the Hippocratic author undertakes to defend the existence and reliability of a scientifically serious medical τέχνη: for more detail, see Noussia 1999, 14 f. In any case, Solon certainly anticipates here in more general terms the famous fifth-century debate over the effectiveness of τέχναι and the power of τύχη, on which see the bibliography in Cordes 1994, 89 n. 14.

δῶρα θεῶν "gifts of the gods" is a common metonymy for identifying the origin of unforeseen events, both positive and negative. Likewise, affirmations of the impossibility of avoiding what the gods give are common: Hom. *Il.* 3.65 f., 20.265 f., *Od.* 18.142; *HHom.Dem.* 147 f. = 216 f.; Theogn. 445 f., 591, 1033 f., 1187–1190; Aesch. *Sept.* 719. See Thalmann 1984, 78–112.

The adjective ἄφυκτα, which is not attested before Solon, has a metaphorical specialization to sinister contexts, since it is used e.g. for death in Simon. *PMG* 520.4, for the "thoughts" of the Moirai in adesp. *PMG* 1018a (perhaps from the *Peleus* of Euripides: *TrGF* (55)F620), for κήρ, doom, in Aesch. *Supp.* 784, for θεῶν ὄμμα in Aesch. *Prom.* 903, and for τύχη in Plato, *Leg.* 873c.

In Sol. 3 G.-P = 4 W.^{2} the κακόν of 26, sent by the gods as a punishment, is an ἕλκος ἄφυκτον (17). This metaphor may have been triggered by the hostile/aggressive sense of ἄφυκτος as an epithet for arms (βέλος, τόξα, κέντρον, οἰστός), which, however, is not attested before the tragedians: Aesch. *Supp.* 110; Soph. *Trach.* 265, *Phil.* 105; Eur. *Med.* 531, 635, *Hipp.* 1422.

65–70. These verses also recur in Theogn. 585–590, while 71–76 recur in Theogn. 227–232; they are the most extended instances of the "panhellenic" reuse of Solon. Ll. 65–70 in particular are taken up by Theognis with two substantial variations: at 587 εὐδοκιμεῖν πειρώμενος "one seeking to be famous" instead of Solon's εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος "one seeking to do good", and at 589 τῶι δὲ καλῶς ποιεῦντι "to him doing good" instead of Solon's τῶι δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι "to him acting badly." Therefore, we do not have a pure and simple reuse of Solon, but rather a μεταποίησις, i.e. one of those reuses "with change/variation" of passages from other poets' poetry. This was not an infrequent sympotic practice, as documented by the Theognidean corpus (cf. also 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}; useful discussions of

various Theognidean examples appear in Ferrari 1987, 177–197; Ferrari 1989, 5–45; Colesanti 2001; see Introd., chap. 4 for a detailed discussion of the Solonian instances in the *sylloge*). The intervention of the Theognidean author seems to be oriented by a more socially edifying perspective: at 587, instead of the objective "doing good", he introduces the image that one presents to other citizens; at 589 (if we keep the καλῶς of the mss at 589, sometimes emended to κακῶς in modern editions) he wishes to eliminate the Solonian idea that one who behaves in an opportunistic way can later plunge into failure. Instead, he seeks to promote the reverse principle: someone who behaves well is always rewarded by the gods on the condition that he is not undeservedly starved of social success.

65 f. The abstract idea of κίνδυνος is not found in epic, although it had been a prevailing force in the vicissitudes of Odysseus' *nostos*: cf. Mette 1952, 409. The term κίνδυνος is here attested for the first time with thematic declension, although Sapph. 184 and Alcae. 415 had, respectively, κίνδυν and κίνδυνι. In addition to Moira being the superhuman entity deciding the result of human actions (63 f.), one must also consider the factor of the unforseen/unpredictable. Indeed here "risk" seems to be the equivalent of Moira from a more secular-human immanent perspective. Our verses, and the following 67–70, are most probably the model for Theogn. 401–406 μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος / ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων· (cp. Solon's πᾶσιν … ἐπ' ἔργμασιν) πολλάκι δ' εἰς ἀρετήν / σπεύδει ἀνὴρ κέρδος διζήμενος, ὅντινα δαίμων / πρόφρων εἰς μεγάλην ἀμπλακίην παράγει, / καί οἱ ἔθηκε δοκεῖν, ἃ μὲν ἦι κακά, ταῦτ' ἀγάθ' εἶναι / εὐμαρέως, ἃ δ' ἂν ἦι χρήσιμα, ταῦτα κακά. Bacchyl. 10.38–47, quoted above ad 43–62, also concludes his list of professions, which is most probably modelled on Solon's in other aspects as well, with the affirmation (45–47) τὸ μέλλον / δ' ἀκρίτους τίκτει τελευτάς, / πᾶ τύχα βρίσει, and Theogn. 637 f. ἐλπὶς καὶ κίνδυνος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὁμοῖοι· / οὗτοι γὰρ χαλεποὶ δαίμονες ἀμφότεροι appears to synthesize the two ideas that Solon, in his pessimistic analysis of the origins and limitations of human action, uses to convey his pessimism: on one hand blind hopes, which provoke men to action (33–42), and on the other "risk", the evident factor which renders hopes vain, and action useless (65–70). For the general unpredictability of the results of actions in archaic lyric and elegy, cf. Theogn. 133–142, 1075 f.; Simon. *PMG* 521; Pind. *Ol.* 7.24–26 and 12.6–9.

οὐδέ τις οἶδεν was a formulaic verse-ending in Homer (*Il.* 1×, *Od.* 4×, Homeric Hymns 1×), and this traditional tone of οὐδέ τις οἶδεν

stands in contrast to the vocabulary of 66, which belongs to everyday language. Indeed, ἔχειν with an intransitive value is idiomatic with an adverb (in this case the verb would be impersonal), or it may mean, also idiomatically, "shore" or "arrive", with the implied ναῦν or ἵππον: for the first interpretation, see Linforth 1919, 316; for the second (cf., e.g., Aristoph. *Ran.* 188 ποῖ σχήσειν δοκεῖς), see Mülke 2002, 316. Most likely, Herodotus took Solon's phrase to have the second meaning, if he had Solon in mind when he ascribed to his Solon the final sentence in his dialogue with Croesus: (1.32) σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῆι ἀποβήσεται· πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε.

The reading of Theogn. cod. A πῆι is probably preferable to ᾗι (the reading of cod. S and Stob. 3.9.23) at the beginning of 66 (Noussia 2001b, 53, 104; Mülke 2002, 316) because indirect interrogatives, more often than relatives, are governed by negative clauses with verbs of knowing: for this rule, first stated by Elmsley 1822, 265 f., see Kühner-Gerth II.438 f., and now Wakker 1999, 150.

The paraphrasis with μέλλειν in the place of a traditional future participle like τὰ ἐσσόμενα, which would have conformed to epic usage, reveals a more dynamic and telic idea of time both here and in the Hesiodic parallel fr. 204.113 ὁππόσα μέλλει ἔσεσθαι: cf. Basset 1979, 129; Markopoulos 2009, 32 f.

67–70. The pessimism of our distich is especially drastic, as can be easily grasped from a comparison with the opposite view expressed by Soph. *TrGF* F831 ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἤν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς, / καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν. It also seems at variance with the faith in divine justice manifested elsewhere in Solon (as well as in the first part of this elegy)—so much so that Del Grande 1956, 75 f. concluded that these lines would have been words uttered by a critic of faith in justice: Solon would have quoted them verbatim in order to reply to them in his final verses with a celebration of the supervising power of Zeus.

Apart from θεός of 69, however, which prefaces the final reference to Zeus' ἄτη, the attention to the immanent principles of "risk" governing human action prevails by and large in 65–70—it is not coincidental that the root ερδ- occurs thrice in these lines (ἔργμασιν 65, ἔρδειν 67, ἔρδοντι 69). I agree with Nesselrath (cf. Introd.) that here Solon temporarily adopts a point of view different from his initial one: this second point of view would be almost entirely concentrated on the human dimension, leaving aside for a while valuations of divine providential

supervision (which he will not contradict). The combination of immanent "risk" and (from 69 onwards) divine control makes the perspectives of human action extremely unrealiable and increases the pessimism of Solon's picture: see the analogous consideration of the joined negative forces of τύχη and θεός in Eur. *TrGF* inc.F901 πολλάκι μοι πραπίδων διῆλθε φροντίς, / εἴτε τύχα ⟨τις⟩ εἴτε δαίμων τὰ βρότεια κραίνει, / παρά τ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δίκαν / τοὺς μὲν ἀπ' οἴκων †δ' ἐναπίπτοντας / ἀτὰρ θεοῦ†, τοὺς δ' εὐτυχοῦντας ἄγει.

As in 33, the polarity of ἀγαθός/κακός (here εὖ ἔρδειν, 67 / κακῶς ἔρδειν, 69) synthesizes human behavior in opposition to divine forces. Here more clearly than at 33, where a hint at the idea of professional skill (or lack thereof) was also possible, the polarity has a technical, and not only an ethical, connotation, illustrating the competence (or lack thereof) displayed in human action (as stressed by Maurach 1983, 24; Eisenberg 1984, 15; Nesselrath 1992, 94; it is difficult to agree with Römisch 1933, 19–24, Büchner 1959, 6 and Pötscher 1987, 79 f. that here the polarity "good"/"bad" still has a prevailing moral sense). Regardless, the two meanings of ethical correctness and professional ability appear to coexist, and not because τέρμα of 71 takes up retrospectively the idea of excess and ὕβρις of 7–13 (as maintained by Büchner 1959, 165 f.), nor because Solon's text implies that the idea of 31 f. that failure of a competent professional depends on the sins of his ancestors (as maintained by Christes 1986, 13 f.)—the text of 65–70 does not seem to look so far back in making these points. Rather, I think that the mainly technical ability with which these verses are concerned had to be retrospectively interpreted at least partially in ethical terms by Solon's audience, as Solon explicitly proposes a connection in 75 f. between ἄτη and Zeus' action (see Manuwaldt 1989, 17–19). The undeserved failure of the seemingly correct professional work, which is first presented as one of the inevitable facts of life as well as the "risk" in 65–70, would thus easily be flagged again within the framework of Solon's theodicy, which at the conclusion of the poem is taken up in ring composition from the first part. It is precisely the temporary emphasis on the descriptions of the limitations of the mortals that leads to the final restatement of man's dependence on the gods: unless gods grant release from the normal limitations of human wisdom, no man can be confident of success (Allen 1949, 58).

οὐ προνοήσας of 67, which is taken up by ἀφροσύνη of 70, has been interpreted as expressing a cause of the failure, and thus a (or the crucial) mistake which precedes it: the people who work well professionally may

fail because they do not know in advance if or when they may fail (Alt 1979, 403), or because they fail to realize soon enough that they have reached the τέρμα πλούτου allotted by gods, and thus deserve ἄτη (so Römisch 1933, 23–25 and Manuwaldt 1989, 15 n. 58; the clear connection existing between οὐ προνοήσας and the ἀφροσύνη of 70 which can easily be taken with τέρμα πλούτου and the lack of its acknowledgment in the following line, makes this second alternative preferable). Otherwise, the participle may not designate temporal anteriority to ἔπεσεν, but time coincident with it, since this is not rare with aorist participles that provide modal qualifications of leading aorists (cf. Barrett 1964, 213 f.); in this case οὐ προνοήσας ~ "without considering in advance" (see most recently Mülke 2002, 318; already Wilamowitz 1913, 263, according to whom οὐ προνοήσας ~ ἀπροσδοκήτως, followed, e.g., by Eisenberger 1984, 15 and Christes 1986, 13). According to the first interpretation, οὐ προνοήσας takes up briefly οὐδέ τις οἶδεν … ἀρχομένου at 65 f. The second interpretation would be in tune with Solon's emphasis at 33–36 that men continue to maintain their delusional positive expectations up to the very moment that they face disaster. In both cases (but slightly more clear in the case of the first interpretation, which I would favor) we have another hint at the relevance, as well as the difficulty, of knowledge as a crucial factor determining human action—here as well as in 8.4 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}, 12.6 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}, 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2}, and 21 G.-P.^{2} = 17 W.^{2}

For the idea that the gods, or Zeus in particular, can reverse the results of anyone's action at any moment, and thus make the great small and the small great, cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 15.490–492, 20.242 f., Hes. *Op.* 5–7, *Theog.* 447, Archil. 130; Eur. *Or.* 340–347, *TrGF* (7) F100, (48) F554, (64) F684; fr.lyr.adesp. *CA* 34.4–7. For the irrationality of fortune in human actions and the idea that its capricious injustice infrequently corresponds to what is actually deserved, cf., e.g., Theogn. 660–666, Eur. *Hec.* 956–960, *Hel.* 711–715, *TrGF* inc.F901 quoted above; Agathon, *TrGF* 39F9. Herodotus' Solon (1.32.1 f.) also refuted Croesus' excessive confidence in his own happiness with the words τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες.

ἔρδειν: the schol. to Aristoph. *Ach.* 330 says that the verb begins with aspiration and many Homeric mss. do write ἕρδ-; that ἕρδ- may be the original correct form has been suggested by Ruijgh 1991–1996, II.273. Theognis has aspiration at 178, 1086, 1096 and 1180; therefore van Groningen ad Theogn. 105 suggests writing ἕρδ- consistently. However, I stick to the position of Chantraine 1958–1963, 1.187 f. who argues that

the aspiration owes its existence to the Alexandrians' wish to dinstinguish ἔρξα (from ἔρδειν) from ἔρξα (from ἐέργειν). See also 23.12, 29^b.7 G.-P.[2] = 27.12, 34.7 W.[2]

ἀφροσύνη seems to mean here, as it usually does in Homer, the "lack of consideration" which prevents one from conducting himself in accordance with his own capacities (the more common ἀφραδίη has more or less the same sense; cf. *LfgrE* ss.vv.), and thus should be in connection with οὐ προνοήσας (see above): the ἔκλυσις ἀφροσύνης would then consist of the opposite achievement of πρόνοια. In any case, the object of human ἀφροσύνη (69) must consist of the misunderstanding of the τέρμα πλούτου which 71 claims is obscure to the mortals. The singular θεός is here the equivalent of the equally generic plural used at 64; in both cases Solon most likely refers to an impersonal super-human force, which at least in the fifth century tragedians is almost synonymous with fate (cf. above ad 63 f.).

The closest parallel to the construction συντυχίην ἀγαθήν is Aristoph. *Av.* 544 f. σὺ δέ μοι κατὰ δαίμονα καί ⟨τινα⟩ συντυχίαν ἀγαθὴν ἥκεις ἐμοὶ σωτήρ, which can help explain the syntactical relationship between this and the other accusative ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης. Usually συντυχίην ἀγαθήν is considered to be the object and ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης is in apposition to it. This plain interpretation is of course possible, but the passage from Aristophanes leads us to suspect that συντυχίην ἀγαθήν has an idiomatic character; since appositions normally are more general than the term they define, whose sense is more specific and restricted in denotation, συντυχίην ἀγαθήν should then perhaps be interpreted as an anticipated apposition (a device which seems to also be attested in 2.2 G.-P = 1.2 W.[2]). ἀφροσύνη as ignorance or lack of competence is an obvious cause of failure, but occasionally the god guarantees to whoever is ignorant the δῶρον of liberation from that ignorance—such "liberation" would be the "lucky strike" generating undeserved success: so Römisch 1933, 21 f. (*pace* Büchner 1959, 167; Maddalena 1943, 9 f.) and Müller 1956, 12 n. 2. Less plausible, because of the harsh asyndeton that it presupposes, is Maurach 1983, 23 who suggests that both συντυχίην and ἔκλυσιν are coordinated objects of δίδωσι at 69.

71–76. Cp. Isocr. *pace* 7 οὕτω γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα τῶν ἐλπίδων καὶ πρὸς τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι πλεονεξίας ἀπλήστως ἔχομεν, ὥστ' οὐδ' οἱ κεκτημένοι τοὺς μεγίστους πλούτους μένειν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐθέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κινδυνεύουσιν.

The verses constitute a sort of unity, as is shown by the δέ of 71, which distinguishes this line from what precedes, while τοι of 74 presents the line as a general reflection broadening the issue (more empirically concerning human matters) of 71–73 (on τοι cf. ad 63 f.). As remarked by Mülke 2002, 321, the poem's last three distichs are divided into two main considerations; each presents a general statement in three lines beginning at 71 and 74, followed by an explanation.

Ll. 71–76 resume the immediately preceding topic of 67–70, which was man's lack of foresight about his own success: as remarked above, οὐδὲν τέρμα … πεφασμένον of 71 is the implied essence of ἀφροσύνη of 69, the god-given κέρδεα of 74 are the god-sent ἐσθλόν of 63, and the κακόν of the same line is taken up by the Zeus-sent ἄτη at 75. At the same time they also reconsider the issue of wealth, the problem with which the elegy had opened. Ll. 71–73 state that men cannot see the limit allotted to their riches, and thus keep seeking more of them; men's self-delusive optimism about their achievements is described in detail in 33–70; 7–32 warn that Zeus' τίσις may arise out of seeking unjust wealth, and 74–76 state that Zeus' ἄτη affects people who have sought riches beyond the limits set by the gods. The summary function fulfilled by the last lines is also made clear by some verbal correspondences with the first part of the poem: the crucial term πλοῦτος of 71 is first presented at 9; ἄτη of 73–76 has already been encountered at 9–25; Ζηνὸς … τίσις of 25 is evoked by the ἄτη which Ζεὺς πέμψηι τεισομένην at 75 f. (in particular (Ζηνὸς τίσις) ἐξεφάνη of 28 is taken up by ἄτη … ἀναφαίνεται of 75).

Nevertheless, this final reconsideration of wealth and its proper limits is not (at least initially) characterized by divine will, as was the case at 9, but instead takes its cues from the observation of the vanity of human hustle and bustle that dominates the elegy from 43 onward. Indeed, the last three distichs also seem to provide a complementary connection between the two main points of the poem (men want too much / Zeus punishes the men who want too much): 11–13 connect divine ἄτη (13) to human ὕβρις (12), and the rhetorical question of 73 introduces the factor of κόρος, which at least in some fifth century theodicies is the automatic human reaction that prefaces the conscious injustice of ὕβρις (within the chain ὄλβος—κόρος—ὕβρις—ἄτη). Indeed, the last lines emphasize the κόρος as an "automatic" mechanism inherent to human activity and as the principal explanation for Zeus' ἄτη. This continues Solon's focus on the human world in the second part of the poem: as Römisch 1933, 28 put it well, the first part of the poem is concerned with divine τίνειν and an evaluative analysis of human ἀδίκως πεπᾶσθαι and ἄδικα ἔργματα

focusing on the unjustly rich, the second with a descriptive analysis of the ἔρδειν of the whole of mankind and the διπλάσιον σπεύδειν, which is a general symptom of the universal lack of κόρος.

As Nesselrath 1992 has already noted, at 9 Solon wishes only to distinguish between riches earned by just means and riches procured in illicit ways. At 71, he is interested in the fact that no "limit" exists on the amount of wealth a person can procure for oneself. The system of valuation outlined in 9–32 implies that human actions are divided into good and bad, where the first conform to the divine order and the second do not, and are thus punishable by Zeus. In the second part of the elegy, where this superior divine order is nearly absent for a while, all human action seems to be under the capricious control of destiny. ἄτη is no longer put forth as the blindness that strikes those who suffer from ὕβρις in opposition to the divine order (as it had been at 11–17), but as, above all, the punishment that strikes whoever oversteps the "boundaries" of the permissible in the quest for wealth. In fact, at least until the reappearance of Zeus at 75, which expresses ἄτη primarily in its moralizing dimension (cf. τεισομένην 76), ἄτη resembles a principle of secular equilibrium, inherent in human society. It is only in the final distich that ἄτη is reintegrated into the nature of divine agency, as it is presented at the beginning of the poem. The instability of material possessions and of human success are not seen from the materialistic human perspective of risk, but are explained by a sort of preordained divine plan for the perennial re-distribution of wealth, and of excessive wealth in particular (see Jaeger 1945, 144). The controlling principle of Zeus' theodicy evoked in the first part surfaces again, and Solon thus gives an especially convincing account of the existence and operation of *dike* beyond all doubt. Indeed, in this poem the ring-composition is probably something more than a formal structural device, which strategically serves to enclose the long presentation of human action within Solon's faith in a divine order (*pace* Stoddard 2002, 158) so that "god is justified, and human guilt for human disorder is demonstrated. Only through restraint and moderation can we break the vicious circle, and this is what Solon recommends in his other elegies" (Fränkel 1975, 236). Allen 1949, 61–65 emphasizes that the last three distichs at the same time implicitly justify Solon's initial prayer to the Muses for righteous well-being and may also be connected to the previous problem of undeserved failure or success. For the benefit of the unjust rich or the body of his fellow citizens, Solon may be highlighting the lack of awareness of the proper τέρμα of riches as a paradigm of a practical situation in which men are led to disaster despite their compe-

tence: those who pursue profit at all costs turn the unpredictable possibility of disaster into a predictable certainty. Piety and moderation do not guarantee security, but they do offer a better prospect.

71. A close formal parallel is Aratus 743 ἐκ Διὸς ἤδη πάντα πεφασμένα πάντοθι κεῖται, expressing a radically different optimism about the atmospheric signs being a significant help provided by Zeus for the understanding of the correct time/season of the main different agricultural works.

οὐδὲν τέρμα … κεῖται: Aesch. *Prom.* 257 οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἄθλου τέρμα σοι προκείμενον, 755 νῦν δ' οὐδέν ἐστι τέρμα μοι προκείμενον (see also Quint. Smyrn. 7.53 f.). νόμος κεῖται appears to be idiomatic in fifth century Greek (cf., e.g., Herod. 1.196.25; Eur. *Hec.* 291 f., *Ion* 1047), and may purposefully underlie the wording of this line: the τέρμα which should be revealed or made clear only by the gods, but is not, has the force of a law that to their disgrace, men cannot understand. By using a term which is especially common in the language of Greek athletics, Solon points out that differently from e.g. the end (in the spatial sense) of a race course there is no end/conclusion in the human race for wealth.

If we acknowledge that the ἀφανὲς μέτρον γνωμοσύνης of 20 G.-P.² = 16 W.² and πλούτου οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται of our fragment are related concepts in the very least because of the difficulty they entail for the human mind, we might be led to suppose that 1.71 f. G.-P.² is somehow integrated with the thought of fragment 20 G.-P.² = 16 W.², and therefore that in the elegy to the Muses, Solon was hinting at the revelation of the Muses~Gods as the necessary guide to understanding the invisible μέτρον γνωμοσύνης.

πεφασμένον already attested in Hom. *Il.* 14.127 (in the same position in the verse as in Solon) is glossed as εἰρημένον ἢ πεφανερωμένον by many lexicographers (Hesychius, *Synagoge*, Photius, *Suidas*), but it can also have the resultative sense of φανερός (Lys. *Theomn.* 19, Harpocration etc.). It is impossible to determine its precise sense in Solon's passage, but it is obvious that the possibility of the strong passive meaning "revealed", which presupposes a divine agent of revelation, better matches the previous mentioning of θεός at 69 and the mentioning of Zeus at 75. Cp. 20 G.-P.² = 16 W.² and comm. ad loc.

72 f. The idea that one grows more covetous as he gets richer is established as a truth of the Seven Sages, which is attributed to Pittacus

of Mytilene in the form ἄπληστον κέρδος "no profit is ever enough" (*VS* 10ε11); cf. then, e.g., Eur. *Supp.* 238 f. οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι / ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' ἀεί and fr.lyr.adesp. *CA* 37.20–23 μέτρα τίς ἂν πλούτου, τίς ἀνεύρατο μέτρα πενίας, / ἢ τίς ἐν ἀνθρώποις χρυσοῦ πάλιν εὕρατο μέτρον; / νῦν γὰρ ὁ χρήματ' ἔχων ἔτι πλείονα χρήματα θέλει, / πλούσιος ὢν δ' ὁ τάλας βασανίζεται ὥσπερ ὁ πένης.

In the "we" of 72 one can see both a general reference to men at large (obviously including Solon himself), and a more specific reference to the Athenians, especially the greedy Athenian rich, whose desire for wealth Solon attacks more explicitly in other fragments: 3.7–10 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7–10 W.^{2}; 5.2 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4bc.1 f. W.^{2}; 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2}; Gerber 1970, 130.

The adverbial neuter διπλάσιον attested by Theognis' mss. in 229 (see above ad 65–70) is preferable to the adverb διπλασίως, especially if we take it to also refer implicitly to βίον of 72 with a sort of sad ambiguity of σπεύδειν: the phrase properly means that they "toil" the double, but it may also hint at the fact that they "pursue" the doubling of their assets. See Isocr. *pace* 7 ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεγόμενοι, quoted above ad 71–76.

τίς is left indefinite: no god, nor man, nor any πλοῦτος can sate the greed of those who are already rich. The rhetorical question makes it clear that Solon sees the issue of human greed in aporetic terms: when the human restraint which Solon recommends is overwhelmed by the human desire to have more than enough, only the intervention of Zeus' ἄτη can solve the problem. On the one hand, the gods have planted the desire for gain in human hearts, and there seems to be no limit on wealth, or the desire for wealth (71); on the other hand, since those who have the most seek even more, there are no resources to meet this unlimited demand. Thus the real problem for Solon seems to be the satisfaction of desire, rather than of need—a subjective rather than an objective concept, where this lack in concinnity between need and desire results in greed (the κόρος of 3.9 G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 W.^{2}) and excess of wealth (from which ὕβρις derives); cf. Helm 1993, 8 f.

74. The second hemistich of the pentameter is equal to the first half of *HHom.Dem.* 220, but the verb was commonly used in a specialized sense for designating the gifts of the gods: cf. Hom. *Il.* 6.156 f., *Od.* 8.498 and 18.19; *HHom.* 24.5, 30.18, 31.17; Hes. *Theog.* 420; Theogn. 321; Bacchyl. 17.132; Rhian. *CA* 1.9 f.

Theogn. 227–232, which takes up 71–76 (see above ad 65–70), replaces this Solonian verse with the pentameter (230) χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς

γίνεται ἀφροσύνη, thus eliminating every mention of the gods as being responsible for the profits of men and allowing that ἄτη derives from profits once they degenerate into ἀφροσύνη.

75 f. ἄτη … ἀναφαίνεται parallels (Ζηνὸς τίσις) ἐξεφάνη of 28. The verb had already been used in Homer for the sinister epiphany of an ὄλεθρος, cf. *Il.* 11.174 and 17.244.

ἐξ αὐτῶν probably does not refer to the θνητοί (as Wehrli 1931, 12 and West 1974, 181 maintained) but either to κέρδεα (so Ziegler 1922, 204; Römisch 1933, 25; Lattimore 1947, 178; Gerber 1970, 130; Spira 1981, 184 n. 24; Matthiessen 1994, 397) or to θεοί (so Hamilton 1977, for whom the gods were messengers of both "profits" and ἄτη, as is the case in Theogn. 133 f.—but if this is the case we would expect some coordinative conjunction between κέρδεα and ἄτη). For the idea that uncontrolled riches lead to *hybris*, cf. also 8.3 G.-P.² = 6.3 W.²; Bacchyl. 15.57–61.

Precise parallels for the second hemistich of 76 are Archil. 13.7 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει τόδε; Sol. 6.4 G.-P.² = 15.4 W.² χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει and Theogn. 157 f. Ζεὺς γάρ τοι τὸ τάλαντον ἐπιρρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, / ἄλλοτε μὲν πλουτεῖν, ἄλλοτε μηδὲν ἔχειν, 232 πέμψηι τειρομένοις, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει, 318 χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει, but the same *polyptoton* had already been used by Homer to express the unpredictable variability of gifts or misfortunes sent by the gods (*Od.* 4.236 f.); see Krause 1976. Here Solon does not simply revisit the unpredictability of divine action, already expressed at 29, but he introduces faith in a principle of divine order consisting of the continuous change of the targets of ἄτη and the perennial redistribution of riches. I think it is improbable that the *polyptoton* implies that ἄτη not only strikes those directly at fault but any other member of the local community as well, i.e. the principle that the sins of one man can fall upon the whole πόλις, as Hasler 1959, 84 interprets. However, Anhalt 1993, 63 f. is correct in pointing out that, while in Archilochus, the closest parallel to Solon's statement, the variability of human fortunes is a comforting idea, or at least an idea that should help human τλημοσύνη, in Solon's text the *polyptoton* holds a dire warning: "knowledge of the variability of human fortunes … reinforces the recognition that certain causal relationships are inevitable, specifically, the relationship between wealth and *ate*."

I take the relative ἥν (= ἄτη) to be the object of ἔχει and πέμψηι, *apo koinou*, and the parallel from 6.4 G.-P.² = 15.4 W.² χρήματα … ἔχει does not seem sufficient enough to justify the syntactically difficult connection

of ἔχει with κέρδεα proposed by Ziegler 1922, 204 and accepted by, among others, Allen 1949, 60 and Müller 1956, 11.

By combining the view that κέρδεα lead to ἄτη in 71–76, and adopting a reference to human activity in 73, σπεύδουσι, which recalls σπεύδει of 43, Solon emphasizes that, while ἄτη does come from Zeus (75), it also comes by way of human actions. Indeed, these lines restate in part the idea of 11–13, where what is mingled with ἄτη is the wealth that men acquire by reckless violence (*hybris*), i.e. unjust acquisition by way of *hybris*. The last distich of the poem also restates the idea of 25–31 on the causal relationship between human behavior and Zeus' justice and the inevitability of divine retribution for the unjust (because they are insatiable): the variability of human fortunes at this point of the poem puts the emphasis again on the wish of acquisition of (excessive) wealth as a paradigmatic origin of seemingly undeserved disasters (because just wealth involves no retribution: 9 f.), and thus leads us to doubt that men are merely at the mercy of Fate: see, e.g., Bowra 1958, 98; above ad 71–76.

2 G.-P.² = 1–3 W.²

The circumstances surrounding Solon's performance of his poem on Salamis are reported by a number of sources whose accounts present elements whose historicity is uncertain. According to Plut. *Sol.* 8.1, Solon needed to avoid prosecution under a law that could charge anyone who sought reprise of the war against Salamis with the punishment of death. To this end, he supposedly feigned the loss of his wits and entered the public square with a felt cap on his head (πιλίδιον); he then proceeded to climb onto the pedestal from which the heralds usually spoke and recited his poem. According to Diog. Laert. 1.46, who like, Plutarch, recounts Solon's pretense of madness (cf. also Philod. *mus.* 20.18; Cic. *Off.* 1.30.108; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 1.20; Just. *Epit.* 2.7), Solon wore a crown instead and had the elegy recited by a herald.

The reuse of Solon's poem in Demosth. *On the False Embassy* (19.255) may lend credence to Plutarch's account of Solon's cap, πιλίδιον: just before citing 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², which contrasts Solon's moral rectitude with Aeschines' dishonesty (cf. further ad loc.), Demosthenes harangues his adversary, οὐκ οἴει δίκην δώσειν τηλικούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἀδικημάτων, κἂν πιλίδιον λαβὼν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστῇς καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορῇι. The main problem in interpreting this passage, however, is the question: did Demosthenes imply that Solon, who is quoted immediately after, had worn a πιλίδιον as well as Aeschines, or not? It is hard to resist the temptation to rely on the closeness of Demosthenes' mentioning of Solon's fragment and his mentioning of Aeschines' πιλίδιον, and thus to interpret this closeness as implying that Solon had also worn the πιλίδιον, in light of Plutarch's anecdote. All the more so, since this felt cap was elsewhere the head-cover worn by invalids (cf. Plato, *Resp.* 406d; with an uncertain sense in Plut. *Colot.* 1127b), by slaves (cf. Mastrocinque 1984, 33), or by someone aiming to move others to compassion by showing or feigning a handicap: cp. the Dicaiopolis of Aristophanes' *Ach.* 439, who uses the cap to simulate the role of a marginalized beggar, τὸ πιλίδιον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τὸ Μύσιον—a role which allowed him to escape the judicial rigor of the chorus, cf. 416 f. Flacelière 1947, 237 f., for instance, suggested that Aeschines imitated the pose of Solon in a statue erected in Salamis which must have included a cap (on the unlikeness of this statue, however, see MacDowell 2000, 311). MacDowell ibid. also

states that, if Aeschines' wearing of the hat had to be interpreted in the wake of Solon's use of this device, we should have expected a clearer reference to Solon's πιλίδιον. Moreover, Demosthenes' Aeschines may have been really sick and may have resorted to the cap as a way to display his sickness and to obtain the sympathy of the audience (on the speaker's strategical self-presentation "in guise most pitious" in front of the popular assembly, when difficult situations and disappointing topics of the speech may harm the speaker, and on the use of special garments in order to reach this aim of pity, see also Aristoph. *Ach.* 384–390, 414–434). I fully agree with the second point, but the first sounds like an *argumentum e silentio*. If Solon was quoted immediately after Demosthenes' mentioning of Aeschines trying to go scot-free, we can still plausibly infer that the archaic statesman was implicitly being compared to him because he had also spectacularized his performance of our poem with some device meant to capture the sympathy of the audience, although for a much nobler reason than Aeschines'. Whether Demosthenes presupposed that Solon's device consisted of wearing a hat (and feigning madness) is something that his description of Aeschines does not enable us to infer.

This cap may just have been spun from a literal reading of the fragment's passing metaphor of being a herald/κῆρυξ. If so, this felt cap could not be anything more than the πῖλος, the typical cap of the travellers (Vox 1984, 45) and also the stock attribute of Odysseus, which was worn by him as a warrior as well as by him as a sailor or beggar (Burr Thompson 1969, 246); the later anecdotal tradition transformed this to a πιλίδιον (Robertson 1998, 301; Tedeschi 1982, 44; Flacelière 1947, 246; Freeman 1926, 171 n. 2). Irwin 2006b 26 n. 30 (and similarly 2005, 142) tries to read the hat of the Salamis tradition as something which evokes a compound picture of Odysseus as both the traveller *par excellence* and the effective performer of martial exhortation, but if Solon had this intention, he does not appear to have been understood: the parallelism between Odysseus and Solon is only drawn by the ps.-Aristotelic *Homeric Problems* (Aristot. fr. 368 Gigon: see below) and in the context of that testimony there is no mention of the cap.

Independently of their reliability about the hat and its performative function, the sources also pose a serious problem concerning the site of the performance. We lack any evidence of the recitation of elegiac poetry in the public square rather than in its more usual setting, the symposium: cf. Bartol 1993, 54 f. Various modern scholars take the information supplied by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius as being accurate: cf. West 1974, 12; Henderson 1982, 24 f.; Tedeschi 1982, 41–44 = 1991, 115 f.; Vox 1984,

31; Aloni 1997, 12 n. 17. Mülke 2002, 74 f. does not exclude the possibility that the poem was performed at a gathering of the people or a festivity with a greater number of people than the symposium. He very interestingly notes, however, that the idea that Solon's thoughts addressed larger groups is not a strong enough argument to exclude the possibility that Solon's performance of his poem took place in front of an aristocratic sympotic group, since Solon probably took for granted that his ideas would be circulated after the original performance in front of a strict group of aristocrats, and could devote some attention to this broader audience when composing his poems (or some of his poems). Other scholars have thought that the mentioning of the square was an erroneous inference stemming from the banalization of ἀγορῆς at 2, where ἀγορά most likely means "discourse in prose" and not, as it commonly means, "town-square": cf. e.g. Lefkowitz 1981, 40, Bowie 1986, 19–22, Anhalt 1993, 122. According to Bartol 1993, 54, Solon may have staged a heraldic ruse, even though he was reciting the poem at a symposium and recalling the stunt himself with the phrase ἀντ' ἀγορῆς, which she takes to mean 'instead of the square' or 'not in the square'. Although this last interpretation of ἀντ' ἀγορῆς does not seem very likely, the idea which is at the root of Bartol's suggestion is plausible and can be further developed. Solon may have staged a performance that was indeed sympotic, but which was based upon the pretense of a semi-theatrical recitation, where he enacted the role of a herald as if he were giving a speech before the assembly (Wilson 1979, 5 remarked that this kind of performance pointed the way to tragedy; likewise Stehle 1997, 63: "a sign of a larger theatrical coup"). The poet/herald emphasized and fortified his ruse by clarifying that he wished to speak in verse, ᾠιδή, while enacting the role of a herald (cf. Anhalt 1993, 122) rather than the spoken language that one would expect from a herald. Furthermore, the admission that the use of poetry in a situation meant for spoken language was paradoxical may have been intended to implicitly recall that the performance was a sort of re-proposal, or rather pre-proposal, in the context of a symposium, of the contents presented or about to be presented before the assembly. When put into these terms, all these references to the situations, objects and roles of the ἀγορά, which were understood by the ancients as allusions to a concrete assembly, would have been interpreted as metaphors pointing to a ruse which is itself similar to the 'verbal scenography' that the tragic poets provided for their audiences, integrating through descriptions made by the actors or the chorus details which could not feature, or not feature clearly enough, on the monumental *skene* on the stage behind them.

The explanation which Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Justinus, and Polyaenus offer to justify Solon's pretence of insanity probably also has to be considered unreliable. According to these sources, Solon resorted to this pretence in order to avoid punishment under a law that prohibited any type of proposal concerning the occupation of Salamis. As remarked by Rihll 1989, 282, there is no independent evidence that Salamis was a taboo subject. Moreover, while laws like this are certainly attested in the fifth and fourth centuries (cf. e.g. Thuc. 2.24.1), it is far less likely that they existed in Solon's time: cf. Raaflaub 1996, 1037. One might also conjecture that, in a way, such a reconstruction would have been unnecessary after political oratory began to obey its own rules of etiquette, so that it was no longer possible to understand the anomalies of a performance, like the one staged by Solon, based upon the sources alone (see further below). Solon clearly introduces himself as a "herald" in what was probably the first line of the original poem. This self-presentation has been interpreted in rather discordant ways. In any case, however, this playing of a "role" (so called already by Liforth 1919, 215) is one of the many examples of the masks, or the polymorphism of the 'I', that was so frequently adopted by the archaic poets. Solon would thus have presented himself as returning from a voyage to Salamis in terms analagous to those which Theogn. 783–788 uses to recall his journey in Sicily (Bowie 1986, 19); also cf. Archil. 1 and Theogn. 257 as examples of metaphorical identities taken on by the poets (although, as Stehle 1997, 62 n. 114 remarks, these are not close enough parallels to Solon). There is no doubt that up until the middle of the fifth century the symposium consisted of a significant level of "internal spectacularization", and one can legitimately suppose that in the symposium extemporaneous performances took place in which the symposiasts temporarily assumed the role of actors and interpreted various parts of the performance: cf. Palumbo Stracca 1996, 45; Puppini 1991. However, Solon's choice to portray himself as a Salaminian herald would not only have served to persuade his public audience with greater force, since thanks to his 'mask' Solon would not have been expressing a personal opinion, but it also enabled him to assume the public role of one proclaiming a truth: cf. Slings 1990, 17 f.; for the shamanic elements which may underly this presentation, cf. Costa 2008, 280. In assuming the role of a herald arriving from Salamis, Solon flaunts the incongruity of his declaration further: no Athenian could reasonably call himself a "messenger" from an island that was held in enemy hands: cf. also Vox 1984, 19. This may have been Solon's pretence of madness, or may have at least contributed to it. Alternatively, because the sur-

viving verses of Solon's poem lack any other indication of a pretence of madness, which is discussed by the sources, we can also conjecture that the account of Solon's feigned madness was only inferred from this initial declaration of being a "herald from Salamis", or/and from the emphasis he placed upon the incongruity of using poetry instead of herald's speech before the assembly within the performative illusion of the symposium.

In any case, pretending oddness (with varying degrees of complexity) would not have been at all incongruous with the archaic orators' modalities of performance, and it was one of the devices used in pursuit of τὰ θαυμαστά which Aristotle identifies in the *Rhetoric* (3.1415b15) as a good effect to strive after in the προοίμια in order to stimulate attentiveness. The other ancient source which is more explicit than Demosthenes about Solon's use of deceit in his performance of the poem on Salamis, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Homeric Problems* (Aristot. fr. 368 Gigon), admits the oddness of his performance, although it does not specify the details of this oddity: ἀπὸ δὲ χλαῖναν βάλε (Hom. *Il.* 2.183): ἀπρεπὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὴν χλαῖναν ἀποβαλόντα μονοχίτωνα θεῖν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα διὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, καὶ μάλιστα οἷος Ὀδυσσεὺς εἶναι ὑπείληπται. φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ἵνα διὰ τοῦτο θαυμάζειν ὁ ὄχλος ἐπιστρέφηται, καὶ ἐξικνῆται ἡ φωνὴ ὡς ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἄλλου ἄλλοθεν συνιόντος. οἷον καὶ Σόλων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὅτε συνῆγε τὸν ὄχλον περὶ Σαλαμῖνος. The source draws a connection between Solon's behavior and Odysseus' behavior in *Il.* 2. When Athena exhorts Odysseus to curb the desire to flee that pervades the Greek camp after they hear Agamemnon's persuasive speech, Odysseus sets the stage for the speeches he will deliver in order to restrain the Greek leaders (189–206) with the gesture of casting off his cloak. Such a gesture was perceived by the ancients as ἀπρεπές "inappropriate", and according to the Ps.-Aristotle it served to θαυμάζειν "stun" and "attract the attention" of the crowd. Vox 1984, 42, who first paid attention to the Ps.-Aristotelic passage, believes that Aristotle was drawing a comparison between Solon's strangeness in dressing and Odysseus'. Yet in Aristotle the strangeness of Odysseus' behavior is grounded only in the gesture of casting off his cloak and running through the camp wearing just his χιτών, which seems inappropriate for someone of Odysseus' social level, but does not involve any transvestism. In all likelihood, this anecdote is an invention of the ancient biographers, but it proves that they were inclined (probably under the influence of Solon's texts) to see Odysseus' behavior in the background of Solon's verbal or behavioral operation. Apart from this gesture by Odysseus (which was perhaps less striking for Homer and his audience than for future scholarly readers, who were no-

toriously obsessed with the problem of what was πρέπον "appropriate" or "inappropriate" in the Homeric poems), Odysseus appears to have been accustomed to a type of oratory in which the creation of erroneous expectations among the public played an essential role. As Cramer 1976, 303 notes in the portrait of an orator at work which is drawn by Homer, "Odysseus is shown as having a consciously chosen rhetorical manner which involved a deliberately incomplete and misleading presentation of himself", with the result that no mortal man could vie with him, as Antenor acknowledges in *Il.* 3.216–224. The performance of the Salamis poem may have been a good example of a Solonian Odysseus-stance, where Solon sought to achieve the effect of the unexpected; compare this with Plut. *Sol.* 30.1, for example who states that on another occasion Solon considered the deceptive behavior of Pisistratus to be an example of an Odyssean disguise and dissemblance (see further ad 25 G.-P.² = 29 W.²).

Thus, the ancient sources on the Salamis poem could easily interpret some sort of peculiarity in Solon's performance as a sort of pre-rhetorical staging done by Solon. It comes as no surprise that in Plut. *Them.* 2.6, when he reports that Themistocles was a pupil of Mnesiphilus, who was an expert of cleverness in politics and practical sagacity, (this was called σοφία or wisdom during his time), he states that Mnesiphilus had received and passed down these skills, as though they were the doctrine of a sect, in an unbroken tradition starting from Solon: cf. Noussia 2006, 137–139. This significant role, which is attributed to Solon in the history of rhetorical activity, is also illustrated by Plutarch's account of the Spartan arbitrations between Athens and Megara over the island of Salamis (*Sol.* 10). It credits Solon's time with something similar to a forensic procedure and Solon himself with the practice of a classical rhetor in competition with the claims of the rival side: see Buxton 1982, 11; Higbie 1997; Lavelle 2005, 60–64; Noussia 2006, 135–137.

The geographic position of the island of Salamis, which stretched before the Piraeus and acted as a natural barrier between Nisea, the port of Megara, and the Piraeus itself, rendered its conquest invaluable to both cities for the security of commercial traffic. Athens had (or rather, had constructed) connections to Salamis dating back centuries. In the Catalogue of Ships, we hear of Salaminian Ajax, who ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, / στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες (Hom. *Il.* 2.557 f.). This line, which is unlikely to have been part of the "original" *Iliad* (nowhere else in the poem does Ajax have an Athenian connection) and was declared spurious by Aristarchus, was often considered to be an interpolation introduced by Solon himself: cf.

Dieuchidas, *FgrH* 485F6 (for which see most recently Slings 2000, 69); Plut. *Sol.* 10.2; Σ Hom. *Il.* 2.558, and Demosth. 19.251, 2.81 Dilts; cf. also Strabo 9.394. The Megarians also sought to identify themselves as heirs to the legacy of Ajax, supporting an alternative interpolation for *Il.* 2.557 f. in which Ajax's forces had been gathered from the Megarian cities of Tripodes and Nisea: cf. Strabo 9.394. Thus, Solon would have looked to the legitimizing force of myth, exploiting the legend in which the two sons of Ajax, Philaeus and Eurysaces, gave Salamis to the Athenians as they became Athenian citizens: cf. Plut. *Sol.* 10.3 and Paus. 1.35.2. A few decades later, Cleisthenes named one of his ten territorial tribes after Ajax, rationalizing this by the fact that Ajax, although "foreign", was "a neighbor and an ally" to Athens in the heroic age (Herod. 5.66.2).

The war for Salamis was long, but there is little extant evidence about this (see e.g. French 1957; Hopper 1961, 208–217; Piccirilli 1978; Lavelle 2005, esp. 60–65). If the Megarian support for Cylon's attempted coup d'état can in fact be dated to the later part of the seventh century (cf. Thuc. 1.126.5), then it may have begun some time before Solon. The war finally ended, however, with an arbitration made by Sparta. In Plut. *Sol.* 10, Solon was showcased as a protagonist in this mediation (for more on this, including additional bibliography, see above), but aside from a few defenses that were made for Plutarch's chronology (e.g. by Busolt and Meyer) the Spartan arbitration is now generally dated to a later time; in the decades 570/50 (Legon 1981, 138 f., Andrewes 1982, 373), in 519/18 (Piccirilli 1973, 52), or 510/07 (Beloch 1912–1913, 312 f., Taylor 1997).

Solon's importance to the war's resolution is recognized in nearly all of the ancient accounts (except for the isolated testimony of the fourth century historian Daimachus, according to whom Solon never led the Athenians against Salamis at all: *FgrH* 65F7). Nevertheless, even our principal source for Solon's conquest of the island, Plutarch, is not without his contradictions. Plutarch actually provides two disparate versions of the conquest, attributing one to 'popular tradition' and the second to 'other historians' (*Sol.* 8 f.). Moreover, at the beginning of chapter 10 he says that, even after the conquest, the Megarians, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν Μεγαρέων ἐπιμενόντων, πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ δρῶντες ἐν τῶι πολέμωι καὶ πάσχοντες, and that the war ended only with Spartan arbitration between the two city-states.

On the other hand, Herod. 1.59.4 talks about the conquest of Nisea made by Pisistratus before his ascent to the tyranny without mentioning Solon or Salamis (for more on this see most recently Lavelle 2005, 46–60), while Plut. *Sol.* 8.3 f. seems to present Solon and Pisistratus as allies

and co-authors of the victory. Later sources ascribe the conquest of the island to Pisistratus, but not to Solon (Frontin. *Str.* 2.9.9; Just. *Epit.* 2.8, Aeneas Tact. 4.8–11). These discrepancies may support the theory that the Athenians conquered and lost the island on multiple occasions, and that Athens' uncertain conquest of the island under Solon was secured at the hands of Pisistratus: cf. Legon 1981, 137.

But it may be better to understand the Salaminian event as something which promoted one of the various "duplications" that attributed details of the tradition concerning Solon to Pisistratus, and vice versa—for this biographical trend, see in particular the "law against laziness", which is of Egyptian origin, and was meant to punish anyone who could not demonstrate his ability to hold employment and thereby support himself (cf. Plut. *Sol.* 31.5); the regulation of rhapsodic recitation during the Panathenaean festival (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.57; also Plato, *Hipparch.* 228b, who attributes this initiative to Hipparchus); and the legally-enforceable attitude of respect which had to be displayed towards the city's existing laws (cf. Herod. 1.59.6 and Aristot. *Pol.* 1273b41–74a1). In general, cf. Podlecki 1984, 122 ff. and 1987; and Aratowsky 1953 on the greater likelihood that Solon, rather than Pisistratus, directed the first conquest of the island.

1. **αὐτός**: according to the two possible constructions of αὐτός with the verb or with κῆρυξ, the sense is either "I myself came as a herald" or "I came as a herald of myself" (= "I came as my own herald", Linforth 1919, 151; "I bring my own dispatch", West 1993a, 74). I agree with Mülke 2002, 77 in assuming that the first meaning expresses Solon's autopsy more explicitly, and thus better fits the context (see also Magurano 1999, 42). Pindar also uses the image of the poet as a messenger who brings good news of victory, creating the impression that he is returning from the games where the victory was obtained (e.g. *Ol.* 4.3; 9.25, *Nem.* 4.74, *Pyth.* 2.3 f.): see Most 1985, 64 n. 23 and Gerber 1999b, 82.

The emphasis which is placed upon the identity of the author and relator of the message also occurs later, usually in the form αὐτοκῆρυξ: cf. Herod. 1.79.2; Aesch. *TrGF* F420a = Phot. *Lex.* a 3226 Theodoridis; Soph. *OC* 1511, *Phil.* 500; Eur. *Supp.* 589; Phrynich. *Praep.soph.* 5.17 de Borries. In any case, if we assume that the practice of "entrusted song" which is attested in professional choral lyric was already widespread in Solon's time (according to this practice, a poem could also be performed by a different performer in agreement with the author: cf. Vetta 1981, 485 f.), the phrase would appear to emphasize that Solon is giving a "personal" performance.

According to Plutarch the poem had one hundred lines. It is difficult to say whether or not the information provided by Plutarch, that l. 1 of the first fragment was the beginning of the poem, was rooted in personal stichometric verification: Càssola 1964, 56; Linforth 1919, 249. Mülke 2002, 76 f. thinks it is most likely that the information came from Plutarch's source, Hermipppus.

The adjective ἱμερτός, which has an almost erotic value, was commonly used to describe one's native land: cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.751; Archil. 22 and 166.3; see also Mimn. 3.2 G.-P.² = 9.2 W.², where it is used to describe Asia and the migrating Pylians settling in Colophon; Tyrtae. 1ᵇ.4 ~ °14.4 G.-P.² = 4.4 W.² has ἱμερόεσσα (on the original difference between ἱμερτός and ἱμερόεις, see Bremer *et al.* 1987, 66). Solon may have used this adjective deliberately, both here and at l. 8, to imply that the island was a land desirable enough to be worth fighting for: cf. Robertson 1997, 149 f.

2. All Homeric usages of the word κόσμος denote the idea of order and organization (*Il.* 11.48, 12.85, 225, 24.622), and sometimes moral or social order (*Il.* 5.759, 8.12, 17.205, *Od.* 14.363). When used in reference to speech, the term seems to denote a sequence containing everything that is necessary without leaving anything out (cf. Maehler 1963, 19 and *LfgrE s.v.*): cf. *HHom.Herm.* 433, 479. In particular, in *Od.* 8.489–491 the phrase λίην κατὰ κόσμον describes the content of a bardic song and the song's internal structure, which is an accurate and well articulated sequence of themes concerning the fate of the Greeks in the Trojan War (for the history of the term, cf. Diller 1956; Kerschensteiner 1962; Haebler 1967; Adkins 1972; Puhvel 1976; Finkelberg 1998, 124–126; Worman 2002, 21–29). The word probably has the same meaning in Solon, where it designates an ordered and metrically defined sequence of ἔπεα: cf. Walsh 1984, 135 n. 8; Gentili 1988, 50 and 249 n. 5. In Homer, the precise meaning of the term ἔπεα is "words" or "speeches"; the meaning of "verse" is also possible, but it is limited to the cases of its appearance in *Od.* 8.91 and 17.519, and does not appear to be common before the fifth century; thus ἔπεα certainly has the same generic meaning in 15.7 G.-P.² = 11.7 W.²

The phrase of Solon reappears in Parmen. *VS* 28B8.52, Democr. *VS* 68B21, and Philitas, *CA* 10.3; cf. also *HHom.Dion.* 59 κοσμῆσαι ἀοιδήν; Simon. 3b.19 G.-P.² = 11.23 W.² κ[όσμον ἀοι]δῆς, 9.6 G.-P.² = 22.6 W.² Μουσέω]ν̣ κόσμ[ο]ν; Pind. *Ol.* 11.13, fr. 194.3 κόσμον … λόγων; Thuc. 3.67.6 λόγοι ἔπεσι κοσμηθέντες; Eur. *Med.* 576 ἐκόσμησας λόγους; *Orph.* fr. 25 κόσμον ἀοιδῆς Bernabé.

Westman 1974, 190 doubted the syntactical legitimacy of ᾠιδήν, and decided it must be a gloss of κόσμον ἐπέων, which would have replaced the original word that belonged to the verse (instead of ᾠιδήν he suggests emending it to λιγέων "clear-toned"/"voiced", in accordance with ἐπέων "words"). I do not share his doubts about the word, however, because κόσμον ἐπέων can be viewed as an anticipated apposition of ᾠιδήν, which defines its formal pecularity as an "ordered sequence of words", namely its adherence to the fixed structural laws of rhythm that distinguish it from prose; the sequence given by the transmitted text would thus be analagous to that, e.g., of the quite common Homeric formula ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων "Agamemnon, leader of men", and can be found elsewhere in Solon in 1.21 G.-P.[2] = 13.21 W.[2] θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν ἱκάνει οὐρανόν (cf. also 1.57 G.-P.[2] = 13.57 W.[2]). In an appealing alternative syntactical construction κόσμον ἐπέων may also be the predicative of ᾠιδήν: "having made the ordered form of my utterance song instead of speech" (Dover 1997, 185) or even "making song, not speech, the order (form) of my words" (predicative complement). ἀείδειν was the most common way in which the Homeric *aoidoi* used to refer to their recitative hexameter poetry; for ἀοιδή being used of elegiac verses, cf. Dionysius Ch. 1.4 G.-P.[2] = 1.4 W.[2] and Theogn. 4, 16.

The distinction between poetry and spoken language that emerges from this line of text appears here for the first time: the Homeric poems do not contemplate an idea of language other than the poetic one. Here the creation of the distinction between the two was motivated by Solon's intention to combine the official nature of his message (which was supported by his presentation of himself as a herald) with the aesthetic quality that ᾠιδή inherently brings. After all the aesthetic effect of ᾠιδή seems to be well explained by the words in apposition to it κόσμος ἐπέων.

The phrase ᾠιδὴν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος (where the participle expresses the circumstances behind the main action of coming, expressed by the verb ἦλθον, and thus stresses the immediacy which connects this action to that of making poetry: Mülke 2002, 79) seems to be a variation of the Homeric expression καὶ τότ' ἐγὼν ἀγορὴν θέμενος μετὰ πᾶσιν ἔειπον (*Od.* 9.171 = 10.188 = 12.319). In the *Odyssey*, this phrase was always used to introduce exhortative or strategic speeches made by Odysseus which linked cunning and daring: these speeches both resolved potentially perilous situations (e.g. the exploration of the lands of the Cyclops and Circe or the taking of action against the herds of Helius) and depicted Odysseus' superiority as a leader over his companions and their collective disorientation. It is a tempting hypothesis that Solon modelled his

own work on these Homeric phrases with the precise purpose of evoking their contexts.

In any case, it is likely that Solon modified the model by using ἀγορά in a different sense than that of the Odyssean formula, where the word meant “assembly”. In fact, Solon’s use of the word ἀντί can hardly mean “in front of” (the assembly); it is more likely that it has the sense “instead of”, which emphasizes the use of an unexpected form of expression. As the ancients already recognized, in Solon ἀγορά here means τῶι πεζῶι λόγωι ἀγορεύειν (Phot. *Lex.* α 221 Theodoridis); even if the meaning “(place of) assembly” had been more common in epic, Solon’s meaning of “speech” (in prose) is also well attested in Homer (cf. *Il.* 2.275, 788, 4.1, 400, 9.441, 12.211, 18.106, *Od.* 4.818) and was clearly recognized by other ancient lexicographers (cf. [Apion], *Gloss.Hom.* 212.2–4 Ludwich; Hesych. *Lex.* α 714 and 724 Latte; *Etym.magn.* 160 Lasserre-Livadaras).

The Homeric θέμενος, which designates the “organizing” of an assembly in the *Odyssey* formula quoted above, is here adopted by Solon to describe the work of the poet: the use of the verb τίθημι “put”/“place” in reference to literary composition (which is well attested from Solon’s age onward: cf. e.g. Alcae. 204.6 coll. *Etym.Magn.* 319.31; Pind. *Ol.* 3.8; Aristoph. *Ran.* 10.52) reveals a vision of a poet’s work from the point of view of a poet, which is seen here as technical craftsmanship (see further Finkelberg 1998, esp. 160–191). This vision coexists with the notion of poetry being a creation inspired by the gods, on which see 1.51 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.51 f. W.^{2}; cp. the analogous use of ποιεῖν “to make” which is used for a poet’s work in the μεταποίησον of 26.3 G.-P.^{2} = 20.3 W.^{2}

3. The island of Pholegandrus is often remembered as being a desolate place: it is rocky, cf. Aratus, *SH* 109; Strabo 10.5.1(484) and 10.5.3(486); afflicted by drought, cf. Antipater Thess. *Anth.Pal.* 9.421 and deserted, cf. Hesych. *Lex.* φ 726 Hansen-Cunningham. More generally, the νησιῶται, or the inhabitants of the Aegean islands, were often exposed to the scorn of the mainland inhabitants who considered them to be backward: cf. Herod. 8.125; Eur. *Andr.* 14 and 210, *Heracl.* 84, [*Rhes.*] 701; Aristoph. *PCG* 884; Plato, *Resp.* 330a; Demosth. 13.34 and 23.211; Teles fr. 3 Hense (from Stobeus 3.40.8).

Σικινήτης is the correct form of the second epithet: cf. *IG* I^3.1, 71.90 col. 1 (425/4 BC), 287.16 col. 1 (418/7 BC); II–III^2.1.1, 43.B.31 (378/7); XI.4, 688.3 (end of the 3rd cent. BC), 1063.17 (300–250?); XII.5, 1099.B (2nd cent. BC); XII.5 Suppl. 177.2 and 5 (end of the 4th cent. BC); Meisterhans-Schwyzer 1900, 19; Redard 1949, 10, 129.

The device of the paradoxical wish has similarities to the wish of Odysseus in Hom. *Il.* 2.259–261 μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ κάρη ὤμοισιν ἐπείη, / μηδ' ἔτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην, / εἰ μὴ ἐγώ σε λαβὼν ἀπὸ μὲν φίλα εἵματα δύσω, κτλ.; *Od.* 2.230–234 = 5.8–12; Hes. *Op.* 270–272. Solon would be willing to renounce his nationality (to belong to Pholegandros, and not to Athens), and thus to exchange his πατρίς, even though he has come back from Salamis to his fatherland (in epic the fatherland is usually evoked as the seat of the οἶκος, of the φίλοι, and of the ἄλοχος when it is being portrayed as the object of intense desire or wishful thinking: for a collection of passages see Mülke 2002, 83 f.). The chronological specification of the circumstances under which Solon's desire would be fulfilled—the circumstances to which τότε, emphasized by δή, refers—was probably provided in the *protasis*, which is lost to us and, whose meaning would have been, more or less, "if we miss Salamis" or "if we do not fight for Salamis any longer".

5 f. Solon graphically depicts the response of blame which people would have directed towards him, as well as all of the other Athenians, in order to arouse their sense of shame. These kinds of hypothetical remarks are frequently found later in symbouleutic speeches (where they are called *hypophorai*: cf. Trevett 1995, 125), and therefore they also may have already belonged to the rhetoric of persuasive speech in Solon's time.

Focalization through the eyes of a real or an imagined critic is a device that we meet elsewhere in Solon, cf. 29[a] G.-P.[2] = 33 W.[2]; for another example of the projection of actual public opinion in direct quotation in elegy cf. Semon. 7.29–31; on public opinion / gossip in the *polis*, see also Mimn. 13 G.-P.[2] = 14 and *16 W.[2] with Allen 1993 ad loc. The immediate reaction of the common people to Solon's and the Athenians' behavior is expressed through a series of Homeric-Hesiodic phrases: αἶψα γάρ, *Od.* 15.495, 19.360 = Hes. *Op.* 93; for 5 cp. *Od.* 23.362 αὐτίκα γὰρ φάτις εἶσιν (cf. also *Od.* 6.29 and 21.323) and *Od.* 18.225 (σοί κ' αἶσχος λώβη τε) μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιτο ~ *Il.* 3.287 = 460. These Homeric references elevate the style of the poem from the narrative and colloquial character of the preceding verses, and not only do they set the stage for the authoritative tone which Solon wants to create for the imaginary/hypothetical and epigrammatic accusation of l. 6, but they also consist of (as noted by Masaracchia 1958, 244) a modification of the Homeric motif "someone spoke etc.", since the Homeric τις is shifted to ἄνθρωποι with the intention of stressing that everyone would subscribe to it; for the τις-speeches, see Wilson 1979 and de Jong 1987.

The notion that one's sense of assigning blame can be influenced by fear of criticism was found already, e.g., in the speech of the swineherd Eurymachus to Penelope (*Od.* 21.322–328): οὔ τί σε τόνδ' ἄξεσθαι ὀΐόμεθ', οὐδὲ ἔοικεν, / ἀλλ' αἰσχυνόμενοι φάτιν ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν, / μή ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι κακώτερος ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν· / "ἦ πολὺ χείρονες ἄνδρες ἀμύμονος ἀνδρὸς ἄκοιτιν / μνῶνται, οὐδέ τι τόξον ἐΰξοον ἐντανύουσιν· / ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις πτωχὸς ἀνὴρ ἀλαλήμενος ἐλθὼν / ῥηϊδίως ἐτάνυσσε βιόν, διὰ δ' ἧκε σιδήρου"; see also Hector's speech in *Il.* 22.105–108 αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους, / μή ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο· / "Ἕκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν." / ὥς ἐρέουσιν. In Solon's case, however, there is no hint that the hostile comment should be uttered by someone who is κακώτερος, namely someone who is more ethically depraved than the character being criticized. There is also no hint that this person would speak out of malevolence, thus limiting the culpability of the subject under the attack. Solon's general use of ἄνθρωποι stresses that the scornful sentence brought against him and his fellow citizens (οὗτος may bring out the contemptuous tone) would be a general and unconditioned one. Again, the formulation of fear of censure is expressed here in such a way that evokes (even though it overturns it) σφραγίς, i.e. the declaration of the identity of the author that is not significantly different than the Homerizing formula "thus someone spoke etc." of *Il.* 6.459–462, 7.87–91, 12.317–321: cf. in particular Theogn. 19–23 Κύρνε, σοφιζομένωι μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω / τοῖσδ' ἔπεσιν, λήσει δ' οὔποτε κλεπτόμενα, / οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοὐσθλοῦ παρεόντος· / ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· 'Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη / τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός' or [Epicharmus], *PCG* 244.12–14 or even Eratosth. *CA* 35.17 f.; cf. Wilson 1979, 4 f.; Vox 1984, 32 f.; Edmunds 1997. Nevertheless, the voice that Solon imagines rising up around him in response to his responsibility, along with his compatriots', for the inept inaction at Salamis is not a voice of praise, but one of blame. And the blame is such that, contrary to that which happens in the affirmative σφραγῖδες, Solon imagines that his name will never be mentioned nor will that of his city.

On the use of "Attic" instead of "Athenian", Mülke 2002, 86 thinks that "Attic", with its reference to the physical land, increases the *pathos* by pointing back to the preceding idea of πατρίς. There may be some additional derogatory meaning at work in this designation. In the case of an Athenian, the markers of identity that were usually listed, apart from one's Athenian citizenship, were his membership in a deme, phratry, or one of the territorial tribes; here, instead of calling himself, "Athenian",

Solon only appears as being "Attic", a term which is often synonymous with "Athenian", but which is certainly more generic. Moreover, in place of the name of his deme, tribe, or phratry, he inserts an imaginary equivalent to the demotic (τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν) that serves to label himself, and his fellow citizens among the Attic people, with additional sarcasm.

The *damnatio memoriae* which Solon predicts that he will incur as a "champion" of his cowardly fellow citizens could not be more complete. The word Σαλαμιναφέτης is coined by Solon and is found only here. Polysyllabic terms of mockery are part of the comic-iambic tradition (esp. Hipponax and Old Comedy; on Solon's use of polysyllabic words, see also ad 26.3 G.-P.^{2} = 20.3 W.^{2}). Thus, this compound adjective is a relatively rare example of the intrusion of iambic motifs into elegy. The derogatory effect of this name-calling adds significantly to the sense of humiliation felt by Solon; furthermore, by attributing the failure to take/keep Salamis to all of the inhabitants of Attica, the adjective suggests a disgrace which is collective, native, and indelible, as demotic ones usually are.

7 f. The act of going to Salamis has two aims which are coordinated syntactically and which are also strongly connected by similar participial expressions: fighting for a beautiful island (ἱμερτῆς, emphasized by enjambement, is the motivation behind the attempt at conquering Salamis) and avoiding dishonor are two aspects of the same action.

The martial paraenesis of these two verses contains strong Homeric resonances: for l. 7 cf. *Il.* 12.216 μὴ ἴομεν … μαχησόμενοι περὶ νηῶν (the short-vowel subjunctive is typically epic, however, and ἴομεν is used elsewhere in the *Iliad* for exhortations to action). For more on this type of friendly command in Homer, see Wackernagel 1926, 1.43. For l. 8 cf. *Il.* 12.276 νεῖκος ἀπωσαμένους, *HHom.Dem.* 276 γῆρας ἀπωσαμένη; Archil. 13.10 πένθος ἀπωσάμενοι (the second hemistich of the pentameter).

As noted by Mülke 2002, 75 f., in this instance the use of the first person plural makes the paraenesis more directly inclusive and tries to extend to the fellow-citizens the feeling of shame which Solon himself feels; cf. the first 'I' in 2.1, 3 G.-P.^{2} = 1.1 and 2.1 W.^{2}, who rather differently is an individual distinct from the community (Slings 1990, 18; Stehle 1997, 62 f.). This progressive involvement with the audience and the inclusivity created by the use of the first person plural appear to be typical features of elegiac exhortations to battle; this can be seen in Tyrtaeus in particular: see further Noussia-Fantuzzi forthcoming c.

3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}

The elegy comes down to us through a few manuscripts of chap. 255 of Demosthenes' *Or.* 19 (*On the False Embassy*), delivered in 343/42 BC and accusing Aeschines of improper conduct and corruption while on the second Athenian diplomatic mission to Philip. The mss. that transmit the Solonian text are not the best representatives of Demosthenes' manuscript tradition, while S and A include nothing of Solon's poem (except that four lines, 2–3 and 6–7, are added in the margin of A): see MacDowell 2000, 312 f.

This lack of uniformity in the transmission, in conjunction with the fact that orators' poetic citations were usually shorter, led Wilamowitz 1893, 2.306 and Jaeger 1966, 78 f. to conjecture that the original text of Demosthenes' oration did not cite Solon's poem in full, but that later grammarians introduced an ampler citation in place of the original mentioning of only a few of the poem's initial verses. After all, e.g., 17–29 in particular may have been omitted as they foreshadow the most extreme ruin of Athens, and thus they do not seem to conform to Demosthenes' paradigm, a basic premise of which is the belief that the gods' protection of the city is eternal. MacDowell 2000, 312 adds that the recitation of the whole poem would have taken up too much of the time allowed for Demosthenes' speech. These doubts are not entirely decisive, however. There are two other instances in which orators provide citations of poetry of equal or greater length than that of Solon here: a speech of 55 lines from Eur. *Erechtheus* and the 32 verses of Tyrtae. 6,7 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2} in Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*: cf. North 1952, Perlman 1964, Wilson 1996, Ford 1999, 235 f. and n. 15. In particular, Rowe 1972 has shown that Solon's poem as a whole is relevant in other ways to the main issue of Demosthenes' oration (the punishment of Aeschines will preserve the city under the gods' protection) and so are several Solonian details (the corruption of the leaders, the theme of banqueting without decorum, the idea of slavery, civil strife, war and conspiracies, and also the metaphor of pestilence for the political decline of the whole *polis*, which may have been interpreted in tune with Demosthenes' emphasis on Panhellenism).

The structure of the poem is less problematic than that of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, and there is general consensus about the development of the ideas within it. The first four verses form a unified group (demarcated

by the inceptive δέ of 1 and that of 5) intended to stress faith in the divine aid of Athena and, by contrast, to emphasize the guilt of those wicked citizens who would drag into ruin a city with an otherwise safe future. The description of the effects that the present δυσνομία has over the city occupies the central part of the poem (5–29), and is divided into three distinct sections: 1) the behavior of the bad citizens and the city leaders who try to destroy the city (5–14), 2) the statement about Dike's reaction (15–16), and 3) a long description of the concrete consequences of Dike's fury on the city (17–25), with Solon's further specification about the universality of the disaster afflicting the city (26–29) (or, alternatively, 17–29 may resume the specific description of *hybris* in 5–14, to which 15 f., on Dike, constitute a coda: see ad 17–29). Solon's direct first-person intervention immediately follows, which affirms his duty to warn his fellow citizens of the risks they run, and culminates in him defining the behavior and politics of the bad citizens as *dysnomia* (30 f.). Finally, there follows a list of the positive effects that Εὐνομία would have on the city, described with the elated tone that usually characterizes hymnodic descriptions of god-sent blessings (32–39). The central portion opens with the assignment of responsibility: Solon only briefly acknowledges the guilt of all citizens (5 f.), and places a much greater emphasis on the culpability of the rich and greedy ruling class (7–14).

The mentioning of the transgressions against Dike at 14 introduces τίσις, vengeance by Dike herself, and then the duration of the disasters resulting for both the city and the individuals. One should note the parallelism with ἔρχεται of 17 for the arrival of calamity upon the city, and ἔρχεται of 26 which designates the beginning of the ruined fortunes of individual citizens. Such a division recalls the Hesiodic account of the consequences of failing to act in accordance with Dike's standards, which is equally broad and central to the moralistic section of *Works and Days* (248–285). Solon's peroration in the first person at 30 f., which is made almost as if excusing himself for the bluntness of his predictions, is accompanied by a precise definition of the wicked (and soon to be worse) condition of Athens—as if by giving a name to the situation (i.e. calling it "Dysnomia") Solon could affirm his intellectual (and hence practical) control over it.

The perspective of the poem, however, changes radically after Solon's brief speech: the pessimism of the first part (32–39) gives way to an optimistic presentation of the Eunomia to come. Thus, Solon leaves his public with the impression that his intervention is linked more to these positive predictions for the future than to the present circumstances, which

are decidedly grim. The hidden message is that Solon's capacity to legislate and govern well could match the incapacity, general foolishness, and greediness of the ruling class which had brought Athens to δυσνομία and ruin. The poem may thus belong to the period of Solon's reforms, but it could also conceivably be earlier and reflect general concerns about the desperate state of the *polis*. In fact, if the poem does precede Solon's reforms, his moralizing stance together with his frank and fearless criticism of those responsible and his vision of a better Athens, might support the idea that Solon was chosen to act as mediator. Especially notable from this point of view are the linguistic links between the section on *dysnomia* and the poem's initial mentioning of the protecting gods which show, in a sort of ring composition, how the dark observations and predictions of the first part might be radically reversed by the advent of "good rule": cf. ἀδίκοις (33) / ἄδικος νόος (7); κόρον, ὕβριν (34) / ὕβριος (8) and κόρον (9); δίκας σκολιάς (36) / Δίκης θέμεθλα (14); ὑπερήφανα ἔργα (36) / ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι (11); ἔργα διχοστασίης (37) / στάσιν (19); ἀργαλέης ἔριδος (38) / πόλεμον (19); ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά (39) / ἀφραδίῃσιν (5); Halberstadt 1954–1955, 202.

The analogies and differences between this poem and the elegy *To the Muses* are clear; it is undeniable that the two poems seem to be notably consistent and complementary at times. 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} expresses Solon's opinions and advice on ethical principles of social (and thus also political) relevance (see Introd. ad loc.), 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} is specifically, and more directly, on political matters. In both cases excessive greed lies at the root of inconsiderate behavior and depravity, both ethical and political (cf. 1.7–13 G.-P.^{2} = 13.7–13 W.^{2} and 1.71–76 G.-P.^{2} = 13.71–76 W.^{2}; 3.6 G.-P.^{2} = 4.6W.^{2} and 3.11–14 G.-P.^{2} = 4.11–14 W.^{2}); in both cases we have descriptions of divine punishment (in 1.25 G.-P.^{2} = 13.25 W.^{2} Solon addresses the τίσις "vengeance" of Zeus, in 3.15 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.15 f. W.^{2} the τίσις of Dike). Both poems begin with a pious request for divine aid (explicit in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, indirect in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}), and in both cases this shows that Solon attributes to the gods the responsibility of securing moral or political order for those they favor, as well as of punishing violations of this order, which he frames as acts of *hybris* (cf. 1.11 G.-P.^{2} = 13.11 W.^{2} and 3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}). In fact, at least later on in the classical age, the specification of divine assistance seems to have been a sort of apotropaic stereotype for avoiding the danger of *hybris* and thus of divine punishment for excess (e.g. Pind. *Isthm*. 4.5; Aesch. *Ag*. 961 f.; Eur. *Med*. 915, *Tro*. 867; Aristoph. *Ran*. 1199), and for wishing good success for an enterprise (e.g. Pind. *Pyth*. 8.53; *Nem*. 6.24; *Ol*. 8.67).

The brevity with which Solon addresses the actual content of his political "credo" as a legislator may be surprising when compared with the extent to which he examines the consequences of the reality that his program was not yet in operation. But Solon either already knew how or hoped to supply the details of his plan in his legislative activity; poetry was thus not so much a place for argument as it was a means of achieving *paraenesis* and exciting emotions in the audience, and providing a broader theoretical frame of generalization for it: poems like 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} or 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} are intended to pave the way for that activity in the consciousness of the citizens—not to replace or to popularize its concrete contents.

1 f. The particle δέ at the beginning of the poem has proven problematic because it is usually correlated with a μέν, to express two propositions or thoughts. It is possible that Demosthenes' quotation is acephalous, and that Solon had previously presented an opinion different from that which he states at 3.1 ff. ("some say that … but Athens, I think …"), or that before our first line he had described the worst possible scenarios of the situation and/or drawn a comparison with other cities that had ceased to exist ("other cities died, but Athens …"): cf., e.g., Nestle 1942, 135; Adkins 1985, 111; Manuwald 1989, 3 and n. 19.

I think that this δέ is inceptive, as can be found elsewhere at the beginning of a literary text (e.g. in the *incipit* of Heraclitus' *On Nature*, *VS* 22B1 (cf. 22A4), of the *Triad* by Ion of Chios, *VS* 36B1, and of pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*), at the beginning of speeches (e.g. Xen. *Cyr*. 4.5.23, 7.1.21: Denniston 1954, 172) or at the beginning of a new train of thoughts within a longer text (e.g. Hes. *Op*. 286); one of the above features also applies e.g. to the fragmentary Mimn. 7.1. G.-P.^{2} = 1.1 W.^{2} For the linguistic justification of this inceptive δέ as a weak form of δή "indeed", cf. Leumann 1949; Verdenius 1955, 17. In particular, the use of particles like ἀλλά, "but", γάϱ, "for", and δέ can be explained by the practice of continuing the song, with the remarks of a symposiast taking up those of the preceding symposiast, all in a series of distinct contributions which together formed the sympotic performance as a whole (cf. Allen ad Mimn. 1.1 W.^{2}). For instance, Solon may have conceived of his poem as a response to the anxiety of a symposiast about the future. After all, as remarked by Denniston 1954, 172 the precise object of inceptive δέ "is to give a conversational turn to the opening … and to avoid formality" (already argued by Reitzenstein 1893, 45–49). Mülke 2002, 100 rules out that our fragment could have adopted this stylistic device that

recalls oral performance because it is too structurally refined, but this seems to me to understate the range of possibilities of oral performance, especially in the latest stage of oral culture. The solemn assertion of security found in the formulaic clausula οὔποτ᾽ ὀλεῖται, which is regularly used in archaic epic to proclaim the immortality of glory (cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.325, 7.91, *Od.* 24.196; *HHom.Ap.* 156; Hes. fr. 70.7) would belong to this type of responsive stance counterattacking widespread pessimism—it is clear, however, that the solemnity of the phrase confirming Athens' prosperity in the future also asserts Solon's own authority and prominence in the present threatening situation. In fact, despite the alarmed and negative tone, Solon's prediction sounds like a strong and reassuring assertion of his faith in divine protection; he stresses that he stands on the side of the gods who favor Athens, whose intentions he is there to present and defend as a sympathetic spokesman against the wicked who would wish ruin upon the city—which recalls Tyrtaeus' encouragement of the Spartans in 8.1f. G.-P.^{2} = 11.1f. W.^{2} ἀλλ᾽, Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἐστέ, / θαρσεῖτ᾽· οὔπω Ζεὺς αὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει, κτλ.

In this direction, the rhetorical strategy underlying ἡμετέρα is also particularly effective. The epithet points above all to the totality of the citizens, and stresses, in its all-inclusive technical sense, that all of the citizens should belong to or are attached to the same city, and thus all of them ought to be interested in its well-being, but are not. In fact, taken in a more sentimental sense, ἡμετέρα "our" hardly includes the citizens who do not care about their city and who harm it unscrupulously. In this restricted sense, it will thus distinguish the singular speaker Solon and the sympathetic ἐσθλοί in front of whom he probably performed this poem at a *symposium* (cf. Melissano 1994), side by side with Athena, the supreme protector of the city, and in conjunction with Zeus' will, opposing them to the wicked citizens and their hybristic leaders.

As remarked by Mülke 2002, 102 f., the institutional term πόλις is most often used by Solon to define the community affected by negative agents: cf. below 5, 17, 31, and 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2}, 30.25 G.-P.^{2} = 36.25 W.^{2} γαῖα and πατρίς are terms Solon keeps in order to define the object of his own love, cf. 2.4 G.-P.^{2} = 2.2 W.^{2}, 11.6 G.-P.^{2} = 19.6 W.^{2}, 30.8 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8 W.^{2}

The μέν/δέ correlation between κατὰ μὲν Διὸς … αἶσαν of 1 f. and αὐτοὶ δέ of 5 (coordinated to δήμου θ᾽ of 7) stresses the difference between the gods on one hand and the bad citizens and their leaders on the other. The city itself, although it unavoidably includes the bad citizens and their leaders, is thus presented as an almost separate entity (Anhalt

1993, 55), which "belongs" to Solon, his audience, Athena, and Zeus—for the bad citizens it is nothing more than a passive object of destruction.

In principle, there might seem to be a distinction in 1 f. between the decisions of Zeus and the other gods and the active protection of Athena which might imply that, were it not for Athena, the gods would have punished the city. But we are immediately prompted not to think of Athena as holding other hostile Olympians at bay, but rather of a general agreement of all the gods, which amounts to Athena's protection (Fowler 1987, 34): if there is any substantial distinction between the gods underlying our lines, maybe Athena is conceived of as an advocate for Athens among the gods, as she was for Odysseus in the *Odyssey*. "Zeus .... and the (blessed) immortal gods" is a formula typical of archaic epic, and is perhaps a traditional form of religious invocation: cf. Hom. *Il.* 3.298 ~ 3.308, *Od.* 5.7 ~ 8.306; Theogn. 757–759. In Hom. *Il.* 9.608 and 17.321, Zeus is the dispenser of αἶσα, the "portion" allotted to each individual by a superior order that men are compelled to respect ("destiny"), and whose guarantor is usually Zeus (see especially *Il.* 17.321 ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν, where the expression refers to Zeus' hostility towards the Acheans and to his favor for the Trojans; *Od.* 9.52, referring to Zeus' decision that Odysseus and his companions are to suffer many woes), or more abstractly to the god himself (δαίμων or θεός: cf. *Od.* 11.61; *HHom.Dem.* 300; Eur. *Andr.* 1204): see Bianchi 1953, 14–17; Yamagata 1994, 116–119. No specific god is ever named in connection with αἶσα other than Zeus: perhaps this traditional phraseology is the reason why at 2 Zeus' αἶσα seems to be distinguishable from the "orientation" of the other gods—for another quasi-synonymic distinction between θεῶν βουλαί and Διὸς θέμιστες see Hom. *Od.* 16.402 f. After the famous *Iliad* case in which Zeus' primacy among the gods is stressed (thanks to his overwhelming strength he is given final say on how long the Greeks will have to suffer before Troy falls, as Hera admits in *Il.* 4.51–56: cf. Anhalt 1993, 74), in Solon the emphasis on the combined will of Zeus and the other gods (this is already frequently highlighted in Homer; for their agreement on assigning the destiny of death cf. *Il.* 3.308 f.) stresses the radically different case in Athens. The expression κατὰ … θεῶν φρένας is rather unconventional. The φρήν/φρένες of gods or a single god appear to be mentioned very seldom in archaic poetry, apart from three cases where the Διὸς φρήν/φρένες designate Zeus' decision to bring the Greek army to the very brink of utter destruction and to favor the Trojans (*Il.* 10.45, 12.173, 15.194)—an ominous precedent, which Solon may have resumed purposefully, in order to stress how different Zeus' stance towards Athens

was (see above about the Διὸς αἶσα). In any case, the word φρήν/φρένες is almost always used to designate the location of emotional, volitional, or rational activity, mainly in circumstantial phrases (like the formulaic κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν) that emphasize the individuality of the φρήν as an organ within the human body: "the relationship between a person and his φρήν/φρένες is one of cooperation: he acts in company with, or by means of it/them … When φρένες function well, man has a means or accompaniment on which he can rely. When they function badly, because they are 'lost' or 'damaged', man loses this means or accompaniment" (Darcus 1979, 166). In Solon's text, the word is chosen to point to the thoughtful consideration according to which the gods are favorable to Athens, as opposed to the ἀφραδίαι of the bad citizens at 5—an attentive divine consideration that is reassuring for the survival of the city.

3 f. The model of 3 is probably Hom. *Od.* 4.826–828 τοίη γάρ οἱ πομπὸς ἅμ' ἔρχεται … Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη (a piece of reassurance to Penelope from Athena in disguise, which starts in 4.825 with the encouragement μηδέ … δείδιθι—although it is not expressed in the text we have, Solon may have included some kind of similar warning not to fear); see also *Il.* 24.182 where the subject of the phrase is Hermes. It is impossible to tell exactly when the local cult of Athena Πολιάς as protecting goddess and eponym of Athens first developed, but this tradition was a constant in Athenian ideology of the fifth century. The cult sometimes has been believed to have been an innovation of Solon (cf. Herington 1963, 63), but such a supposition is without solid foundation. Athena is elsewhere found linked in this function, as she is here, to Zeus: cf. e.g. *skolion PMG* 884 and Aesch. *Eum.* 997–1002 and 1044–1046.

Although Athena is not invoked in the second person, the asyndeton of her epithets gives 3 a "hymnodic tone" (Bartol 2001, 21 f. "the accumulation of the epithets of Athena is modeled on cultic πολυωνυμία which is present also in hymns that are already disconnected from a real cult"; Mülke 2002, 104). Solon is very careful in his choice of epithets for the functions Athena performs in these lines. Μεγάθυμος is an epithet typically used of warriors and soldiers in the *Iliad* (cf. e.g. 6.145, 20.498, where it is used of Achilles), but appears twice for Athena in the *Odyssey* (8.520 and 13.121, in both cases it is used for Athena as an adjuvant of warriors—the Greeks under Troy and Odysseus); see later Bacchyl. 13.195; Quint. Smyrn. 12.153. Furthermore, two anti-Greek gods of the *Iliad* (Apollo: 7.23 and Ares: 21.391) mention the μέγας θυμός that drove

her to help the Greeks (she is called ἐρυσίπτολις as early as Hom. *Il.* 6.305 and *HHom.* 11.1, 28.3). ἐπίσκοπος, however, is used before Solon only for a spy watchful of enemy movements (*Il.* 10.38 and 342), for merchants concerned with their merchandise (*Od.* 8.163), herdsmen careful about their flocks (Hes. fr. 217.3), or for the gods in their roles as witnesses and guarantors of agreements (*Il.* 22.255), but never of a deity keeping a watchful eye on a city (Campbell 1983, 92). A passage that expresses this idea of protective "guardianship" in a way that is similar to Solon is *Il.* 24.728–730: Andromache, while mourning Hector's death, prophesies πόλις ἥδε κατ' ἄκρης / πέρσεται· ἦ γὰρ ὄλωλας ἐπίσκοπος, ὅς τέ μιν αὐτὴν ῥύσκευ. It is understandable that Solon wishes to make his audience recall this very passage. The allusive implication would be that, unlike Troy, Athens enjoys an extremely potent immortal ἐπίσκοπος, even if the city's internal enemies (the citizens themselves) are doing their best to bring the city to the same ruin that Troy had seen (cf. Anhalt 1993, 78).

ὀβριμοπάτρη is found earlier as an epithet for Athena in both Homer (5×, always referring to the severity of her anger—the case of Athens is reassuringly different) and Hesiod (1×). On the one hand, it reaffirms the power that Athena derives from being the daughter of Zeus, born fully-armed from his head. On the other hand, the epithet also underscores the parental nature of the understanding between the two divinities mentioned at 1 and 4, a further guarantee that their favor for Athens would endure, and that they would continue to protect Athens' interests. Cf. Herington 1955, 57: "within the framework of the Olympian system, Athena could not be made the supreme deity: from time immemorial that position belonged to Zeus ... on the other hand the system satisfied Athenian pride in that it made Athena the particularly favored daughter of Zeus".

"Keeping one's hands over something or someone" is an idiom frequently used as early as Homer to indicate a protective attitude on the part of the gods (although often in the slightly different form χεῖρα(ς) ὑπερέχειν): cf. *Il.* 4.249, 9.419 f., 9.686 f. (Zeus), 5.433 (Apollo); later, e.g., Theogn. 757–759 (Ζεὺς μὲν τῆσδε πόληος ὑπειρέχοι αἰθέρι ναίων / αἰεὶ δεξιτερὴν χεῖρ' ἐπ' ἀπημοσύνηι, / ἄλλοι τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοί); Eur. *IA* 916; *Epigr.Gr.* 831.10 Kaibel (2nd cent. BC); *Epigr.ded.* 254.10 Cougny and *Orac.* 144.3 Cougny (= Buresch 1889, 100.16); also Theodor. *Anth. Pal.* 6.155.6 κτεάνων χεῖρας ὕπερθεν ἔχων (cp. Solon's κτεάνων in 12), if we accept the final participle constructed with Phoebus of l. 1, which is suggested by I.G. Schneider (ἔχειν mss.).

Solon's phrase inspired an amusing parody in Aristoph. *Eq.* 1173–1178, based on a word-game between the Solonian χεῖρας and χύτρα: ὦ Δῆμ', ἐναργῶς ἡ θεός σ' ἐπισκοπεῖ, / καὶ νῦν ὑπερέχει σου χύτραν ζωμοῦ πλέαν. / οἴει γὰρ οἰκεῖσθ' ἂν ἔτι τήνδε τὴν πόλιν, / εἰ μὴ φανερῶς ἡμῶν ὑπερεῖχε τὴν χύτραν; / … ἡ δ' Ὀβριμοπάτρα, κτλ. (in Solon "the protection that comes from the hands of Athena is directed against unscrupulous and greedy political leaders, and we might likewise suppose that the benefit that comes from the pot full of soup is protection from greedy and unscrupulous leaders like Cleon": Anderson 1995, 30).

5 f. In perfect parallelism with 1–4, which reassure the audience about the future of Athens in general, 5–8 show the reverse side of the coin, and point to the people who are responsible for undermining the safety of the city (cf. Henderson 1982, 27). Who are the αὐτοὶ (= not the gods) … ἀστοί of whom Solon speaks at 5 f.? If one interprets χρήμασι πειθόμενοι as "relying on [their] wealth" and keeps in mind Theogn. 191 f. οὕτω μὴ θαύμαζε γένος, Πολυπαΐδη, ἀστῶν / μαυροῦσθαι· σὺν γὰρ μίσγεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖς (where ἀστοί points mainly to the nobility), we might suppose that in his programmatic elegiac poems—which possibly precede his legislation—Solon is focusing on the rich ruling class and their leadership (cf. 7.3 G.-P.^{2} = 5.3 W.^{2} χρήμασιν … ἀγητοί), as most recently argued by Spahn 1977, 122. But it is more natural to suppose that Solon is referring in l. 7 to the entire δῆμος of 7 (cf. also Lavelle 2005, 74), the social body he mentions again in 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2} and implies in 12.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 f. W.^{2} and 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} (in an analogous context). The sense of the hemistich would thus be that many members of the δῆμος have been "attracted/seduced by wealth", as in Theogn. 194 χρήμασι πειθόμενος (used of someone of noble origins who marries a woman of base stock, and is thus "misguided" to undervalue the worth of his class by the prospect of increasing his wealth). Immediately before emphasizing the greed of the rich at 9 ff., Solon implies that a new type of immorality is arising within the general public, i.e. the greed of those not yet rich (for which cf. also 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2}). Their corruption was probably modelled on the example set by the rich (cf. Stahl 1992, 388; Masaracchia 1958, 254–256): Theogn. 41 f. ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἵδε σαόφρονες, / ἡγεμόνες δὲ τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν, describing the corruption of the rich, shows the earliest stage of a generalized immorality. The notion that the sense of ἀστοί in l. 6 is deliberately left indeterminate in order to ensure that the poem could be performed again and again for different audiences, maintained

by Adkins 1985, 113, has been correctly refuted by Mülke 2002, 108 f.: as is generally the case in poetry created for performance, textual ambiguities of this kind would have been carefully disambiguated and resolved by the contextual hints listed above, which lead us to understand ἀστοί as the body of the citizens and not as the nobles.

Here, as well as with the analogous concept expressed in 15.1–3 G.-P = 11.1–3 W.[2] (where αὐτοί appears again), Solon may have in mind the affirmation articulated in Hom. *Od.* 1.32–34 ὢ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται. / ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἳ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ / σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν: speaking about Aegisthus, Zeus asserts that mortals bring about their own ruin through folly and wickedness, although they blame the gods for the actual strike against them; only a few lines after this speech (*Od.* 1.63–79), however, Zeus expressly attributes the withholding of Odysseus' homecoming to the anger of Poseidon (the idea that ruin comes to humans because of their own "wickedness", but without the juxtaposition of divine truth and human perspective, can be found in both Hom. *Od.* 1.7, 10.27, 22.317 = 416, 23.67, 24.458, and Hes. *Op.* 133–137). The practice of blaming the gods for any disaster lacking an obvious cause is common in Homer (*Il.* 3.164 f., 19.86–88, *Od.* 1.347–349, 11.558–560, 12.371 f.); cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983, 1–54; Teffeteller 2003. An example from the case of Aegisthus is when Nestor, speaking from the human point of view, overturns an assertion made by Zeus in *Od.* 1; he claims that if Clytemnestra yielded to Aegisthus' seduction, it was because of μοῖρα θεῶν (*Od.* 3.269). Solon puts forth here the divine point of view; as noted by Jaeger 1966, 86 f., by taking as a model Zeus' speech at *Od.* 1.32–34, Solon assumes the superior role of prophet-advisor and spokesman of the gods. Another instance of the fortune of the theodicy in the *Odyssey* passage may be Aesch. *Prom.* 1072–1076 μηδὲ πρὸς ἄτης θηραθεῖσαι / μέμψησθε τύχην, μηδέ ποτ' εἴπηθ' / ὡς Ζεὺς ὑμᾶς εἰς ἀπρόοπτον / πῆμ' εἰσέβαλεν· μὴ δῆτ', αὐταὶ δ' / ὑμᾶς αὐτάς, where it is Hermes, god and messenger of the gods, who assumes the role of warning the daughters of Oceanus (not mortals, in this case, but divine beings behaving like mortals) not to hold Zeus responsible, but rather to acknowledge their own responsibility for their ruin.

μεγάλην πόλιν "big city", hence "powerful", and thus worthy of the citizens' pride and love (distinct from, e.g., the small islands named in 2.3. G.-P.[2] = 2.1 W.[2] which would not have inspired great pride in their citizens), is a phrase strategically placed between φθείρειν and ἀφραδίῃσιν, which highlights the notion that only people who do not think can reach

the point of destroying a city as great as Athens (cf. Mülke 2002, 107 f.). The idea that Athens would have been of insuperable greatness had it not been destined for ruin at the hands of its own citizens, reappears in Plato, *Menex.* 243d; the contrast between greed for wealth and the well-being of the city is also found in Eur. *Supp.* 236 f. and *Heracl.* 3–5.

βούλονται "they wish" serves, differently from other possible auxiliary verbs for the future (e.g. μέλλειν), to emphasize the idea of purposefulness: it underscores the deliberation with which the citizens plot the destruction of the city, in spite of the gods' favor for it (cf. Adkins 1985, 113).

The correction ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι (Bergk and supported by Masaracchia 1958, 254 f.) is paralleled in Theogn. 1152 = 1238b = 1262 (where the verb has the negative connotation of "being seduced": more idiomatic for this meaning is the verb ἀναπείθεσθαι), and in a variant of Simonides' epigram on the fallen at the Thermopylai ap. Herod. 7.228 = *FGE* 777, where, however, ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι has no negative connotations. This would present an image not very far from 15.7 G.-P.^{2} = 11.7 W.^{2}. Our passage, however, lacks the opposition between word and deed which clearly exists in 15 G.-P.^{2}, as well as any negative appraisal of the quality of either the words or the one who utters them. Therefore, χρήμασι πειθόμενοι seems preferable, since it is also paralleled in Theogn. 194 χρήμασι πειθόμενος quoted above.

Similar analyses of the political situation can be found in Theogn. 833–836 πάντα τάδ' ἐν κοράκεσσι καὶ ἐν φθόρωι· οὐδέ τις ἡμῖν / αἴτιος ἀθανάτων, Κύρνε, θεῶν μακάρων, / ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν τε βίη καὶ κέρδεα δειλὰ καὶ ὕβρις / πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἐς κακότητ' ἔβαλεν (cf. also 855 f.) and Bacchyl. 15.51–63 (where Menelaus speaks to the Trojans before the beginning of the war) Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων ὃς ἅπαντα δέρκεται / οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων, / ἀλλ' ἐν μέσωι κεῖται κιχεῖν / πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις Δίκαν ἰθεῖαν, ἁγνᾶς / Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτᾶς Θέμιτος· / … / ἃ δ' αἰόλοις κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφροσύναις / ἐξαισίοις θάλλουσ' ἀθαμβής / Ὕβρις, ἃ πλοῦτον δύναμίν τε θοῶς / ἀλλότριον ὤπασεν, αὖτις / δ' ἐς βαθὺν πέμπει φθόρον· / κείνα καὶ ὑπερφιάλους / Γᾶς παῖδας ὤλεσσεν Γίγαντας, a passage which also openly presupposes 3.7–16 and 32 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7–16 and 32 W.^{2} (compare ὕβρις, πλοῦτος, Εὐνομία). Bacchylides' poem also begins (1–7) by mentioning Theano the priestess, who in Hom. *Il.* 6.297–311 leads the Trojan women to deposit the *peplos* on the knees of Athena and who prays to the goddess to ward off the fury of Diomedes on the battlefield, and her mercy for Troy. But the initial mentioning of Theano's Iliadic prayer to Athena, which will not be

fulfilled, may also be contrasted in the closure of the Bacchylidean poem with the unawavering faith in the benevolence of the gods that we find in our fragment of Solon. The fact that the Athenian Solon would represent a foil for the Trojan Theano sits quite well with the Athenian context of the performance of the dithyramb. For a different, more complex (and more adventurous) interpretation of the role of Sol. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and *Il.* 6 in Bacchyl. 15, cf. Fearn 2007, 257–294. Plato, *Leg.* 906a σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτῆμα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων· φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης, σώιζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως and Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 130 οὐδεμίαν τοι πώποτε ἔγωγε μᾶλλον πόλιν ἑώρακα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν θεῶν σωιζομένην, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐνίων ἀπολλυμένην seem to have the same motif in mind.

7 f. The term "leaders of the people" designates the ruling class, or rather the aristocrats who represent some especially factious group of interests (or are particularly hostile to Solon's politics). I agree with Nagy 1985, 43 in doubting that the expression points to the demagogues ("mob-leaders": West 1974, 68 f.), because in that case δῆμος would already need to have the socially negative sense (= πλῆθος), which, although it is widespread in the fifth century, is unlikely here. Although Solon uses the term to refer to those Athenian citizens who are not the leaders and who are in opposition to them in 8.1 G.-P.^{2} = 6.1 W.^{2}, here δῆμος seems to be taken without social implications, as a synonym of ἀστοί, and includes the "ruling class", namely the leaders, whom Solon mentions in 7 (see also 5.1 G.-P.^{2} = 4b W.^{2}, 7.1 G.-P.^{2} = 5.1 W.^{2}, and 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}): cf. Forti-Messina 1956, 233; Donlan 1970; Spahn 1977, 123 f.; Donlan 1999, 225–231; Cagnazzi 1980; contrarily Irwin 2005, 109. It is impossible to ascertain whether these "leaders of the δῆμος" with their μεγάλη ὕβρις are the same as the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες whom Solon charges with "destroying" the city in 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2}, or the μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες of 31.4 G.-P.^{2} = 37.4 W.^{2} (in both cases they are mentioned again in combination with the δῆμος), but the coincidence of the two terms is plausible. Indeed μεγάλη, which is used of the ὕβρις generated by an ἄδικος νόος, may imply something more than "heavy", and perhaps carries the ethical sense of "excessive". This is not its most common nuance in archaic epic (cf. below ad 9), but it can be found in Homer, more frequently in the *Odyssey* but also in the *Iliad*, where μέγα ἔργον often has the derogatory sense of "big crime": μέγας θυμός, μεγάλαι φρένες, μεγαλήτωρ θυμός, for instance, are used to describe

the excessive anger of Achilles or Agamemnon in *Il.* 9.109, 184, 496. A strongly negative connotation is also present in μέγαν νόον of 5.4 G.-P.[2] = 4c.3 W.[2] Cf. Bissinger 1966, 307; Griffin 1987, 89.

Solon's criticism of those in power has a parallel in Hes. *Op.* 202–224, where Perses is admonished to σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε (213), instead of behaving like the kings of *Op.* 202 or the judges of 221, who provoke the harsh reaction of Dike (*Op.* 220–224, quoted below). Solon has a much broader perspective (private in 9 f., public in 12 f.) than Hesiod's, which is primarily a polemic against the injustice of the sentences handed down by the judge-kings.

νοεῖν means not only to "realize" a sitution, but also to have a "plan" or "intention" as a consequence of this understanding, and thus often focuses on the conclusion of the thinking process: cf. von Fritz 1943, 80–90; Clarke 1999, 121–125. The ambivalence of νόος emphasizes here the special danger engendered by leaders that have an unjust νόος (a relatively recent use of the term, dating from Hesiod; in Homer we have only instances of a νόος that is dulled or stunned, and not of a νόος that is deceived and therefore no longer functioning properly: von Fritz 1945, 226 f.). Not only do the leaders acquire money unjustly and lead an unjust lifestyle (9–14), but they also conceive of plans for the future that are not just: they ignore the fact that evil can reach everyone (26–29) and the advantages which a good government would provide to everyone (32–39). The connection between ἀδικία and excessive greed is a strong point in Solon's ideology: here there is only an indirect relationship between the ἄδικος νόος/ὕβρις of the leaders and the χρήματα that seduce the bad ἀστοί (the leaders must have promised the bad citizens greater wealth), but in 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2] Solon takes a pronounced stance, since in 7 he states that he does not want to χρήματα … ἀδίκως πεπᾶσθαι, and ὕβρις of 8 and 34 is a catchword for the excesses of the oligarchy (Nagy 1985, 43), used to "designate intentional behavior, found especially among the rich, displayed either when getting richer, or when engaged in conspicuous consumption" (Fisher 1992, 74). For this reason I doubt that the *hybris* attacked by Solon belongs to the community of ἀστοί ~ δῆμος (as was most recently maintained by Santoni 1981, 68–70); instead I think that οἷσιν of 7 must be taken with δήμου ἡγεμόνες, and not *apo koinou* with δήμου ἡγεμόνες and ἀστοί.

Differently from other possible terms implying the idea of "destiny", the profane term ἑτοῖμον stresses how mechanical the sequence of ἄδικος νόος after ὕβρις μεγάλη and "suffering many pains" must be. The adjective conveys the same strong sense of inevitability in Anacr. *PMG*

395.11 f.: the road down to Hades is grievous and it is certain that he who goes down will not come up again, καὶ γὰρ ἑτοῖμον / καταβάντι μὴ ἀναβῆναι.

A formal model for the final verbal phrase is Hom. *Od.* 9.53 ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθοιμεν, but underlying 8 f. is most likely the description of the immature and arrogantly impious men of the Silver Age in Hes. *Op.* 133–135 … ἄλγε' ἔχοντες / ἀφραδίηις· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο / ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν (compare Hesiod's ὕβριν γὰρ … οὐκ ἐδύναντο … ἀπέχειν with Solon's οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταντο κατέχειν κόρον).

9 f. Another example of the relationship between κόρος of 9 and ὕβρις of 8, which Solon makes explicit with γάρ at the beginning of 9, is in 8.3 G.-P.² = 6.3 W.², reused and adapted by Theogn. 153 f. See later the oracle cited by Herod. 8.77 Ἀλλ' ὅταν Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσαόρου ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν / νηυσὶ γεφυρώσωσι καὶ εἰναλίην Κυνόσουραν, / ἐλπίδι μαινομένηι λιπαρὰς πέρσαντες Ἀθήνας, / δῖα Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον, Ὕβριος υἱόν, / δεινὸν μαιμώοντα, δοκεῦντ' ἀνὰ πάντα πιθέσθαι. / Χαλκὸς γὰρ χαλκῶι συμμίξεται, αἵματι δ' Ἄρης / πόντον φοινίξει. Τότ' ἐλεύθερον Ἑλλάδος ἦμαρ / εὐρύοπα Κρονίδης ἐπάγει καὶ πότνια Νίκη; Pind. *Ol.* 13.10 Ὕβριν, Κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον. The causal connection between (wealth), κόρος, ὕβρις, and ἄτη, which is frequently seen in Attic tragedy, thus seems to appear for the first time in Solon (see the remarks at 8.3 G.-P.² = 6.3 W.²; for ὕβρις/ἄτη see 1.11–13 G.-P.² = 13.11–13 W.²). In the only Homeric passage where the ideas of κόρος and ὕβρις appear together, *Il.* 13.633–635, the quality of being ὑβριστής is opposed to the possibility of reaching the κόρος. Indeed, it is an appealing idea that the usage of the word in combination with ὕβρις may be precisely what allowed for the evolution of the negative sense of "insatiability" that it has in Solon: Santoni 1981, 72 f.

In Homer κόρος exclusively designates the positive condition of "having/getting enough"; the word expresses relief from a preceding condition, usually negative, of lack or distress (hunger, battle, or mourning). Only the adjective ἀκόρητος "insatiable" implies the negative meaning of addiction to something and the unrelenting desire for more of it (cf., e.g., Hom. *Il.* 7.117, 14.479, and Ps.-Hes. *Sc.* 346, 433, 459). The absence of the idea of "excess deriving from satiation" in Homer comes as no surprise, since the Homeric poems, and especially the *Iliad*, tend to give the least weight possible to the problems deriving from excess, as excess is a behavior inherent to heroic ideology: cf. Anhalt 1993, 85–87. In Hes. *Theog.* 593, where κόρος is opposed to πενίη, I take the term to designate a sort

of "well-being" in a positive sense as the opposite of "penury", which is in tune with the Homeric sense; but it cannot be ruled out that it implies the idea of opulent "plenty", and thus in a way anticipates the derogatory sense that it has in Solon, as is maintained by Santoni 1981, 66. At least in Sapph. 68a.8 κ̣όρο̣ν οὐ κατισ.ε. (usually integrated κατισχε.) the term already seems to have Solon's derogatory connotation, even if the lacunose context does not reveal its reference (yearning? disgust? insolence?; if the integration of the verb is correct, Sappho's fragment is also the closest existing parallel to Solon's κατέχειν κόρον in 9). Another couple of lyric passages may utilize a sense of the word which is closer to Solon than to Homer, as is maintained by Helm 1993, 7: again Sapph. 144 μάλα δὴ κεκορημένοις / Γόργως, where the excess of satiety (for an undesirable object) may be featured, and Alcm. *PMGF* 1.64, who speaks of the κόρος of purple—purple is a frequent symbol of wealth, so κόρος might involve the idea of "more than enough"; however, the interpretive *koine*, starting with Page 1951, 90, takes the term in the sense of "abundance" rather than "over-abundance".

In Solon κόρος implies the idea of an ever-increasing yearning, the "desire to have more than enough" (Helm 1993, 9) and becomes a leitmotif of his disapproval and criticism of both the aristocrats' thirst for power (here and at 5.2–5 G.-P.[2] = 4c.1–3 W.[2]) and the new greed assailing the *demos* as a whole (cf. also 8.3 f. G.-P.[2] = 6.3 f. W.[2]). Pindar also insists on the opportunity and difficulty for the rich of limiting κόρος: cf. *Ol.* 1.56 f. κόρῳ δ' ἕλεν / ἄταν ὑπέροπλον and *Isthm.* 3.3 κατέχει φρασὶν αἰανῆ κόρον (this is the only parallel for Solon's verbal phrase κατέχειν κόρον of 9, apart from the uncertain Sapph. 68a.8 quoted above). The most relevant parallel for Solon's linking of insatiability born from an excess of wealth to *hybris* and the violation of Dike (note also the analogous metaphorical reference to the "seat" of Dike) is without doubt Aesch. *Ag.* 381–384 οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἔπαλξις / πλούτου πρὸς Κόρον ἀνδρὶ / λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας / βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν: for a detailed analysis, see Noussia-Fantuzzi forthcoming a; Dopchie 1968.

As early as Homer, the order of the dinner/symposium seems to be a metaphorical manifestation of a stable, serene and well-ordered community (cf. Murray 1983; Rundin 1996), and at least in Theognis it is certainly a microcosm of the *polis* community (cf. Levine 1985). In Solon this paradigmatic value of the symposium is perhaps less articulate and emphasized than in Theognis, but I do not see how our fragment might imply a criticism of the "inadequacy of the aristocratic symposium as a paradigm for political organization … Solon's criticism recognizes a fun-

damental flaw in the analogy: the appetite for food is not, in fact, parallel to the appetite for wealth. The former has an inherent physiological limit; the latter has none" (Anhalt 1993, 82; also 93). In fact, it is true that the two appetites involve different mechanisms, but Solon does not stress this distinction at all; on the contrary, in Solon κόρος seems to be an ambivalent term aptly chosen to cover the insatiability of both appetites. In the absence of any authorial hint towards a critical direction, it is necessary to believe that Solon accepts and furthers the idea of the orderly dinner/symposium as a parallel to the order of relations between people in society.

This idea is based upon the principle that the wisdom that produces a symposium without excess is the same wisdom that gives rise to the good government of a city: on this connection see also Melissano 1994, 57 f. In particular, εὐφροσύνη (see also ad 24.2 G.-P.[2] = 26.2 W.[2]), which is personified as one of the Charites, was a specialized term used to define the atmosphere of the ordered banquet, and its moderate consumption of wine, following from Homer's definition of wine as ἐύφρων καρπὸς ἀρούρης (*Il.* 3.246), Telemachus' acknowledgement of how difficult is for him δαίνυσθαί τ' ἀκέοντα καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι ἕκηλον together with the suitors (*Od.* 2.310 f.), or Odysseus' comment at the banquet organized by Alcinous in *Od.* 9.5 f. οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι / ἢ ὅτ' ἐϋφροσύνη μὲν ἔχηι κάτα δῆμον ἅπαντα (see also the comment that Hephaestus makes in *Il.* 1.574–576, at the outbreak of the argument between Zeus and Hera: εἰ δὴ σφὼ ἕνεκα θνητῶν ἐριδαίνετον ὧδε /… οὐδέ τι δαιτὸς /ἐσθλῆς ἔσσεται ἦδος, ἐπεὶ τὰ χερείονα νικᾶι and Latacz 1966, 165); Theogn. 473–510; Simon. 23 (of wine) ἀμύντορα δυσφροσυνάων; Xenophan. 1.4 G.-P.[2] = 1.4 W[2] for whom the κρατὴρ … μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης was one of the symbols of a symposium (and of a society) that loathed the struggles of the Titans and avoided partisanship; Anacr. *IEG* eleg. 2 = 56 Gentili, who opposes ὅστις … ἐρατῆς μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης and thus "mixes the festive gifts of the Muses and Aphrodite" to the person who "drinking by the mixing bowl, talks of quarrels and tearful war"; Panyassis, *PEG* 17.13 f., who emphasizes the dangers of drinking too much, τότε δ' Ὕβριος αἶσα καὶ Ἄτης / γίνεται ἀργαλέη, κακὰ δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀπάζει, and 12.17–19 who calls λελασμένον εὐφροσυνάων the person who has immoderately drunk and eaten too much. On the relationship between inebriation or gluttony and *hybris*, or between moderate consumption and peace, cf. MacDowell 1976; Slater 1981 and Slater 1990; Fisher 1992, 203–207.

In historical terms, Solon's verses, as well as the warning in Theogn. 541 f. about the dangerous *hybris* of the Centaurs, capable of "destroying cities" (an allusion to the battle between the Centaurs and Lapiths, which broke out because of the Centaurs' drunkenness), show an awareness of the anger aroused in the ordinary Athenians by the self-confident manifestations of *hybris* which used to take place in the κῶμοι following the symposia of the rich: cf. Murray 1987; Fisher 2000, 93, 99 f. Once in power, Solon himself seems to have become interested in limiting the excesses typical of the aristocratic symposium. It is likely that he is responsible for the legislation regulating the κῶμοι of drunkards with which symposia often concluded. As manifestations of aristocratic *hybris*, these raids represented a violation of the dignity of the other citizens: cf. Murray 1987. Pittacus of Mytilene, a contemporary Lesbian statesman who, like Solon, was one of the Seven Sages and a target of the ferocious attacks made by the aristocrat Alcaeus, seems to have enacted a similar principle in his own legislation by doubling the usual punishments for crimes committed in a state of inebriation: cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1274b19–23 and *Eth.Nic.* 1113b30–33; Diog. Laert. 1.76.

The way in which Solon elects to focus on the *hybris* of the ruling class—their incapacity to respect the δαίς "portion", or quantity of food and wine assigned to each person participating in the δαίς—may have another meaning. Solon possibly chooses this imagery because the elegy was actually performed at a symposium (cf. Tedeschi 1982), or perhaps at a religious festival with a banquet in honor of the gods: Vetta 1996, 208; see also Mülke 2002, 118. But Solon may have simply wished to begin anticipating his theme of the degenerate tenor of σύνοδοι, the private "assemblies" where, according to 21 f., the destruction of the city was determined. Certainly the symposium, one of the principal social events of the aristocracy, was often the setting of private meetings and agreements that would have had repercussions for the management of public affairs, cf. Murray 1983; Levine 1985; Nagy 1990a, 269–275; Schmitt Pantel 1992, 32–38, 46–48, 53–113; Fisher 1992, 203–207 (it is not surprising that relationships of real incompatible hostility often existed between aristocratic associations and democracy: cf. Sartori 1957, 28 f., 41–43; Murray 1990c; see, however, Hammer 2004 for a criticism of the claim that the archaic Greek symposium served as a site for an anti-*polis* ideology). In any case, speaking of dinner/symposium within poetry with a sympotic destination has a clear metaliterary relevance, common in Solon (see also 32, 33, 34 G.-P.^{2} = 38, 39, 40 W.^{2}) and the later "theorists" of sympotic etiquette. In both cases, referring to the

environment to which the poetic speech belongs serves to reinforce the consciousness of the solidarity and common interests shared by Solon and his audience.

From this perspective, the use of the term δαίς would be justified by its etymology from δατέομαι "to distribute" food or booty, an origin recalling the division and apportioning of the sacrificial meat: cf. Saïd 1979, 14–23 (on δαίς pointing to the feast being rooted in notions of redistribution); Cerri 1969, 97–104 and Nagy 1988 (~ 1990a, 269–275), who correctly connects Solon's verses to the information from Philochorus, *FgrH* 328F216 on the Spartan custom of advancing the value of social egalitarianism by accompanying the apportioning of meat with the singing of Tyrtaeus, the poet of *eunomia*. It comes as no surprise that the idea of egalitarian distribution of food portions at a banquet was, at least in later ages, not only a metaphor for the order of community life, but also a historical explanation of it: a speaker in Athen. 1.12d–e would later attribute the origin of social disorder (ἀκοσμία) and assassination to the scarcity of food among primitive men and to their ignorance of the later Homeric concept of δαὶς ἐίση a "meal divided into equal parts". Indeed δαίς can also involve the "balanced reciprocity that ideally characterizes the giving of feasts", and is no doubt connected with the egalitarian sensibility that underlies a feast described as a δαὶς ἐίση: cf. Rundin 1996, 194. On the other hand, δαίς might also evoke the concept of ἶσος δασμός "equal distribution", the end of which would coincide with the end of every social order, when as an effect of "violent robbery" there is no longer an equal distribution in the common interest, according to Theogn. 677 f. … δασμὸς δ' οὐκέτ' ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον: cf. Cerri 1969; Figueira 1985, 149 f.; Schmitt Pantel 1992, 45–52; on the affinity of ἰσομοιρία social "equity in distribution" and εὐνομία, cf. below ad 32 and 29^b.9 G.-P.[2] = 34.9 W.[2] There may be a connection between the initial mentioning of Zeus as the protector of the city, and the use of the meal's distribution as a metaphor for the ordered structure of the city, since Zeus often has the function of the "apportioner": Rundin 1996, 184. Despite the different opinion of some interpreters (e.g. Linforth 1919, 199; Masaracchia 1958, 257; Murray 1993, 188) the genitive δαιτός has to be taken with ἐν ἡσυχίηι, not with εὐφροσύνας, since in Solon a word in the second hemistich of the pentameter is never strongly connected with a phrase in the first half of the line unless the line displays a strong semantic unity: Mülke 2002, 116.

Hippon. 128.1 f. = 126.1 f. Degani ἐσθίει οὐ κατὰ κόσμον shows a connection between Eurymedontiades' lack of restraint in drinking and eat-

ing (τὴν ποντοχάρυβδιν, / τὴν ἐν γαστρὶ μάχαιραν) and the impossibility of an "orderly" dinner according to customary etiquette. In light of the term εὐφροσύναι, which may anticipate the idea of κρητὴρ δ' ἕστηκεν μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης in fr. 1.4 G.-P.^{2} = 1.4 W.^{2} of Xenophanes (one of the later "theorists" of the symposium, together with Ion of Chios and Critias), we can suppose that Solon is referring to the customary etiquette of the post-prandial symposium; but see, e.g., Aesop. 245 Chambry^1 (243^2) κατεσθίων εἰς κόρον / ἐπαπολαύων αὐτὰ μετ' εὐφροσύνης for εὐφροσύνη being connected to the prandial consumption of food (Hipponax's context). In any case, Solon's verb κοσμεῖν, as well as Hipponax's κόσμος, designates "enjoyment in an orderly way", as suggested by Diller 1956, 55, who compares it to Hes. *Op.* 306 σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέτρια κοσμεῖν (where the predicative μέτρια means "in proper allocation" (West 1978): see *Op.* 382 ἔργον ἐπ' ἔργωι ἐργάζεσθαι).

Like εὐφροσύναι, ἡσυχίη "tranquility" is another keyword for describing the climate of the ideal symposium or banquet—cf. e.g. Hippon. 26.1–3 W.^{2} = Degani ἡσυχῆι ... δαινύμενος; Pind. *Nem.* 9.48 ἡσυχία δὲ φιλεῖ μὲν συμπόσιον; Demosth. 19.197 πίνειν ἡσυχῆι καὶ τρώγειν. Solon's choice of the plural εὐφροσύναι (the singular παροῦσαν / εὐφροσύνην would also be metrically acceptable) stresses that there are several aspects of sympotic pleasure, or several forms it can take according to different individuals, while the participle παρών, by pointing to the immediate availability of these pleasures, is opposed to the endless greed of those who cannot restrain their κόρος: cf. Mülke 2002, 115. ἡσυχίη may also have strong political connotations: the *incipit* of Pind. *Pyth.* 8 is a hymn to Hesychia personified, who, as a daughter of Dike, "makes cities grand" and knows how "to put *hybris* into the bilge"; see also *Pyth.* 11.54–56 εἴ τις ἄκρον ἑλὼν / ἡσυχᾶι τε νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὕβριν / ἀπέφυγεν, κτλ., and fr. 109. On the relationship between being κόσμιος and appreciating the ἡσυχία of life, cf. also Plato, *Pol.* 307e.

10–12. This impossible succession of three pentameters points to a corruption of the text. It could be that two hexameters were lost, one before and one after 11, describing sympotic excesses (Fisher 1992, 70 n. 108) or acts of injustice, possibly in a temporal/conditional phrase ("*ubi autem homines pravi* ...") that extended up to 16 and functioned as the protasis of 17—as suggested by West (*IEG*), who consequently prints a comma, not a stop, at the end of 16 (Adkins 1985, 118 seems to misunderstand West's exegesis, since he believes that his comma at the end of 16 is a misprint). Or, alternatively, 11 is a hexameter with a corrupt second

hemistich. This hemistich ἀδίκοις … πειθόμενοι picks up the identical phrase of 1.12 G.-P.[2] = 13.12 W.[2] In that passage, however, ἀδίκοις … πειθόμενος refers to the personified πλοῦτος which follows neither willingly nor κατὰ κόσμον the people who have acquired it hybristically. Therefore, in that poem πείθεσθαι does imply the idea of being won over, but not without some reluctance to do something rather undesirable under the effect of the "seduction". But in our verse πείθεσθαι seems to have the middle sense of "obeying" or "trusting in", and can hardly have undertones of passive compulsion, since πλουτέουσιν expresses a precise outcome—it seems that unjust conduct inevitably accompanies the means by which this kind of wealth is acquired, and does not criticize their aim of becoming rich. The slight shift in the sense of πείθεσθαι may have been a sort of paraformulaic adaptation of what Solon considered to be a catch-phrase of his ideology of wealth. But of course the identity of the second hemistich of 11 and of 1.12 G.-P.[2] = 13.12 W.[2] may also show that the phrase had been introduced erroneously in our verse on the basis of 1.12, possibly resulting in the removal of an original hexametric hemistich.

12 f. The term δημόσιος appears here for the first time, but it also occurs in connection with κτέανα to designate the state's financial resources in Xenophan. 2.8 G.-P.[2] = 2.8 W.[2]. Regarding the distinction between public and sacred property, a Locrian law of 525/500 BC (*GHI* 12.1–3 Meiggs-Lewis) appears to contain a distinction between public lands, δημόσια, and ἀπότομα. According to Meiggs and Lewis the latter word, since it shares its root, would have had a meaning similar to τέμενος, which sometimes means "sacred enclosure"; but in both Homer's time and afterwards, it more commonly designates the "private property": cf. Donlan 1999, 303–320. The distinction between lands ἴδια (private) on one hand, and lands ἱερά (sacred public) and δημόσια (secular public) on the other is never clearly stated before Aristot. *Pol.* 1330a 9–16, and more customarily the terminology of fifth/fourth century Attica would distinguish between ὅσια, secular public property, and ἱερά, sacred public property: cf. Connor 1988, 165–170. Independently of the terminology, however, there is no serious reason to doubt, along with Moses Finley, the existence of a distinction between sacred and public secular land: cf. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992, 120–134; McInerney 2006, 33–39.

On the motif of laying hands on holy things as "a symbol of disorder and the shattering of divine justice" (Connor 1988, 167), cf. at least Soph. *OT* 883–894 (with *OC* 39 f.; Aesch. *Ag.* 369–372); Plato,

Resp. 1.344a; Xen. *Hier.* 4.11. On the polluting potential inherent in disregarding sacred lands or properties, cf. Parker 1983, 165–175, who reminds us that the enormity of this sacrilege is seen in the enormity of the penalty for the transgressors in the legislation of several cities (at Athens the temple-robber, like the traitor, was denied burial in the fatherland). Parker 1983, 170 f. also comments that "the emotional charge attaching to the offence was sufficient to make 'temple-robber' a term of everyday abuse; orators exercised ingenuity in devising ways in which their opponents had deprived the gods of their due and so fell into the abominated category"; cf. e.g. Demosth. 22.69 f., 24.111 f., 120, 129, 137, 49.65, and in particular Lys. 12.96 (ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν συναρπάζοντες βιαίως), a passage rich with Solonian allusions, on which cf. Vox 2000, 192 f.

κτέανα seems to be a specialized word in poetry for unjustly conquered properties (cf. Hes. *Op.* 315 f. ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων ἀεσίφρονα θυμὸν / τρέψας and Theogn. 1149 ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κτεάνοις ἐπέχουσι νόημα, whence Eubul. *PCG* 137.3; Manetho 2.306, 4.144, 6.358; Macedon. *Anth.Pal.* 9.649.3, etc.). Solon's morphological choice (Homer has κτεάτεσσι instead) may have been influenced by the Hesiodic precedent. However, κτέανα was possibly a more common technical term in Solon's age than in the Homeric word, since it is attested to designate one's own properties in some metrical inscriptions starting from the late sixth century: *CEG* 205, 251, 264, 774. As well as the Homeric κτέατα, κτέανα means both estate (cf. at least Hom. *Il.* 5.154) and (more often) movable goods. The properties which Solon charges the people's leaders with "plundering" may thus be the temple- or state-stores of silver and other movables (cf. Harris 2002, 426 and n. 32). But κτέανα may also designate both the land and the movable objects belonging to sanctuaries, or the "public", cultivated or uncultivated spaces that were in common use (including movable livestock or crops: cf. Xenophan. 2.8 G.-P.^{2} = 2.8 W.^{2} κεν σῖτ' εἴη δημοσίων κτεάνων / ἐκ πόλεως) and which were held by the *polis* or by phratries: cf. Manville 1990, 111 f.; Rihll 1991, 106–110; van Wees 1998a, 15. If "Solon's primary concerns in this passage are likely to have been encroachments on temple estates and enclosures of common land for private exploitation" (van Wees 1998a, 15), then when he speaks of the *hybris* behind these illegal appropriations as a blow to the entire city and as the origin of miserable slavery for it (17 f.), he may have in mind that the decrease of common spaces made the majority of the citizens dependent upon the few rich people who by expropriating the public or sacred lands had reduced the chances of survival of that major-

ity: cf. Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 2.2 (stating that before Solon's time "all land was in the hands of few") and Manville 1990, 109–111. Public estates can be expected to have been greater, quantitively, than sacred properties; hence the adoption of the adverbial τι "in any way" (not the object of φειδόμενοι, governing κτεάνων; cf. Ps.-Lucian, *Anth.Pal.* 10.26.2 φείδεο κτεάνων), which emphasizes the relevance of the "public" properties: Mülke 2002, 120.

But in these verses Solon may, alternatively, be prompting the Athenians to remember a relatively recent event in their own history, i.e. Cylon's attempt to instate a tyranny, an event which is usually placed between 640 and 623. When they attempted the coup, Cylon and his supporters were accused of sacrilege for plundering the temple of Athena (cf. Σ Aristoph. *Eq.* 445). But the supporters of the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles, who stoned the followers of Cylon, were also deemed sacrilegious and condemned to exile for overlooking the fact that the Cylonians had been suppliants of Athena. According to Plut. *Sol.* 12.3 f., Solon himself was a first-hand participant in these events since he undertook to soothe the tension that had arisen in Athens between Cylonian and Megacles' supporters after the stoning of Cylon's followers. He cast the Alcmaeonids into exile beacause they were guilty of sacrilege. Whatever credibility we grant to Solon's biographical tradition in this case (indeed if Solon was associated with a purification of Athens from the Alcmaeonids, that probably will not have happened in the immediate aftermath of the Cylonian affair but some time later), it should be noted that, at least according to Aeschin. *Ctes.* 108, Plut. *Sol.* 11 and Paus. 10.37.4–8, Solon himself also orchestrated the accusation of sacrilege lodged against Cirrha for the Delphic Amphictyony, organizing Thessaly, Athens, and Sicyon in a sort of crusade against it during the so-called "First Sacred War" of about 600/580, for which cf. Davies 1994.

Only a few late mss. have ἐφ' ἁρπαγῆι, which is evidently intended with an adverbial sense. The oldest variant is ἀφαρπαγῆ, whence ἀφαρπαγῆι West, which would be a Solonian *hapax* based on the verb ἀφαρπάζω. Given the possibility that ἀφαρπαγῆ is a proleptic error (ἐφα- 〉 ἀφα-), I conform to the parallels 29^b.1 G.-P.[2] = 34.1 W.[2] ἐφ' ἁρπαγαῖσιν and Hom. *Il.* 23.574 ἐπ' ἀρωγῆι.

14. After the material offence against public and sacred properties in 12 f., Solon in 14 stigmatizes the disrespect for public properties as an offence against Dike: by presenting them as an ethical/religious sacrilege that pollutes the whole *polis* he thus introduces the topic of the frightening

consequences of the leaders' *hybris* for all the citizens. Hes. *Op.* 256–262 presents Dike, the powerful maiden of Zeus, as ready to inform him about the unjust men (see below ad 15–17). Hesiod consequently warns his bribable kings (*Op.* 263 f.): ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι (cf. Solon's φυλάσσονται at 14) βασιλῆς ἰθύνετε μύθους / δωροφάγοι.

σεμνά "venerable" is especially well chosen from among the other possible terms to designate sacredness, since it creates dissonance with φυλάσσονται: the leaders of the people do not even "pay attention to" what ought to be worthy of veneration: cp. ἀλιτρός in 1.25–28 G.-P.² = 13.25–28 W.² The term θέμεθλα "foundations" does not occur in a metaphorical sense before Solon, and has been thought (Masaracchia 1958, 263; Defradas 1962, 49) to be used here as a synonym for θέμις "law", a term which is often linked to δίκη. See especially Aesch. *Supp.* 708 f. τόδ' ἐν θεσμίοις / Δίκας γέγραπται and Hes. *Op.* 220–237, which is another Dike passage which Solon may have had in mind (cf. above ad 7–10, below ad 15–17, and the previous paragraph about *Op.* 256–262): after hinting briefly at the dangers of *hybris* (*Op.* 214–216; also 238–241 quoted below), Hesiod describes the tumultuous resistance put up by Dike when corrupt judges σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέμιστας (*Op.* 221), and she has to yield, but does so κλαίουσα and κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα, / οἵ τέ μιν ἐξελάσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν (*Op.* 222–224; see also 238–241 οἷς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα / τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς. / πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, / ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται), whereas full prosperity blooms in the cities of the people who δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν / ἰθείας καὶ μή τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου (*Op.* 225 f.; also 228–237); see also Parmen. *VS* 28B1.28 θέμις τε δίκη τε. Solon may, however, be using the Homeric-Hesiodic meaning of θέμεθλα in a metaphorical-abstract way—"foundational bases" ("what X is set in": Adkins 1985, 116)—analogous to that which one finds elsewhere in relation to δίκη with the terms βάθρον or πυθμήν, which also mean "basis"/"fundament": cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 646 Δίκας δ' ἐρείδεται πυθμήν (for other interesting parallels for the architectural imagery depicting the violations against Dike, see *Ag.* 381–383 … ἀνδρὶ / λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας / βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν and *Eum.* 539–541 βωμὸν αἴδεσαι Δίκας, / μηδέ νιν κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέωι ποδὶ / λὰξ ἀτίσῃς· ποινὰ γὰρ ἐπέσται; cp. also *Eum.* 516 πίτνει δόμος Δίκας); Soph. *Ant.* 853–855 προβᾶσ' ἐπ' ἔσχατον θράσους / ὑψηλὸν ἐς Δίκας βάθρον / προσέπεσες … ποδί; see also Pind. *Ol.* 13.5–7 (Corinth is opulent because it enjoys Dike and Eirene, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές). It is

all the more likely that Aeschylus had precisely Solon's passage in mind, seeing that there are other passages of the *Eumenides* which suggest that Aeschylus had 3 G.-P.[2] = 4 W.[2] among his models: cf. above at 5 f., 8.1 f. and Ameduri 1970–1971, 18.

15 f. Possible models for the Dike of these verses are Hes. *Op.* 222–224, 238–241, and 256–262, quoted above ad 14 f. (the last passage is also discussed in the next paragraph). Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between the Hesiodic and the Solonian perspectives: cf. Masaracchia 1958, 259–261; Manuwald 1989, 5–9. While Hesiod is skeptical of the idea that there is an end to the state of injustice, and does not even minimally foreshadow it, Solon links the situation of "injustice" in the Athens of his time closely with the coincident historical factors described at 5–14. And, at the end, Solon advances the possibility that justice, and specifically Eunomia, the sister of Dike in Hesiod's *Theogony*, will triumph.

Solon's description of the works of Dike has no known direct precedent. As suggested by Mülke 2002, 122 Solon may, however, have transferred to Dike the functions of the φύλακες, "watchers of Zeus", described in *Op.* 252–255, who are said to roam around everywhere in the air and to "watch over judgments and wicked deeds" (φυλάσσουσίν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα). This seems especially plausible because in the passage that immediately follows (*Op.* 256–262) Dike, the powerful maiden of Zeus, is presented as the messenger (γηρύετο) who seems to mediate the reports of the watchers and inscribe the wrongdoers in Zeus' register: she informs him "whenever someone harms her by crookedly scorning her," so that Zeus can "take vengeance (ἀποτείσηι: cf. ἀποτεισομένη used of Dike in Solon's l. 16) upon the people for the wickedness of their kings, who think baneful thoughts, etc.". The extend to which Solon gives Dike an active and executive role (in contrast to Hesiod) should perhaps be stressed more. Dike shifts from a figure who complains to Zeus to one who intervenes directly; this distinguishes her not only from Dike in Hesiod but also from his watchers.

In any case, Solon's description of Dike's role, much more than the Hesiodic one, appears to have been influential on fifth century tragedy (compare in particular the detail of the "silence" of Dike): Eur. *TrGF* (13)F255.3–5 ἡ δ' ἐγγύς ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁρωμένη δ' ὁρᾶι / ὃν χρὴ κολάζειν τ' οἶδεν· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶσθα σὺ / ὁπόταν ἄφνω μολοῦσα διολέσηι κακούς, inc.fab. F979 οὔτοι προσελθοῦσ' ἡ Δίκη σε, μὴ τρέσηις, / παίσει πρὸς

ἧπαρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων βροτῶν / τὸν ἄδικον, ἀλλὰ σῖγα καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ / στείχουσα μάρψει τοὺς κακούς, ὅταν τύχηι; adesp. *TrGF* F486.3 f. ἀλλ' ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτὸς ἡ Δίκη ποτέ / τῶι δυσσεβοῦντι σῖγ' ἔχουσ' ἐνήλατο, adesp. *TrGF* F493.1 f. ὁρᾶις Δίκην ἄναυδον οὐχ ὁρωμένην εὕδοντι καὶ στείχοντι καὶ καθημένωι; see also Soph. *TrGF* F12; Eur. *Bacch.* 882–890, *El.* 771, *TrGF* (48)F** 555; Dionysius, *TrGF* 76F5 on the fact that Dike always sees every human fault. The "silence" of Dike appears to be connected to the unpredictability of her intervention and it contributes to Solon's "non-transcendent" point of view: "there is no space for revelation here, but the poet speaks about a causal process which is unavoidable" (Blaise 2005, 9 ~ 2006, 118 f.; differently Irwin 2005, 174 for whom the silence of Solon's Dike may be ambiguous).

Knowledge of the past, present and future (expressed in the form τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα and its variations) was a prerogative often ascribed to prophets or divinities during the archaic period (cf. in particular Hom. *Il.* 1.70, about Calchas, or Hes. *Theog.* 38). Solon's decision to forego mentioning the future points to his emphasis on pragmatism as far as human time is concerned, which is also emphasized by the evolutionary idea of the present inherent in τὰ γιγνόμενα, instead of τὰ ἐόντα: as remarked by Blaise 2005, 7 ~ 2006, 117 f. (after Treu 1955, 276 f.), in τὰ γιγνόμενα "the reference is not to a general and stable state, but, more concretely, to an activity, a process: the present becomes the present moment, and this moment is not closed". There may be other reasons for omitting the category of the future from the realm of Dike's knowledge: as we noticed above, an omniscience inclusive of the future traditionally belongs to gods and seers, but in operational terms this prerogative is irrelevant to Solon's personified principle of justice, since Dike is not said to prevent injustice from being committed, and her τίσις is itself the future of all present or past actions which are wrong at the time when they are committed. In any case, γιγνόμενα may also be used instead of a future, because the future of γίγνομαι is generally avoided in archaic and early classical literature (S.R. Slings *per litteras*), thanks to the specific kinetic sense of γίγνομαι vs εἶναι, "to become" vs "to be" for which see e.g. Kahn 2003, 194–207; the use of the present γιγνόμενα instead of the future might also be similar to the future sense in which the present tense of verbs of going is used, cf. Kühnert-Gerth 1898, I.136. σύνοιδε, attested here first, would mean "to know something as a potential witness", of course "together" with Dike, and stresses the autoptical and synoptical comprehension of past and present-in-progress which Dike enjoys in regard to the hybristic leaders, and through which

Dike decides her prospective τίσις interventions (cf. Thuc. 2.35, where ὁ ξυνειδώς is opposed to ὁ ἄπειρος "the ignorant": Huart 1968, 225).

For the unpredictable sluggishness, but nevertheless inexorable nature of justice, apart from Solon's lines 8 and 25 f., cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 8.15 and Bacchyl. 18.45, who predict the ruin of the arrogant and unjust respectively ἐν χρόνωι "in due course" or ἐν τῶι δολιχῶι χρόνωι "after a long time"; furthermore Eur. *TrGF* (12)F222 τήν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ' εἶναι Χρόνου, / δείκνυσι δ' ἡμῶν ὅστις ἐστὶ μὴ κακός and 223.86 f. Δίκα τοι Δίκα χρόνιος, ἀλλ' ὅμως / ἐπιπεσοῦσ' ἔλαθεν ἔλαβεν, ὅταν ἴ[δ]ηι / τιν' ἀσεβῆ βροτῶν; adesp. *TrGF* F624.3–5 εἰ δέ τις πράσσει καλῶς / κακὸς πεφυκώς, τὸν χρόνον κερδαινέτω· / χρόνωι γὰρ οὗτος ὕστερον δώσει δίκην. See also Aesch. *Ag.* 58 f., 126, 463, *Cho.* 61–65 quoted above, 383, 935 f., *Supp.* 732 f., *Eum.* 498; Soph. *Ant.* 302 f., *Phil.* 1041; Eur. *Heracl.* 941. A rationalistic explanation of Dike's sluggishness is provided by Theodectas, *TrGF* 72F8 ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν μέμφεται τὰ θεῖ', ὅτι / οὐκ εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ τῶι χρόνωι μετέρχεται / τοὺς μὴ δικαίους, πρόφασιν εἰσακουσάτω· / εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτίκ' ἦσαν αἱ τιμωρίαι, / πολλοὶ διὰ φόβον κοὐ δι' εὐσεβῆ τρόπον / θεοὺς ἂν ηὖξον· νῦν δὲ τῆς τιμωρίας / ἄπωθεν οὔσης, τῆι φύσει χρῶνται βροτοί. / ὅταν δὲ φωραθῶσιν ὀφθέντες κακοί, / τίνουσι ποινὰς ὑστέροισιν ἐν χρόνοις. For πάντως as a key word for Solon in connection with Dike cf. ad 1.8 G.-P.² = 13.8 W.² On the images of Justice in early Greek poetry see Nagy 1995.

ἀποτεισομένη, only in a late ms., is preferable to the better attested ἀποτισαμ-, cf. 1.76 G.-P.² =13.76 W.² πέμψηι τεισομένην.

17–29. The gnomic aorist ἦλθε of 16 (~ 1.8 G.-P.² = 13.8 W.²), still concerned with the conduct of Dike, begins a section characterized by the alternation between a series of other aorists (ἤλυθε of 18, ὤλεσεν of 20) and of presents (ἔρχεται of 17, ἐπεγείρει of 19) that describe the consequences of the arrival of the "inescapable wound" of 17; the same description continues from 22 to 29 with verbs in the present tense. Especially after the generalizing lines 14–16 on Dike, and because of the ambiguity of τοῦτο and πάσηι πόλει at 17, or of δουλοσύνην at 18 (perhaps the fact that Athenian citizens are sold as slaves overseas, as in 30.9 G.-P.² = 36.9 W.²?, or the metaphorical enslavement to a tyrant of 15 G.-P.² = 11 W.²?, or the metaphorical enslavement of the many to the few, as described by Aristotle?: see below ad loc.), the audience who has just heard l. 17 might be uncertain whether Solon is now continuing his general assessment of Dike's practice from 14–16 (with τοῦτο referring to it, πάσηι πόλει in the sense of "every city", and ἤλυθε as a gnomic aorist) or resuming the

specific description of the situation of *hybris* in 5–14, to which the two lines on Dike would be a coda, with τοῦτο referring to that situation of *hybris*, which has alerted Dike, and πάσηι πόλει in the sense of "(our) whole city", and ἤλυθε as perfective: cf. Adkins 1985, 118.

Adkins 1985 has interpreted this ambiguity as being purposeful and functional to different performances of this poem, so that "different members of Solon's audience might interpret ἤλυθε and δουλοσύνην differently," but I agree with Mülke 2002 125 f. that it is quite difficult to postulate that each different audience member could interpret these words straightforwardly in the sense to which they would have been inclined, or that oral poetry could rely on such strategic uses of ambiguity. The ambiguity of the lines is a very natural one, given both that the punishment by Dike is inextricably connected with the misbehavior of the leaders and that within a theology which incorporates the concept of overdetermination the impact of Dike is not necessarily something which supervenes externally but something which arises directly from the human actions. Furthermore, this ambiguity leaves room for two different interpretations, not because Solon wanted to have his audiences distinguish between them and choose only one, but because Solon wanted to blur the two senses: the statement about the general way in which Dike operates, which is a gnomic and widely held truth, mingles with Solon's personal analysis of the reality at Athens at 5–14 and his hyperbolic prediction/description of the ruin of Athens at 17–29, in order to give the frightening impression that at present the city is *already* in the throes of a larger mechanism that *will* unavoidably generate destruction. From this perspective, the contrast between the gnomic aorists ἦλθε and ἤλυθε on the one hand, and ἔρχεται on the other, would not be puzzling, but would involve the subtle rhetoric of persuasion. The two aorists, modified by the adverbs πάντως and ταχέως, respectively, appear to point to the shared experience of Solon and his audience concerning a series of past events that are said to have taken place "always" and "promptly." This conveys the idea that what took place (always or promptly) in the past is very general (cf. Sicking 1991, 36), i.e. it may apply to the present as much as to the past. As for ἔρχεται, the social war and destruction of individual fortunes were developments logically positioned in the future of Athens, as the reassuring statements at the beginning of the poem (οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται, 1; Παλλὰς … χεῖρας ὕπερθεν ἔχε, 4; ἑτοῖμον, 7) make clear. Nevertheless Solon's present tense ἔρχεται, with the help of ἤδη, is intended to figuratively describe this future as a result of a process that is already in progress (see ad loc.). The effect should be, of course, an ἐνάργεια

(clearness/distinctiveness) that more deeply engages the feelings of the audience by making the event more frightening in their eyes: Henderson 1982, 27 correctly calls these presents "visionary," aptly defining the scene enacted by Solon as "synchronic, not historic" (τίκτει 8.3 G.-P.[2] = 6.3 W.[2] also belongs to this kind of tense).

The political dynamics described here, where the origin of *stasis* mainly derives from the insolence of some members of the leading class, does not appear to have been unique to Athens. Aristot. *Pol.* 1302b6–10 presents it as a general principle that "when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt (στασιάζουσι) against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds (ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν) … Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty"; cf. Cohen 1995, chap. 2. A parallel to this passage is Hesiod's description of the effects of unjust judges in *Op.* 238–247. But there is a clear difference between Hesiod, who describes in detail a utopia under Dike's reign (abundant harvests, exceptional children, sumptuous feasts, etc.) and the catastrophic results of unjust behavior (poverty of the masses, scarcity, disease), and the character of the Solonian passage. In Solon the social and economic connotations of the "irremediable wound" could not be clearer, and 17–29 may be read as a progression that relates the public wound to the most private aspects of life, to "each man" (ἑκάστωι at 26)—a progression that moves from the social organizations of the φυλή (ἔμφυλον at 19), and the σύνοδοι of 22, to the private house (οἴκαδ(ε) at 26), and the innermost of the bedchamber (θάλαμος at 29), and thus mirrors the disintegration of the whole *polis*: cf. Lewis 2006, 66. Even if Solon's Dike is still undoubtedly a divine personification, she is already displaying some of the abstract traits of the Anaximandrean principles of δίκη and τίσις "revenge" (*VS* 12B1) as regulators of cosmic equilibrium: cf. Jaeger 1966, 92 f.

17. τοῦτο, the new situation which is coming to the city as an "inescapable wound", may be the destructive consequences of Dike's punitive intervention (as is maintained by the scholars who connected τοῦτο with 15 f.: following Jaeger 1966, 91, e.g., Römisch 1933, 39 and Masaracchia 1958, 264) or of the citizens' hybristic behavior described at 5–14 (e.g.

Linforth 1919, 201 and Manuwald 1989, 5–7). The ambiguity is insoluble, and it does not seem to be the case that the interpretation in which τοῦτο refers to the citizens' behavior is less probable than the other one, because τοῦτο usually refers to what immediately precedes it, as maintained by Mülke 2002, 127, coll. Kühner-Gerth 1898–1904, I.646 f.: the two verses on the function of Dike are, at least syntactically, a coda to the description of the citizens' hybristic behavior, and therefore τοῦτο of 17 can refer to the whole dangerously anomalous situation of 5–16.

πάσηι πόλει, which is the target of this wound, has sometimes been thought to have a generalizing distributive force ("every": above all Jaeger 1966, 91), but I agree with Mülke 2002, 129 f. that the most common interpretation of πάσηι as "whole" (= Athens) is a better match for the following references to the globality of the δῆμος (cf. also ἐν δήμωι of 23, at least according to my interpretation, and δημόσιον ἑκάστωι of 26). The ambiguity between the two causes and targets mentioned above may be authorially constructed, and there is no doubt that ἄφυκτον, qualifying the ἕλκος, has to be connected to δῶρα δ' ἄφυκτα θεῶν of 1.64 G.-P.^{2} = 13.64 W.^{2}, thus favoring the idea that in our poem the arrival of the "wound" also depends on divine agency.

ἤδη "by now" (Edmonds, Loeb ed., 1931); "forthwith" (Stahl 1992, 391, and Anhalt 1993, 102); possibly with a temporal/consequential value, especially if a phrase of the kind "but where wicked men operate ..." appeared in the plausible lacuna before and after 11: cf. above ad 10–12. The adverb imparts a strong sense of urgency and indicates that (like the punishment of Zeus in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}) although she is slow, Dike is decisive when she moves. The present here and elsewhere hovers interestingly between the habitual and the continuative, expressing a general and inevitable truth but also a process which is underway in the present circumstances.

According to Hammond 1961, 89, the idea of the "wound" would have recalled the "injuries" brought upon the earth by the ὅροι, on which see ad 30.6. G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 W.^{2} and the Introd. ad loc. However, the connection is certainly far from being evident in our poem. The metaphor here shares with the concept of στάσις as disease (which we meet elsewhere) the idea of the state as an organic entity which is subject to pathologies analogous to those of the human body. Although Hammond is probably wrong to tie this too closely to the *horoi* of 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, and the two poems certainly take a different perspective (since 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} speaks of the land, while the present passage sees the *polis* as a political structure), both poems certainly share the notion of a necessary symbiotic relationship

between citizen and country where the health of the latter is dependent on the former. The closest parallel to Solon's metaphor of the "wound" is Aesch. *Ag.* 638–643, where a military defeat, and the fact that plenty of citizens were killed and delivered to Hades, is reported by a messenger, metaphorically, as ἕλκος which happened to be inflicted to the whole δῆμος (πόλει μὲν ἕλκος ἓν τὸ δήμιον τυχεῖν, 640); other metaphorical occurrences of ἕλκος as "heavy damage", appear in Archil. 13.8; Pind. *Pyth.* 2.91; Soph. *Ant.* 652. It is probably wrong to interpret Solon's ἕλκος as "disease", as was suggested by Linforth 1919, 201 and Jaeger 1966, 91, since the word only meant a wound inflicted by other men or animals in Homer, and probably still in Solon's time: cf. Masaracchia 1958, 260–263 and Adkins 1985, 118, followed by Anhalt 1993, 102. This fact does not, however, rule out the possibility that Solon shares the nosologic imagery concerning particularly critical situations for the city (as was maintained by Adkins 1985, 118): although ἕλκος is the result of a traumatic attack from certain men, and not a disease, these certain men are ἀστοί, and thus the ἕλκος is in a way internally generated. In any case, the "wound" anticipates the idea of a healing intervention (by Eunomia) no less than the present injury, as can be seen from another clearly political passage of Theogn. 1133 f. Κύρνε, παροῦσι φίλοισι κακοῦ καταπαύσομεν ἀρχήν, / ζητῶμεν δ' ἕλκει φάρμακα φυομένωι, and from Alcmaeon. This philosopher-doctor of the late sixth century would have called νόσος "illness" the result of the failure of ἰσονομία between the components of the human body, i.e. the supremacy (μοναρχία) of one such component having an ill effect on all the others (*VS* 24B4); see Mackinney 1964. Certainly Solon's Eunomia was not the same as the ἰσονομία of the fifth century, nor the democracy representing its fulfilment, but it was a first step towards ἰσονομία itself (cf. below ad 32–39). On the possibility that Solon's imagination was influenced by the developing medical thought of his time, cf. also Introd. ad 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}; further cf. Vlastos 1947, 156–158; Kudlien 1967, 51 f. and 60; Phillips 1980–1981, 2; Cambiano 1982; Cordes 1994, 19 f.; on medical imagery in the Greek *polis* in the fifth and four centuries see Brock 2000.

18. With Jaeger 1966, 91 f. I take this phrase to be equivalent to a paratactical consecutive. In my opinion, however, it explains what the "wound" is, with δέ in a sense close to γάρ, and ἥ of 19 constructed with δουλοσύνην. According to Jaeger 1966, 18 should be interpreted as parenthetical, and ἥ as being governed by πόλει of 17, but this syntax would hardly be comprehensible given that the feminine noun δουλοσύνην immediately precedes ἥ, and is more easily taken with it.

ταχέως is not in contradiction to the statement in 16 concerning the slow speed at which Dike operates (*pace* Manuwald 1989, 7): as soon as Dike finally begins to operate, according to her pace, the city's descent into "slavery" follows soon thereafter (so Mülke 2002, 130). The adverb is resumed in 21 so as to stress the inexorable speed of the city's ruin. On the temporal value of ἤλυθε, cf. above ad 17–29.

The "slavery" of which Solon speaks may anticipate the idea of a concrete debt-slavery which has been supposedly underlying lines 23–25 and 30.8 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.8 W.^{2} (see Introd. chap. 3); or the effect of the raids by the aristocrats for plunder and slaves that were taking place when law and order broke down, as described in 5–14 (Harris 1997, 106); or the metaphorical enslavement to a tyrant of 12.4 G.-P.^{2} = 9.4 W.^{2} and (possibly) 15.4 G.-P.^{2} = 11.4 W.^{2} (see ad loc.), which of course would have involved the loss of civil rights (an hypothesis which is frequently supported, most recently by Stahl 1992, 392 f. and Mülke 2002, 132; this synecdochical sense of "slavery" is attested in, e.g., Herod. 6.22; Eur. *Her.* 251; Plato, *Resp.* 344b, 578d, *Leg.* 777e, *Menex.* 238e; Beringer 1985, 49 "where δουλοσύνη is used in lyric poetry, the notion of being rightless before strength and of being unprotected against abuse is in every passage the core content, etc."). At the time Solon was composing our fragment, he most probably had not yet foreseen (Pisistratus'?) tyranny as a risk inherent to the greed and prejudice of the aristocratic clans (cf. van Wees 1999, 27). But he may well have deduced from the attempt of Cylon or from the experiences of other *poleis* a causal connection between the *hybris* of the rich, the dissatisfaction of the poor, civil strife and tyranny: cf. Raaflaub 2004, 27. In any case, both the δουλοσύνη of the whole city resulting from "tyranny" (12.3–5 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3–5 W.^{2}) and the δουλοσύνη of single individuals resulting either from the citizens' subjection to predominant leaders or from the citizens' personal (debt?) bondage (30.8–15 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8–15 W.^{2}) are seen by Solon to be a consequence of a dysnomic situation which his laws would aim at transforming into *eunomia*: cf. Raaflaub 2004, 54. δουλοσύνη may also be referring to the hardship of the *hectemoroi's* dependency on the owners of the land (cf. Introd. chap. 3), or more generally to the excessively powerful aristocracy's political subjection of the masses—subjection which likely fueled the social revolt. Aristot. *Pol.* 1274a15–18, commenting on Solon's initiative to open access to public office to the δῆμος, believed that if the members of the δῆμος were not given this minimal opportunity for participation in the governing of the state, they would have become a "slave and enemy" δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος. But it is difficult to believe that

Aristotle could do anything more than work ad lib on Solon's fragments, especially since in Solon's age it is most likely that στάσις did not yet have the sense of contrast between classes (see below ad 19).

19. στάσις refers to the partisan struggles between aristocratic factions (each eager to make use of popular support), rather than to a class struggle between the rich and the poor: cf. Stahl 1987, 60–66, 89–104, and Herod. 3.82.3 about the ambitions of the oligarchic nobles originating στάσεις, with the consequent need for the strong controlling power of a μουναρχίη. Indeed it seems that both ἔμφυλος and στάσις, words foreign to epic, were technical terms of contemporary political life: cf. Alcae. 70.11 ἐμφύλω ... μάχας and 208 ἀσυν⟨ν⟩έτημμι τὼν ἀνέμων στάσιν (where it is possible however that στάσις actually means the "direction" of the winds) and Theogn. 51 στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν; later, e.g., Democr. *VS* 68B249 στάσις ἐμφύλιος; Aesch. *Eum.* 862 f. Ἄρη ἐμφύλιον; Herod. 8.3 στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου ... κάκιόν ἐστι. The combination of στάσις and πόλεμος/μάχη was certainly also technical, at least from the fifth century onwards: a list of passages can be found in Gehrke 1983, 8 n. 33. In later periods the word πόλεμος clearly means "foreign war", and is used to make a distinction between this and civil struggles: cf. Plato, *Resp.* 470b. This distinction may already have existed by Solon's time (for hypotheses identifying possible "dormant" foreign wars, cf. Ferrara 1964a, 74), but it may also have come into maturity only in the classical period. In that case ἐπεγείρειν might refer merely to the awakening of a war between parties that was in abeyance at the moment but had already broken out, e.g., on the occasion of the Cylonian episode, for which see above ad 12 f. Balot 2001, 81 f. claims that Solon purposefully presents civil strife as *polemos* (external war) rather than *stasis* (internal conflict) and implies that the city's leaders treat Athens as if it were a foreign conquest whose goods are distributed among the victors. In his view, Solon's polemic is directed against this tendency of the aristocratic factions to use Athens as a source of wealth from which they could draw in order to compete in the internal and international arena. In fact, however, Solon does not hint in this direction, but concentrates instead on the city itself and its internal competition.

The metaphor of the "awakening" of the war is recurrent in Homer with similar objects (μάχην, Ἄρηα, νεῖκος, φύλοπιν etc.), but with πόλεμος this verb is only attested before Solon in Hom. *Il.* 20.31 πόλεμον δ' ἀλίαστον ἔγειρε. Solon may have wanted to evoke this passage in connection with the aristocratic rivalries, since it introduces the beginning

of the Theomachia, i.e. the *internal* war between the gods fought over the settlement of the Trojan War. The model of *Il.* 20.31 would have been combined with the formula ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει of *Il.* 24.344 = *Od.* 5.48 and 24.4 to produce the image of the dormant war. Such an image, never employed before Solon, underscores the idea that a latent state of social war already existed. For the "sleep" of war cf. also Eur. *Supp.* 1146.

20. The parallelism between the relative ὅς at the beginning of this line and ἥ at the beginning of 19 underscores the inexorable sequence δουλοσύνη 〉 στάσις / πόλεμος 〉 death of many young citizens.

ἐρατὴν … ἡλικίην is probably adapted from epitaph formulas for young people who have died prematurely: *CEG* 13.3 (sixth century BC) ~ 136.3 (sixth century BC) νεαρὰν hέβεν ὀλέσαντα "having lost tender youth"; moreover *CEG* 6.ii.1 (440/39 BC); *GVI* 771.4 (first century AD); "Simon." *Anth.Plan.* 26, *Anth.Pal.* 7.258, 7.515, 7.254 = *FGE* 890; cf. also Tyrtae. 9.23 G.-P.[2] = 12.23 W.[2] Hom. *Il.* 11.342 = 20.412 φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν "(he) lost his own dear life". Solon's use of the epithet ἐρατός, whose etymology suggests an undertone of eroticism, stresses the aesthetic quality of the young dead, which specifically belonged to the ideal of the life of the aristocracy (so Mülke 2002, 134 and Irwin 2005, 107 f., for whom the "eroticising element of the symposium is extended to the many"). But the choice of this epithet may also, at least in part, depend upon a modification of the traditional motif of the "beautiful death" in battle (Vernant 1982, 45–76), which is adopted after Homer by martial elegy. Rather than the traditional aesthetic admiration that aggrandizes those who die fighting in pursuit of κλέος or in defence of their fatherland (see especially Tyrtae. 7.21–30 G.-P.[2] = 10.21–30 W.[2]), Solon's ἐρατὴ ἡλικία reflects his distressed affection and regret for the young Athenians who have to die fighting in a civil war rather than nobly defending their homeland—the emphasis on the loss (ὤλεσε) of what was lovable could not stress more explicitly that this was not a matter of choice; these young Athenians died as passive victims of the civil war.

21 f. In the *Iliad*, δυσμενεῖς designates external enemies (a sense that is here impossible, cf. above ad 19), but in the *Odyssey* one already finds it used 1× (6.184) for personal enemies (opposed to friends, εὐμενέτῃσι), and 4× for the suitors, the hostile fellow-citizens whom Odysseus finds inside his house after his return. Although δυσμενής is certainly not enough to allude to the suitors in the *Odyssey*, the use of the verb τρύχειν makes it more likely that Solon is suggesting a comparison of the

suitors' unruly and dissipate banqueting to that of the enemies of public wealth evoked at 9 f.: indeed, as was already remarked by Adkins 1985, 119, τρύχειν, with the accusative οἶκον, is a fixed formula for designating the destruction of Odysseus' property by Penelope's suitors (*Od.* 1.248 = 16.125 = 19.133), and is resumed within a similar context by Mimn. 8.11 f. G.-P.² = 2.11 f. W.² οἶκος / τρυχοῦται; the fact that the undeserved wrecking of Odysseus's private οἶκος is in the background of the consumption of the ἄστυ in Solon may have led the aristocratic audience to anticipate fearfully that their destructive activity and maneuvering against the ἄστυ would later impinge upon their own private dimension (which Solon makes explicit at 29). It is impossible to decide what exactly the "consumption" or "wearing out" of the city means: for hypotheses cf. Mülke 2002, 136. In any case, the idea belongs to the same imagery of 12.3 G.-P.² = 9.3 W.² ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται; see also ad 5 f. above.

Apart from these *Odyssey* implications, the choice of δυσμενής also has strong connotations: instead of using ἐχθρός, etymologically meaning "hated", which would have focused on Solon's subjective feelings, the etymology of δυσμενής highlights, once again after 5–14, the "wrong" or "bad" "will" or "feelings" of the hybristic aristocrats, who are "ill-disposed" towards their city: cf. Eur. *Supp.* 429 οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει, where the autocrat prevailing over the "common laws" (*Supp.* 430) is presented as a form of *hybris* towards the city. Thus, there is an especially strong opposition between the δυσμενεῖς and the πολυήρατον ἄστυ, which in my opinion focuses on Solon's feelings of affection for Athens, with a contrast similar to the one underlying οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ … θέμεθλα of 14 (cf. ad loc.); differently Mülke 2002, 136, believes that the epithet reflects the appeals which the ἄστυ has to the aristocratic elite. πολυήρατος is again used of Athens in Bacchyl. 19.9 f. and of Attica in Aristoph. *Nub.* 301; but also cf. Hom. *Od.* 11.275 (Thebes). It produces a kind of obvious etymologic climax with ἐρατός of 20: personal life is something individuals love, but the city should be loved more.

A close parallel to ταχέως (already in 18) is Alcaeus' emphasis on the prompt effects on the city of someone's (possibly Pittacus') autocratic ambitions: 141.3 f. ὤ]νηρ οὖτ[ος ὀ μαιόμενος τὸ μέγα κρέτος / ὀν]τρέψ[ει τάχα τὰν πόλιν.

The term σύνοδος may be, after στάσις, ἔμφυλος, and ταχέως, another instance of the similarities between Solon and Alcaeus in what appears to be the technical language of politics—like ταχέως it is commonly found in antityrannical rhetorics. In fact, σύνοδος is first attested in Alcae. 130b.15 f., where it can only mean the "meetings" of girls for

beauty contests at a temple, and must still have the etymological meaning of "gathering together", without any political implications—but it is difficult to resist the temptation of supposing that such a sympotic and political poet like Alcaeus used this specific word because he was already acquainted with its political nuances. In any case, the word is almost unanimously interpreted as a designation in Solon of the "political clubs", which were commonly called ἑταιρεῖαι or συνωμοσίαι from the fifth century onwards (we have, however, no instance of σύνοδος = "association of people" before Isocr. *Nic.* 54); for the origins of the archaic *hetaireia* see Talamo 1961; for Mazzarino 1943, 41 f. and Sartori 1957, 53–57 the secret meetings to which Solon alludes may have been the meetings of subversive organizations similar to the later ἑταιρεῖαι (although probably less organized than the later ones), which were in operation between the seventh and sixth centuries and to which some sources credit the plotting of Cylon's coup in Athens and Megacles' in Mytilene (according to Herod. 5.71 and Plut. *Sol.* 12.1 Cylon would have enjoyed the help of, respectively, a ἑταιρηίη τῶν ἡλικιωτέων or συνωμόται). However, it is better not to project the meetings of the ἑταιρεῖαι or συνωμοσίαι of the late fifth century back to the time of Solon and instead to adopt a not-too-specific interpretation of σύνοδοι here. Mülke 2002, 137 f. and Lavelle 2005, 279 n. 37, for instance, prudently take the word in the sense of private "meetings" where the members of the political factions used to gather: see, e.g., Aristoph. *Eq.* 476 f. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας ἐρῶ, / καὶ τὰς ξυνόδους τὰς νυκτερινάς; Thuc. 3.82.6 τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο … οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίαι. These conspiring meetings probably coincided with the typical sympotic meetings of the aristocrats: cf. Plato, *Tht.* 173d (the philosophers do not indulge in) σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι and Poll. *Onom.* 6.7.4. This coincidence may have been another motivation for Solon to employ sympotic imagery in 9 f. The sense of "conflicts" or "fighting encounters" between factions has also been proposed for the word, but it is not very likely (see, e.g., Siegmann 1975, 269); on the affair of the Mysteries and the drinking group see Murray 1990b.

According to Gaius, *Dig.* 47.22 (F76a Ruschenbusch), Solon was also interested in legislating the activity of citizens' associations. He would even have allowed them to make internal regulations for themselves, provided that these did not contradict the public laws, in an initiative that controlled the decision-making power of these organizations and attempted to reduce their subversive power against the public institutions of the city: cf. Jones 1999, 33–50.

23–25. ταῦτα … ἐν δήμωι resumes the concrete details of the slavery and devastation brought on by/engendered by the ἕλκος ἄφυκτον of the city, which have been described at 17–22, while οὕτω δημόσιον κακόν of 26 points to the extension of the same agent/subject to the private properties of individual citizens. In a similar way, τοῦτο at the beginning of 17 also resumes the cause of the city's distress, which is hinted at in the preceding lines (either the unjust and hybristic behavior of the rich or the arrival of Dike's punishment, see above ad 17). For the singular κακόν, the same verb ἔρχεται is adopted in 17 and 26, whereas στρέφεται of 23 aptly points to the proliferation *in loco* of a plurality of unleashed κακά, which are the many unpredictable forms that the κακόν may take, as soon as it penetrates the city—as remarked by Mülke 2002, 140, in Hom. *Il.* 12.41 f. and 30.27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.27 W.^{2}, στρέφεσθαι expresses the disorientation of lacking a specific target. In every case, however, both ἔρχεται and στρέφεται imply some level of personification of the public disaster, thus contributing to the plastic (Römisch 1933, 79) and visionary tone of its description. The passage in *Il.* 12 suggests that the κακά should be seen as a threatening beast; if so this would be the first hint at the image which is developed later in the poem and ἐν δήμωι (see below) may be better taken as "among the people".

ἐν δήμωι may mean "in the homeland", in tune with the most common Homeric sense of ἐν δήμωι or κατὰ/ἀνὰ δῆμον (e.g. *Il.* 9.634, 16.437, etc.): so, after Linforth 1919, 204, Masaracchia 1958, 264 and Fowler 1987, 79 (and more prudently Adkins 1985, 120) think of a strong μέν-δέ opposition between what happens at home and what happens with the poor citizens sold abroad of 23–25. I prefer to assume that ταῦτα … ἐν δήμωι κακά is equivalent to δημόσιον κακόν of 26, and the μέν-δέ correlation is weaker (Denniston 1954, 162), so as to express not an opposition, but a distinction between the δῆμος ~ "the global citizen community" and a part of that δῆμος, the lesser citizens whose "enslavement" (18) consists of being sold abroad (so Halberstadt 1954–1955, 201 n. 16, according to the sense that δῆμος most often has in Solon and at 7; but see Introd. chap. 3 for other attempts at explaining the nature and origins of this enslavement). Mülke 2002, 141 has suggested, using Xen. *Symp.* 4.36 as a comparison, that here Solon might also anticipate the tendency of tyrants to "enslave". But the hyperbole that tyrants πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὅλας πόλεις χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐξανδραποδίζονται only appears in Xenophon after a list of other hyperbolic forms of dispossession by the tyrants (κλέπτουσιν, τοιχωρυχοῦσιν, ὅλους … οἴκους ἀναιροῦσιν, etc.). In Solon's passage, instead the idea of tyranny is implied only obliquely—and thus

only inferred by some scholars—from the δουλοσύνη of the city in 18, and this δουλοσύνη is usually assumed to be the metaphorical enslavement to a tyrant consisting in the loss of civic rights (cf. ad loc.): it is difficult to see how in Solon the concrete slaves of our verses could be understood as being the effect of a despotic ruler.

The adjective describing the "shackles" points to their inappropriateness in social terms, as in Hes. fr. 37.4 ~ Aesch. *Prom.* 97, 525. Differently, the Homeric epithets for them instead emphasized their painfulness or burdensomeness for the people who bear them (e.g. ἀργαλέα, δυσηλεγή, etc.), whereas ἀεικής was used for more physically heavy "strokes" (πληγαί). The phrase γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπήν of 24 specifies πραθέντες, thus perfectly balancing δεσμοῖσι τ' αἰκελίοισι as a specification of δεθέντες. The parallelism between the two phrases describing the conditions of the Athenians sold abroad is also emphasized by the fact that their verbs appear at the beginning and at the end of a verse in the same voice, mood, and tense. The closest parallel for γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπήν (apart from two Homeric occurrences of δήμωι ἐν ἀλλοδαπῶι, ἀλλοδαπός designates the "foreigner" 8× in Homer and once in *HHom.Ap.* and in Sappho) is Hom. *Od.* 9.36 ὡς οὐδὲν γλύκιον ἧς πατρίδος οὐδὲ τοκήων / γίνεται, εἴ περ καί τις ἀπόπροθι πίονα οἶκον / γαίηι ἐν ἀλλοδαπῆι ναίει ἀπάνευθε τοκήων, where the sweetness of life in one's own fatherland is considered to be superior even to a well-off life abroad—the members of Solon's audience who could remember this model would have found Solon's reference to those Athenians who in addition to being poor are forced to live abroad even more emotionally compelling. See also 30.8–16 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8–16 W.^{2}, where Solon is proud of having recalled πατρίδ' ἐς θεόκτιτον the people who, having been sold into slavery abroad, had been away for such a long time that they could no longer speak Attic. It is his consciousness of this very indignity—the indignity of an Athenian sold into slavery—that leads Solon to reinforce the legal distinction between free men (Athenian citizens) and slaves (non-Athenians): cf. Manville 1990, 132 ff.

26. In most mss. after 25 another hexameter follows, l. 26, and the lacuna of one, three or more verses can be hypothetized. Only in the ms. Matrit. 4562, does one find the pentameter παίκακα δουλοσύνης ζυγὰ φέρουσι βία, where, as remarked already by Schneidewin and Sauppe, both the writing παίκακα = πάγκακα and the prosody of ζυ- being long demonstrate that it is a Byzantine forgery (possibly by Constantinus Laskaris, who handwrote the ms.).

After the description of the effects of the ἕλκος ἄφυκτον on the "whole city" (17), the results of the same "public" disaster (here defined as δημόσιον κακόν; cf. ἐν δήμωι of 23) on individual citizens are depicted. The thematic parallelism is stressed by some formal similarities between the two passages: for the sequence τοῦτο of 17, ταῦτα of 23, οὕτω of 26, cf. below ad 23–25 (οὕτω "closes the ring" with τοῦτο of 17: Fowler 1987, 79).

δημόσιον κακόν is another phrase that Solon possibly borrows from the lexicon of the public values of his time. It is found in a Corcyran public epitaph for a *proxenos* datable to 625/600 BC, *CEG* 143.4 δαμόσιον δὲ καϙὸν ϙο[(where verbs of motion similar to Solon's ἔρχεται—ἀφῖκε or hίκανε—have been supplied at the end of the line); it is later found in Theogn. 50, again in a context where illicit earnings and public damage are discussed: κέρδεα δημοσίωι σὺν κακῶι ἐρχόμενα.

The image of the δημόσιον κακόν that "enters" (substantival κακόν/κακά is frequently joined with ἔρχεσθαι from Homer onwards: *Il.* 11.363, 15.450, 17.292, 20.450, *Od.* 20.367 f.) into each person's home (see also below ad 35) finds a parallel in the demonic personification of death in *Bible*, *Jer.* 9.29 "for Death has come up into our windows, it has entered our citadels" (cf. West 1997, 509). This image begins as a simple personification, then develops into a very vivid description of fast movements which seem to belong to a ravening beast which hunts everyone down relentlessly (see also below ad 27–29 and Noussia 2006, 140 n. 20). On the one hand, evil operates on the individuals' psychology and serves as a warning for those who believe they can satisfy their personal greed by obstructing the public good without consequences. On the other hand, it reminds us of the objective general principle that any act of injustice, impairing the common security, is a threat to everyone's individual security, in a sort of disquieting extension of the principle of family solidarity: although the initial injustice may affect only one or a few, its repercussions will eventually imperil everyone's welfare. Thus, any person's wrong is everybody's business (Vlastos 1946, 69 f., who suggests, after Calhoun 1927, 72 ff., that the underlying principle of criminal law may also have already been conceived of by Solon, since in his legislation he enables any citizen to take action for offenses against other persons). Solon's image is oriented by a perspective diametrically opposed to Hesiod's, who responds to the injustice and litigiousness of his own times by avoiding the public sphere: he immerses himself in his work while tending to his own οἶκος and cultivating good relationships with his neighbors: cf. *Op.* 27–34 and 342–352; Raaflaub 1996a, 1060.

οἴκαδ' ἑκάστωι adapts the Homeric formula ἔβαν οἶκόνδε ἕκαστος: *Od.* 1.424, 3.396, 7.229, 13.17; cf. also *Il.* 7.334f.; *Od.* 24.418; *HHom.Dem.* 302.

27–29. The "doors of the courtyard" are the principal entryway between the αὐλή and the public space (Harpocration *s.v.* αὔλειος: ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ πρώτη θύρα τῆς οἰκίας), and ἕρκος of 28 is the surrounding wall dividing the αὐλή from the public space, whereas μυχὸς θαλάμου focuses on the inner core of the house. Thus, the poem moves progressively—following the penetration of the δημόσιον κακόν—from the external to the internal spaces of the house. The emphasis on architectural details reminds the aristocratic members of Solon's audience of their own concrete οἶκος, and thus of the vulnerability of their private sphere as individuals; at the same time, the general object that concludes or has to be assumed at the end of the line resumes, after ἑκάστωι of 26, the idea that this same public disaster will eventually afflict everyone—of the *vv.ll.* for the last word of 28, the genitive πάντων is impossible; adverbial πάντως, accepted by West and Gentili-Prato, is plausible, but with the accusative πάντας there is no need to suppose that the ἑκάστωι of 26 must also be taken as the logical object of εὗρε of 28, as is the case if we accept πάντως.

αὔλειοι ... θύραι and **μυχὸς ... θαλάμου** are Homeric phrases: cf. respectively *Od.* 18.239, 23.49; *HHom.Herm.* 26 (the expression becomes idiomatic in fifth century Athens), and Hom. *Il.* 17.36 and *Od.* 16.285, 22.180, 23.41 = *HHom.Dem.* 143 (later they are very rare, apart from Pind. *Nem.* 1.42; Simias, *CA* 26.17). Homeric is also ἕρκος ὑπέρθορεν: see *Il.* 9.476, where Phoenix recollects how he once ran away from home after an argument with his father, ὑπέρθορον ἑρκίον αὐλῆς (for ἕρκος as a part of the Homeric house, other than *Il.* 9.476 cit., cf. *Il.* 24.452–455, *Od.* 22.442, 459). In content, however, Solon is probably recalling the Homeric similes of the lion that attacks domestic animals, as, e.g., *Il.* 5.136–142, where the shepherd surprises and injures the lion αὐλῆς ὑπεράλμενον (138).

οὐκ ἐθέλουσι may be used here as being almost equivalent to οὐ δύνανται (cf. *LSJ* s.v. ἐθέλω), but the verb may also refer to the unwillingness of the doors, whereas οὐ δύνανται would point unambiguously to the inability of the doors to resist the attack of the δημόσιον κακόν: if οὐκ ἐθέλουσι implies some reference to the idea of a wish, as is possible, the sense would be that the duty of the house doors is to keep back (ἔχειν) what comes unauthorized from outside (as they have done in the past: cf.

ἔτι), but they do not like the idea in the case of the punitive public disaster. In any case the "public disaster" is so strong and fast that it jumps over the fence: the wish of the house-doors becomes irrelevant, and the final emphasis is on the inadequacy of the ἕρκος. See Adkins 1985, 121 and Anhalt 1993, 110.

ὑψηλόν emphasizes that the ἕρκος should be a safe one; but the fact that despite this height the δημόσιον κακόν enters the house in a single jump emphasizes the unbeatable power of κακόν and the futility of every human defence.

ἦι: the subjunctive of the verb "to be" (+ genitive θαλάμου) is a good conjecture made by Schneidewin, in place of the disjunctive conjunction ἤ (+ dative θαλάμωι) of the paradosis, which would coordinate μυχός and θάλαμος. The phrase μυχὸς θαλάμου "recesses of the chamber" has a certain idiomatic frequency in poetic language (see above), whereas the two substantives never appear side by side as synonyms; in Hesych. *Lex.* θ 21 Latte and Σ Aesch. *Ag.* 96, where θάλαμος and μυχός explain one another, the familiar Greek lexicographical principle of using one of the two members of a phrase (often a genetival phrase, not necessarily coordinative) to explain the other is at play; cf. Degani 1977–1978. The mentioning of the θάλαμος, a word that designates the special domestic quarters of the house as opposed to the reception rooms, and which here is possibly, but not necessarily the bedroom, evokes the image of citizens who seek refuge in the most secluded corners when the κακόν appears in the home—much like the suitors who ἀνεχώρησαν μεγάροιο μυχόνδε (*Od.* 22.270) after Odysseus, Telemachus, Philoetius and Eumaeus began shooting arrows at them.

30f. The verb διδάξαι signals the beginning of Solon's assumption of a more didactic attitude. His description of the city's ruin is comprehensively resumed with ταῦτα in 30, and defined as the consequence of Dysnomia. Dysnomia as Solon understands it is more complex than in Hes. *Theog.* 230 which makes her a neighbor of Ate, but the long preceding description of concrete details in 5–29 allows the author to introduce it abruptly, and to suggest its identity as the sum of all these mishaps. For this reason Solon's lines 5–29 will be markedly at variance with the brief, almost elliptical description of the course of the τίσις from Zeus in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, and its emphasis on the solar effects of this divine function (cf. above ad 1.19–22 G.-P.^{2} = 13.19–22 W.^{2})—they not only serve to introduce us to Dysnomia as the origin of the city's evils, but at the same time they clarify the concept of Dysnomia itself.

Solon does not want to describe himself as an instructor to his fellow citizens from a position of superiority (as Hesiod permits himself to do with his younger brother Perses: see also Introd. ad 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}), and thus presents his teachings not as the result of his mind or experience, but as a sort of confession of his emotions, spoken more from the heart than from the head.

θυμός is the air breathed into and out of the lungs (Onians 1951, 44–53) and the psychological center of the emotions and volitional activities, only partially synonymous with φρήν/φρένες (physical lungs and the mental location of the emotions), on which see above ad 1 f. (compare the very common Homeric formula κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν): cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983, 44 f.; Stahl 1992, 396; Clarke 1999, 77; on θυμός in archaic poetry, Caswell 1990, 27–30; Sullivan 1991 and 1995, 54–60. Solon's phrase varies a formula—θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει (see also, less frequently, κραδίη θυμός τε κελεύει)—that occurs 10× in Homer and twice in Hesiod, and thus gives Solon's utterance a special epic solemnity and authoritativeness. However, θυμός often appears in archaic post-Homeric poetry as an active agent which urges someone to action: ἀνώγειν (Hesiod), ἰθύνειν (Archilochus), κελεύειν (Hesiod), ὁρμᾶν and ὀτρύνειν (Pindar): cf. Sullivan 1991, 152. The choice of this phrase may be purposeful in Solon. According to Jaeger 1966, 87 it expresses Solon's independence from the divine revelation of truths of the Hesiodic tradition: "the prophetic warner does not speak as a divine herald of the future, coming down from Heaven with an authority entrusted to him through the command of Zeus, but by the supernatural superiority of human knowledge, which springs from the depths of his own spirit". In any case, this phrase, which allows Solon to present his advice not as his own initiative, but as an inner command to which Solon himself has to submit, reduces the impression of subjectiveness in Solon's advice. The rhetorical strategy of this presentation, which is intended to make Solon's claims seem dispassionate and objective, is similar to the invocation to the Muses at the beginning of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, in that a presence besides the authorial one validates Solon's authority. However, this is not enough to maintain (with Lloyd-Jones 1983, 44 and Mülke 2002, 243) that in our fragment Solon is presenting himself as being endowed with the authority that he requests from the Muses.

At the same time, the content of Solon's teaching on the one hand necessitates a frightening analysis of the present situation (Solon describes at length the city's evils as caused by the citizens' misbehavior, which is ultimately synthesized at 31 in the abstract idea of Dysnomia),

but on the other it also involves in the last lines a concrete practical truth that is reassuring for his audience: if the citizens give up their misbehavior, the conditions in the city will improve (cf. Mülke 2002, 146).

πλεῖστα: "very many", in number (as e.g. in Eur. *Hipp.* 397) or in size (as e.g. in Hom. *Od.* 4.697).

32–39. The mentioning of Δυσνομία (here personified) leads Solon with a fervor that reminds us of Old Testament prophecy (Campbell 1983, 94) to mention her opposite, the Homeric and Hesiodic Εὐνομία. And Solon dedicates to Eunomia a brief hymn that contains various analogies with the hymnodic list of Zeus' prerogatives in the Proem (3–10) of Hesiod's *W&D* or with the short hymnodic description of the effects of Eirene in the same poem (*Op.* 228–237, concluding the presentation of the effects that *hybris* and transgressions against Dike can have, and of the compliance with justice in *Op.* 220–237; see above ad 3.14–16). Formal analogies are especially clear between Solon's dicola, tricola, tetracola, and chiasmi (see below) and the tricola and chiasmi of the proem to the *W&D* (especially 5–7), but also between Solon's polar opposites (τραχέα λειαίνει and ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ of 34, εὐθύνει ... σκολιάς of 36, ὑπερήφανα ... πραΰνει of 36 f.) and the ones of Hes. *Op.* 3–7 (ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε, ... ῥητοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε ... βριάοντα χαλέπτει ... ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει ... ἰθύνει σκολιὸν) or the anaphora of Solon's keyword παύει (34, 37, 38) and Hesiod's anaphora of ῥέα (twice in *Op.* 5) ~ ῥεῖα (twice in *Op.* 6 f.). It is true that these kinds of stylistic devices are common in archaic elegy, as Henderson 1982, 29 remarks (cf. also Irwin 2005, 185 f.) but I agree with, e.g., Solmsen 1949, 117 and Mülke 2002, 149 that their concentration must point to a sort of hymnal function for these verses in Solon in the wake of the Hesiodic passages or of the tradition to which they belonged. After all, both the Hesiodic passages and this epilogue by Solon are theodicies of divine justice: Hesiod at the beginning of the *Works and Days* centers on the cosmic justice of Zeus, and later on in Hesiod, as well as in Solon, human justice and peace, which are also nonetheless personified, are hymned.

The term εὐνομία appears in Hom. *Od.* 17.487, a passage very close in its content to Hes. *Op.* 249–255 (cf. West 1966b ad Hes. *Theog.* 902). There the gods are imagined as visiting mortals and putting their hospitality to the test: by doing so, they discover either the mortals' *hybris* or εὐνομίη: these are clearly juxtapposed as the two antithetical social behaviors of men as they are implicitly presented in Solon, where the unruly *hybris* of the rich is again opposed to Eunomia (although within the

more complex κόρος-ὕβρις-ἄτη chain: cf. Ostwald 1969, 65). In Hesiod (*Theog.* 902) Eunomia, daughter of Themis and Zeus, is one of the three Horai (~ adesp. *PMG* 1018b), along with Dike and Eirene. The genealogy of Alcm. *PMGF* 64 is different, where Tyche is defined as "sister of Eunomia and Peitho ("Persuasion") and daughter of Prometheia ("Foresight")". Dysnomia is the sister of Ate and daughter of Eris: cf. *Theog.* 226–230.

Eunomia/Dysnomia are probably still connected to the basic sense of the root νέμειν, "(due) sharing", or νόμος "custom", rather than to the later metaphorical sense of νόμος, institutional "law", which appears to have been developed mainly in the fifth century. Therefore, Eunomia designates the condition of a state where the citizens obey the laws, with little or no lawlessness and *hybris* (in Hesiod Dysnomia's sister is Eris: see Solon's reference to στάσις in 19 as being among the first consequences of the present situation of prevailing *hybris*), rather than the condition of a state in which the laws themselves are good: cf. Andrewes 1938, 90; Ostwald 1969, chap. 2; Adkins 1985, 122; Mülke 2002, 150–152 (see the opposition in Hom. *Od.* 17.487 cit. between *hybris* and εὐνομίη as improper and proper social behaviors of men respectively). Already for Hesiod, Eunomia, Dike and Eirene are clearly personified virtues which are more social than individual. During the archaic period the social/political sense of *eunomia* is more or less explicit in *HHom.* 30.11; Xenophan. 2.19 G.-P.^{2} = 2.19 W.^{2}; Pind. *Ol.* 13.6; Bacchyl. 13.186; adesp. *PMG* 1018b cit. It is however only in the late fifth century that iconography shows how Eunomia had become a real catchword for Athenians involved in power struggles during the Peloponnesian War (although with little to no memory of the Hesiodic or Solonian precedents): cf. Grossmann 1950, 30–89; Shapiro 1993, 79–88; Borg 2005.

According to Aristot. *Pol.* 1307a1 and Strabo 8.4.10(362), "Eunomia" was also the title given to the poem in which Tyrtaeus sang the praises of diarchy and of the restoration of previous religiosity and order of the state at Sparta as guarantors of the stability of Sparta itself (cf. Andrewes 1938, 95 ff.)—in connection with the "Lycurgan" Rhetra (as is usually assumed) or independently of it (as suggested by van Wees 1999, which should be read together with the constructive criticism in Raaflaub 2006, 393–398). Therefore, as opposed to the *eunomia* of Hesiod, which was still not an openly political concept, and was still seen in a strongly mythologized way within the entourage of her divine parentage, the *eunomia* of Solon's text, as well as of Tyrtaeus' poem, is more comprehensible as the personification of the abstract idea of a well ordered community than as the autonomous goddess of Hesiod (cf. Ostwald 1969, 67–69). See, however,

Mülke 2002, 154 for an attempt, to which I do not subscribe, to see various divine 'relatives' of Hesiod's Eunomia implied in Solon's references to ideas that are not personified: Themis and Dike in Solon's phrase Δίκης θέμεθλα of 14, Eirene in Solon's presentation of war as a consequence of *dysnomia* at 19 f., Eris in Solon's reference to the χόλος ἔριδος in 38, etc.; similarly Irwin 2005, 190 f. argues that Hesiodic genealogy is not far from Solon's notion of Eunomia. However, the fact that Solon chooses not to present these ideas as explicitly personified divine entities within a precise genealogical scheme highlights his aim of abstraction. Rather, Solon's *eunomia* seems to respond to a sort of "religious realism" that emphasizes the need to put an end to aristocratic *hybris* and trust in the re-establishment of lawfulness and civic harmony by maintaining faith in divine assistance: cf., e.g., Ehrenberg 1930; Ostwald 1969, 64; Meier 1998, 82 f.

The presentation of the effects of Eunomia in 32–39 consists of a positive version of the negative effects produced by the lawlessnees and *hybris* which were described at 5–29 (see already Römisch 1933, 42), and this reversal is constructed through lexical repetitions from the first verses: εὔκοσμα, 32–κοσμεῖν, 10; πάντα, 32, 39–πάντως, 33; τοῖς ἀδίκοις, 33–δίκας σκολιάς 36–ἄδικος νόος, 7/ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι, 11/Δίκης θέμεθλα, 14/τοῖς ἀδικέουσι φίλους, 22; πέδας, 33–δεσμοῖσι, 25; κόρον, 34–κόρον, 9; ὕβριν, 34–ὕβριος, 8; ἔργα διχοστασίης, 37/ἔριδος, 38–στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν τ(ε), 19; ἀργαλέης, 38–ἄλγεα, 8/ἕλκος, 17; πινυτά, 39—ἀφραδίηισηιν, 5/οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται, 9. Unlike 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} in this poem justice has a binary function, both as a force which punishes human actions and as a force leading to order (the closest we get to the idea of order in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} is with the clear weather after the dispersal of the clouds/evil in 23 f.). However, all the concrete positive situations established and the negative situations suppressed by Eunomia undergo in 32–39 an expressive concentration that is absent from the first part of the poem. In both cases a rhetorical strategy appears to be at work, which Aristotle would later articulate in *Rh.* 1365a10–11: "the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there appears to be superiority in a greater number of things" (see Noussia 2006, 149–151). But the most detailed description of 5–29, exemplifying the evils involved in the present condition of lawlessness and *hybris*, become more effectively persuasive through *enargeia*, whereas 32–39 give the impression of an irresistible, objective *list* of blessings, which no one can turn down. Although concentrated abstract ideas are certainly an important aspect prevailing in 32–39, Solon also intersperses some concrete images,

which contribute to keeping alive some effective *enargeia* in the last part of the poem: ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας of 33, αὐαίνει … φυόμενα of 35, εὐθύνει … σκολιάς of 36, παύει … χόλον of 38. Other details of word placement and lexical choices also show the complex rhetorical ambitions of 32–39. First of all, Eunomia, who is actively responsible for the re-establishment of order, is always maintained as the subject of all the verbs, from the beginning to 38a (in 38b and 39, where Eunomia is the agent of a passive verb, she is still the logic subject). Furthermore, the first and last verses reprise one another in ring composition (εὔκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ(α), 32; πάντα ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά, 39): ἄρτια, understandably a catchword for Solon (see below ad 32), is kept in both the beginning and the ending verse, while thanks to the other lexical reprises εὔκοσμα and πινυτά are presented as equivalent, practically as two sides of the same idea: good order is the obvious and inevitable choice of good sense. Furthermore, in the first and last verse the action of Eunomia is presented in positive terms, as the establishment of something pleasant, whereas 33–38a as a whole describe the elimination of unpleasant situations connected to the present *hybris* and lawlessness. For the sake of the list's regularity, but also of *poikilia*, each of the phrases of 34–37 consists of a verb and an object, but in each distich the succession of the two phrase-members is always in chiasmus with the preceding phrase; within 34–35, the three phrases 34 are dicola, 35 is tetracolon, and within 36–37 all phrases are tricola (perhaps another hymnal device: on the tricolon in prayer, see Pulleyn 1997, 145 f.).

32. In Homer, κοσμεῖν applies primarily to military "ordering" or "marshalling" the army. The family of terms derived from the root κοσμ- may imply the idea of a moral or social "order", although the aesthetic idea of "ornament" often does not appear as a separate and clear meaning—neither in the verb, nor in the term κόσμος (formulaic in the phrase κατὰ κόσμον, quite often used for the correct order of the presentation of the ideas in speeches): cf. ad 2.2 G.-P.² = 1.2 W.² In any case, the adverb εὐκόσμως, once in Homer and once in Hesiod (εὔκοσμος never occurs before the fifth century), refers in both cases (*Od.* 21.123; *Op.* 628) to the correct arrangement of material objects (Hom.: axes; Hes.: sails on the ship); also in Theogn. 242 εὐκόσμως expresses again the ordered sequence of the voices in a song. We should therefore consider Solon's εὔκοσμα as the designation of the correct order of every element of society, and resist the temptation to see an ethical/aesthetical appreciation implied in it.

A combination which seems quite similar to Solon's synonymic sequence of εὔκοσμα and ἄρτια occurs already in Homer: after Odysseus'

speech accusing Euryalus of having spoken not κατὰ κόσμον regarding Odysseus' athletic prowess (*Od.* 8.179), Alcinous apologizes and tells him that no one who knew how ἄρτια βάζειν *Od.* 8.240 would have dared to blame him. The term ἄρτιος is a keyword for Solon (it also recurs later at 39, then in 5.5 G.-P.² = 4c.4 W.² and 8.4 G.-P.² = 6.4 W.²). Since it derives from the root of ἀραρίσκειν "to be joined/to fit closely with", or less probably from the adverb ἄρτι "just/exactly", which also derives from ἀραρίσκω (cf. Calame 1977), it expresses the sense of "befitting/suitable". This sense can be applied, in relative terms or in absolute terms—in relative terms it is applied either to (1) a connection with something or someone else, or to (2) the connections among components of a single unified entity; in absolute terms it focuses on a generic connection with any context ("appropriate"/"seemly") (3). The meaning (1) certainly appears in Hom. *Il.* 5.326 = *Od.* 19.248 οἱ φρεσὶν ἄρτια ᾔδη (of the completely sympathetic/agreeable mental behavior of someone towards someone else). In the compound ἀρτίπος of Hom. *Od.* 8.310 (Ares vs. the lame Hephaestus) the good reciprocal connection of the legs is emphasized. But in the compounds ἀρτιεπής (Hom. *Il.* 22.281; Hes. *Theog.* 29) and ἀρτίφρων (Hom. *Od.* 24.261), and in the phrase ᾗσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν (Hom. *Il.* 14.92, *Od.* 8.240) the focus of the root ἀρτι- is on the good and befitting internal connection between words and thoughts, as in the phrase φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀρηρώς of *Od.* 10.553—the proof comes from the speech of Euryalus, so defined in *Od.* 8.240, as it is also qualified as being οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, 8.179 and οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν, 8.397 (cf. Calame 1977). However, in many of these cases the impression of appropriateness to the audience (1) may be intended, especially in the case of οὔ τι μάλ' ἀρτίφρων, *Od.* 24.261, where the following ἐπεί-clause highlights that the man questioned did not show himself to be at all obliging to the interlocutor (cf. M. Fernández-Galiano ad loc.). Solon's preference for the epithet ἄρτιος makes sense in that it expresses a concept that—as opposed to the Homeric ideology of "being superior to all" (cf. Treu 1955, 274 f.)—is very suitable to the mentality and the messages of a politician who has as his objective (or at least as his slogan) the satisfaction of all social parties (cf. above all 31.8 f. G.-P.² = 37.9 f. W.²). What characterizes Solon's use of ἄρτιος in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² is its prevailing detachment from any specific context: the epithet conveys here the idea of compactness and internal structural agreement, with perhaps more of an emphasis on structural compactness in 32 (cf. εὔκοσμα), and more on seemliness in 39 (cf. πινυτά). In any case, in our fragment the only context in which this structural suitability applies

seems to be society as a whole, and the specialization of the epithet in the sense (3) described above is strong (different is the case of 5.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.4 W.^{2}, ambiguous is the case of 8.4 G.-P.^{2} = 6.4 W.^{2}: cf. ad loc.). It is not fortuitous that the hymn is bound, in ring composition, by the two phrases εὔκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια, 32 and ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά, 39; the first focused on the "structural shape" of εὐνομία, where all things seem to be in good order with each other and fit each other closely; the second on the wisdom and appropriateness of this compact structure—both invite us to consider the condition of εὐκοσμία as the only option of good sense in terms of image and of rationality (see above ad 32–39).

33. Εὐνομία justly shackles those who merit it—as opposed to the rich, whose violence has reduced many to shackles that they do not deserve (25).

θαμά makes little sense as an equivalent to πολλάκις = "often", emphasizing the great number of iterations (and thus was emended to θ᾽ ἅμα in the 19th century). I agree with Mülke 2002, 156 that it most likely means "in quick succession" (emphasizing the closeness of the iterations to each other), a sense that is prevailing, e.g., in Hom. *Il.* 15.470 θαμὰ θρώισκοντας ὀϊστούς. Indeed θαμά is glossed πυκνῶς, συχνῶς, or συνεχῶς no less often than πολλάκις by ancient scholiasts.

The same verbal phrase, in the same metaphorical sense of "blocking", can be found in Sem. 7.116 δεσμὸν ἀμφέθηκεν ἄρρηκτον πέδην (Zeus assigns man the unbroken 'shackles' of the woman). But the metaphorical πεδάω is already commonly used in Homer to designate the overruling of human will (especially by the *moira* or the sleep).

34. *Koros* and *hybris* are mentioned earlier at 8 and 9 f., in relation to the symposium: see ad loc. Pind. fr. 52a9 f. and Bacchyl. 13.186–189 later spoke of εὐνομία and its beneficial effect on festive occasions: cf. Anhalt 1993, 93.

The asyndeton of this verse is most likely another stylistic peculiarity in common with prayer: see, e.g., the beginning of *HHom.* 8 and 19, and cf. Fraenkel 1950, 163.

ἀμαυροῖ: "makes opaque", hence "weakens" (McKinlay 1957, 29; Handschur 1970, 177 f.; Barrett 1964, 319); in polar opposition to ἀποφαίνει of 32.

35. αὑαίνει with aspiration (adopted by West) would be the Attic form that became common at least from Aristophanes' age, cf. (ἐπ)αφαυαίνεσ-

θαι in *Eccl.* 146 and *Ran.* 1089. But the mss. of Aesch. *Cho.* 260 and Soph. *Phil.* 954, *El.* 819 are consistent in giving the psilotic form of αὐαίνειν. We cannot know whether in this case Solon rejected the ionic psilosis or not. But maybe the mss. of the Attic testimony of Demosthenes would have retained the Attic form with aspiration, if this was original.

The connection of ἄτη or the furor of madness with images of (hypertrophic = hybristic) plant luxuriance can be found especially in tragedy: cf., e.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 821 f., *Sept.* 601; Soph. *Ant.* 959 f., *Trach.* 998b–999, *TrGF* F786 (moreover e.g. Plato, *Pol.* 310d); Michelini 1978; Padel 1992, 134 f. However, see already Hes. *Op.* 7 ἀγήνορα κάρφει (Zeus).

The image of Eunomia drying up the blooming flowers of *ate*, like the image of δημόσιον κακόν jumping over the high fence and pursuing the man as he flees to the innermost part of his house (26–29, see above), are examples that constitute *enargeia* (actualization/vivification) in Aristotelian terms; Solon makes the lifeless seem living: see Noussia 2006, 140.

36 f. An ὑπερήφανος "overweening" behavior and *hybris* appear to be often connected: Hom. *Il.* 11.694 f. ὑπερηφανέοντες ὑβρίζοντες; Demosth. *Meid.* 83 ἑκάστου τὴν ὕβριν καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν αὐτοῦ, *Timocr.* 121 τὴν ὕβριν καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν. In any case, ὑπερ- points to the idea of excess, and πραΰνειν is a well-chosen term to express the overruling of this behavior. This is probably the first occurrence of the verb used for human actions; but it is said of κρατερός Apollo in *HHom.Herm.* 418, which is possibly later.

σκολιός to designate the unjust sentences is already Homeric (*Il.* 16.387 σκολιὰς ... θέμιστας) and Hesiodic; Hesiod also uses the catachresis of ἰθύνειν for the sentences of the judges (called or thought of as σκολιαί): *Op.* 7 ἰθύνει σκολιόν, 9 ἴθυνε θέμιστας, 263 f. ἰθύνετε μύθους ... σκολιέων δὲ δικέων ... λάθεσθε. The form εὐθ- of the verb is an Atticism, consistently attested in tragedy: Adrados 1953, 140 f.

For ἔργα plus genitive, see ad 1.16 G.-P.^{2} = 13.16 W.^{2} διχοστασίη, not attested before Solon, may already have been part of the technical political lexicon: cf. Theogn. 78; adesp.dub. 50 G.-P.^{2} = adesp. eleg. *12 W.^{2} (parodied by adesp. *PCG* 951); Eur. *TrGF* (11)F173.2; however it is used differently in Herod. 5.75, where the word means 'discord' *tout court*. Internal wars are listed among the evils produced by hybristic *dysnomia* described in the first part of the poem: see above 19.

38 f. Lines 38 f. offer a very impressive and succinct ending to a powerful poem. It is noteworthy that after emphasizing Eunomia/Dike as suppressor of evil Solon returns pointedly to its positive aspects, Eunomia/Dike as restorer, in order to end the poem on an optimistic note.

ἔριδος χόλον: the two terms had already been joined as synonyms in Hom. *Il.* 18.107 f. ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο / καὶ χόλος. ἀργαλέα ἔρις is, and will remain, typical of epic language: cf. Hom. *Il.* 11.3 f., 17.384 f., 21.385 f. (also 23.791 f.); Ap. Rhod. 1.773. For χόλον παύειν cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.192, 15.72, 19.67, and, later, Bacchyl. 5.98 f.

In the stopping of ἔρις as a result of Eunomia's intervention, Anhalt 1993, 113 n. 74 sees an authorial statement: this reference indicates "his rejection of the use of invective, and, therefore, of the attempt to achieve social harmony by strengthening the bonds of *philotes*, 'friendship' among members of a select portion of society". An authorial metaliterary statement might be overly subtle. But there is no doubt that through this reference Solon takes the opportunity of opting once again for a self-image centered around the idea of mediation between the contrasting noble factions, and between their *hybris* and the rest of Athenian citizens.

κατ' ἀνθρώπους: "in relation to humans, concerning humans".

For πινυτός as the definition of a person who *inter alia* is angered by people who behave with *hybris*, cf. Hom. *Od.* 1.226–229 οὐκ ἔρανος τάδε γ' ἐστίν, / ὥς τέ μοι ὑβρίζοντες ὑπερφιάλως δοκέουσι / δαίνυσθαι κατὰ δῶμα. νεμεσσήσαιτό κεν ἀνὴρ / ... ὅς τις πινυτός γε μετέλθοι.

4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}

In *Ath.Pol.* 5.1–3, Aristotle informs us that 5.1 and 5.2–5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b, 4c W.^{2} belong to the same poem. There are certainly also conceptual affinities between 4–5 and 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4a, 4b–c and 4 W.^{2} There has actually been a detailed and thoughful attempt (Sploesteter 1911, 18–34) to reconstruct a logical thread which unifies 4 + 5.1 + 3 + 5.2–5 G.-P.^{2} = 4a + 4b + 4 + 4c W.^{2} into a single poem; for similar combinations cf. also Linforth 1919, 178; van Groningen 1958, 133 f.; Masaracchia 1958, 272–281; Chambers 1990, 162. However, Solon often reiterates the fundamental ideas behind his political program, and an attempt at unifying these fragments may be misguided.

First of all, Aristotle maintains that 4 and 5.1 G.-P.^{2} = 4a and 4b W.^{2} are two incipits. Furthermore, according to *Ath.Pol.* 5.1 f. Solon was made διαλλακτής between the opposite parties of Athens after composing the poem from which 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} was extracted, where he was attacking both factions (i.e. the rich and the poor), and in the interest of both parties, was seeking to put an end to the destructive struggle between them ("on behalf of either side against the other"). In the surviving text of 5.1 and 5.2–5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b and 4c W.^{2}, however, he only criticizes the faults of the rich. As Rhodes 1993, 123 f. correctly acknowledges, 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b, 4c W.^{2} fails to show Solon's μεσότης, i.e. that Solon was of moderate social and economic status.

Immediately afterward, when introducing 5.2–5 G.-P.^{2} = 4c W.^{2} Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 5.3 says that by birth and renown Solon was one of the most eminent citizens (πρῶτοι) but, as he himself testifies ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ποιήμασιν, by means and position he belonged to the "middle class", as he invited the rich not to be covetous (μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν); this same idea, that Solon's "poetry" shows his sympathy for the middle class, also appears in Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1296a20 δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως. Another problem which is highlighted by Rhodes in Aristotle's presentation of 5.2–5 is that Aristotle's use of ποιήμασι to mean "poems" would have made very little sense, since what follows seems to be an extract from a single poem (immediately after quoting 5.2–5, Aristotle introduces 5.1 as a line belonging to the same poem: καὶ ἐν ἀρχῆι τῆς ἐλεγείας). In fact, ποιήματα can mean "lines" (within a single poem), but this sense of the word is not attested before Dionysus of

Halicarnassus (*de comp.* 3.8 and *AR* 1.41.3; the emergence of this sense of the word ποίημα as "line", and not "poem", may have been facilitated by its connection with ἔπος "epic poetry"/ἔπη "lines", and the Hellenistic distinction between ποίημα "passage" or "short poem" and ποίησις "whole poem" or large "poem"; for more on this, see Dahlmann 1953, 120–123; Ardizzoni 1953, 9–30; Greenberg 1961). It is reasonable to suspect, along with Rhodes 1993, 124, that the quotations (or at least some of the quotations) from Solon that appear in the *Ath.Pol.* did not rely upon his own knowledge of the archaic author, but were already present in his source: at this point in particular, Aristotle's source would have provided more than one quotation (the first being intended to confirm Solon's μεσότης), and in abbreviating his source Aristotle would have retained the introduction, but not the entirety of the quotation which it introduced. But perhaps there is no need to imagine that one or more later citations that documented Solon's social and political "middleness" were lost, passages for example that criticized the responsibility of the poor. The poem including 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} may have provided Aristotle with a text showing the reason why Solon became διαλλακτής between the opposite parties, and how he could be equally critical of both the poor and the rich in his attempt to reconcile them. Together with this poem Aristotle may have quoted 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b, 4c W.^{2} in order to show that, despite belonging to the wealthy class, Solon did strongly criticize them (as Aristotle remarks immediately after in *Ath.Pol.* 5.3, Solon "always ascribes the cause of the dissension to them"). Thus Aristotle may have demonstrated Solon's middle position in the political arena on the one hand through his critique of both the rich and the poor, and on the other hand through his being polemically divorced from the party which ought to have been his own "natural" one by birth, namely the faction of the rich which was greedy and violent, and thus more distanced from the idea of political μέτριον which Solon favored (as was finely argued by Mülke 2002, 170). After all, the "middle" ground about which Aristotle speaks is hardly ever a positive, substantial matter of fact in Solon's poetry, and most often it seems to consist of criticizing the most extreme manifestations of both the rich(er) and the poor(er): cf. Introd. ad 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} If we accept that Aristotle is making a sort of synthesis of 4 and 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} and 4b, 4c W.^{2}, then the phrase ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ποιήμασιν might mean "in this group of poems" (this has already been suggested by Linforth 1919, 133), referring not only to 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b, 4c W.^{2} which is quoted immediately afterward, but also including 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} previously quoted, and thus referring

to Solon's political poems which demonstrate his independence from his original class and his attempt at mediation between the rich and the poor.

It is a fair inference from Aristotle's decisive comment in *Ath.Pol.* 5.2, κοινῆι παραινεῖ καταπαύειν τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλονικίαν, that at some point in the poem from which 4 G.-P.² = 4a W.² derives Solon would have asked the two factions to suspend their hostilities; as Mülke 2002, 161 remarks, Aristotle's καταπαύειν may reflect Solon's language: cf. 3.37 G.-P.² = 4.37 W.² παύει δ' ἔργα διχοστασίης.

Mülke 2002, 161 also correctly observes that in archaic Athens στάσις was mainly internal to the aristocracy. It is likely that Aristotle's reading of Solon was conditioned by the fifth and fourth centuries' reinterpretation of the politics of Solon's age, and we may suspect that—quite differently from the emphasis Aristotle places on Solon's social mediocrity—Solon was not mediating between the rich and the poor classes, but between two or more factions of his own class, where ὑμεῖς/ἡμεῖς was easily banalized by Aristotle as a reference to a plurality of social subjects (hence κοινῆι).

1. The Attic form of the verb γιγν- should be introduced together with γίγνεται in 1.14 G.-P.² = 13.14 W.² (Aristotle has γιν-, which is Ionic from the fifth century BC onwards, and starting from the end of the fourth century also supplanted γιγν- in Attic). γιγνώσκω(ν) is often at the beginning of a verse in epic (*Il.* 8×, *Od.* 7×). Either the accusative participle in l. 3 is being constructed with ἐσορῶν, where γιγνώσκω governs an object or an infinitive in the part of the fragment which is lost (as was most recently argued by Masaracchia 1958, 273), or with both γιγνώσκω and ἐσορῶν, and in this case καί μοι … ἐσορῶν, Solon parenthetically expresses the emotional feeling that follows the cognitive perception (so e.g. Ziegler 1954, 384 f.). The latter construction seems to be preferable. Since ἐσορῶν is governed by the initial and dominant word γιγνώσκω, and is thus in anacolouthon with μοι … κεῖται, to which it is attached in meaning, it seems strange that the infinitive introduced by ἐσορῶν would not also be related to γιγνώσκω. Furthermore, the construction of γιγνώσκω with the participle ὁράω is already well documented in epic, where it is used to designate the first sighting of something: cf. e.g. *Il.* 7.189, 17.333 f., and in particular (where it governs an object plus a predicative participle referring *apo koinou* to both verbs) *Od.* 15.532 ἔγνων γάρ μιν ἐσάντα ἰδὼν οἰωνὸν ἐόντα (also *Il.* 7.189). In many cases where visual and intellectual elements are paired in Homer, the

recognition was considered to follow the viewing (apart from some important exceptions in the *Odyssey*, where the gap between sense perception and knowing/recognizing is displayed): "seeing, while not an absolutely necessary condition for knowledge, seems … at least sufficient for it" (Lesher 1981, 13). Solon adds an emotional element, the response of regret at seeing etc., and lists it in between the verb of knowing and the verb of seeing. Thus, his intellectual γιγνώσκειν turns out to be paired with, but not immediately preceded by, the visual acknowledgement of reality, whereas the latter occurs simultaneously with the emotions. This mediating filter of feelings is most likely similar to the gap between what is deceitfully visible and the more subtle reality, which is often emphasized by archaic thinkers, and by 20 G.-P.[2] = 16 W.[2]

HHom.Dem. 94 f. οὐδέ τις ἀνδρῶν / εἰσορόων γίγνωσκε βαθυζώνων τε γυναικῶν has been considered to be a particularly relevant intertext for Solon, since in this passage the object of the action of seeing/recognizing is Demeter, the goddess of the fields in disguise as an old woman, whom Solon's γαῖαν πρεσβυτάτην may evoke (Vox 1984, 50–57; for a criticism of Vox's excessive inferences, see Mülke 2002, 162).

ἄλγεα κεῖται contains Homeric echoes. The very common hexametrical clausula consisting of ἄλγεα plus a form of πάσχειν is modified by the idea of sufferance "lying" in the soul in *Od.* 24.423 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔκειτο or in *Il.* 24.522 f. ἄλγεα δ' ἔμπης / ἐν θυμῶι κατακεῖσθαι. Both passages relate the sadness of a father over the fate of his sons, and thus may have been intentionally echoed by Solon, with the implication that his own affliction struck him on the level of intimate paternal feelings: cf. Vox 1984, 53 f. φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν (the genitive is governed by ἔνδοθεν) also seems to be a variation on φρένας ἔνδον, which appears 4 × in the *Odyssey*.

2. The sense of the line is made uncertain by the ambiguity of πρεσβυτάτη, which not only means "the most ancient"/"very ancient", but also "the most important"/"very important". Campbell 1983, 94 favors the former meaning, noting that since maltreatment of the old is particularly deplorable, this description of Attica would be particurarly effective; the latter meaning can underlie this one, but only if a "propagandistic" or subjective interpretation is assumed on behalf of Solon, since in reality it is very unlikely that Athens was the most important Ionian city at the beginning of the sixth century. The Athenians' and Ionians' famous common stock occasionally led them to use the ethnic term "Ionians" for "Athenians", from the most likely interpolated Hom. *Il.* 13.685 and 689

onwards (the (pseudo-) Homeric passage was considered to be Solon's model by Heubeck 1987, 142; but it may have been written later). Ἰαονίας can thus be epexegetical here, specifying "land", with the absolute superlative πρεσβυτάτην: Athens would be the "very old" (or "quite important") "Ionian land" (doubtfully, Vox 1984, 50, after Richards 1893, 212, who also unnecessarily emended it to the acc. Ἰαονίαν). It is more likely, however, that Ἰαονίας is partitive gen., and πρεσβυτάτην is a relative superlative, and that this verse contains the first explicit attestation of the common notion that Athens was the city from which the sons of Codrus founded the cities of Ionia, or at least that Athens was the most ancient of the Ionian cities: Pherec. *FgrH* 3F155; Herod. 5.97 and 9.97; Thuc. 1.6, 1.12.4, 1.95.1 f.; Roebuck 1955, 34; Sakellariou 1958, 24–27; Barron 1964, 46–48; Mazzarino 1966, I, 92; Prinz 1979, 373–374; Alty 1982, 2 n. 8, 9 n. 46; Parker 1987, 205–207; Hornblower ad Thuc. 1.95.1; Hall 2002, 69; Gallet de Santerre 1962, 26 f. There is no doubt the definition of "Ionian" in Herod. 1.147.2 as a name for all of those who "are of Athenian descent" (and who celebrated the Apatouria) may also reflect the point of view of fifth century Athens, projecting onto the past her influence on the Ionian cities of Asia. However, despite the considerable scepticism of the past, recent archeological evidence supports the idea that Athens' influence on Ionian pottery dates from a very ancient (proto-Geometric) period, thus vindicating the ancient traditions about Athens' prominent role in the colonization of Ionia: cf. Emylyn-Jones 1980, 13.

The correction of ἐσορῶν γαῖαν in ἐσορῶντ' αἶαν, suggested by Naber and supported by Hude, would get rid of the anacoluthon between the participle and μοι. However, as remarked by Kaibel 1893, 131, epic poetic language appears to use αἶα instead of γαῖα for metrical reasons, and this only occurs at the end of the hexameter.

3. Most of the early editors of the *Ath.Pol.* (first Blass 1892, 572, which was then approved by Keynon in his 1903 edition; Mathieu in the 1922 ed.; Chambers 1990, 162) read καινομένην "killed" in the papyrus of the *Ath.Pol.* (καρφομένην "whithered", suggested by Diels, was paleographically unacceptable). All modern editions, however, with the exception of Chambers' one, print κλινομένην, which was first read by Wilcken 1895, 620. In fact, the verb καίνειν "to kill" is used only in reference to humans (although, of course, the personification of Athens would not be implausible from Solon's emotional point of view), and above all, it is not attested before the fifth century. The slight correction to καιομένην "in flames" (accepted by Hudson-Williams) may appear to be supported by

Lys. 33.7 Carey (ap. Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 30) τίνι ποτὲ γνώμηι χρώμενοι καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, a passage that could have had the Solonian fragment in mind as its model, among others (cf. the περιορῶσιν of Lysias and Solon's ἐσορῶν; Lysias had also just alluded to Solon shortly beforehand in 33.3 ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα: cf. Vox 2000, 199 f.). But the catastrophic hyperbole created by καιομένην in Lysias' description incited Dobree to emend to κακομένην, and led Kern 1918, 220 f. to correct καιομένην to κλινομένην in the Lysian text as well immediately following the publication of the London papyrus of the *Ath.Pol.* The metaphor of falling "prey to the flames" actually seems less likely, even for the troubled Solonian Athens, than that of being "prostrate" (κλινομένην). The latter, which is similar to the image of "falling on one's knees" that appears in athletic jargon (e.g. "Simon." *Anth.Plan.* 24.2 = *FGE* 785), is also used a few times to describe cities or regions: cf. Theogn. 855 f. ἡ πόλις ἧδε δι' ἡγεμόνων κακότητα / ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν; Herod. 6.27 ἐς γόνυ τὴν πόλιν ἔβαλε; Aesch. *Pers.* 929 f. Ἀσία δὲ χθών, … / αἰνῶς αἰνῶς ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται; also Euphor. fr. 19e41 van Groningen and Nonnus 47.668, who used the verb πρηνίζειν, meaning "bring to its knees", for a city.

According to Plutarch (*Sol.* 14.1–3), Solon began his political activity with hesitation, fearing both the "greed" of the poor and the "haughtiness" of the rich (δεδοικὼς τῶν μὲν τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν). According to Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 5.3, however, Solon considered them ὅλως ἀεί and the origin of the ἔχθρα in Athens. Plutarch's assignment of one fault to one class and the other to the opposing class may very well have been a mistake, perhaps conditioned by the emphasis that Plutarch found in Aristotle (or Aristotle's source), on Solon favoring a political middle ground; hence he felt the need to find some fault with the poor, rather than blaming only the rich (so Spahn 1977, 125–127). Alternatively, perhaps Plutarch was conditioned by the argument made by Phanias of Eresos, whom Plutarch quotes immediately before, about Solon cheating both the rich and the poor through ἀπάτη (cf. Mühl 1955; Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 178 f.; David 1985); there may have been some continuity between the deceptive operations which Phanias ascribes to Solon and Plutarch's (and perhaps also Phanias'?) remark about Solon's hesitation and "fear" of the behavior of both classes (he would have deceived both classes, because he feared both). In any case, the φιλοχρηματία makes perfect sense in reference to the rich. At least once Solon underscores that the greed of the wealthy was no less relevant than their arrogance to the genesis of social conflict in Athens (cf. also Balot 2001, 92): the κόρος that is mentioned at 2 f. of our fragment is also attributed to the rich in 3.7–10 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7–10 W.^{2} and 8.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 f. W.^{2} Plato, *Resp.* 391c5 understands that φιλοχρηματία and ὑπερηφανία are behaviors ἐναντίω ἀλλήλοιν, but he does not exclude the possibility that some perturbed spirit could host them both.

The use of the first person plural ἡμεῖς and the verb have been understood as being due to the fact that Solon presented himself as a leader of the μέσοι: cf., e.g., Bowie 1986, 20; for Solon as representative of a group cf. 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2}, where, again, the plural appears to present the speaker as a representative of correct thinking and widely shared opinion. But it is also possible (as already argued by Masaracchia 1958, 276) that ἡμεῖς, which includes Solon and the rest of the Athenians, is intended to highlight the isolation in which the rich, who are designated by the second person plural ὑμῖν, closed themselves up as a result of their hybristic

behavior. In any case, the plural ἡμεῖς remains surprising, since it is the only instance in which Solon implicates others in his project of reforms (Stehle 2006, 89).

The context of this sharp opposition which is drawn between the group for whom Solon speaks inclusively ("us") and the opponents ("you") is unclear. It has been considered to be proof that the source-poem for this fragment was performed publicly before a large crowd of citizens (see e.g. West 1974, 12). Such an audience would have consisted mainly of Athenians who were not sympathetic to Solon's ideas, or who had intervened to condition him in his legislative work or political campaign; Solon would have opposed himself to these ὑμεῖς (with a *pluralis maiestatis* declaring his imperviousness to opposition), or himself and his party, or the *demos*. But we can also imagine a more complex scenario of mimetic dramatization within the spectacle of the symposium. Here Solon could be assuming the role of a popular leader, just as he assumed that of a herald from Salamis in 2 G.-P.[2] = 1 W.[2] By doing so (as was suggested by Vetta 1983, XVIII f.; cf. also Melissano 1994, 53 f.) he would have adopted for his performance one of the expressive forms that we know was typical for sympotic poetry, i.e. an apostrophe *in absentia*: he would fictionally turn to the faction of nobles as if they were present and warn them using terms similar to those with which Alcae. 74 (another poem most probably sympotic) called upon the Mytileneans as if they were before him in the assembly, exhorting them to squelch the tyranny.

The text of the poem from which our fragment was derived may have been behind Aristot. *Eth.Nic.* 1179a: "Solon doubtlessly gave a good description of the happy people when he said that in his opinion those men were happy who, being moderately equipped (μετρίως κεχορηγημένους) with external goods, had performed noble exploits and had lived temperately; for it is possible for people of all but moderate possessions (μέτρια κεκτημένοι) to do what is right" (differently, see Linforth 1919, 213, for which cf. Introd. ad 6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2]); on the fourth century concept of the polis as a community of οἱ μέσοι see Morris 1996.

1. The metrical form of this verse has been produced by scholars through the correction of the different texts of two testimonies. Aristotle's pap. has two accusatives (the first being very lacunose), whose articles are both followed by the correlative τε. These correlative particles have led Jackson and Mayor 1891, 107 to suppose that there was an original poetic text behind Aristotle's passage (τε … τε appears nowhere else in *Ath.Pol.*). Plutarch's text (where the correlatives τε … τε are not present) gives

the two accusatives, φιλοχρηματίαν and ὑπερηφανίαν, which, with the insertion of an elided τε = ϑ' before the second name and the exclusion of the first τε, should be a pentameter: τήν φι[λοχρηματ]ίαν τήν ϑ' ὑπερηφανίαν. A pentameter has also been achieved by retaining the first τε and adopting for the first accusative the shorter synonym φιλαργυρία: τήν τε φι[λαργυρ]ίαν τήν ϑ' ὑπερηφανίαν. However, I agree with Mülke 2002, 170 f. that the poetical flavor of the correlative τε … τε, or the single τε, is balanced by the prosastic flavor of all the possible accusatives, which almost never appear in poetry—although φιλοχρηματία is attested in a hexameter oracle that, according to Diodorus 7.12.5, was given to Lycurgus, and the adjective ὑπερήφανος (already in Hes. *Theog.* 149) appears in 3.37 G.-P.^{2} = 4.37 W.^{2} where it defines the hybristic actions which Eunomia assuages. There is no doubt that the two accusatives may more or less reflect Solon's original text. Reconstructing Solon's actual text, however, is impractical.

2 f. The relative pronoun of l. 3 either defines the ὑμεῖς of l. 2 or explains the reason why Solon addresses an invitation to these ὑμεῖς in l. 4 ("you that have …" or "you, since you have … moderate, etc."). Therefore, the circumstantial phrase ἡσυχάσαντες … ἦτορ of l. 2 heavily separates ὑμεῖς from the relative pronoun. Since the temporal participle expresses the premise behind the moderation which the ὑμεῖς has to reach, this phrase receives priority at the expense of syntactical harshness.

The "tranquillity" that Solon hopes for is the controlled behavior exemplified by the environment of the symposium in Sol. 3.10 G.-P.^{2} = 4.10 W.^{2} Tranquillity was also the opposite of *hybris* in the Hesiodic myth of the races, where the men of the golden race who were "content and tranquil (ἥσυχοι), shared out the fruits of their labors together with many good things" (*Op.* 119), while the men of silver stock lived a short life of pains, because they could not restrain themselves from "*hybris* against each other" (134 f.): cf. Dickie 1984, 84 f.; see also the Introd. ad 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}

The second hemistich of l. 2 contains Homeric echoes: *Il.* 17.111 ἐν φρεσὶν ἄλκιμον ἦτορ (describing the lion to which Menelaus is compared); 20.169 ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίῃ στένει ἄλκιμον ἦτορ (describing the lion to which Achilles is compared); ἐνὶ φρεσί, which occurs more than seventy times in the same position of the line in Homer (on the sense of φρένες, cf. ad 3.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.1 f. W.^{2}). However, instead of the epithet ἄλκιμος, which univocally expresses a positive martial value in epic, Solon uses καρτερός, which was never combined with ἦτορ in Homer; further-

more, this epithet is not used by Solon in its usual positive sense of martial heroism, but here instead it designates strength that has degenerated into arrogance, a sense which is rarely used in epic (see in particular *Il.* 5.757 and 872, or Hes. *Op.* 147). A further clue about the thoughtful and unconventional moulding of the language of the verse is the transitive use of ἡσυχάζειν, which is rarely found elsewhere: cf. Plato, *Resp.* 572a. The result is an exhortation which sounds epic, but which is radically unepic in content, since it suggests that one "soothe" the "strong" spirit, almost as if one could substitute a calmer spirit for the turbulent one. For other examples of the semantic re-connotation/specification of Homeric expressions in light of new notions of morality, cf. below, ad 4 and also ad 1.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.3 f. W.^{2}, 3.9 G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 W.^{2}, 7.5 G.-P.^{2} = 5.5 W.^{2}

The second hemistich of l. 3 possibly reuses Tyrtae. 8.10 G.-P.^{2} = 11.10 W.^{2} ἀμφοτέρων δ' ἐς κόρον ἠλάσατε, which explains the "satiety" of the military flight and chase described in the preceding verse (on the use of ἐλαύνειν in military vocabulary, see Melissano 1994, 54; the rarity of the metaphorical ἐλαύνειν being used absolutely also supports the notion of a direct derivation). Thus, it may be another instance of the way in which the language of positive martial paraenesis is reshaped in Solon's discourse about the excess of power and wealth (the πολλὰ ἀγαθά).

4. Formally the verse may echo Hom. *Il.* 13.732 f. ἄλλωι δ' ἐν στήθεσσι τιθεῖ νόον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς / ἐσθλόν (cf. also *Od.* 2.124). The possibility that the middle form of the verb is being used (as in *Od.* 4.729) accounts for the reflexive character of the initiative requested by Solon: the members of the audience who remembered the Homeric models would have been reminded that opting for the correct behavior was, according to Solon, a choice to be made and not a divine gift, e.g. from Zeus as in the Homeric models quoted above. τὰ μέτρια is the point to which the rich have to orient their minds, as if they were "entrusting" themselves to the sphere of "proper measure", in opposition to the μέγας νόος which the rich had favored before. From this opposition we understand that μέτρια is connoted with a stronger sense here than in its first occurrence in Hes. *Op.* 306, where it was almost a synonym for ὥρια or καίρια (West 1978, 233). This stronger sense of the word would therefore anticipate, or coincide with the later meaning of "moderate", e.g., Theogn. 615 ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέτριον ἄνδρα. A μέγας νόος is usually attributed to the gods in epic, with no negative connotations, cf. *HHom.Dem.* 37; Hes. *Theog.* 36 f.; Pind. *Pyth.* 5.122 (also *Nem.* 6.5); Theocr. 30.30. According to Mülke 2002, 177 Solon would thus be implying that the rich behave towards their fellow

citizens as if they were gods. But the parallel expression μέγα/μεγάλα φρονεῖν "to think grandiose things", is equally used in epic to express the "magnanimity" of heroes without any negative connotations. Both here and in 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} Solon may simply have anticipated the derogatory sense (megalomania, we might say) which was usually implied by writers of prose from the fifth century onward when they used verbs and substantives deriving from the root μεγαφρον- (Bissinger 1966, 307). See most clearly Eur. *TrGF* (13)F257.1 πολλοὺς δ' ὁ θυμὸς ὁ μέγας ὤλεσεν βροτῶν. On the uses of the adjective, cf. also 5.4 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.3 W.^{2}; 9 G.-P.^{2} = 7 W.^{2}

4b–5. γάρ motivates the exhortation of 2–4a by forecasting both that the reaction of the opponents (Solon and his party, or more likely the rest of the citizens: see above) is unavoidable and that "these things" (perhaps the immoderate behavior pointed out in the exhortation, or the actions which would have been described in the following lines) are not going to be "well-suited" even for the rich. ἄρτιος had been one of the key concepts in Solon's presentation of Eunomia in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} The term usually expresses the appropriateness of someone's words or thoughts to their context (cf. ad 3.40 G.-P.^{2} = 4.40 W.^{2}). Therefore, when Solon adopts it here it has an unusual reflexive twist: by continuing in their unmeasured ὕβρις (which is certainly not in tune with the other citizens), the rich would have eventually arrived at results detrimental even to their own interests. As Balot 2001, 92 notes, "if *koros* is the state reached when much prosperity has been won, then this fragment implies that those who possess more than they can handle typically become arrogant to their less prosperous fellows".

6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2}

A new criticism of the negative effects of wealth is united with some of the ideas at the root of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} Solon's preference for the value of *arete* and the refusal of unjust wealth reminds us of the first part of this other fragment, and his emphasis on the instability of wealth reminds us of the second part of it. It is difficult to agree with Plutarch's account, according to which Solon is displaying here his preference for the "poor" over the "rich". It is more prudent to think that the interlocutors of whom Solon speaks, or imagines himself speaking (if we suppose that the occasions for the performance of Solon's poetry was mainly symposia), are the "rich", as Basil has interpreted, or more generally the nobility, wealthy and non-wealthy alike (cf. Stanton 1990, 54). The two distichs are also found with slight variations in the Theognidean corpus, 315–318: for more see Introd. chap. 4.

1. The terms κακοί and ἀγαθοί lend themselves to diverse interpretations. They may designate the distinction—which later became technical political terminology—between the nobility and the commoners. As a consequence of the economic upheaval brought about by the increase in commercial activity, a few nobles became impoverished. The older economy, primarily based on land ownership, had been controlled exclusively by the aristocracy, whereas the new economic order afforded opportunities for profit to a number of non-nobles. Solon would have included himself among the nobility whose position was threatened, thus favoring the traditional system of ethical values in which the newly wealthy, non-ἀγαθοί, had no place. It seems better, then, also to view the opposition between ἀγαθοί and κακοί in an ethical sense when it appears to refer to social classes (Hoffmann 1914, 126–130). ἀγαθοί would refer to those who by their own merit deserve to be wealthy but are not; κακοί to those insignificant people who prosper lacking in merit and ἀρετή. As remarked already by Donlan 1968, 112 f., this last interpretation is particularly likely, because Solon almost always avoids adopting the technical dichotomy ἀγαθοί "aristocrats" / κακοί "non-aristocrats"; in his elegiac poems he prefers to depict the aristocratic class as holders of power or wealth (power and wealth were often qualified as excessive and thus presented in ethically negative terms): cf. 3.7–13 G.-P.^{2} =

4.7–13 W.^{2}, 5.2 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4c.1 f. W.^{2}, 7.3 G.-P.^{2} = 5.3 W.^{2}; also 31.4 G.-P.^{2} = 37.4 W.^{2} (not so in 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}, for which see the Introd. ad loc. and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}). Therefore, in Solon's fragments, as well as in most occurrences in Theognis, ἀγαθός probably has both an ethical and a social/technical sense, and it seems to designate someone who is born into nobility and who has correctly assimilated the aristocratic παιδεία (Cerri 1968, 16–24) and thus demonstrates ἀρετή (= non-commitment to excessive richness), which from l. 3 would appear to be intrinsic to his being ἀγαθός; the κακός is whoever does not belong to this class of "virtuous" nobles (birth matters, but behavior matters more: as Theogn. 577 explicitly says, an ἀγαθός can become κακός, but the reverse is more difficult).

Indeed, criticism of the leading class is much more frequent in Solon than in Theognis, but when the defence of the ἀρετή of the ἀγαθοί is at stake—and not the evaluation of some of their excesses—Solon's voice is pretty much in tune with Theognis' (cf. also below ad 2 f.), and it comes as no surprise that a version of Solon's fragment also reappears in the Theognidean corpus. What seems to be different between Solon's work and other passages of the Theognidean corpus is the evaluation of poverty, and especially of the impoverishment of the rich. In Theognis we find that poverty is the worst situation for an ἀγαθός (cf. 173–176 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν πενίη πάντων δάμνησι μάλιστα, / καὶ γήρως πολιοῦ, Κύρνε, καὶ ἠπιάλου, κτλ.; also 621 πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀτίει δὲ πενιχρόν), or even that an ἀγαθός who has become poor is not ὁμῶς αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός (930). This opinion is in tune with the evaluation of wealth/poverty expressed by Alcae. 360, where the maxim χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἶς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος is defined as "not bad" (the maxim is often restated in various forms between the sixth and fifth centuries: e.g. Theogn. 718 πλοῦτος πλείστην πᾶσιν ἔχει δύναμιν; *skol. PMG* 910; Bacchyl. 10.49–51; Soph. *TrGF* F354.6 f.; Eur. *El.* 37 f., *Phoen.* 442, *TrGF* (7)F95.2).

Solon has his own views about the proper measure of wealth, and although in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} his plea for moderate ὄλβος is not far from this commonly held opinion, in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} he appears to consider greed as being principally responsible for the *hybris* of some members of the leading class. In our fragment, Solon seems to focus more on the ethics of the individual: by reacting against the excessive emphasis placed upon the importance of wealth (and especially of wealth for the ἀγαθός), he opts instead for the belief that losing one's ἀρετή is worse than losing one's richness.

2 f. These verses break the usual link that exists between ἀρετή and wealth (one thinks, e.g., of the prayers of the *HHom.* 15.9 and 20.8 "give me ἀρετή and wealth", of Hes. *Op.* 313 πλούτωι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ, or of Pind. *Ol.* 2.53 ὁ μὰν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος). Instead, Solon presents himself as a man who is virtuous, but who is either not wealthy or who stands to lose his wealth. Cf. adesp. *PMG* 961 οὐ μή ποτε τὰν ἀρέταν ἀλλάξομαι ἀντ' ἀδίκου κέρδους; also Sapph. 148 ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ †ἀρέτας οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος / ἀ δ' ἀμφοτέρων κρᾶσις †εὐδαιμονίας ἔχει τὸ ἄκρον† (the second verse does not appear to be by Sappho).

The construction of διαμείβειν/διαμείβεσθαι with an accusative and a genitive meaning "exchanging something for something else" is extremely rare after Solon (cf. Eur. *IT* 396 f.), and is never attested before him. Thus, it is likely that Solon has in mind the isolated instance of Hom. *Il.* 6.235 f. τεύχε' ἄμειβε / χρύσεα χαλκείων, which describes the unequal exchange between Glaucus and Diomedes of bronze armor for golden, which had become proverbial by the time of Plato: cf. *Symp.* 219a ἀντὶ δόξης ἀλήθειαν καλῶν κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῶι ὄντι "χρύσεα χαλκείων" διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς (where, by the way, the Homeric ἀμείβειν is replaced by the Solonian διαμείβεσθαι).

ἔμπεδος is solemnly epic and was never attested outside of Homer and Hesiod before Pindar and Aeschylus (for its combination with αἰεί, cf. *Il.* 15.683 and Hes. fr. 294.4; on ἔμπεδος wealth, see Solon's idea in 1.10 G.-P.^{2} = 13.10 W.^{2}).

Solon's stance is at least in part similar to Theognis', an aristocrat for whom the ill-gotten riches of the *nouveaux riches* and the resulting social baseness of the ruling class are a constant source of worry. Theognis, however, reacts to the new social instability with indignation at the paradoxical and unnatural lack of correspondence between ethical merits and richness (based on his conviction that some wealth is fundamental to the life of the ἀγαθός: see above ad 1), so that the only option left for the ἀγαθοί to preserve their sense of ἀρετή is a physical separation from the κακοί: cf. 57 f., 149 f., 321 f., 683, 749–752, 1061 f.; Cerri 1968; Nagy 1985, 42–54; von der Lahr 1992, 19–23.

3 f. The idea that "virtue" is the most constant good returns with great frequency in the fifth century, often in comparison to material wealth: cf. Bacchyl. 3.90 f., 13.176–181; Soph. *TrGF* F201d; Eur. *El.* 939–944, *TrGF* (48)F542, (68)F734, inc.fab. F1029 f. On the instability of wealth in particular cf., e.g., Hes. *Op.* 326; Theogn. 157 f.; Pind. *Pyth.* 3.105. Solon's

ἀρετή, as well as ἀγαθοί of 1, do not refer to military prowess or to the skill that promotes success in war, as they do in Homer or Tyrtaeus, but instead they seem to reflect the values of public and private submission to justice, as they also do later in classical Athens. The term ἀρετή, in particular, has a particularly limited and technical sense elsewhere in Solon: cf. 23.8 G.-P.^{2} = 27.8 W.^{2} and 16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2} On (some of) the virtues considered to be useful in a civic context in archaic verse see also Roberton 1997.

The first hemistich of 4 is reused in Theogn. 918 (see Introd., chap. 4); for the second one cf. ad 1.43 G.-P.^{2} = 13.43 W.^{2}

7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}

This fragment may be taken to demonstrate that Solon fell on a specific political line, or it at least shows how he could be believed to have fallen on a political line—a line that, according to Aristot. *Pol.* 1296a18–20 favored the middle class. We do not know how the fragment continues (it is most likely that Aristotle did though), but what the verses quoted by Aristotle demonstrate is, once again, that Solon and his reforms involve primarily two groups: the rich(er) and the poor(er); the third distich in particular shows that Solon stood between the two classes as a διαλλακτής (thus he was not necessarily the representative of a middle class: cf. Introd. ad 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}; Mülke 2002, 182). In particular, Aristotle praised Solon in *Pol.* 1274a15–21 for "assigning to the *demos* the most necessary power" (τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῶι δήμωι δύναμιν), namely the power to elect and control (ἰθύνειν) the magistrates, in order not to have the masses "enslaved and hostile", although he left most of the public offices in the hands of the nobles by excluding the *thetes* from them (cf. also *Ath.Pol.* 7.3). Plut. *Sol.* 14.4 also recalls how the maxim "what is balanced does not provoke war" (τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ) helped Solon to find favor with the rich and the poor alike. A situation which is probably similar to the one underlying Solon's stance in our fragment, is depicted in *Ath.Pol.* 11.2: although both parties would have liked to make him *tyrannos*, he elected to "oppose" both and to "stay far" from both, and in doing so he managed to save Athens. Furthermore, at *Sol.* 18 Plutarch states, in very Aristotelian terms, that Solon wished "to leave all the magistracies in the hands of the well-to-do, as they were, but to give the common people a share in the rest of the government, of which they had hitherto been deprived"; therefore he formalized the four property classes and left the right to belong to the assembly and the juries solely to the last class of the *thetes*—and therefore, to be jurors of the popular courts who could judge the activity of the magistrates: a privilege which "seemed at first of no significance, but afterwards proved to be of the very highest importance". It is for precisely this initiative, according to Plutarch, that Solon claims credit in our fragment. From these sources and their overlapping, we understand that, at least in Aristotle's and Plutarch's opinion, our fragment refers

mainly to Solon's creation of the property classes and the institution of the right of the popular juries to judge the activity of the magistrates. We can also infer that the poem from which our fragment derives may have defined Solon's political action as being in opposition to the prospect of tyranny.

Solon seems to speak retrospectively about his reforms in this fragment, as well as in 8 G.-P.[2] = 6 W.[2] and possibly in 9 G.-P.[2] = 7 W.[2] (the only other retrospective elegiac fragments), nor is there any doubt that, when pointing to an activity that had already taken place, Solon may be referring to concrete facts about his legislation—the case of fragments like 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2], 3 G.-P.[2] = 4 W.[2], 5 G.-P.[2] = 4b–c W.[2], or 6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2], seems different however; these texts belong more to a program for the future and they have a sort of paraenetic indefiniteness. If our fragment reflects a criticism of the institution of the property classes, then the well-weighted γέρας which is bestowed upon the *demos* may refer to the different degrees of τιμή which the different property classes had in terms of property qualifications (provided that γέρας, in particular, can mean granting everyone the right to vote; not "adding" τιμή might mean denying the *thetes* the right to be elected magistrates) cf. Murray 1990c, 141. It is impossible, however, to determine the accuracy of the references made by Aristotle and Plutach, especially since some modern scholars doubt that the popular juries ever had the power to εὐθύνειν the magistrates before the fifth century.

It is also impossible to ascertain whether or not this poem was constructed as a response to a criticism, as γάρ leads us to believe. If so, this criticism seems to have come mainly from the upper class, and thus Solon's answer in this fragment is aimed in their direction (after all γέρας, and less exclusively τιμή, are aristocratic terminology: Mülke 2002, 185; furthermore, the *demos* is not particularly eulogized, whereas the rich are χρήμασιν ... ἀγητοί). Thus, the aristocratic symposium seems to be the most likely place that these verses were performed. The main motivation behind this poem may have been similar to adesp.eleg.50 G.-P.[2] = *IEG* 12 ἐν δὲ διχοστασίηι καὶ ὁ πάγκακος ἔλλαχε τιμῆς, or Theogn. 289–290 νῦν δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὰ γίνεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν / ἀνδρῶν· γαίονται δ' ἐκτραπέλοισι νόμοις: cf. Vox 1984, 59; Mülke 2002, 182. In fact, it was later theorized by Aristot. *Pol.* 1302b 10–14 that: "it is clear what the power of honor is and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either honored or dishonored contrary to what they deserve; it is just

when this is done according to what they deserve" (cf. Cohen 1995, 31, who comments that "envy is thus necessarily divisive, because it involves the will not to outstrip others in the race for glory or prestige, but rather merely to overthrow their relatively greater prosperity. In the political arena, of course, this produces stasis").

The fragment is constructed according to a clever stylistic strategy. The "I" of the narrator is the only acting subject, while both the *demos* and the class of the powerful/rich are the recipients of his actions, as has already been remarked by Mülke 2002, 181 f. Furthermore, after one distich which describes what the *demos* has received (without getting too much), the other describes what the rich have retained (and not been deprived of) without losing too much, and the idea of the final couplet unifies those of the first two couplets so that it appears to be a kind of crown to the whole message (Will 1958, 306). This underscores the 'embrace' with which Solon has defended both classes (from one another, of course), while at the same time preventing either class from an "unjust" victory over the other: thus the only one who emerges from this struggle victorious—and the victory is just and defendable—is Solon.

1. γέρας of *Ath.Pol.* is preferable, because it is *lectio difficilior* than κράτος "force", which is supplied by Plutarch; furthermore, it is difficult to believe that Solon could call what he had provided to the *demos* κράτος (Rhodes 1993, 172), especially since he seems concerned with stressing the limits of his concessions (Lardinois 2006, 28 has even argued that the term γέρας was "the product of fourth century elitists, who liked to portray Solon as a benevolent aristocrat who supported the people but did not give them a real power").

The choice between Plutarch's verbal form ἐπαρκεῖ and the ἀπαρκεῖ of *Ath.Pol.* must also favor Aristotle's text. Because the specific sense of ἐπί, ἐπαρκεῖ means "is strong enough for" (usually used in a situation of danger, hence meaning "helps") and focuses on the needs of the *demos*. On the contrary ἀπαρκεῖ expresses a more objective sense of "sufficiency", and ἀπ- seems to convey the idea of the fulfillment of this sufficiency, and nothing more, for the *demos* (this sense of ἀπό in composition is especially clear in Eur. *TrGF* inc.fab. F892: grain and water should be, but are not, "enough" (ἀπαρκεῖ) for men, and they keep searching for other ways of sating their appetites). As Mülke 2002, 186 remarks, the variants of Plutarch (both κράτος and ἐπαρκεῖ) are adaptations that serve the purpose of Plutarch, according to whom 7 G.-P.[2] = 5 W.[2] confirms that Solon understood the importance of being able

to appeal to the popular juries as a way for the whole *demos* to control the laws. Aristotle's ἀπαρκεῖ and γέρας are also in tune with his presentation of the fragment as showing Solon's middle position, but ἀπαρκεῖ seems more likely to reflect the original. See above on the aristocratic point of view reflected in γέρας; ἀπαρκεῖ also must have sounded much less alarming for Solon's aristocratic audience. The generalizing infinitive form of the verb, already suggested in Herwerden's and Leeuwen's ed. of *Ath.Pol.*, defended by Ziegler 1963, 656 (Brunck had also corrected the ἐπαρκεῖ of Plutarch to ἐπαρκεῖν), and accepted by West, adds a final/consecutive sense to the phrase, which is certainly not uncommon with the correlatives τόσος … ὅσος, and is also suitable to our context, although it is not necessary.

γέρας can mean any type of "privilege", both the sort that one has by nature or circumstance (especially forms of honor rendered to the elderly, the deceased, and the gods), and the sort one acquires and enjoys by virtue of social status (τιμή). The latter includes the privileges of the king or military leaders (for whom there is e.g. a favored treatment in the distribution of the loot). Both types of privilege are often depicted as forms of tribute from the citizens or soldiers, and are therefore usually rendered by people of an inferior status to their betters. The verb διδόναι "to give" is used most often as it appears in Solon, for both the distribution of Iliadic plunder, cf. 1.123, 135, 137, 163, 276, 9.334, 367, as well as the acknowledgement of Arete's regality at *Od.* 7.150 ὅ τι δῆμος ἔδωκεν; see Bottin 1979; Garland 1984–1986.

The case of τιμή in l. 2 is different: it is the "honor" that every individual has within his society, although everyone has this in different quantities (cf. Riedinger 1976, 246 f., 251 f.), according to which a specific γέρας is allotted so that the γέρας becomes proof of that τιμή: cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.355 f. In the case of the kings, their superior τιμή is said to depend on Zeus both in Homer (*Il.* 2.197, 17.251) and in Hesiod (*Theog.* 96).

In any case both γέρας and τιμή are usually assigned (and not only in epic) to individuals by society, gods, or destiny, and not by a human to classes of the society, as happens in this fragment (Mülke 2002, 184). The reorientation of the direction in which the granting of γέρας moves (here it is the *demos* that receives it) is another example of how Solon reuses epic vocabulary (and epic culture): while in most cases he remains formally faithful to the language of Homeric epic, he is semantically very innovative. In this case, the aim of such linguistic maneuvering may have been, as Anhalt 1993, 100 f. observed, the attribution of an especially

important political role to the δῆμος: Homeric society had always made the δῆμος the dispenser, and never recipient, of a γέρας.

This echo of Homeric terminology has another implication for the text. As previously noted, the most frequent episodes where a γέρας is acknowledged in Homer are scenes of distributing booty—the obvious premise being that there is a prize to distribute, as in the instance between Agamemnon and Achilles in *Il.* 1.122–124 (ξυνήϊα κείμενα). By using the word γέρας, Solon may be reminding the exponents of the δῆμος of their debt to him, because political rights were (partially) (re-)distributed and returned to the community as a whole.

ἀφελών: the anger of Achilles in the *Iliad* teaches us how heavy the consequences can be when someone is deprived of his γέρας, especially if this privilege had been allotted by society: 1.161 καὶ δή μοι γέρας αὐτὸς ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς, / ᾧι ἔπι πολλὰ μόγησα, *δόσαν δέ μοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν*, 16.52–54 τόδ' αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἱκάνει, / ὁππότε δὴ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀνὴρ ἐθέλῃσιν ἀμέρσαι / καὶ γέρας ἂψ ἀφελέσθαι (in both cases Achilles speaks while thinking about Agamemnon's abuse of power in the case of Briseis).

ἐπορεξάμενος formally picks up a *hapax* of Hom. *Il.* 5.335 ἔνθ' ἐπορεξάμενος μεγαθύμου Τυδέος υἱὸς / ἄκρην οὔτασε χεῖρα, in which Diomedes is said "to lean forward" in order to strike with his spear. Here, however, the verb seems to mean "to give more", namely the sense which it had in a passage where it was used in the active voice and in *tmesis*, *Il.* 5.224 f. (εἴ περ ἂν αὖτε / Ζεὺς ἐπὶ Τυδεΐδηι Διομήδεϊ κῦδος ὀρέξηι), or, in the active voice but without *tmesis*, in Phoenix, *CA* 2.18. For the use of the middle voice, cf. Sol. 23.6 G.-P.^{2} = 27.6 W.^{2} ἀμειβομένης, for a meaning usually expressed by the active ἀμείβειν; the middle voice might also point explicitly to what the interlocutors/accusers of Solon might believe, namely that "giving more" to the *demos* would have been in Solon's interest. Lloyd-Jones (in Rhodes 1993, 172 f.) interprets the verb in a similar way, but sees it as expressing a different egoistic intention: Solon would not only have avoided subtracting τιμή from the *demos*, but he would not have "leaned forward" or "reached out" to take τιμή for himself, stripping it from the *demos*. Irwin 2006a, 49–51 reads the participle as belonging to a tyrant's platform since "in making such a claim one linguistically alienates power from oneself while ensuring one's role as the guarantor of this transfer, a strategy more characteristic in narratives of tyrants than lawgivers". In fact, Solon's unique position as the only politician capable of bringing just distribution to Athens is a trait which potentially links him with several archaic tyrannical figures. McGlew 1993, 87–123

insightfully analyzes Solon's position by comparing him to other archaic lawgivers and tyrants, especially Pittacus of Mytilene, 94–98. Differently, Balot 2001, 66 suggests that Solon's stance can be considered "egalitarian": as a member of the elite himself, Solon makes demands that actually serve the interests of the non-elite.

From Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 6.2, Plut. *Sol.* 15.8, and *praec.ger.reip.* 807d–e we know that Solon and some aristocratic friends who had supported his policies were accused of pursuing their own personal interests and growing rich because they cancelled their debts (χρεωκοπίδαι), but this accusation was probably a retrospective invention created by the oligarchs of the end of the fifth century (perhaps Critias) to discredit some of the liberal families of their age: cf. Duemmler 1892, 260–265; Rhodes 1993, 128 f. In any case, the correlation οὔτε … οὔτε makes it more likely that the second hemistich of 2 does not implicitly react to a new charge brought against Solon, but that both hemistichs deny types of behavior according to which the quantity of γέρας provided to the *demos* would have been insufficient: cf. Vox 1984, 58.

3 f. The precision is notable with which Solon characterizes the "power" of the ruling class as being connected to its members' wealth in accordance with an idea that was widespread among archaic aristocracies and was reflected in Alcaeus and Theognis: cf. 6.1 G.-P.^{2} = 15.1 W.^{2} On the economic polarization that Solon's poetry suggests, see Lavelle 2005, 73 f.

5 f. This remarkable image must be cross-referenced to the one found in 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}; see also Introd. chap. 5. There is a striking paradox in the notion of a figure who shields both sides, since shields are normally used for protection in conflict against an enemy. The image very effectively reinforces Solon's unique impartiality, and in particular the idea that he has harmed neither party.

8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}

The theme of this fragment is the argument between the *demos*, which most likely means the citizens who are led, in contrast to the leaders, and their leaders. In the "Eunomia" fragment Solon had already spoken about the leaders of the *demos* (cf. ad 3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}). But his perspectives in each of two poems are quite different. In 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, where the theme of wealth prevails, the whole body of citizens (not directly or simply the *demos*) is criticized for being led astray by their ambition to become rich (5 f.), and thus sharing the greed of the leaders of the *demos*. It was mainly the ruling class that was censured for greed and deliberate acts of injustice. On the contrary, in our fragment the ruling aristocracy is in no way considered to be the negative element, and the conclusion that those citizens who are led should be forced to obey their leaders, even if it is not stated outright, is certainly implicit in the poem; in other words, the fragment suggests that Solon was not unhappy with the idea that the proper role of those citizens was to be led.

A reasonable explanation for the difference in attitude is that 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} dates from a stage in Solon's political career—e.g. following his archonship and the reforms of εὐνομία projected in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}—during which Solon felt the threat of potentional anarchy posed by the insubordination of the *demos* no less acutely than the threats of injustice and rapacity among the ruling class (cf. Ferrara 1954, 341–344).

This interpretation may be supported by the fact that *Ath.Pol.* 12 quotes 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}, after 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2} and before 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} In fact, despite the verbal tenses, 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} is in tune with the kind of (re)interpretation of Solon's reforms in terms of a mediation between rich and poor that Solon himself seems to pursue after his reforms, where he justifies them in retrospect. The optative mood and gnomic present of verses 1 and 3 certainly do not have the clear orientation towards the past that is expressed by the aorists of 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}, 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, but nevertheless perhaps here they express a general truth that Solon points out in order to justify his past choices (cf. also ad 3 f.).

It is difficult to determine who the targets are of the warning in 3 f. about the risks of "great wealth". In Homer and Hesiod, ὕβρις and κόρος are almost always connected to the rich and powerful, and so

is the βία (βιαζόμενος, 2); cf. 31.4 G.-P.^{2} = 37.4 W.^{2} μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες. Here, however, I believe (along with, most recently, Santoni 1981) that Solon is not admonishing only the traditional leaders. In 3 f. he has included new leaders, namely the members of the *demos* who have come into money (and power?), like the citizens of 3.6 G.-P.^{2} = 4.6 W.^{2}, who are ready to destroy Athens because they are χρήμασι πειθόμενοι. After all, it comes as no surprise that the author of 153 f. of the Theognidean corpus interprets the meaning of Solon's lines 3 f. in this sense (or rather nudges it in this direction), and that with such a minor substitution (κακῶι, which is either a technical term for plebeian or an ethical term meaning "base/mean", 153, instead of Solon's πολύς, 8.3 G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 W.^{2}) aligns this distich with his many other statements against the new rich (see, e.g., 149 f.). Hes. *Op*. 321–324 εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίηι μέγαν ὄλβον ἕληται, / … οἷά τε πολλὰ / γίνεται, εὖτ' ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσει / ἀνθρώπων, κτλ. points out the risks involved in unjust wealth and the mindset of the new rich (the addressee, Perses, is not one of the unjust *basileis*).

The idea expressed in this fragment was probably the model for the chorus' and Athena's respective warnings in Aesch. *Eum*. 526–537 μήτ' ἄναρκτον βίον / μήτε δεσποτούμενον / αἰνέσηις. παντὶ μέσωι τὸ κράτος θεὸς / ὤπασεν, ἄλλ' ἄλλαι δ' ἐφορεύει. / ξύμμετρον δ' ἔπος λέγω· / δυσσεβίας μὲν ὕβρις τέκος ὡς ἐτύμως, / ἐκ δ' ὑγιείας / φρενῶν ὁ πᾶσιν φίλος / καὶ πολύευκτος ὄλβος. Lines 526–528 μήτ' ἄναρκτον … αἰνέσηι appear to reflect the first distich of our fragment. Also, the consideration δυσσεβίας … ὄλβος certainly reintroduces thoughts expressed by *Ag*. 750–782 (*hybris* descending from wickedness) and *Pers*. 750 f. (impiety as the result of an unsound mind): cf. Sommerstein 1989, 178. However, it is phrased according to a sequence of key words which might be reminiscent of 8.2–4 G.-P.^{2} = 6.2–4 W.^{2} βιαζόμενος … ὕβριν … ὄλβος … μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι (in addition, the following strophe of *Eum*., especially ll. 538–543, recalls the violation of the "altar" of Dike, which was already in *Ag*. 381–384, but which also appeared earlier in Sol. 3.14 G.-P.^{2} = 4.14 W.^{2}). See also Aesch. *Eum*. 696 f. τὸ μήτ' ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον / ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν and our first distich. Eur. *TrGF* 56(F)626.1 f. δήμωι δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσηις κράτος / μήτ' αὖ κακώσηις, πλοῦτον ἔντιμον τιθείς might remind us of our fragment; the memory of Solon, in particular, rather than just the *topos* of moderate democracy, is possible since Euripides' lines 4 f. μηδ' αὖξε καιροῦ μείζον', οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές, / μή σοι τύραννος λαμπρὸς ἐξ ἀστοῦ φανῆι also seem to have in mind Sol. 12.3–6 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3–6 W.^{2} and 15.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 11.3 W.^{2}

1 f. The second hemistich of 1 closely echoes Hom. *Il.* 12.87 and 13.801 ἅμ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕποντο. In these two passages, as often with ἅμα plus the dative, the verb ἕπεσθαι means "to accompany in a somehow subordinate capacity" (*LfgrE* s.v. ἕπομαι), usually in a military context: e.g. in the battlefield, or as a member of a mission or of a contingent participating in a war. Snell 1965, 46 f. has maintained that σύν expresses the idea of parity or equality, whereas ἅμα stresses the idea of a secondary action which is "added" to an autonomous and primary one. Indeed, the only two cases in Homer where ἕπεσθαι is combined with σύν are *Od.* 7.304 μ' (scil. Odysseus) ἐκέλευε σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισιν ἕπεσθαι and 10.435 f. ἵκοντο / ἡμέτεροι ἕταροι, σὺν δ' ὁ θρασὺς εἵπετ' Ὀδυσσεύς, where, as remarked by W. Beck (*LfgrE* s.v. ἕπομαι), Odysseus is certainly not subordinate to handmaidens or to his companions. We cannot rule out the possibility that Solon's σύν is just the 'modern' equivalent of the Homeric ἅμα. But, as in the two *Odyssey* passages quoted above, Solon may be aware that σύν attributes a lesser sense of humiliating subordination to the *demos* that is willing to follow its leaders. This possible divergence from the Homeric model of *Il.* 12.87 and 13.801 also applies if we interpret σὺν … ἕποιτο as a *tmesis* of the fifth century συνέπεσθαι, thus meaning "accord" ("thus would the commons and its leaders best accord": West 1993a, 96). It is less likely that σύν connects the *demos* and its leaders, and that ἕποιτο is used absolutely in the sense "commons and its leaders should let themselves be guided" (Mülke 2002, 195): guided by whom? Solon? But the protagonism of the politician who might present himself as leader of both the *demos* and its leaders is not suited to Solon's customary self-representation.

The word ἀνεθείς "released" may, but does not necessarily, presuppose the hippic imagery of "giving reins to", as in Plut. *Per.* 11.4 τῶι δήμωι τὰς ἡνίας ἀνείς (as was suggested by Campbell 1967, 245; G.-P.² app. ad loc.). Also close, and not as late, is Herod. 2.129 τὸν λεὼν … ἀνεῖναι πρὸς ἔργα τε καὶ θυσίας. On the risk of *hybris* when someone is "released too much", cf. Plato, *PCG* 105 γυνὴ γάρ … ἐὰν δ' ἀνῇς, ὑβριστόν ⟨ἐστι⟩ χρῆμα κἀκόλαστον.

βιαζόμενος is a verb that is well attested in Homer and Hesiod, and βία belongs to Solon's political vocabulary, especially in his poems which probably date to after his legislation (in 29.2 G.-P.² = 32.2 W.², 29^{b}.8 G.-P.² = 34.8 W.² in connection with tyranny, in 31.4 G.-P.² = 37.4 W.² within the class definition μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες). Thus, this verb has been commonly chosen over Plutarch's πιεζόμενος, which is a verb that is not attested before the fifth century.

3 f. Cf. 1.13 G.-P.² = 13.13 W.², 3.5–10, 34 G.-P.² = 4.5–10, 34 W.², and notes ad locc.; on the connection between *hybris* and κόρος see also Theogn. 751 ὑβρίζηι πλούτωι κεκορημένος. The reworking in Theogn. 153 f. and the Hesiodic precedent for these lines (see Introd. above) favors the idea that Solon's criticism here points not only to the ruling class who is affected by κόρος and responsible for *hybris* in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², but also to the new money emerging among the *demos*.

The text remains ambiguous, however, in regard to the question of whether or not those responsible for *hybris* belong to the traditional rich ruling class, the new rich, or both. The first interpretation takes 3 f. mainly with the warning μήτε βιαζόμενος (see most recently van Groningen 1966, 61 and Murray 1990c, 141); the second takes it mainly with μήτε λίαν ἀνεθείς (Linforth 1919, 181). However, I would discourage the notion that the "unbecoming thought" of 4 focuses on the political incompetence of the *demos* as "incapable of being trusted with too much wealth and power" (Mitchell 1997, 142). In this case we would need to suppose that here Solon applies the basic criticism of *hybris* and *koros*, which he has raised against the traditional ruling class, *only* to the new rich. It seems more prudent to suppose that μὴ ἄρτιος … νόος of 4 does not refer only to the new rich as makeshift politicians, but to both the new rich (the equivalent of the ἀστοὶ … χρήμασι πειθόμενοι of 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.²?) and the *demos*' leaders who make up the main target of the fragment. This reading would also pick up and broaden the idea of ἄρτιον being opposed to *hybris* that is depicted at the end of 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² There, among the results that Solon intends to obtain through his *eunomia*, is that it ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει (3.32 G.-P.² = 4.32 W.²), and that under it πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά (3.38 G.-P.² = 4.38 W.²): ἄρτια refers to the "appropriateness" of all the elements of the system to one another and in connection with the system. But the absence of any specific referent makes the sense of ἄρτιος in 8.4 G.-P.² = 6.4 W.² almost absolute—similar to the Homeric ἀρτίφρων and ᾗισι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν, which focus on the good internal connection between words and thoughts, as in the phrase φρεσὶν ᾗισιν ἀρηρώς (cf. ad 3.32 G.-P.² = 4.32 W.²). The greater emphasis which is placed in 8 G.-P.² = 6 W.² upon the subjective aspect of the individual νόος, contrary to the global view expressed in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², is perhaps telling. *If* 8 G.-P.² = 6 W.² reflects the consequences of his legislation, then Solon cannot blame the system in general (which would have been, at least in part, his own), but instead he needs to focus on the faults of individuals.

I agree with Mülke 2002, 198 that τίκτει of 3 belongs to those "visionary presents" that Solon uses to describe the nosology of the city affected by *hybris* (cf. ad 3.17–29 G.-P.^{2} = 4.17–29 W.^{2} and also below): again, in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} it is the nosology of the political system that interests Solon, whereas in our fragment the focus is on the individual.

The difference between Solon's ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις and Theognis' κακῶι is noteworthy: Solon "accepts that a person's mind could not be ἄρτιος regardless of whether this person is κακός or ἀγαθός, and leaves open the possibility that this same person's mind could become ἄρτιος", whereas Theognis "accepts neither the possibility that the mind of an ἀγαθός could not be ἄρτιος, nor that the mind of a κακός could become ἄρτιος" (Anhalt 1993, 96 f.).

πολὺς ὄλβος: this is also a negative idea in 29^b.2 G.-P.^{2} = 34.2 W.^{2}, where some rapacious members of the *demos* are said to wish to acquire ὄλβον … πολύν.

Both τίκτει and ἕπηται personify, by transforming into human-like operations, the causal connections between the emotional status and financial standing of the "men with a not ἄρτιος mind". The same personifying device is found in 1.11–13 G.-P.^{2} = 13.11–13 W.^{2} for the πλοῦτος which is not god sent: ἔρχεται … πειθόμενος οὐκ ἐθέλων ἕπεται. This metaphorical use of τίκτειν is not attested before Solon (although it is sometimes implicit in Hesiod), but it is frequently found in tragedy: in combination with *hybris*, aside from Theogn. 153 and Aesch. *Eum.* 533 f. quoted above (which is also reminiscent of Solon in other ways), cf. *Ag.* 763–771; Pind. *Ol.* 13.10 (ὕβριν κόρου ματέρα); Herod. 8.77.1 (κρατερὸν κόρον, ὕβριος υἱόν); Eur. *TrGF* (34)F437, (34)F438 (ὕβριν τε τίκτει πλοῦτος); Ps.-Plato, *Epist.* 315c5; Ps.-Long. *Subl.* 44. The idea of measurement of a righteous ὄλβος is developed in Sol. 1.1–14 G.-P.^{2} = 13.1–14 W.^{2}

9 G.-P.^{2} = 7 W.^{2}

In *Sol.* 25.6 Plutarch maintains that this pentameter is the principle motivation behind Solon's attempt to avoid the captiousness and censoriousness of the citizens who ask for changes to be made to his newly launched legislation or who demand an explanation of the meaning and purpose of its individual details. In Plutarch's account Solon leaves Athens under the pretense of a long journey abroad (see also 10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2}; more or less the same explanation, but without the quotation of 9 G.-P.^{2} = 7 W.^{2}, is also found in Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 11). If Plutarch's explanation is correct, then in our verse Solon may be thinking over his written laws (cf. 30.20 G.-P.^{2} = 36.20 W.^{2}) in terms similar to Theognis' considerations about the publication of his elegies (19–26): "for me … let a seal, Cyrnus, be placed on these verses. Their theft will never pass unnoticed, nor will anyone take something worse in exchange when that which is good is at hand … but I am not yet able to please all the townsmen (ἀστοῖσιν δ' οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι). It is not surprising, Polypaides, since not even Zeus pleases everyone when he sends rain or holds back": not unlike the poems of Theognis, which, once they were finally published in written form, would have avoided (at least in the hopes of their author) alterations to which they were more susceptible when transmitted orally, the written laws of Solon would also have escaped concessions to this or that social group (cf. Vox 1984, 153–156).

The historical authenticity, however, of the various ancient sources which describe Solon's trips abroad is itself quite questionable (cf. Introd. ad 10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2}). This verse might just as well be a comment on Solon's difficulties in managing his project, even before his archonship. Or alternatively, it might be an echo of the idea that according to Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 5.1 f. was expressed in 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} and 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4b–c W.^{2}, where Solon would have presented himself as a politician that "fights and disputes against each side on behalf of the other". Moreover, the ideal of "being appealing to all" is a firm point for Solon and a trope in archaic Greek culture: apart from Theogn. 19–26 quoted above, cf. 367 f. ~ 1184a–b, 801–804; Pind. *Nem.* 8.38; Bacchyl. 13.202 f.; in general, see Lévy 1985, 58.

1. ἔργμασι γάρ of Plutarch's quotation is not metrical—and indeed, within the context of Plutarch's passage, γάρ seems to be inserted by Plutarch to highlight the explanatory nature of the entire Solonian reference ἔργμασι ... εἴρηκε, which is actually demarcated by parentheses in modern editions; differently, Mülke 2002, 201, argues that γάρ is an erroneous replacement of a different original particle. The athetesis of γάρ as well as one of the two economical corrections ἔργμασιν or ἔργμασι δ' are thus necessary. The suffix -μα, which hints at the idea of the result of an action (cf. ad 1.12 f. G.-P.[2] = 13.12 f. W.[2]), is especially important in this passage: Solon presents his actions as "achievements" (this is not done by chance, e.g., Pindar almost always uses ἔργμα to define the deeds of his heroes).

μεγάλοις also appears to follow the same literary strategy, since it stresses the importance of the affairs with which Solon is dealing, at variance with other archaic passages that express the same thought (Mülke 2002, 201): contrast especially Bacchyl. 13.203 πάντεσσι ... ἐπ' ἔργοις. The epithet μέγας, apart from the extensive sense of size, also commonly conveys qualitative nuances: "great", "important", "solemn", "difficult", but also "overly-great", which involves the idea of excess: cf. Thesleff 1954, 167–170 (this last nuance surfaces in 3.8 G.-P.[2] = 4.8 W.[2], cf. ad loc., and 5.4 G.-P.[2] = 4c.3 W.[2]; 12.3 G.-P.[2] = 9.3 W.[2]). Here, however, Solon adopts the sense of μέγας which is common in the *Iliad*, where size and excess are very seldomly negative values, and μέγα ἔργον is the typical definition of the heroic deed: Griffin 1987, 86–88.

χαλεπόν plus an infinitive to designate a difficult but necessary task also appears in 20 G.-P.[2] = 16 W.[2] This must have been typical of the archaic gnomic phrasing: e.g. "Pittacus", *VS* 10.2 (p. 62.11), Heracl. *VS* 22B85, Democr. *VS* 68B79 and 236.

10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2}

According to Herod. 1.29f., Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 11.1, and Plut. *Sol.* 25.6–26.1, Solon travelled to Egypt during the ἀποδημία, i.e. during his journey abroad after his archonship and legislation, which lasted ten years—the span of time in which, according to the *Ath.Pol.* 7.2, this legislation legally had to remain untouched. If Solon's trips really were concentrated into a single decade, then the strong *Odyssey* imagery of 11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2} might have a very concrete and obvious motivation. But it is also possible to read this the other way around, where 11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2} with its *Odyssey* aura may have helped to birth the decennial ἀποδημία.

As a pretence offered to his fellow citizens, Solon cited the opportunity of visiting new countries, sightseeing (θεωρία: Herodotus), "sea-trading" (ναυκληρία: Plutarch), or trading and visiting (κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἅμα καὶ θεωρίαν: Aristotle) as the reason for his journey. If we interpret the term θεωρία in a sense independent of the one used to denote an opposition to commerce in Aristotle's narrative, we allow for a reading in which Solon adapts the religious undertones of the word to fit his role as a recently retired legislator; the religious conventions of the word might also allow him to achieve the goal of his departure (to keep his laws unchanged). In particular, Ker 2000, 317–329 argues that by refusing to change or explain his laws (Plut. *Sol.* 25.6), the legislator presents himself in the role of the ideal oracular θεωρός who acts as a civic guardian whose duty is not to add nor to substract from an oracle that he conveys to the city (on which cf. Theogn. 805–810), and whose "laws are thus analogous to the sacred utterances of an oracle, except that it is Solon himself who has uttered them". Furthermore, in Solon's narrative, his departure from the city of Athens—which has the function of imposing the permanence of the new laws on the city—is another element of θεωρία, since it adheres to the civic restrictions in Athens during the Delos θεωρία, which refer to the purification of the city and the avoidance of disturbance until the ship has reached Delos and returned again (cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 58bc); on θεωρία and peace see Rutherford 1995: 279 and 1998: 141–145.

Solon's theoric departure, however, is much longer than the Delos θεωρία: Solon's ten-year self-imposed "exile" from Athens has a precedent in Hes. *Theog.* 793–804 where a god who breaks an oath after swearing by

the Styx is banished for nine years, to return in the tenth: see West 1978 ad *Theog.* 636. Thus, Solon's narrative may be a creative blend of more than one tradition: for more on the tenth day or the tenth year being the time for a decisive event to occur, see Germain 1954, 13 f.

From a practical point of view, Solon's departure from Athens also relates to his role as a source of power which aimed at reducing, up to a point, the inequality among the classes and the rivalry among the factions, but which could easily become tyranny in favor of just one faction (as 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2} prove): "Solon's presence at the center is healthy only to the extent that it presupposes his ultimate absence" (Ker 2000, 323).

A stay in Egypt is also attributed to Solon by Plato, *Tim.* 21 f. In another passage, Herodotus explains that the law against idleness (which condemned to death anyone unable to demonstrate his ability to support himself financially), which he ascribes to Solon, was an imitation of a law passed by Amasis (2.177); therefore, in this second passage Herodotus seems to believe that Solon travelled to Egypt before making his legislation. Most likely, however, Amasis neither passed such a law nor influenced Solon to pass such a law, if the Athenian νόμος ἀϱγίας was really Solon's initiative: Herodotus' belief appears to be a fictitious reconstruction, based simply upon the fact that Amasis himself was the most important figure of Pharaonic Egypt interacting with archaic Greece (he was even worthy of the title φιλέλλην starting from at least 545 BC, whereas before that date he seems to have been hostile to the Greeks—a chronology that makes his personal acquaintance with Solon even more unlikely), or upon Herodotus' habit of dating events back to the age of Amasis: cf. Hammond 1955, 396; Wallace 1983, 87 f. After all, Herod. 2.178 f. connects the philellenism of Amasis precisely to the fact that he was the one who presented the Greeks with the land for the construction of Naucratis, which is most likely the setting of our fragment. However, it could also be the case that the entire story of Solon's trip to Egypt after the legislation was fabricated by Herodotus, and that all the journeys ever taken by Solon at different times in his life were amalgamated into this long hypothetical one: cf. Podlecki 1976; Rhodes 1993, 170; Wallace 1983, 88 f. After all, when making reference to the Peripatetic Hermippus (fr. 7 Wehrli), Plutarch speaks of a series of voyages made by a young Solon (trips which neither Herodotus nor Aristotle mention), and Diog. Laert. 1.50 dates Solon's trips to the time of Pisistratus' seizure of power. Thus, the (or *a*) visit to Egypt could have been included in one of these different voyages: cf. most recently Alessandrì 1989, 191–215, and for

the chronology of Solon's travels see also Alessandrì 1977–1980; Reeker 1971; Markianos 1974.

In principle, our fragment might also be the *incipit* of a narrative *topothesia* concerned with other characters, and it is possible that the entire tradition concerning the sojourn of Solon in Egypt is only a later inference from this verse or the poem that once contained it, implemented by the widespread *topos* of Egypt as the source of a large part of Greek culture (see e.g. Froidefond 1971), and in particular of the "voyages of instruction" in Egypt which were imagined for various Greek wise men and philosophers of the archaic period, e.g. Alcaeus, Thales of Miletus, Pythagoras: cf. Lloyd 1975, 55–57; Müller 1997; Zhmud 1997, 57–64.

Solon's poetry, however, usually has an autobiographical concern, and Naucratis would have been an interesting location for Solon for more than one reason. Trade was Solon's "pretext" for his trip to Egypt according to Aristotle and Plutarch; and it is beyond any doubt that Naucratis was a common target of Greek traders in the early sixth century. Famous is the case of Charaxus, Sappho's brother, who had sailed to Naucratis as a dealer of wine and bought the freedom of the celebrated Rhodopis or Doricha at the *emporion*. Furthermore, this sort of Shanghai of the ancient world (so Braun 1982, 38) must really have been a melting pot of cultures (Greek and Egyptian in particular), and thus it would have been a very likely target for Solon if his *apodemia* was the opportunity for θεωρία, the pleasure of getting in touch with different peoples and cultures: according to Herodotus, Milesians, Samians, and Aeginetans had temples in the city, and the Hellenium for Apollo, dating from the age of Amasis, was erected at the expense of four Greek Ionian cities, four Dorian cities, and the Aeolian Mytilene, and all these Greeks lived there side by side with the Egyptians. Therefore, apart from the problem of the chronology of the Solonian trips, it would be overly sceptical to doubt Plutarch's claim that Solon "spent time" (διέτριψεν) in Naucratis.

Naucratis was a city, or rather a large commercial post (on the early history of Naucratis, cf., e.g., Austin 1970, 22–33; Boardman 1999, 118–132; Möller 2000, chap. VI.2–3), situated on the Canopic branch of the Nile, some fifty miles from the sea and ten from Sais, the capital of the kings of the sixteenth dynasty. Archaeologists nowadays agree that Naucratis was, as Herod. 2.97 says, on the east bank of a canal branching off from the Canopic arm of the Nile (Möller 2000, 115 f.)—which would explain Solon's ἔγγυθεν. The Greeks inhabited it starting from at least 630/10 BC (despite what Herodotus says about Naucratis' land being a gift from Amasis to the Greeks, cf. above).

A close parallel to Solon's text is *GVI* 33.12 = *SGO* 01/20/08 (which dates to the beginning of the second century BC): Ν̣είλο̣υ̣ τ̣' ἐ̣ν̣ π̣ρ̣οχοαῖς Ναύ̣κ̣ρ̣α̣τ̣ι̣ν̣ ε̣ἰσ̣ά̣[μ]ενοι. As Peek 1966 has already observed, the first hemistich of this pentameter provides strong evidence for the reception of Solon's poetry. The second hemistich would also confirm the identification of Naucratis as the city to which Solon alludes, if Ναύκρατιν were legible on the stone, instead of being a reconstruction by Peek. However, the identification of the place is not in question, since the only other relevant settlements of the Greeks in Egypt in the sixth century appear to have been Daphnae, on the Eastern edge of the Delta of the Nile, and thus opposite to the Canopic Delta in the West, and Memphis, which was not on the Delta (Austin 1970, 19–22, 33 f.; Boardman 1999, 133–141).

One should not overlook the possibility that the author of the inscription independently composed a hemistich similar to Solon's. This hypothesis is especially plausible since the phrase N(ε)ίλου προχοαί also occurs in Aesch. *Supp.* 1024 f.; Aristoph. *Nub.* 272; Strabo 2.5.25; and the two late inscriptions (respectively from Ephesus and Rhodus) *IEph.* 1177.1 = *SGO* 03/02/53.1 and *IG* XII.1, 144.4. The epigraphical poet might also have departed from the same model which Solon himself is likely to have used, namely *Il.* 17.263 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἐπὶ προχοῇσι διιπετέος ποταμοῖο (the beginning of a simile describing the clash of sea-surf and a river), where ἐπὶ προχοῇσι appears in the same position as it does in Solon, before the caesura in the third foot. A schol. to *Il.* 17.265 recounts that Solon, μιμησάμενος τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν ἐν ἅπασιν, was so struck by the vivid sound of the simile in 17.263–265, that he wanted to burn his own "thoughts" (σκέμματα). The anecdote is of course a fiction: in fact, the other schol. to 17.263–265 attributes the same reaction of "burning his ποιήματα" to Plato, despite the fact that Plato was not a poet. In the case of Solon, however, we know that he probably wrote poem 10 with the simile of *Iliad* 17.263–265 in mind, and the anecdote which concerns him may have had scholarly roots, originating in the scholiast's awareness that Sol. 10 G.-P.^{2} = 28 W.^{2} imitates *Il.* 17.263.

Before leaving Cyprus, Solon bids farewell to the king of the city of Soloi. Herod. 5.113 gives an account of Solon's trip to Cyprus and points to the existence of epainetic poetry written by Solon for the king of Cyprus, Philocyprus, to which our verses probably belong.

Solon has been said both to have contributed to the foundation and to have given name to Cypriot Soloi—while being a guest of king Philocyprus (this form of the name is found in Herod. 5.113 and Plut. *Sol.* 26.2) or Cypranor (*Life of Aratus I* = schol. Arat. p. 7.18 f. Martin)—, or alternatively to a Cilician Soloi; Solon's eponymies of the Cypriot or the Cilician Soloi are also recorded in *P.Oxy.* 680, which dates to the second half of the third century AD. The Solonian eponymy of the Cilician Soloi is, however, the oldest attested one, in Euphor. fr. 3 van Groningen; cf. also Diog.Laert. 1.50 f.; schol. Plato, *Resp.* 599e Greene; on the agenda of the Cilician story, which is almost unanimously cited as the origin (*aition*) of the grammatical phenomenon of solecism (the exception being *Anth.Pal.* 11.146 in which solecisms are associated with Cyprus), see Irwin 1999. All of these eponymies may have just originated from the similarity between this toponym and the name of Solon, and they could very well be the result of the Hellenistic taste for κτίσις traditions (and inventions): cf. Gallo 1976. From a linguistic perspective, it is unlikely that either this Cypriot Soloi, or the other Soloi of Cilicia, was named after Solon. As for the Cypriot Soloi, the city existed with this name a century before Solon's visit, since it is mentioned as "Sillu" in the prism inscription of Asarhaddon (*RE* s.v. "Soloi"). Furthermore, Herod. 5.113 certainly makes no allusion to Solon being eponymous of the Cypriot city. Further evidence of this tradition's dubiousness is the fact that the Solon who was eponymous of Soloi was considered by others not to be the Athenian Solon, but rather an obscure Solon from Lindos; cf. especially *Life of Aratus III* (schol.Arat. p. 14.6–9 Martin) and Strabo 14.5.8 (671); in Euphor. fr. 3 (about the Cilician Soloi) it is difficult to tell which of the two Solons the author is citing (see, however, Gallo 1976, 31 f. who argues in favor of the Athenian one); Plut. *Sol.* 26.3 f. and *Life of Aratus I* (schol.Arat. p. 7.14–24 Martin) undoubtedly speak of the Athenian Solon.

Plut. *Sol.* 26.2 f. recounts that Solon persuaded the king to abandon the previous city, Aipeia, which had a mountainous location, and build

a new one in the fair plain close by: "he also remained and took charge of consolidating the new city (ἐπεμελήθη τοῦ συνοικισμοῦ), and helped to arrange it in the best possible manner both for convenience of living and for safety. The result was that many colonists flocked to Philocyprus (ὥστε πολλοὺς μὲν οἰκήτορας τῶι Φιλοκύπρωι προσελθεῖν), and he was the envy of the other kings".

While the precise chronology of Solon's travels remains wildly uncertain (cf. Introd. ad 10 G.-P.[2] = 28 W.[2]), there is a broad consensus that the voyage to Cyprus took place after Solon's archonship (thus between 569 and 560 according to Markianos 1974, who accepts from Herodotus that Solon met Amasis and Croesus, and therefore dates his archonship and reforms to 570s—certainly Solon could not have met Amasis, Croesus or Philocyprus any earlier; the son of Philocyprus was still alive in 497, as we know from Herod. 5.113). There is a chance that Solon visited Cyprus during his stay in Egypt; in this case, the trip to Cyprus may have taken place on his way to Athens from Egypt, since Athens appears to be the destination of the sailing which Solon is about to start in the poem. In fact, it is precisely from about 560 that the island became a new frontier of the Egyptian expansion, when Amasis occupied it (although he left in power the Cypriot kings who were prepared to pay a tribute). In any case, the sixth century also brought Cyprus closer to the Greek world, since the Greek presence at Tarsus, Al Mina, and the Greek trading posts in Syria brought many more Greeks through Cyprus (cf. Karageorghis 1982, 64–68). Solon's interest in the island might therefore be unrelated to the Egyptian conquest.

The doubtfulness about whether Solon is eponymous of Soloi (see above), the fact that the most ancient source for this is Euphorion, who speaks of a Cilician Soloi, and the absence of 5 f. from the text transmitted by the *Life of Aratus I* have all led scholars to question the authenticity of the third distich of our fragment. This is especially the case because these verses begin with the word οἰκισμῶι, which hints at some kind of foundation, and thus these verses might have been added later in the wake of this legend (so, e.g., Sykutris 1928; Wilamowitz 1929, 459 f. was the first to defend the authenticity of the distich). However, there is no compelling reason to doubt the historical accuracy of the account of Philocyprus' re-foundation of Soloi sometime in the sixth century: we can think of e.g. Gelo's resettling of the inhabitants of Camarina and the distinguished citizens of Megara in Syracuse, for which cf. Herod. 7.156. Furthermore, the connection of Solon to the Cilician Soloi may have been fabricated directly by Euphorion, or in Hellenistic times, when the city became more

famous, e.g. for giving birth to the poet Aratus (Gallo 1976, 34). In any case, as Masaracchia 1958, 83–87 and 288 emphasizes, the text of Solon itself does not provide any reason for connecting this resettlement with his actual participation in it and (therefore) with his own name—such participation and eponymy may instead be an integrative impletion made by one of the Peripatetics who wrote the lives of Solon, like Phanias or Hermippus (see most recently Momigliano 1971–1975, 41; differently, see Wehrli 1974, 105), or some Atthidographer: Athenian propaganda had, for instance, made the Athenian Phalerus and Acamas (the sons of Theseus) the founders of Aipeia, and Demophon the founder of Soloi itself: cf. Plut. *Sol.* 26.2 and Strabo 14.6.3. Finally, the fact that οἰκισμῶι of 5 designates a (re-)foundation does not necessarily imply that Solon had some role in it as much as it implies that emphasis on the *ktisis* motif was very fashionable in choral poetry of the sixth and fifth centuries, for which one can speak of a real and true "poetics of colonization": cf. e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.60–63 (Etna), 5.72–81 (Cyrene), *Ol.* 7.27–33 (Rhodes); Bacchyl. 11.64–72 (Tiryns); see also ad 30.8 G.-P.² = 36.8 W.² and Dougherty 1993.

This fragment is surely one of Solon's most rhetorically ambitious pieces, conforming to its dignified function of a farewell to a king. It displays the characteristics of what the ancient rhetoricians called συντακτικός and is articulated with motifs already expressed in the leavetakings of Odysseus from Arete and Alcinous in Hom. *Od.* 13.38–46 and 59–62: cf. Men. Rhet. 430.10–434.9. Bartol 2001, 14–16 argues that here Solon uses elements which traditionally make up a hymn; however, at least some of these elements (e.g. the formula ἀτὰρ ἐμέ which indicates the transition to another theme) belong to the form of the συντακτικός, as the quotation in Menander Rhetor from Odysseus' taking leave of Alcinous in the *Odyssey* shows.

The literary value of this fragment is most evident in the way in which Solon presents his reasons for leaving, imitating, but also consciously departing from, the model of the *Odyssey*, particularly at 13.38–46 (for a possible, though speculative reason as to the revelance of the *Odyssey* imagery in relation to the ἀποδημία, see Introd. ad 10 G.-P.² = 28 W.²). Solon openly alludes to the model of the "goodwill wishes", which Odysseus formulates twice: once on the day of his arrival to Scheria when he announces to Alcinous that he cannot marry Nausicaa but must instead leave the Phaeacians and go home, and again when he asks Alcinous to escort him home after he tells of his wanderings. In both cases he expresses the hope that the king, his family,

and the city might enjoy an enduring well-being which is presented in connection with Odysseus' own safe return home: Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἴθ', ὅσα εἶπε, τελευτήσειεν ἅπαντα / Ἀλκίνοος· τοῦ μέν κεν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν / ἄσβεστον κλέος εἴη, ἐγὼ δέ κε πατρίδ' ἱκοίμην, *Od.* 7.331–333; πέμπετέ με σπείσαντες ἀπήμονα, χαίρετε δ' αὐτοί. / ἤδη γὰρ τετέλεσται ἅ μοι φίλος ἤθελε θυμός, / πομπὴ καὶ φίλα δῶρα, τά μοι θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες / ὄλβια ποιήσειαν· / ἀμύμονα δ' οἴκοι ἄκοιτιν / νοστήσας εὕροιμι σὺν ἀρτεμέεσσι φίλοισιν. / ὑμεῖς δ' αὖθι μένοντες ἐϋφραίνοιτε γυναῖκας / κουριδίας καὶ τέκνα· θεοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν ὀπάσειαν / παντοίην, καὶ μή τι κακὸν μεταδήμιον εἴη, *Od.* 13.38–46. There is, however, a substantial variance from Odysseus' longest speech at 13.38–46, which reveals Solon's personal intention to deal with Philocyprus as an equal—an intention which is also apparent from the balance of pronouns (you, I) in the first and second distich, and the good wishes expressed in the last distich for both the king and himself. Instead of asking Alcinous and the Phaeacians to "send me off safely (ἀπήμονα)" (*Od.* 13.39), in the second distich Solon prays to Cypris to do the same (as Cairns 1972, 41 has already remarked): the focus of the prayer is shifted from a temporarily superior human (Alcinous) to a god, so that little doubt remains about whether Solon and the Cypriot king are equals. Even the invocation of Aphrodite serves to put Solon and his addressee on par; Aphrodite is the protector goddess of Cyprus (Cypris is the name by which she is called at 4, and the goddess is Κυπρογένεια "born on Cyprus"), from whom it would be more than natural to request prosperity and κῦδος for the new city (5); but she also is the protector of navigators, from whom Solon asks for a safe return home (numerous epithets refer to her in this role: Εὐπλοία "of good navigation", Λιμενία "of the harbor", Γαληναίη "of the calm (sea)" etc.: cf. Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 433–437; see also Sapph. 5, quoted below ad 3 f., where Cypris is invoked to ensure Charaxus, Sappho's brother, with a successful journey back home).

Solon also alludes to the model of the "apologies" and "regrets" that one should leave the host, which Odysseus formulates both when announcing to Calypso that he will leave her in the *Odyssey*, despite their love-story and her promise of immortality to him (*Od.* 5.209), and later at his departure from Alcinous in *Od.* 7, who felt such an affection for Odysseus that he even promised him the hand of Nausicaa (*Od.* 7.311–315). Furthermore, both the island of Calypso and the Phaeacians' Scheria were earthly paradises (*Od.* 5.73 f. and 7.86–132). Cyprus itself was also an illustrious island (at least in the classical age it was considered to be a sort of paradise: cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 402–416). Solon can be imagined

to be saying that despite all this he must set out on his return voyage (νόστος) to his homeland (πατρίς); Odysseus had told Calypso that he wished οἴκαδέ τ' ἐλθέμεναι καὶ νόστιμον ἦμαρ ἰδέσθαι, *Od.* 5.220), and then told Alcinous that he needed to return to his own land (ἐγὼ δέ κε πατρίδ' ἱκοίμην, *Od.* 7.333). Finally, ἀσκηθής is a key word for Solon's *nostos*, just as it is for Odysseus' (*Od.* 5.144, 168): through his prayer in the second distich that Cypris let him reach ἀσκηθής his fatherland, Solon expresses his awareness of the dangers of the sea voyage, recalling the fears that Odysseus expresses before leaving Calypso (cf. *Od.* 5.221–224); when he departs from the land of the Phaeacians, Odysseus does not express his fears, but they are, in a way, anticipated and assuaged in Alcinous' assurance of his sailors' skill, etc. (cf. *Od.* 7.318–328).

1 f. The second hemistich reuses Hom. *Il.* 2.343 πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' (ἐόντες), *Od.* 4.594 ~ 15.68 (μὴ) … πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' (ἔρυκε/ἐρύξω), and 15.545 πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδε (μίμνοις), combined with the participle ἀνάσσων which occurrs here, as it always does in Homer, at the end of the verse.

ναίοις second person singular refers to both the king and his descendants. The verb agrees in person or number, or both, (as it does here) with only one of two subjects when this one is emphasized, or when the two subjects form a sort of unity (cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.255 ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες; Kühner-Gerth I.79–82). Both explanations apply to our verse.

Dynastic continuity was so vital to the Greek concept of monarchy that according to the Simonides of Xen. *Hier.* 11.14 a good ruler should consider his sons the same as his soul.

3 f. Cf. Sapph. 5.1 f. Κύπρι καὶ] Νηρήιδες ἀβλάβη[ν μοι/τὸν κασί]γνητον δ[ό]τε τυίδ' ἴκεσθα[ι, where the poetess wishes her brother Charaxus a safe voyage home: this might have been a particularly relevant model if Solon stopped at Soloi on his way back home from Egypt (see Introd. ad 10 G.-P.[2] = 28 W.[2]). But the models for Solon's phrasing again come from the *Odyssey* (Alessandrì 1977–1980, 190 f.): (ἀπὸ νήσου) ἀσκηθῆ πέμποι of 4 and νόστον πατρίδ' ἐς ἡμετέρην in 6 are phrases likely to recall Odysseus and Calypso in *Od.* 5.26 = 144 ὥς κε μάλ' ἀσκηθὴς ἣν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἵκηται (~168) and 5.263 πέμπ' ἀπὸ νήσου δῖα Καλυψώ, or at least have an Odyssean flavor: cf. *Od.* 9.79 καί νύ κεν ἀσκηθὴς ἱκόμην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν and 15.65 ἤδη νῦν μ' ἀπόπεμπε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν (Telemachus addresses Menelaus, and Menelaus

responds in ll. 68–85 with a long discussion about the necessity for a host to grant leave to his guest when his guest wishes for his νόστος). Solon's ἀσκηθῆ πέμποι focuses on the moment of arrival, "may Cypris escort me so that I arrive safe and sound" (in fact, normally one arrives, not leaves, "safe and sound"), with a sort of sentimental *prolepsis* of the moment when his return will finally be fulfilled, which is similar to the anticipation of a safe and sound arrival expressed by Odysseus in *Od.* 5.26 and 9.79.

The name Cypris (4) does not frequently appear in epic (five times, all in book 5 of the *Iliad*, and once in the *Hymns*), and the fact that it is never accompanied by an epithet leads us to suspect that it was less traditional in epic language than her other two names, Aphrodite and Cythereia (cf. Boedeker 1974, 18–22 and Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 310–318). The epithet ἰοστέφανος (on which see Cook 1900) is also "modern" and is attested for the first time here in reference to Aphrodite; it may also be used of her in *CEG* 368 (600/500 BC? or 500?) or *HHom.Aphr.* 175 and 6.18, but in both hymns the variant ἐϋστέφανος, "of the beautiful garland" of *Od.* 8.267, 288, 18.193 etc. is also attested.

In his prayer to Aphrodite Solon joins the requests for his own safe return and for her to show favor towards the city and the king. The connection between the good of a calm voyage and the good of prestige is also drawn in Pind. *Pyth.* 1: in the poem there is a strong and continuous connection drawn between the celebrations of the chariot victory of Hiero and the foundation of Aitnai, and in 29–40a the ovelapping of the two *laudandi*, city and Hiero, is particularly strong: at the end of this section, the wish that Hiero's present victory be a good omen, or even a portent of long lasting prosperity for the city, is expressed through a metaphorical comparison to a favorable wind behind a departing sea traveller, which can ensure the safety of the whole trip (33–38): ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρώτα χάρις / ἐς πλόον ἀρχομένοις πομπαῖον ἐλθεῖν οὖρον· ἐοικότα γάρ / καὶ τελευτᾶι φερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν, ὁ δὲ λόγος / ταύταις ἐπὶ συντυχίαις δόξαν φέρει / λοιπὸν ἔσσεσθαι στεφάνοισί ν⟨ιν⟩ ἵπποις τε κλυτάν / καὶ σὺν εὐφώνοις θαλίαις ὀνυμαστάν. This image of the safe sea trip may have originated within Pindar's mind. But, if Pindar had in mind 11 G.-P.^{2} = 19 W.^{2}, with its open reference to a (re-) foundation, οἰκισμῶι, then there may have been an intertextual motivation behind the genesis of Pindar's imagery.

5 f. οἰκισμός is first attested here, where it provides evidence of the fashion of the culture of colonization (see Introd. above). Instead of this word,

Plut. *Sol.* 26.3 quoted above uses the term συνοικισμός, which designates the foundation of a city by people of more than one city and which specifies that "many inhabitants" from other cities joined Philocyprus and the new city (πολλοὺς … οἰκήτορας *συν*ελθεῖν), thus provoking the jealousy of other kings. This information cannot be an inference from the text of Solon, and may thus—in principle—be correct. In this case, we would have to take Solon's οἰκισμός as the poetic equivalent of Plutarch's συνοικισμός (cf. Casevitz 1985, 100).

The phrase χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι ἐσθλόν also has clear Homeric models: especially *Od.* 15.320 χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζει and *Il.* 4.95 χάριν καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο, which are varied by the intensification of the notion of prestige through the use of the adjective ἐσθλός, suggested by the very common Homeric construction κλέος ἐσθλόν (κλέος is a synonym of κῦδος). An epithalamium of the Imperial age (see PRyl. 1.17, *GDRK* 1.1 Heitsch σοὶ χάριτες γλυκεραὶ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδ[ε]ῖ) and Greg.Naz. *Carm. ad alios*, *PG* 62.1472, 5 ἐπ' ἐμοῖς ἑτάροισι χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζειν may be modelled on Solon, and thus provide evidence for the reception of Sol. 11 G.-P.² = 19 W.² in eulogistic poetry.

12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}

In *Ath.Pol.* 14 Aristotle maintained that Solon unsuccessfuly tried to oppose Pisistratus; he spoke against his request for a bodyguard, claiming to be "wiser than those who failed to realize that Pisistratus was aiming at tyranny, and braver than those who realized it but kept quiet about it". He then displayed his arms in front of his door and said that he was too old to continue helping his country as much as he had, but asked the others to intervene on behalf of Athens as he had done.

This report includes no quotation from the fragments of Solon to support it, and above all it does not hint at Solon warning the Athenians about the danger of Pisistratus' emergent power before Pisistratus' request for bodyguards. On the other hand, an anonymous prose treatise which probably dates from the early third or late fourth century BC (*P.Oxy.* 664) includes notice of these warnings, since it states that "before Pisistratus seized the government (Solon) went abroad; for his warnings to the Athenians that Pisistratus was aiming at tyranny failed to convince them (ἐπεὶ δὴ προλέγων Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι Πεισίστρατος ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι πιθεῖν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἦν δυνατός)". However, 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}, 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}, and 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} are all presented in their testimonies as warnings made by Solon in response to the tyranny of Pisistratus: the first two fragments are said by Diodorus and Diogenes respectively to be anticipatory warnings (both authors use the same verb προειπεῖν: a common source?); 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} could have been written while Pisistratus was seizing power (according to Plut. *Sol.* 30.3), or when he was already a tyrant (according to Diog.Laert. and Plut. *Sol.* 30.8). Thus, Solon would have reacted, in principle, to the first coup d'état of Pisistratus in 561/560 (Plut. *Sol.* 30.3 connects 15.5–7 G.-P.^{2} = 6.5–7 W.^{2} to the episode of the concession of a personal bodyguard to Pisistratus, which was the premise for this first revolt; cf. also *Ath.Pol.* 14.2 on Solon's judgment of the incident that led Pisistratus to seize control). Even the historians who believe that Solon had a very long life doubt that he could still be alive in 556, when Pisistratus seized power again and for a much longer period of time (see Introd. chap. 1).

The disinclination of the *demos* to follow its leaders, whom Solon in 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} still seemed to think he could confront positively, is presented in these fragments as being close to resolving itself in the worst

of ways, i.e. the seizure of power by a tyrant. This situation is depicted as the final ruin of the πόλις by its leaders (12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται) which in 3.1, 5 f., 21 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.1, 5 f., 21 f. W.^{2} (πόλις … οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται, φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν, ἄστυ τρύχεται) had been the much-feared consequence of the citizens' greediness and the "unrighteous minds" of their leaders. Both in 3.18 G.-P.^{2} = 4.18 W.^{2} and 12.4 G.-P.^{2} = 9.4 W.^{2}, among the calamities which Solon cites as the manifestation of the city's ruin is its sinking into δουλοσύνη. The consistency of terms and ideas between 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} does not allow us to share the opinion of Rihll 1989, who maintains that here Solon is not thinking of the dangers of tyranny in the Athens of his time, and that 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}, 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}, and 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} actually constitute a historical reflection made by the young Solon on the dangers of the autocracy which Athens conceded to Draco for his legislation in the 620s.

Not favoring the reading that Draco was the subject of these poems does not necessitate, however, that 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} and 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2} or 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} dealt with Pisistratus. There is no explicit reference to Pisistratus in them. Rather, in 15.3 G.-P.^{2} = 11.3 W.^{2} the dangerous demagogues to whom the *demos* is accused of having yielded are designated with the plural, τούτους. This plural might perhaps have the sense "Pisistratus and his followers", but, had Solon meant to refer to Pisistratus, it would have been logical for Solon to emphasize the anomaly of his power as μόναρχος (as he does in 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2}), and not to refer to him in the plural. It is therefore more plausible that 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2} reflects a phase during which the people had already been deprived of part of their freedom of decision by the aristocratic leaders whom they had raised to power (possibly the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες of 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2}?; or the leaders without a νόος ἄρτιος of 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}?). In 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} the tone seems very general, and not specifically directed towards/concerned with Pisistratus. πέλεται, γίγνεται, ἔστι are certainly universal in their application. ὄλλυται and χρή may be in tune with the "visionary" perspective which characterizes many parts of 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, and ἔπεσεν will be gnomic, if we consider that, according to the testimony, Solon was speaking before Pisistratus' seizure of power in order to warn (προειπεῖν) the Athenians of the threat he posed. This interpretation, first elaborated by Linforth 1919, 303–307, admits Solon's concern with the excessive power of some leaders of the *demos*, whom we might think of as Pisistratus-like, but does not presuppose that Solon was personally involved with Pisistratus. The testimonies that spoke of Solon's

involvement with and opposition to Pisistratus after the first revolt may have been fictionalized based on Solon's fear of too powerful emerging leaders. After all, the attempt to construct stories of personal connections between more or less synchronous important characters from the same area is one of the best known devices of ancient biography (a love story between Solon and Pisistratus was already rejected as being implausible by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 17.2): cf. Mühl 1956; De Libero 1995, 51 f.; see Introd., chap. 1 and ad 25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2}

The fragment has an educative aim from the beginning to the end (as Mülke 2002, 203 remarks), but its mood seems to change progressively. It starts in the first distich as an observation, reminding the Athenians about the origins of two natural phenomena—snow/hail, thunder. In a society that was still mainly agrarian, this could have had fearful implications for Solon's fellow citizens/sympotic *hetairoi* (compare to the destructive storm of 1.18–24 G.-P.^{2} = 13. 18–24 W.^{2}), but the observation does not seem to be related to the life of the city. This first distich has a paroemiographic tone, and relies on a shared wisdom which equalizes Solon and his audience (hence, perhaps, the presents πέλεται and γίγνεται instead of gnomic aorists, as was remarked by Mülke 2002, 206). The second distich introduces a similar observation about the ruin of the city: the similarity is reinforced by the use of the same preposition ἐκ for both the natural phenomenon and for the socio-political 'phenomenon' which is taking place inside the city. In 3b–4 an aetiological interpretation of the city 'phenomenon' is provided—the ruin consists of/is provoked by the fact that the *demos* fell enslaved to an autocrat due to its stupidity. The connection between the natural phenomena (and their causes) and the situation of the citizens inside the city is most obviously analogical: political events are shown to be bound by laws as strict as the laws of nature (so Campbell 1967, 245; Jaeger 1966, 93; Müller 1975, 135). But δ(ἐ) of 3 is ambiguous, and may also convey a contrasting relationship between the first distich and the second, since natural phenomena arise from natural causes, whereas it is a human cause that provokes the destruction of the city (so argues Gerber 1970, 136 f.). In fact, as remarked by Race 1982, 65 men cannot intervene to change the weather and its internal order, but they can do something about politics, as the last distich of Solon demonstrates. The third distich expresses *ex cathedra* pessimistic advice for the remedy of the present situation (try to restrain whom has been empowered too much), and implies a reproach to the audience (you have empowered him). Thus the initial images are a Priamel-introduction to the explanation of 3b–4 and the

advice of 5 f.: while being left their full autonomy (differently from a comparison with ὥς), they serve to throw the last interpretive statements into stark relief: cf. West 1997, 509 f., who reminds us of strikingly similar parallels from the Bible (*Prov.* 25.23 and *Eccles.* 32.10) "The north wind brings forth rain, and a backbiting tongue a cursed(?) face", "Before the thunder, the lightning runs ahead, and before the shamefaced man shall go favor".

Solon's observations about the origins and links between atmospheric phenomena and the life of the city has had an unhappy fortune among the critics. Plut. *Sol.* 3.6–8 considered the way in which Solon refers to atmospheric phenomena in this fragment as evidence for the simplistic views he held toward natural science, despite all his competence in ethical matters (Plutarch's judgment is largely based on peripatetic sources like Dicaearchus, who had emphasized the limited competence of the Seven Sages in 'theoretical life': cf. frr. 30 and 31 Wehrli; Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 122 f.). Jaeger 1966, 93 (cf. also Müller 1975, 135) saw in this fragment yet another example of the comparison of harsh weather or natural disasters with the difficulties or ruin of states in the wake of, e.g., Archil. 105; Alcae. 208; see Edmunds 1987 for later instances of this tradition. More recently, Masaracchia 1958, 298 f. suggested interpreting the fragment as an allegory of the power of Zeus, the god who in the *Iliad* oversees atmospheric phenomena (cf. e.g. 2.146, 10.154, 13.796). Our fragment would thus simply be a replica of the simile found in the elegy *To the Muses*, where Zeus' punishment of the unjust is compared to the action of a storm followed by a destructive spring wind. However, Zeus is never named in our fragment, and the final ruin of the tyranny is presented as a consequence of the foolishness of the *demos*, not as a divine punishment.

Solon's use of this image should also be considered in the historical context of the naturalistic speculations of his age, which sought out the causes of various atmospheric phenomena, such as the origin of thunder and lightning from clouds: e.g. Anaximander maintained that "thunder, lightning, and thunderbolts (βρονταί, ἀστραπαί, κεραυνοί) occur as a result of the wind (ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος … συμβαίνειν): for whenever the wind is shut up in a thick cloud and then bursts out forcibly through its fineness and lightness, then the bursting makes the noise, while the rift against the blackness of the cloud makes the flash", and defined thunder as "the noise of a smitten cloud" (*VS* 12A23). This idea was shared by Anaximenes (*VS* 13A17), Heraclitus (*VS* 22A14) and Anaxagoras (*VS* 59A1.9). We know that Anaximenes also explicitly included rain, snow

and hail as products of the clouds (loc. cit.)—an obvious observation, which must have been widely shared: "A. said that clouds occur when the air is further thickened; when it is compressed further, rain is squeezed out, and hail occurs when the descending water coalesces, snow when some windy portion is included together with the moisture"; Aristot. *Mete.* 347b10–14 and 369b–370a also considered (rain), snow, hail, thunder, and lighting to have originated from the clouds. In 2, Solon may thus be referring to the naturalistic theory on the origin of snow, hail, lightning and thunder from the clouds. In any case, he distances himself from the topical imagery of lighting and thunder as prerogatives of Zeus that are produced by him, which is the standard image in Homer.

1 f. The chiastic order in these verses is striking, as is the variation πέλεται—γίγνεται. They were probably the beginning of the poem, since no particle connects 1 with a preceding context: cf. Masaracchia 1958, 296. Similar images serve as similes in Hom. *Il.* 15.170–172 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἐκ νεφέων πτῆται νιφὰς ἠὲ χάλαζα / ψυχρὴ ὑπὸ ῥιπῆς αἰθρηγενέος Βορέαο, / ὣς κραιπνῶς μεμαυῖα διέπτατο ὠκέα Ἶρις, where the *comparatum* is the swiftness and direction of Iris descending from the sky, but the harshness of the atmospheric phenomena is in tune with Zeus' severe threat that Iris has to report to Poseidon, and 10.5–9 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀστράπτῃ πόσις Ἥρης ἠϋκόμοιο / τεύχων ἢ πολὺν ὄμβρον ἀθέσφατον ἠὲ χάλαζαν / ἢ νιφετόν, ὅτε πέρ τε χιὼν ἐπάλυνεν ἀρούρας, / ἠέ ποθι πτολέμοιο μέγα στόμα πευκεδανοῖο, ὣς πυκίν' ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀνεστενάχιζ' Ἀγαμέμνων, where the rigors of the atmospheric phenomena, stressed as they are by the author (πολὺν, ἀθέσφατον), are an ominous accompaniment to the disgraceful situation of the Greeks which torments Agamemnon (as remarked by Fränkel 1921, 28 f.).

πέλεται seems to confirm the semantic distinction drawn by Neuberger-Donath 1980 between the active πέλειν and the middle πέλεσθαι (as Mülke 2002, 207 agrees): the former would express a static event and is "extroverted" (analogous to εἰμί), whereas the middle would refer to a dynamic dimension of the subject and point to an essential inherent feature of it (analogous to γίγνεσθαι). It may be, however, sheer chance, since after all the middle voice is more common than the active. The common opinion is still that the two voices are interchangeable according to metrical necessity: cf. e.g. Schwyzer-Debrunner 1950, 232 f.; Allan 2003, 207.

μένος plus the genitive is a frequent periphrasis used to point to the "energy" intrinsic to some natural phenomena, which in Homer are usually fire, rivers, wind, and sun (likewise ἴς, βία, etc.): compare to

ἠελίοιο μένος in the long simile of 1.23 G.-P.² = 13.23 W.², which is similar to our fragment in its presentation of the energetic actions of the storm and the following αἰθρίη as being similar to the effect of some external intervention on the routine life of the city. Tellingly enough for a fragment where the influence of naturalistic speculation may be at work, ἀνέμων μένος and αἰθέριον μένος (Empedocl. *VS* 31 B 111.3 and 115.9) are among the few of these Homeric periphrases for natural phenomena which survive in naturalistic philosophers: cf. Mugler 1963, 47.

λαμπρός is not attested with certainty in reference to lightning before Solon, as was remarked by Mülke 2002, 207, who supposes that the phrase was originally adopted by Solon for this verse, and that his focus was on the "visual effect". But, apart from Hom. *Il.* 10.154 λάμφ' ὥς τε στεροπὴ πατρὸς Διός (of metal shining), Anaximenes also may have used the epithet for ἀστραπή, since according to a testimony (*VS* 13A7.8) he described it as a λαμπρὰ καὶ πυρώδης αὐγή produced by a cloud (cf. also, according to a different testimony, Xenophan. *VS* 21A45 ἀστραπὰς γίνεσθαι λαμπρυνομένων τῶν νεφῶν). The epithet becomes, however, quite common for lightning: cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.198; Soph. *Trach.* 99, and *Aj.* 257 f. The coincidence of Solon and Anaximander using λαμπρός for lightning is especially likely, since γίγνεσθαι ἐκ is also a phrase commonly used by later sources presenting the Presocratics' investigation of the ἀρχή of some natural elements from others (as Mülke 2002, 207 notes): cf. Anaximand. 12A14, Anaximen. 13B2, Xenophan. 21A28 ap. ps.-Aristot. *Meliss.* 977b23, Heracl. 22B31, etc.

That lighting and thunder were different forms of the manifestation of the same phenomenon is clear, at least from the Anaximander quoted above. As for their sequential order, see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.133 (Zeus) βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινὸν ἀφῆκ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν seems to presuppose an opposite sequential order (first thunder and then lightning); thunder and lightning are also listed in this order in descriptions of meteorological phenomena (= metereological operation of Zeus) by Hom. *Il.* 21.198 f.; Hes. *Theog.* 72; Aesch. *Prom.* 992–994, 1017, 1082–1084; Aristoph. *Av.* 1744–1747. Solon's different sequence reflects the obvious succession of the two phenomena in everyday experience: cf. Soph. *TrGF* F578 οὐρανοῦ δ' ἄπο / ἤστραψε, βροντὴ δ' ἐρράγη δι' ἀστραπῆς, whose last phrase was parodically quoted by Aristoph. *Nub.* 583 and Epicurus, *Ep.Pyth.* 102.5 προτερεῖ δὲ ἀστραπῆς βροντή. Aristot. *Mete.* 369b8–10 appears to report Anaxagoras' opinion, stating that lighting is produced by clouds after thunder, but he agrees, of course, that it "appears to us that the lighting precedes, because we see the flash before we hear the noise"; a sim-

ilar remark reflecting this common experience is made by Democr. *VS* 68A126a, who believes that in reality the two phenomena are contemporaneous.

Ionian naturalistic meditations, perhaps, if they were known in Solon's Athens, and certainly everyday experience would have led the audience of the poem to understand that thunder and lightning also derive from clouds. But Solon chose not to stress the subordination of 2 to 1, namely that ἀστεροπή originates ἐκ νεφέλης as well as snow and hail. The same seemingly coordinative parataxis, which in reality portrays a relationship of dependence, applies to 3 f., and is easily detectable in light of 1 f.: the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες have evidently provoked the ruin of the city (3a); but their negative influence over the *demos* implicitly depends upon the falling of the *demos* into the slavery of an autocrat (3b–4).

3. The ablatival ἐκ is used here to express the agent (not the origin, as it usually does and as it does in 1 f.), instead of ὑπό, which would be expected with a passive verb. The persistence of ἐκ probably emphasizes the connection between the human causality of the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες in the case of the city and the origination of snow, hail, thunder, and lightning from the clouds in the case of the natural phenomena: cf. Römisch 1972, 166.

For the negative implications of μεγάλοι in the designation of powerful/dangerous leaders of the *demos* cf. ad 5.4 G.-P.² = 4c.3 W.²: see in 31.4 G.-P.² = 37.4 W.² another Solonian definition of the powerful as μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες. There may be a hint at the dangerous climax starting from the destructive influence of the leaders who believe themselves to be μεγάλοι "(over)great" in comparison with the other citizens, and ending in the final seizure of power by a single man who excludes the traditional leading class and all the other citizens from the government. For πόλις ὄλλυται cf. ad 3.1 G.-P.² = 4.1 W.²

μόναρχος/μοναρχία in the sense of "tyrant/tyranny" also appears in Alcaeus: cf. 6.27 f. (μοναρχίαν δ.[/ μ]ηδὲ δεκωμ[εθα) and 306C.e Campbell = *SLG* S271. Soon afterward μούναρχος appears in Theogn. 51 f.: from excessive greed derive internal στάσεις, killing of citizens, and μούναρχοι, with ruinous effects for the city (πόλει μήποτε τῇιδε ἅδοι). The term was then used by Alcmaeon, a Pythagorean philosopher possibly familiar with Solon's thought, for designating the hegemonic element that disturbed the equilibrium between the elements of the body: cf. ad 29ᵇ.9 G.-P.² = 34.9 W.²: a possible clue to the reception of Solon's language among naturalistic philosophers, or perhaps to the commonality

between him and them in some of the ideas underlying these terms. I agree with Mülke 2002, 209 that it remains a mystery why Solon uses this rare term instead of the common and metrically equivalent τύραννος. A hypothesis might be that the term μόναρχος, which differently from the non-Greek word τύραννος, is a Greek formation which "belonged to the interrelational context of the internal conflicts of the nobles", and thus would have focused on the fact that a single person monopolized the power usually controlled by the whole leading class (Cobet 1981, 52): in this case, the term would have been especially suitable for the point of view of the aristocrat Alcaeus or Solon. Another hypothesis might be that in order to define the emerging absolute ruler of Athens Solon chose to adopt the term which an oracle (quoted by Herod. 5.92β.2) applied to the Cypselids of Corinth, because the tyranny of Cypselus was in a way the most paradigmatic one for the Athenian audience—in fact it was the first tyranny, the longest lasting one (almost three decades), and it took place in one of the cities closest to Athens. If this oracle about his seizure of power was a forgery organized by Cypselus himself (Oost 1972, 18; Salmon 1984, 186 f.), then μόναρχος was possibly the official term by which the tyrant liked to be addressed (but the oracle does not seem to be intended to win Cypselus conventional political support and favor, nor does the *later* derogatory connotations of the term μόναρχος: McGlew 1993, 65 f.; in any case another oracle, quoted by Herod. 5.92ε.2, despite being quite negative about the ruler, called Cypselus βασιλεύς, which was in all likelihood the most conventional and reassuring title with which a tyrant might wish to be addressed: Oost 1972, 21–25). Finally, μόναρχος was also the title which Solon was given by some of his supporters according to the report of Plut. *Sol.* 14.7 μάλιστα δ' οἱ συνήθεις ἐκάκιζον, εἰ διὰ τοὔνομα δυσωπεῖται τὴν μοναρχίαν. Plutarch's report is unreliable, however, since the idea that illegitimate μοναρχία was soon going to become legitimate βασιλεία (which, according to Plutarch, was suggested to Solon by his supporters who wanted him to seize hegemonic power in Athens) seems to reflect a much more Aristotelian than archaic ideology (cf. *Pol.* 1279).

For the idea that the power of the tyrant depended on the support of the *demos*, besides Sol. 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2}, cf. Alcae. 348 (it became a firm point in historical thought: cf. Plato, *Resp.* 568e and Aristot. *Pol.* 1305a21–23, 1310b12–16 and 29–31).

For δουλοσύνη, cf. 3.18 G.-P.^{2} = 4.18 W.^{2}, where ἐς … ἤλυθε also parallels ἐς … ἔπεσε; for the value of the tense, cf. ad 3.17–29 G.-P.^{2} = 4.17–29 W.^{2} In Homer and Hesiod, ἴδρις is someone who has the knowl-

edge to do (something); ἄιδρις/ἀιδρείη refer to the lack of this insight. It may have a more general sense, in which case it is almost synonym for ἄφρων (e.g. *Od.* 10.231 = 257), or a more specific sense, where it designates the ἄπειρος "unskilled" in a specific activity (e.g. *Il.* 3.219, *Od.* 10.282). In some cases it refers to ignorance about the significance or outcome of a future action, or to much heavier than expected consequences: e.g. *Od.* 10.231 (by their ἀιδρείη (ignorance, stupidity) Odysseus' companions follow Circe inside her palace), *Od.* 11.272 f. (of Epicasta who did not know what it meant to have sex with Oedipus, whose identity was unknown to her), *Od.* 12.41 (of whomever of Odysseus' companions is going to approach the Sirens without knowing the gravity of the consequences: cf. Römisch 1972, 166 f.), and Hes. *Op.* 685 (ἀιδρίη leads men to practice seamanship, although they do not know what risk it is, so that (686) their greed overtakes their concern for life). This is clearly the sense of the word in our verse: cf. 15.6 G.-P.² = 11.6 W.² χαῦνος … νόος. The closest parallel for πίπτειν εἰς is Theogn. 41 f. ἡγεμόνες δέ / τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν (where van Groningen ad loc. maintains that the verb should mean "rush to", rather than "fall into"; I do not see why this sense should apply to either Theognis or to our verse).

5 f. ἐξάραντ' is more likely an accusative than a dative, since the elision is easier and the need of a dative is not felt until οὐ ῥάιδιον ἐστι is heard (Linforth 1919, 206). An absolute/intransitive value for the word cannot be excluded (defended by Renehan 1975, 86 and Anhalt 1993, 124): it is not recorded in *LSJ*, but seems to be attested, at least for the taking off of a bird (and thus not in a metaphorical sense), in Diod.Sic. 2.50.5. Regardless, in the absence of similar occurrences of the word in an absolute sense, the connection to Sol. 15.3 G.-P.² =11.3 W.² τούτους ηὐξήσατε makes the interpretation of ἐξάραντ(α) as a transitive verb more likely.

Various conjectures exist about the implied object of ἐξάραντ(α) (if it is taken as a transitive verb, in this case e.g. the *demos* would necessarily be the subject in the accusative: Linforth 1919, 206; Gerber 1970, 137), or its subject in the accusative (if the verb is taken as being intransitive). An indefinite τινα (Fränkel 1975, 228; West ed.; Campbell 1967, 246; Gerber ed.) is as possible as μέγαν ἄνδρα (Linforth 1919, 206; Gerber 1970, 137); τὸν μόναρχον has also been suggested a couple of times (cf. Mülke 2002, 211.), but would be redundant after this verb.

The mss. leave a lacuna of two short syllables before πάντα in 6. The indefinite subject in the accusative τινα, proposed by Sintenis, with which

Masaracchia 1958, 298 and Gentili and Prato fill the lacuna, is not entirely satisfactory, because the verb νοέω means "to have in mind", "to take notice of", in a sense that is too weak and neutral on its own (in Homer it is quite often paired with ἰδεῖν: cf. Bertolín Cebrián 1996, 54–69) to convey the meaning required by the context, i.e. to "ponder" attentively. West's καλά "thoroughly" complies with this semantic exigency and is thus more tempting, but the resulting structure: monosyllable + bisyll. + bisyll. + bisyll. would seem too fragmented for the second hemistich of a Solonian pentameter, as Gentili and Prato make clear. Because of its synsemantic value, the περὶ proposed by Dindorf does not lend itself to these types of objections, which would be applicable to every orthotonic bisyllable—⟨περὶ⟩ πάντα νοεῖν could form a metrical unitarian "Wortgruppe" in H. Fränkel's terms—, and it seems more satisfying for the sense of the verse: compare to, although very late, Tzetzes' Σ Aristoph. *Ran.* 958 περινοεῖν· … βαθέως πάντα νοεῖν. The fact that περινοεῖν only occurs later in fifth century authors, and never in tmesis (Mülke 2002, 212), is not a strong enough reason to rule out Dindorf's emendation, since there are other examples of new Solonian words which reappear only in the fifth and fourth centuries: see e.g. ἀχρήμων ad 1.41 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13. 41 f. W.^{2} and the construction ἴχνεσι βαίνειν ad 15.5f. G.-P.^{2} = 11.5f. W.^{2}

13 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2}

The similar beginning of and larger quantity of text belonging to 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} suggest that the natural imagery of 13 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} probably belonged to a storm like the one assailing the ship of state in the allegory of Alcae. 208: ἀσυννέτημμι τὼν ἀνέμων στάσιν,/τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔνθεν κῦμα κυλίνδεται,/τὸ δ᾽ ἔνθεν, ἄμμες δ᾽ ὂν τὸ μέσσον/ναῒ φορήμμεθα σὺν μελαίναι/χείμωνι μόχθεντες μεγάλωι μάλα, κτλ. Analogously, at least according to Heracl. *Alleg. Hom.* 5.2, Archil. 105 had compared the beginning of a war to the beginning of a sea storm: Γλαῦχ᾽, ὅρα· βαθὺς γὰρ ἤδη κύμασιν ταράσσεται/πόντος, ἀμφὶ δ᾽ ἄκρα Γυρέων ὀρθὸν ἵσταται νέφος,/σῆμα χειμῶνος, κιχάνει δ᾽ ἐξ ἀελπτίης φόβος. We do not know though, whether the statement belonged to a descriptive allegorical metaphor for a situation, as it does in Alcaeus or Archilochus, or to an analogical explanation of the origins of social turmoil, as it does in 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} (the derivation of Solon from Archilochus was taken for granted by Havelock 1978, 256, according to whom Solon "transfers" Archilochus' idea of the ship of state to the imagery of the sea; the latter interpretation is assumed by Fränkel 1975, 228, according to whom the image, here as well as in 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}, does not merely illustrate a situation, but it argues and demonstrates a thesis). In any case, in light of the various models for the comparison between the *demos* and the sea, calm by nature but capable of tempests if agitated by the winds (fr. iamb. adesp. 29 Diehl; Demosth. *falsa leg.* 136; Polyb. 11.29.9, 21.31.9; Lucil. 44–47 Krenkel; Cic. *Clu.* 49; Dion.Hal. *Ant.Rom* 19.7.12; Livy 28.27.11 and 38.10.5; Plut. *seni resp.* 788c; Libanius 25.44.3, on which see Lomiento 1987; for people presented as being instable as the sea, see also App. *B Civ.* 3.2.20), it is certain that ἐξ ἀνέμων of 13.1 G.-P.^{2} = 12.1 W.^{2} must parallel ἐκ νεφέλης of 12.1 G.-P.^{2} = 9.1 W.^{2} in designating the perturbing agent of the good weather/natural condition of calm which would naturally characterize phenomena/civic society—the use of the preposition ἐκ to point to the provenance, instead of ὑπό which is more commonly used to designate the agent, is an important hint in this direction.

We can then suppose that these "winds" are equivalent to the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι of 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} It is more difficult to ascertain whether θάλασσα is the *comparandum* for the *demos* in 12.4 G.-P.^{2} = 9.4 W.^{2} or

more generally for the *polis* in 12.3 G.-P.[2] = 9.3 W.[2] But I agree with Mülke 2002, 228 that the implication of the former interpretation is that the *demos* would then be called δίκαιος when not agitated by the arrogance of the nobles, and this definition would have greately upset the class to which Solon belonged, since this derogatory view of its excesses does not seem balanced by any critical remark on the *demos*. On the contrary, if θάλασσα corresponds more generally to *polis*, then the lost calmness of Solon's θάλασσα would recall Hesiod's idea of the flourishing εἰρήνη of the *polis* whose rulers give righteous sentences (δίκας … ἰθείας): *Op.* 225–229; it would also be equivalent to the stormy ship of the *polis* in Alcae. 208 quoted above (from which Hor. *Carm.* 1.14, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.44). In my opinion, the morphology of the motif in its oldest datable occurrence after Solon, Herod. 7.16α1, also leads us in this direction: "evil acquaintances are your bane; even as the sea, who is of all creatures the most serviceable to men, is hindered (they say) from following its natural bent by the blasts of winds that fall upon it" (κατά περ τὴν πάντων χρησιμωτάτην ἀνθρώποισι θάλασσαν πνεύματά φασι ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῆι ἑωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι). In this speech of Artabanus to Xerxes there is no hint at the equalization of the sea to the *demos*, which later becomes topical, and we may suspect that Solon also knew of the motif in this generic form. It is interesting to see the way in which Herodotus tones down Solon's personification of the sea as δικαιοτάτη, replacing it with χρησιμωτάτην in the interest of realism (further variations are offered by Polyb. 11.29.10 and Livy 38.10).

One possible formal precedent may have been provided to Solon by the visual and aural simile between the noise of the sea's waves and that of the shouting assembly of the Achaeans in Homer (*Il.* 2.144–146 κινήθη δ' ἀγορὴ φὴ κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης / πόντου Ἰκαρίοιο, τὰ μέν τ' Εὖρός τε Νότος τε / ὤρορ' ἐπαΐξας πατρὸς Διὸς ἐκ νεφελάων; also 2.394–397 about the crowd of the Argives Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἴαχον, ὡς ὅτε κῦμα / ἀκτῆι ἐφ' ὑψηλῆι, ὅτε *κινήσηι* Νότος ἐλθών, / προβλῆτι σκοπέλωι and 4.422–429 about the ranks of the Achaeans moving towards battle: cf. Masaracchia 1958, 300). The sea as a paradigm of both calm and fury, endowed with a spontaneous energy which, differently from the bulky and steady earth, changes and moves without external stimulus, and is therefore inconstant and capricious *by its own nature* (cf. Fränkel 1975, 205 f., 261) seems to be presupposed by Semon. 7.27–42: "another is from the sea, a woman with a twofold mind. One day she sparkles and is happy … But another day she is unbearable even to look at … Just as the sea often stands without a ripple, harmless, a great joy to sailors, in the sea-

son of summer, but often rages, tossed about by the loud-crashing waves, such a woman seems very much like this in temperament"; for the idea of the mutability and cruelty of the sea among the ancients and its associations with injustice, cf. Hom. *Il.* 16.33–35; Plaut. *Trin.* 826; Prop. 1.15.12; Ov. *Am.* 2.11.12; see also Lesky 1947, 26 ff. and Pease 1943, 71–77.

The main variance between these parallels and Solon's imagery is that Solon stresses the dynamics of calmness and distress (as does Semonides, but differently than in Homer); he considers calm to be the natural status of the sea (which is not capricious at all by nature, as in Semonides) and in general he is geared more towards stating the aetiology of the sea's alteration. Defending the calmness of the sea from the accusations of unpredictable variability may be the political twist of Solon's argument (it clearly presents in a more favorable light the *demos* or the city which was implied by θάλασσα). But the other nuances of Solon's image, which are concerned with natural aspects, may very well show the influence of naturalistic speculation which is no less strong in 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} Indeed, according to the testimony of Σ Nic. *Alex.* 171 ff. (*VS* 22A14a), Heraclitus would have declared that the sea was a "slave" (δοῦλος) to the winds. It is impossible to ascertain whether the idea that the sea is "naturally calm" also had its roots in naturalistic reflection. Although this idea does not seem to be documented before the first century BC (cf. Varro, *Ling.* 7.23, p. 259 Traglia; Cic., *Acad.* 2 (fr. 3); Servius ad Verg. *G.* 1.50; Schol. to Arat., Introd. p. 92.20–23 Maas), the fact that it appears to be presupposed at a popular level in ancient fable supports the idea that it was, in fact, quite ancient. One of Aesop's fables (178 Hausrath = 168 Perry) tells of a shipwrecked man that accuses the sea, now pacified after the storm, of deceiving men with its affable appearance and then destroying them when it becomes angry. The sea then replies: μὴ ἐμὲ μέμφου, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιαύτη εἰμί, ὁποίαν καὶ νῦν με ὁρᾷς· οἱ δὲ αἰφνίδιόν μοι ἐμπίπτοντες κυματοῦσι καὶ ἐξαγριαίνουσιν (cf. Jedrkiewicz 1989, 327). A similar fable, with a similar answer given by the sea is also found in Babrius 71.

In any case, naturalistic speculation would have provided Solon with the conceptual basis for calling δίκη the state of a natural element, the sea, in the absence of winds that generate tumult. Anaximander, not unlike Solon, maintains that the natural elements can become "unjust" at some moments of the cosmological process, and that "justice" consists of the uniform and impersonal principle that establishes reciprocal equality among the elements by regulating alternation κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (cf. the Solonian ἐν δίκηι χρόνου of 30.3 G.-P.^{2} = 36.3 W.^{2})

between the moments in which an element finds itself in a position of injustice, i.e. a position of prevalence over others, and those in which this element finds itself in the position of subordination and therefore pays the penalty: cf. especially *VS* 12B1, with the analysis of Kahn 1960, 178–183; for Anaximander and Solon, see Gentili 1975 and Edmunds 1987, 11. Most likely both were influenced by the idea that justice was full reciprocity, which was predominant in archaic Greece: cf. García Quintela 1996, 58–61. Somehow analogous is also Parmenides' Dike, who holds the keys to the changing of day and night (*VS* 28B 1.14), as does Heraclitus' Dike, whose helpers, the Erinyes, punish the sun if it "surpasses its limits" (22B94); on the state of "justice" between the elements of the body in archaic medicine (Alcmaeon included, cf. above), see Vlastos 1946, 66.

Solon's vocabulary is well chosen to fit both the naturalistic context of the image and to evoke the political sense implied by it, as Archil. 105.1 quoted above had already done with ταράσσειν. This verb ταράσσειν is idiomatic for the sea (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 5.291 and 304; Pind. *Ol.* 2.63 f., fr. 94b18–20; Aristoph. *Eq.* 431; Hipp. *Diaet.* 90.26; Aristot. *Pr.* 944b23), and κινεῖν was also used to describe it in two of the Homeric similes quoted above. But ταράσσειν/ταραχή also denote the "political tumult", at least from Theogn. 219; Herod. 3.150, 4.162 and Aristoph. *Eq.* 214, 867 onwards (it is telling that, when commenting on Alcae. 208, Heracl. *Alleg.* 5.5 said that the image of Alcaeus connoted τὰς τυραννικὰς ταραχάς), as does κίνησις, at least from Thuc. 3.75 onwards. For a conjecture on what it meant for Solon to "incite" the δῆμος, cf. ad 31.6 G.-P.^{2} = 37.7 W.^{2}

On ἐξ ἀνέμων, cf. above and ad 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} I agree with Mülke 2002, 231 that πάντων cannot mean "of all the elements" (Masaracchia 1958, 302), unless other elements were mentioned in the lost section of the fragment. The similar definition in Herod. 7.16α1 quoted above, πάντων χρησιμωτάτην, leads us to take it as "all things"/"everything". The "justice" of the sea consists of being reliable and not troublesome for the sailors who use it ("it can furnish the equity and equanimity which in the *Odyssey* the voyaging traveler should justly receive from human beings": Havelock 1978, 255). This idea of justice has a very naturalistic character, which may be better appreciated in contrast to the set of ideas connected with the religious idea of justice in terms of avoidance of pollution which had achieved a wide influence over Greece in Solon's age—these were ideas which were involved in Draco's law of homicide and had been crucial during the Cylonean feud, which found its resolution shortly before Solon's archonship (Vlastos 1946, 66 f.).

14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}

According to Diogenes Laertius 1.49 (who quotes and may presuppose the historian Sosicrates as his main source), Solon rushed into the assembly, armed with shield and spear, and anticipated Pisistratus' seizure of power shortly before his revolt. The reaction was that the Athenian βουλή, where the pro-Pisistratus party was a majority, accused him of foolishness. Solon answered this allegation with these verses and declared himself ready to help against the tyrant.

Nothing of this contextualization is confirmed by Solon's distich, and very little of it seems likely. The detail about the weapons and Solon's performance before the assembly seem to be duplications introduced from the tradition of the performance of Solon's poem for Salamis. These verses can be easily matched with the Salamis poem (2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–3 W.^{2}) in that they presuppose the reputation earned by the unconventionality of some of Solon's decisions (for this 'weaker' sense of μαίνεσθαι to designate an unexpected behavior, cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.360 (Athena about Zeus) φρεσὶ μαίνεται οὐκ ἀγαθῇσι). In the case of Salamis, this reputation may have originated from Solon's persistence in exhorting the Athenians to a war for which many other Athenians seemed unreluctant (see Introd. ad 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–3 W.^{2}); in the case of our fragment, it may have originated from Solon's refusal to seize power, despite the invitations of the Athenians, about which, maybe not by chance, Diogenes Laertius reports just before introducing our fragment. On whether or not a *boule* even existed in Solon's time, and on the testimony of the ancients about the establishment of a *boule* by Solon himself cf. Introd., chap. 3. Solon's arms and his offer to help against Pisistratus may also have been invented as a reaction to Pisistratus' request for a body-guard, which according to the biographic tradition (Plut. *Sol.* 30) Solon tried to oppose.

The 'center' is obviously the place of maximum visibility and control, where prizes (cf. Hom. *Il.* 23.704) or items slated for equal distribution (cf. Theogn. 678) were dispensed under the eyes of everyone (here also the ἐς μέσον … δικάσσατε "judge in public" of *Il.* 23.574; cf. Cerri 1969, 102 f.). It was also the place where one went when speaking in public and desiring to be heard better (as Demodocus does in Hom. *Od.* 8.262). For all these reasons "to put in the middle" also meant "to render public": cf. Herod. 3.80, 4.97 and 161, 6.129, 7.164 and in particular 3.142, where

at the death of Polycrates of Samos his successor Meandrius announces to his citizens: "in setting power in the center (ἐς μέσον), I proclaim ἰσονομία for you". Parallel to this metaphorical arena of politics was the martial one: one advances into the space separating the opposing forces either to urge one's own troops into battle (cf. *Il.* 3.77 = 7.55) or to initiate a duel (cf. *Il.* 6.120 = 20.159 ~ 23.814, 18.263 f.). It would be tempting to suppose that Solon is not only thinking about the moment in which the truth "becomes public" (the more clear and obvious meaning in our passage), but that this middle space is also the space between opposing forces on the battlefield, called μεταίχμιον in 31.8 G.-P.² = 37.8 W.², where Solon established his physical position in 7.5 f. G.-P.² = 5.5 f. W.² and 31.8 G.-P.² = 37.8 W.² as a defender of both the city and the opposite parties, thus also defining his own ideological position in the political middle (reaching the martial μεταίχμιον was already called ἐς μέσον ἰέναι in Hom. *Il.* 3.77). "Truth" may have been believed to go in the middle, where Solon also is, because this is its natural position between the opposite extremes. Solon's pride in sharing the position of truth would not be out of place: on the one hand, Solon's attitude in this fragment seems to be the attitude of a politician who has suffered a defeat and is in a defensive stance, on the other hand, he still believes that his fellow citizens will acknowledge the correctness of his suggestion. Indeed, as remarked by Mülke 2002, 215, the prophetic tone (depending not only on the future, but also on the invocation of Time) allows Solon to present himself as being endowed with the privileged knowledge of seers—quite at variance with the shortsightedness of the Athenians, who not only had not accepted his orientation (and thus misunderstood the future reality), but had also accused him of madness: see also below ad l. 1. In the iambic fragment 30.3 ff. G.-P.² = 36.3 W.², the future perspective, in which the epiphany of truth is brough about by an appeal to the super-human witness of the Great Mother Earth, seems different. For the geometric character of Anaximander's cosmology, in which the earth occupies the center (*VS* 12A1) and all the space is symmetrically constituted around it, see Vernant 1968.

It is impossible to infer from ἀστοῖς any information about the original performance. Here, as well as in 3.6 G.-P.² = 4.6 W.², however, it is possible to suppose that Solon speaks of the "citizens" in the third person, and does not apostrophize them in the second person, because he does not speak directly to them in public, but addresses his peers on a private occasion, possibly in a sympotic meeting. In this case, ἀστοί would have meant all the citizens, including the ones present at the symposium.

1. The emphatic particle δή may here, as it frequently does elsewhere, denote words or ideas not understood at face value with objective certainty, but which instead respond to someone's subjective opinion and are ironically presented as supposed truths (cf. Denniston 1954, 234 f.)—as if Solon were saying "my so-called madness". The particle μέν is used especially with personal or demonstrative pronouns, which are implicitly contrasted with other persons and things, so that the speaker points to something which he does not intend to express in words (Denniston 1954, 380–382); here the idea implied, but unexpressed, may be: "but it will be late, and the citizens will regret …".

βαιός is the common form of the Ionic of Herodotus and of the Attic, whereas ἠβαιός, which is likely artificial (from the erroneous division of words in the sequence οὐ δὴ βαιόν), is the most common Homeric-Hesiodic form. Before the fifth century βαιός is attested elsewhere only in Hes. *Op.* 418 and the Ionic of Ananius, *IEG* 3.2. Solon's choice should be regarded as his personal linguistic preference for the 'modern' form.

The motif of time endowed with the power to unveil truth has a long legacy: e.g. Thales, *VS* 11A1§35 (although this is probably not genuine); Theogn. 967; adesp.eleg. *IEG* 22; Pind. *Ol.* 10.53–55, fr. 159; Bacchyl. 13.204–207; Aesch. *Prom.* 981; Eur. *Her.* 805, *Hel.* 1420, *TrGF* (3)F60.1; Isocr. 14.41. But the first known occurrence of this motif in Solon displays a specific nuance. Whereas in the other passages quoted above an indefinite passing of the time is ascribed to this role, in Solon the span of time after which the revelation will take place is specified as short, with a note of remarkable optimism; cf. also ad 30.3. G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}

2. In accordance with the etymology from an alpha privative and the root λήθη "oblivion", ἀλήθεια expresses the negation of the "bad transmission of data" (objective) and the "bad memory" (personal) respectively: cf. especially Krischer 1965; Snell 1975; Cole 1983; see further ad 1.1 G.-P.^{2} = 13.1 W.^{2} The contrary concept of ἀλήθεια, which characterizes the understanding of reality by the citizens before the "revelation", is not so much "falseness", but "bad memory" or "misinformation". For this reason it is unnecessary to think that Solon is charging the citizens with factious or malevolent misconceptions, and that, consequently, the distich was followed by an explanatory self-defense about the actions or intentions ascribed to him on the basis of this false understanding (the kind of apologies which, on the contrary, are found in his poems in tetrameters). Rather, Solon seems to believe that at the moment the

citizens do not have a clear enough vision of the data to interpret reality, nor should one presume that Solon is charging his co-citizens with being liars or believing in lies. Simply put, time will facilitate the "correct remembering" of those events which have earned Solon the reputation of a crazy man.

15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2}

The ancient accounts associate these verses with Solon's reaction to Pisistratus' first attempt at seizing power (561/560 BC; the oldest reference to it is in Herod. 1.59.3–60.1; on the early tyrannies of Pisistratus, see most recently Lavelle 2005, 66–112). Most modern scholars accept this interpretation, and it is difficult to agree with van Wees 1998a, 44 n. 55 that the introductory phrase of Plut. *Sol.* 30.3 πολλὰ διεξῆλθεν ὅμοια τούτοις οἷς διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων γέγραφεν suggests that the fragment originally illustrated the sort of thing that Solon might have said against Pisistratus, without necessarily implying that Solon's verses actually dealt with the tyrant.

If the tyranny of Pisistratus was the topic of our fragment, Solon's stance would have a parallel in Alcae. 348, where the ascertainment that Pittacus had been elected αἰσυμνήτης (a sort of elected monarch) is joined with a harsh criticism of his good favor in the eyes of his foolish fellow citizens: τὸν κακοπατρίδαν / Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος / ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες.

The skepticism regarding the identification of Pisistratus specifically as Solon's implied target arose already with Wilamowitz 1893, II.312, who remarked that the plural τούτους would be inappropriate if the polemic objective was Pisistratus alone. In order to trust the ancient testimonies, it would be necessary to think that this plural designates Pisistratus and his supporters (with, e.g., Masaracchia 1958, 292 f.). But if Solon had Pisistratus in mind, he probably would have pointed to him in the singular as an institutionally anomalous μόναρχος (cf. 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} and Alcaeus quoted ad loc.). As alternatives to the ancient accounts, there have been various attempts to identify the οὗτοι of 3: members of the group in power, i.e. the "leaders of the δῆμος" of 3.7 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 f. W.^{2}, towards whom Solon displayed a very critical attitude in 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4c W.^{2} and 12.3 = 9.3 W.^{2} but a more amicable one in 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} (Wilamowitz loc.cit.; Podlecki 1987, 9); some governing junta in Athens of which the sources do not inform us (West 1993a, 203); Draco, when passing the law on the hectemorage (Rihll 1989, 279, 286) or when passing severe laws on debts (van Wees 1999, 28): in both of these cases creditors would have been given greater power and authorized to seize insolvent debtors and to sell them abroad (hence 30.8–13 G.-P.^{2} = 36.8–13 W.^{2}).

The most economical approach seems to be that which was tried, most recently, by Podlecki 1987. In his wake I would view 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} as part of a strategical pattern of Solonian propaganda, which is also seen in 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} In this pattern, which does not necessarily have a single diachronic definition, Solon would have primarily expressed the fear of (and then the observation of) the ruin of Athens, and at the same time assessed what exactly he believed to be responsible for its ruin as seen from many different points of view, thus strengthening his diagnosis through this polyphony. In 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} he accuses the leaders and speaks in general of the co-responsibility of many of the ἀστοί, naming the *hybris* of both as the principal cause of the worsening situation (on politics as played out in or near the city by the ἀστοί: cf. Lavelle 2005, 67, who stresses the absence of country-folk in Solon's political poems). In 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} Solon considers at the same level both the past culpability of the leaders and the foolish choice made by the *demos*. In 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} Solon does not define his addressee, but according to lines 7 f. he appears to be thinking of the *demos* (there is no conspicuous situation known to us in the history of sixth century Athens where the choices of the aristocratic class could have been charged with gullibility). Solon's different emphases can be explained as the result of a chronological evolution, or rather as the consequence of different performances—especially of different sympotic "fictions" calling for different interlocutors: Solon would have imagined himself speaking to the wealthy of the leading class in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, but to the *demos* in general (possibly including the leading class) in 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} and 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} Mülke 2002, 218 maintains that, were the *demos* the addressee, δουλοσύνη of 12.3 G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2} and 15.4 G.-P.^{2} = 11.4 W.^{2} would have been a term very much in tune with the aristocratic point of view. But defining tyranny in this way in front of the *demos* (or rather within the fiction of the *demos* as audience in a sympotic performance) may have been a sort of 'strong' didactic suggestion to the *demos* of what the aristocratic Solon considered tyranny to be. At any rate, in the troubled period after Cylon different factions came to political prominence at different points (as they would later do in the more settled conditions of the democracy), always with the danger that they would make their grip on power permanent. And in 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} Solon seems to connect δουλοσύνη to the excessive power granted by the *demos* to a plurality of οὗτοι who, as we have seen, seem to be a group of overwhelming leaders of the noble/rich class. Therefore, we cannot rule out that this "slavery" represents a different (but consequent) stage of the increase in strength of some leaders, involving some kind of

blind obedience to their choices, which anticipates the servile acquiescence to the αἱμύλος ἀνήρ described in 7 f.

From a structural point of view, the staccato style of the fragment (there are no enjambements in it, and never more than one finite verb in each verse) develops a logic which can be described in the following terms. The first two distichs "read" the recent past in the *demos*' political behavior as the preparation for the present λυγρά, and the last two suggest a behavioral etiology of both past mistakes and present λυγρά. In tune with this structure, Solon "deictically" focuses on his (real or fictional) addressee through the use of a personal adjective or pronoun in the first verse of each section (ὑμετέραν, ὑμέων). In the first distich Solon emphasizes the "historical" responsibility of the *demos*, and blames it for having created the current situation—it was actually the *demos* who had given its support (ῥύματα δόντες) to some powerful people (τούτους) and in exchange had been reduced to conditions of "slavery". The guilty κακότης of the *demos*, which ll. 5–8 of our fragment specify as stupidity, is contrasted to the inculpability of the gods in terms analogous to the beginning of 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, where the *hybris* of the rich had also been blamed (as remarked by Anderson 2005, 207 f., Solon seems to insist that it is men, not gods, who support *tyrannoi*),—differently from the gods, who support Solon's attempt at avoiding the chaos of the *polis* in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} (cf. Lavelle 2005, 66, 85 on public favor as an indispensable condition for successful politics and the establishment of tyranny). The second distich, which clarifies the historical roots of the situation, purposefully adopts the aorist for its verbs. From the third distich onwards, Solon returns to the present, and accordingly to the present tenses: even now, despite the errors of judgment of the past, the *demos* has not changed its approach to politics (third distich) and continues to err in its choice of leaders (fourth distich). The last two verses, which speak of a single man, could be both a generic description of the ease with which the Athenians are seduced by this or that leader of the various power groups, or an admonition that specifically puts them on guard against the growing influence of a future tyrant.

1 f. A clear formal model is Hom. *Od.* 24.455 ὑμετέρηι κακότητι, φίλοι, τάδε ἔργα γένοντο, κτλ., whose context may also have been presupposed by Solon, and which would have had an effectual emotional impact upon the members of the audience who could remember it. On the day following the massacre of the suitors, in the speech starting with this verse Halitherses places ultimate responsibility for the massacre itself on

the Ithacans as a whole, i.e. on the ineptitude which led them to neglect his call to intervene against the suitors and cause them to desist from their arrogance—both in Homer and in Solon, κακότης does not seem to be aggressive wickedness, but the stupid baseness deriving from ineptitude. Just as the Ithacans had not listened to the soothsayer Halitherses (οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ πείθεσθ', οὐ Μέντορι ποιμένι λαῶν, 24.456), and thus were even more responsible for their present sufference, so too are the Athenians, who had not wanted and still do not want to give their attention to Solon, who had predicted everything, and now they must pay the price.

The opposition between the witlessness of the citizens (responsible for the ruin) and the benevolence of the gods, who would have never wished the ruin of the city, was already expressed at the beginning of 3 G.-P = 4 W.², and in particular at 5–8 (cf. ad loc.). The tone, however, is much more pressingly didactic here than in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² (ἐπ)αναφέρειν seems to be common for "placing the blame" on someone, not seldomly the gods (Eur. *IT* 390: Leto, *Ion* 543: Apollo; Aristoph. *Nub.* 1080: Zeus). Maybe we can suppose that here Solon was directly reacting to the popular trend of attaching the responsibility of crises or troubles to the gods. Mülke 2002, 219 suggests the parallel of Theogn. 731–752, which expresses the doubts about the actual attention of the gods to human affairs, especially in terms of the remuneration of the righteous and the wicked (Theogn. 373–400 should be added, where the concern is the same)—but this is a slightly different motif, which underlays 1.29–32 G.-P.² = 13.29–32 W.² (see ad loc.).

The perfect, πεπόνθατε, as usual, implies the performance of the action (with verbs of emotional state, specifically the beginning of the state) in past time, but points to the continuance of the result of the action or emotional state down to the present: "you have been affected by grief"/"you are oppressed by grief" (McKay 1965, 6 f.).

λυγρός is often connected in Homer with ὄλεθρος (16× = one fourth of its occurrences: *LfgrE* s.v.), or with names designating the pain of situations surrounding death—personal death or mourning for other people's death. The only close parallel for Solon's expression is Hes. *Theog.* 276 Μέδουσά τε λυγρὰ παθοῦσα, where the participial phrase applied to Medusa is promptly explained in connection with her grim destiny to be beheaded by Perseus' sword (280 f.). If from the ample choices for terms designating intense suffering Solon chose precisely λυγρά, which (as a result of the usual combinations in which it appears in archaic Greek) would have conferred connotations of death, he may have been pointing towards the sad destiny of the final end and destruction, in which his fellow-citizens felt that they were living (or in his opinion

should have felt): compare φθείρειν and τρύχεται in 3.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4.5 W.^{2} and 3.22 G.-P.^{2} = 4.22 W.^{2}

τούτων μοῖραν of 2 will mean "the apportionment (to you) of these (pains)", with μοῖρα in a passive sense, and τούτων as an appositive genitive, as in Theogn. 355 f. … κἀσθλοῖσιν ἔχαιρες, / εὖτέ σε καὶ τούτων μοῖρ' ἐπέβαλλεν ἔχειν; for the periphrasis "the sharing of these miseries" = "these miseries", see also Pind. *Pyth*. 4.127 with Braswell 1988, ad loc. In the context of a statement where the responsibility of the gods is explicitly excluded, μοῖρα has its profane, concrete meaning of "share", accompanied here as it usually is in Homer, by an ethical connotation of order and appropriateness = "due share" (less probably, τούτων μοῖραν has to mean "destiny of these miseries": Vian 1960, 275, and approved by Gentili and Prato). Differently, in Solon's 1.63 G.-P.^{2} = 13.63 W.^{2}, where a personified Μοῖρα "brings" both misfortunes and prosperity to men and is paired with δῶρα θεῶν of 64, (see ad loc.), Μοῖρα has an active sense and designates the power of determining man's destiny. Both senses existed already in Homer: Dietrich 1965, 194–231. The present imperative is well chosen: it is a "prescription for repeated use rather than an instruction for the occasion" (Sicking 1991, 166 f., already quoted by Mülke 2002, 221).

3 f. αὐτοί conveys the same opposition to divine action which is displayed in 3.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4.5 W.^{2} (see ad loc). In the latter poem, however, Solon expressed the view that the gods would never have favored the ruin of the city, because of the strong and effective support of some of them for it. The citizens, however, were quite determined to bring about its ruin. But the poem concluded on an optimistic note, consisting of Solon's recipe for a change of politics, *eunomia*, which would have saved the city. Gods, or Eunomia, were their reliable alternatives to the fear of ruin. In our fragment, the gods are simply not responsible for the ruin, and Solon cannot suggest a solution (at least in the portion of the text which has survived). Therefore, the darkest tone dominates, and the Athenians' ability for self-destruction appears not to have antidotes. The verb αὐξάνειν (in the form ἀέξειν) is attested only twice in epic with the meaning "to strengthen" an individual, and in both cases the subject of the action is a divinity: cf. Hom. *Od*. 13.359 f. (Athena); Hes. *Op*. 6 (Zeus); it is later used in the same way in, e.g., Pind. *Ol*. 8.88 (Zeus). By Solon's time the verb may, however, have developed a special political sense defining, e.g., the support given to strengthen tyrants which is found in Theogn. 823 μήτε τιν' αὖξε τύραννον ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, κέρδεσιν εἴκων; Eur. *TrGF* (32)F420.1 f. ὁρᾷς τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ηὐξημένους, / ὡς

μικρὰ τὰ σφάλλοντα, κτλ.; Aeschin. 2.131 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ηὔξησέ τε τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι τυράννων τὰ πράγματα καὶ καθεῖλε; Aristot. *Pol.* 1308b10–13 κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμωι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ μοναρχίαι καὶ πάσηι πολιτείαι μήτ' αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν.

The penultimate word of the line poses a textual problem. Diogenes Laertius gives the reading ῥύσια, but the other testimonies (Plutarch and Diodorus) give ῥύματα. ῥύσια means what is "seized" away on the grounds of a legal claim, in the perspective of "securing" the claim, or alternatively the pledges or sureties spontaneously given by someone in order to guarantee someone else of his credit or legal possession. Linforth 1919, 207 tried to defend this variant, suggesting that the *demos* must have reinforced the power of οὗτοι (who for Linforth are Pisistratus and his supporters) "giving themselves as pledges", i.e., maybe, turning themselves into metaphorical hectemores who mortgaged their persons through a complete reliance on a tyrant. Somehow similarly, Anderson 2005, 208 translates "giving them your pledges". The only appeal of this interpretation is that Solon here would resort to the semantic field of the hectemorage, which according to some ancient sources (cf. Introd. chap. 3) would have been a concern of his legislation. But this metaphorical meaning of ῥύσια is never attested elsewhere. Differently Bravo 1980, 785–792 has shown that up to the end of the classical age the word does not seem to be attested in the sense of "pledge", but only in the sense of "reprisals" taken or stolen in compensation, as in Hom. *Il.* 11.674. Starting from Bravo's results, Gottesman 2005, 413 has recently tried another defense of ῥύσια: the "reprisals" are something which is taken with force (as in Homer): by "giving reprisals", Solon's interlocutors would be proving their total tamed submission and metaphorical domination that led them to slavery, possibly after a setback at the hands of an enemy *hetaireia*—on the rather speculative level of this interpretation, cf. Henderson 2007, 101.

It seems more easily understandable to me the imagery presupposed by ῥύματα = "defenses", a word whose form regularly alternates between ἐρῡ- and ῥῡ- as a consequence of its derivation from the verb ἐρύ- (short υ) or ῥύ- (long υ) (Chantraine 1968–1980, 376). ἔρυμα χροός was used of an armor protecting against arrows in Hom. *Il.* 4.137 and of a garment against cold in Hes. *Op.* 536, and ῥῦμα/ἔρυμα is a very common military term for every kind of "defence" (e.g. tower, walls) and a synonym of φυλακή in the lexicographers and scholiasts. Understandably, some ancient sources (certainly Plutarch), and some modern interpreters (in particular Beloch 1912–1913, II.353) connected our verse with the

fact that Pisistratus based his seizure of power upon the concession of a bodyguard of club-bearers (*korynephoroi*); after all, other tyrants, at least according to fifth century sources, also rushed to protect themselves with bodyguards: cf. Herod. 1.59.5; Aristoph. *Eq.* 852–857; Thuc. 6.46.2 and 57.1; Plato, *Resp.* 8.566b5 calls the request for bodyguards "the storied tyrannical demand"; see Lavelle 2005, 95 f. on the term *korynephoroi*. But it is also plausible, and more prudent, to suppose that here Solon is charging the *demos* (perhaps inclusive of the leading class) with having supplied the wicked ambitious μεγάλοι ἄνδρες with the metaphorical "bulwarks"—"some real measure of legitimacy" sanctioned by the community for these leaders (Anderson 2005, 208) to maintain and increase their hegemonic power, so that their excessive power could no longer be checked.

δουλοσύνη of 4 may mean the formal loss of the lawful rights of the Athenians to govern themselves in a situation of tyranny or in the preparation of a tyranny, as perhaps in 12.4 G.-P.² = 9.4 W.², but it may also mean the substantial loss of the autonomy of decision and action which depended on the willingness to conform to the impositions made by this or that αἱμύλος ἀνήρ (cf. ad 3.18 G.-P.² = 4.18 W.²). The epithet κακή seems formulaically intrinsic to δουλοσύνη—cf. already 3.18 G.-P.² = 4.18 W.²—but here it will also be connected to δι' ὑμετέραν κακότητα, reminding us also at a formal level of the relationship between the political ineptitude of the Athenians and the miserable baseness of their present condition of slavery.

5 f. As 5–8 deal in an almost farcical way with the political gullibility of the *demos*, it comes as no surprise that 5 was reused by two comic poets: Cratin. *PCG* 135 ὑμῶν εἷς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπηξ δωροδοκεῖται which according to Bergk was pronounced by Solon himself, who may have been a character of the comedy *Nomoi* from which this fragment derives (on another reuse of Solon in Cratinus, see Noussia 2003) and by Strattis, *PCG* 71.2 f. πεντήκοντα ποδῶν ἴχνεσι βαίνετ(ε). Here Solon also adopts the register of everyday language. The construction of βαίνειν with the dative ἴχνεσι does not seem to be attested outside of Solon and Strattis apart from few other instances in prose authors of the imperial age and Nonnus; εἷς ἕκαστος appears to be an Attic idiom, and not a poetical one, as it is not attested after Solon before Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristoph. *PCG* 67.1, Andocides, Xenophon, Menander (in tragedy only in Soph. *Ant.* 262), and later becomes rather rare in the *koine*. The emphatic opposition between individuals and collectivity (not only is εἷς ἕκαστος pleonastic, since the simple ἕκαστος means the same thing,

but also the idea of totality is enforced through συν- in σύμπασι) may have been common: cf. Herod. 7.53 εἷς τε ἕκαστος καὶ οἱ σύμπαντες προθυμίην ἔχωμεν and Thuc. 6.41 εἷς τε ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις … παρασκευασόμεθα (from direct speches in both historians). Moreover, the cunning of the fox must have belonged already in Solon's age to the popular tradition of fable, and certainly to the tradition of iambic or blame poetry. The fox is remembered as πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον in Archil. 185.5 f. (cf. also 201 πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ), while Alcae. 69.6 takes up the image of this animal, possibly as a paradigm for the unscrupulous cunning of Pittacus. A strongly negative and anti-Archilochean image of the fox as symbol of the deceiving power (ἄμαχον κακόν) of slanders, which, however, provides little concrete profit, is proposed by Pind. *Pyth.* 2.77 f. (at 54 f. Archilochus, the author who has presented the fox in a most sympatheic way, and who was also a notorious slanderer, is introduced as being τὰ πόλλ' ἐν ἀμαχανίαι for his slanders). The fox's antonomastical cunning also gave birth to the verb ἀλωπεκίζειν "to charmingly deceive": cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1241 f.; Babr. 95.64; Hesych. *Lex.* α 3369 Latte. See in general Detienne and Vernant 1991, 34–37.

A crucial point in the interpretation of our distich is the precise function of the image of the fox. The traditional interpretation (reproposed e.g. by Masaracchia 1958, 293) sees the fox as a symbol of the cunning and/but greed used by the Athenians in pursuing their own private affairs: they metaphorically "follow" the fox's steps (ἴχνεσι as a modal dative), namely imitate its example, cf. the parallels in Pind. *Pyth.* 10.12 τὸ δὲ συγγενὲς ἐμβέβακεν ἴχνεσιν πατρός and Plato, *Resp.* 553a9 f. παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκηι. A different take is suggested by D.L. Page apud Cook 1954–1955, 3, based on the interpretation of ἴχνεσι as a *dativus loci* (already suggested by Kynaston 1890), which can be found, e.g., in Strattis quoted above. There should be no antithesis between the private (foxy) and public (stupid) behavior of the Athenians, and ἴχνεσι βαίνει would mean no more than to follow where the fox leads, stupidly. The image should be understood in light of the fable of Babrius 95, where the fox deceives the deer with the promise of the "tyranny" over all the animals into entering the cave of a sick lion (who of course eats the deer). Babr. 95 is beyond every doubt a parallel of particular importance (also pointed out by Gerber 1970, 136 and Lassere 1984, 89 f.): in regard to the idiocy of the deer deceived by the cunning words of the fox it is said that τῆς δ' ὁ νοῦς ἐχαυνώθη / λόγοισι ποιητοῖσιν (cf. also λόγοι μελίγλωσσοι at 95.9), of course to be compared with Solon's 15.6 χαῦνος νόος … ἔπη αἱμύλου ἀνδρός.

This interpretation would be perfect, since the image of the fox would anticipate that of the tyrant (or a political figure of overwhelming power) designated by αἱμύλος ἀνήρ in 7, as possibly in Alcae. 69.6 quoted above, and oppose him and the fox to the stupid Athenians (as remarked by Henderson 2007, 104f.). But it must presuppose that Solon shared with his audience the knowledge of Babrius' fable, since we do not have other evidence of the paradigmatic nature of the fox as a destructive trapper, although this evidence might have existed in Solon's time—before understanding that they are "out-foxed", Solon's Athenian audience must understand implicitly that the destination to which the fox's steps lead is deadly. A third interpretation, which also eliminates the opposition between private and public, and presupposes a consistent focus on the political ineptitude of the Athenians, has been proposed by Gottesman 1998, 20f. and 2005, 414. Relying on Xen. *Cyn.* 3.1, 5.4, 6.3, he pointed out that the fox's way of running is especially inconsistent and confusing, and apparently aimless. Therefore, following the fox would mean to adopt its aimless way of running around: to follow fox-tracks would cause the follower to wander aimlessly and lose all sense of direction; the meaning in Solon's lines may be that his audience has no sense of reality. But in fact the fox is only *seemingly* aimless in its running, as it is an animal which knows how to escape and is proverbially difficult to catch. Therefore, it would be an ambiguous paradigm for the inconsistent and purposeless politics of the Athenians. I would thus suggest a fourth interpretation, which is in tune with the traditional one (no more than it is a specification of it), and focuses on the cunning manner of the fox's running, thus making the fox a positive paradigm of the cunning of the Athenians in pursuing their interest. At least according to Aelian, *nat.anim.* 13.11, the fox has a very intelligent way to pursue the hares, a real τέχνη to which Aelian devotes an enthusiastic and long description, concluding that "not by speed but by length of time and by craft" the fox manages to catch the hares: the Athenians in their private lives should be following the steps of the cunning fox. For the ability of the individual to pursue his own private interests in opposition to his total myopia when it comes to the management of the public good, cf. above all Aristoph. *Eq.* 752–755, and *Ran.* 1427–1429.

For χαῦνος cf. also Sol. 29^b.4 G.-P.^{2} = 34.4 W.^{2} The χαυνοπολίτης of Aristoph. *Ach.* 634f. is deceived by the words of strangers and is delighted by their adulation; or the average Athenian in *Eq.* 1115–1120 ἀλλ' εὐπαράγωγος εἶ, / θωπευόμενός τε χαί/ρεις κἀξαπατώμενος, / πρὸς τόν τε λέγοντ' ἀεὶ / κέχηνας· ὁ νοῦς δέ σου / παρὼν ἀποδημεῖ.

The sequence adjective + verb + νόος is extremely common in Theognis for the second half of pentameters (74, 88 = 622 = 1082d ἔνεστι νόος, 196, 498, 580, 698, 792): it may be an imitation of Solon or, more probably, of a structural formula typical of elegiac poetry.

7 f. Hes. *Theog.* 85 πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι shows the early diffusion of the verb ὁρᾶν εἰς in the sense of "being subdued to" (cf. Hom. *Od.* 19.513 f. for the weaker sense of the verb "to take care of"). As in Solon, the subject of Hesiod is λαοί (the mass) and in his l. 90 Hesiod speaks of the capacity of seduction exercised by the king on the populace in very similar terms to Solon. Also, in Thuc. 3.38.4 the citizens of Athens are considered to be superficial spectators of *logoi* (θεαταὶ ... τῶν λόγων), a fact that would lead to the downfall of the city: "it is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective". See Herod. 1.60 for a description of the Athenian reactions to Pisistratus' entry into Athens in procession as a favorite of Athena which emphasizes their total participation in this sort of dramatic performance without insisting on their manipulation: Connor 1987, 44; Sinos 1993. On Greek contestations of vision, see Jay 1993.

In the second hemistich of 7 there is an important divergence between Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria, who have εἰς ἔπη αἱμύλου ἀνδρός "to the words of a seducer", and the other ancient authors, who read εἰς ἔπος αἰόλον ἀνδρός "to a man's flashy word". Eunapius, *Vit.soph.* 6.5.1 τό τε ἐπὶ τῆι γλώσσηι καὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν αἱμύλιον οὐκ ἔξω γοητείας ἐδόκει, concerning a character whose oratorical ability is compared to the Sirens', may include a reminiscence of Solon's verses, and thus favor the variant αἱμύλου. Masaracchia 1958, 291 argued that αἰόλος connotes the fact that a tyrant's promises are unstable/unreliable (the epithet is in relation to any man's word e.g. in Aesch. *Prom.* 661 and Pind. *Nem.* 8.25); from this perpective, there should also be a precise opposition between the two singulars ἔργον and ἔπος. Additionally, since αἰόλος is a very rare term in Attic, one might think that the alternative reading banalized both its sense and the collective singular ἔπος (cf. Piccolomini 1895, 74). On the other hand, the fact that according to Plutarch, *Sol.* 29.3 Pisistratus would have had "something seductive" (αἱμύλον τι) about the way in which he spoke possibly plays in favor of Plutarch's text (as is emphasized by

Gentili-Prato)—although Plutarch may have modeled this last definition of the amiability of Pisistratus' eloquence on the text which he read for 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} In any case αἱμύλος is such a specific and suitable keyword in a context where oratorical deceptive cunning is described, that it is difficult to get rid of it: both the Homeric-Hesiodic αἱμύλιος, first attested in Hom. *Od.* 1.56 for the seductive speeches with which Calypso tries to make Odysseus forget his *nostos* home, and the Hesiodic αἱμύλος always and only occur in contexts where verbs like θέλγειν or ἐξαπατᾶν, or names like ψεύδεα also occur.

The metonymy "to look someone in the mouth" makes us imagine the faces of the Athenians at the assembly all concentrated on the mouth of their "seducer", and makes them seem sillier than people more reasonably "believing someone's words". It not only responds to the diffuse tendency of Solon (cf. 1.36 G.-P.^{2} = 13.36 W.^{2} and Introd. ad 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2}) to parody certain attitudes of the interlocutors at whom he directed his criticisms, transforming them into caricatures, but it also reduces the dimension of the political proposals of the "seducer" not only to the mere occasion of the performance, but also to the dimension of the product of a single organ, the tongue, and thus the pure emissions of sound, where the content hardly matters.

The opposition between "word" and "concrete action" or the "reality" that follows it, which is later widespread in sophistic Athens, already existed in Homer (cf. e.g. *Il.* 1.395, 5.879, 9.374, 11.703, 15.234, *Od.* 2.272, 3.99, 4.329, 15.375; additionally *HHom.Dem.* 117, 199, *HHom.Ap.* 540, *HHom.Herm.* 46). In Homer the coexistence of the two abilities in waging war and discussing matters within the council was also often considered to be the marker of exceptional personalities: cf. *Il.* 1.258 etc. From the silence about the actions of his target, at least at this point Solon tries to present himself as unilaterally endowed with rhetorical abilities.

16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2}

In *amat.* 751e, Plutarch ascribes this fragment to the youth of Solon which is "overflowing with semen" and he considers that 24 G.-P.^{2} = 26 W.^{2} was composed by Solon at an advanced age, when "he had brought his life into the peaceful sea of marriage and philosophy". Both fragments illustrate perspectives of the elite Athenian ideology about *eros* in the sympotic environment. The issue of pederasty may also have interested Solon in his activity as a legislator. Aeschines, *Tim.* 10–12 and 138 f. cites a "law" of Solon which regulated the hours that the gymnasia could be open, and Kyle 1984, 99–102 has argued that the part of the law referring to the prohibition of slaves oiling themselves in the gymnasia or acting as lovers is genuinely Solonian.

The fragment belongs to the poetic genre of *paidika*. The verb παιδοφιλεῖν appears to be a technicism of erotic language, and as such may reflect the cultural-intellectual attention that Solon devoted to the phenomenon of pederasty; παῖς may also be technical, denoting the junior partner in homosexual eros: see Dover 1978, 85. In any case, l. 2 is certainly a sort of quintessential description of two frequently mentioned objects of erotic interest to *erastai*, and thus it conveys a small psychological picture of pederastic behavior. Solon's interest and terminologic precision must be contrasted with the silence of Homer on homosexual love, e.g. in the case of Achilles and Patroclus, who, at least in some classical interpretations of their Homeric behavior, were suspected or positively believed to have cultivated a homoerotic relationship. The prevailing assumption of at least the Hellenistic scholars must have been that Homer's silence depended upon his adherence to the epic *prepon*. But it is more likely that Homer could not yet focus on their sexual dimension, and thus adopted the terminology of conjugal and kinship relations in order to define their friendship, because he was not yet familiar with the social and emotional institutions of pederasty which matured among the Greeks of the classical age (cf. Halperin 1990, chap. 4, especially p. 85 f., and Fantuzzi forthcoming).

After all, Solon's fragment dates from nearly the same age (ca. 560/475 BC) to which black-figure vase representations of scenes of pederastic courtship (cf. Shapiro 1981, 135 f. which includes comments on the age

of the participants) and conceits on the same theme in poetry date back (cf. Mimn. 7.9 G.-P.^{2} = 1.9 W.^{2} and Alcae. test. 430; see Vetta 1980, XXXVII–XLIV; Percy 1996, 176–181). As was remarked by Skinner 2005, 119, as a system ancient Greek pederasty was class-marked because courtship required leisure and money. Presents might range from apples and flowers to crowns, mantles, slabs of meat, or tokens of affection usually in the form of animals (fighting cocks, hares, deer, dogs: the gifts usually indicated the qualities expected from the *eromenos*: Bremmer 1990, 142); on the ἀγαθά that an *erastes* can offer to his *eromenos*, see Plato, *Phaedr.* 232c and also ad 17 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2}

Solon does not seem to be speaking about himself in this fragment. Supposing, along with Plutarch, that he was doing so is a biographical fallacy. On the suspicious Plutarch's reading of 24 G.-P.^{2} = 26 W.^{2}, see ad loc.

1. The temporal clause introduced by ἔστ(ε) can either denote time subsequent to that of the principal verb and mean "until" or time contemporaneous to that of the principal verb and mean "while" (Gerber 1999a translates the conjunction "as long as"). The conjunction ἔστ(ε) is not attested in Homer, but it is already used in Hes. *Theog.* 754; cf. later Theogn. 959, and Xenophan. 5.4. G.-P.^{2} = 6.4 W.^{2} Also, the use of temporal conjunctions with the subjunctive without ἄν is not Homeric, but it is common in Attic poetic language (cf. Kühner-Blass II.449 f. n. 4; Soph. *Aj.* 1183 exemplifies ἔστε). There is no substantial reason therefore to emend παιδοφιλήσῃι of the mss. into -εις (Brunck, Gaisford) or -σει (Boissonade)—in fact, the future indicative can be found after temporal conjunctions in Homer, but always with ἄν (cf. Kühner-Blass II.447 n. 2).

ἥβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄνθεσι: I agree with Roth 1993 that the preposition ἐπί could not be intended to have a temporal sense and that the flower of youth here is not that of the ἐραστής (*contra* Campbell 1983, 19). Solon's subtle image is that of the ἐραστής, who alights on an ἐρώμενος, just as in Hom. *Il.* 2.89 the bee alights on flowers (ἐπ' ἄνθεσι)—providing evidence of a local (-causal) meaning for ἐπί. Alcman, *PMGF* 58.2 depicts Eros coming down from heaven over the topmost flowers of the galingale, ἄκρ' ἐπ' ἄνθη καβαίνων, so roughly (madly?/lustfully?) that he seems likely to damage them: cf. Campbell 1983, 9. On the commonplace metaphor of sex as the picking of the flowers or fruit of love see Mimn. 7.1–5 G.-P.^{2} = 1.1–5 W.^{2} τίς δὲ βίος, τί δὲ τερπνὸν ἄτερ χρυσέης Ἀφροδίτης; / τεθναίην, ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι, / κρυπταδίη φιλότης καὶ μείλιχα δῶρα καὶ εὐνή, / οἷ' ἥβης ἄνθεα γίνεται ἁρπαλέα / ἀν-

δράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξίν, and in later poetry, cf. Asclep. *Anth.Pal.* 7.217.3 f. ἃ νέον ἥβας ἄνθος ἀποδρέψαντες ἐρασταί / πρωτοβόλου.

The metaphor of the ἥβης ἄνθος indicates a youth on the verge of manhood, a time which can be considered the culmination of both physical and martial force (cf. Hom. *Il.* 13.484; *HHom.Herm.* 375; Pind. *Pyth.* 4.158; Aesch. *Supp.* 663), and the height of beauty (= flower of beauty) (cf. *HHom.Dem.* 108, where it is applied to young girls; Hes. *Theog.* 988; Tyrtae. 7.28 G.-P.² = 10.28 W.²; Mimn. 7.3 G.-P.² = 1.3f. W.² and 8.3f. G.-P.² = 2.3f. W.²; Theogn. 1007 f., 1348). In fact, differently from the ἐρώμενος, who is often reminded of the brevity of youthful puerility (παιδεία) as an argument that should convince him not to be reluctant (cf., e.g., Theogn. 1303 f., 1305 f. θυμῶι γνούς, ὅτι παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος / ὠκύτερον σταδίου; Xen. *Symp.* 8.14), the ἐραστής was usually older than the beloved. For this detail about the ethics of homosexual love in Greece, see Plato, *Symp.* 179e–180b, where Phaedrus questions how the pederastic model could be applied to Achilles and Patroclus (as in Aeschylus) since Achilles was the more youthful and beautiful of the two as well as the more noble, thus combining both the features of the *erastes* and the *eromenos*, and Pausanias' speech at 180c–185c, which states that the better sort of admirer (the noble lover) refrains from loving boys who are too young; his preoccupation implies that some adult male Greeks did court too young boys (181d). Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.4 celebrates the erotic charms of a twelve-year-old and he increases his praise successively up through the seventeenth year, the furthest limit. For the suitable age for being loved and being a lover, see Cantarella 1992, 36–42.

παιδοφιλήσηι, is probably a technical term (see Introd.), first attested in Solon; for the ending, see above. Cf. Theogn. 1318, 1345, (1357), and later, e.g., Seleuc. *CA* p. 176, Mel. *Anth.Pal.* 12.137.4, 12.164.2, the adjective in Glauc. *Anth.Pal.* 12.44.4, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.145.1; cp. Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.1.3 εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ παῖδάς τε φιλῶ καὶ παισὶν ὁμιλῶ.

2. Physical attraction and pressing desire (ἵμερος) were no less part of a pederastic relationship than its pedagogical function in Archaic Greece. In literary celebrations of the beauty of a beloved, the lover's lust is often focused on two parts of the body which express the essence of sexual attraction: the eyes (cf. e.g. Simon. 9.10–12 G.-P.² = 22.10–12 W.²; Pind. fr. 123; Aristot. fr. 43 Gigon; Meleag. *Anth.Pal.* 12.109, 110, 113; Strato, *Anth.Pal* 12.196; adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.130) or the thighs (cf. Anacr. *PMG* 407 = 43 Gentili; Simon. 8.5 G.-P.² = 21.5 W.²; Aesch. *TrGF* F135, ** 136; Soph. *TrGF* F345); see also Buffière 1980, 307 and Dover 1978, 70 f.

A similar reference to the thighs and kisses (and thus mouth) is found in Aesch. *TrGF* F135 (from the play *Myrmidones*) on the sacredness of the feelings of love uniting Patroclus and Achilles: σέβας δὲ μηρῶν ἁγνὸν οὐκ ἐπηιδέσω, / ὦ δυσχάριστε τῶν πυκνῶν φιλημάτων: see further Fantuzzi forthcoming. For iconographic material, see Dover 1978, 98–100; Reinsberg 1989, 194 ff.; Lear and Cantarella 2008. Calame 1999, 54 and n. 4 refers to the inscription "in exchange grant me your between thighs" (*diamerion*) on an Attic *lecythos* with athletes, coll. Lord Guilford (*ABV* 664, *Paralip*. 317).

γλυκερός "sweet", being used of the beloved's "mouth", is the first attestation of this adjective with an erotic connotation; epic had used it to define the pleasure of the voice or of song: cf. Hom. *Il*. 13.637, *Od*. 23.145; Hes. *Theog*. 83 f., 97 = *HHom*. 25.5: Paschalis 1995, 181–183. The idea here is that the boy's mouth gives pleasure to the lover. For the sensual meaning of the phrase, cf. in particular the late erotic epigramatists Paul.Sil. *Anth.Pal*. 5.281.6 and Marc.Argent. *Anth.Pal*. 5.128.2; *GVI* 746.4 (3/4 AD); also "Mosch." *Bion. Epit*. 72; Long.Soph. 1.18.1; Nonn. *Dion*. 35.48; in a similar sensual use the adjective is applied to Cleophon's gaze in Asclep. *Anth.Pal*. 5.153 γλυκεροῦ βλέμματος ἀστεροπαί.

17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2}

This fragment offers some glimpses into the often-lauded activities of the lives of elite male Greeks (we lack a reference to athleticism, which would produce a more complete picture: see the μακαρισμός of Theogn. 1335 f. Ὄλβιος ὅστις ἐρῶν γυμνάζεται οἴκαδε ἐλθὼν / εὕδειν σὺν καλῶι παιδὶ πανημέριος). The closed sphere of the aristocratic symposium is certainly the setting for the performance of this kind of poem.

Pederastic love (cf. also 16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2}) and ξενία, ritualised friendship, were well known components of aristocratic ideology, as was the hunt, evoked here by the mentioning of hounds and horses. Pederasty and hunting are also dominant themes in sympotic iconography (cf. Dentzer 1982, 438–442). In Aristophanes' *Wealth* the good ἐρώμενος asks his ἐραστής for a fine horse or a pack of hunting dogs (149–159)—besides the fact (noted by Hubbard 1998, 52) that χρηστός, which is said of the good ἐρώμενος in Aristophanes, "is an aristocratic core word", the gifts also place these ἐρώμενοι in the circles of nobility (Skinner 2005, 121). ἱπποτροφία, the keeping of horses, presupposes an upper class of wealthy landowners. Aristot. *Pol.* 1289b35–38, e.g., when describing the factors that sanction the wealth distinctions between the well-to-do, first cites the breeding of horses and argues τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥάιδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν (cf. also Thuc. 6.12.2; Xen. *Eq.* 2.1; Isae. 5.43; Isocr. 6.55 and 16.33). Actually, it appears that the political forces which, after Solon, had a major interest in reducing the power of the aristocratic landowners (Hippias and the post-Pisistratean democracy) sought on numerous occasions to reduce the strategic importance of the Athenian cavalry in warfare: cf. Anderson 1961, 128–130.

ξενία refers to the hospitality that binds host and guest, their families, and their descendants (such ties are hereditary, as is the case with Diomedes and Glaukos in Homer, on which see also ad 6.2 G.-P.^{2} = 15.2 W.^{2}) and was manifested in an exchange of goods and/or assistance (e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.30 f., Anacr. *IEG* fr.iamb. 1). In fact, e.g. in the words of the Pisistratus of Hom. *Od.* 15.54 f., the ξένος is a person who "provides φιλότης", not very differently from the *eromenoi* of 1—this is expressed in the case of the *eromenoi*, but left unexpressed in the case of the ξένοι.

This social dimension of pleasure = affection may have been what Solon privileged in the enjoyment of wealth. Otherwise Solon may have quoted the ξένοι as being providers of the pleasure of information about foreign *poleis* or countries, a pleasure which could enliven the sympotic meetings and satisfy the curiosity of the archaic intellectual/political elites—hence, perhaps, the specification ἀλλοδαποί. Bonds of this kind of ritualized friendship were facilitated by the extraordinary geographical mobility of the Greeks: exile, war, trade, and other itinerant professions provided some of the reasons for being abroad and establishing or reviving old ξενίαι. Many of the principal aristocratic families of various Greek cities had numerous associations of this kind even with the lands of the Near East, that is the land between Greeks and non-Greeks; in fact, the number of ξένοι that could be drawn was limitless and determined only by the number of individuals with whom one had a chance to interact. Cf. Lewis 1996, 27–31; on *xenia* as a cultural phenomenon, its history, and functions, see Herman 1987.

Perhaps the closest structural parallel to Solon's *makarismos* is a passage from the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, which describes the fortune enjoyed by those initiated into the rites of the goddess: 486–489 μέγ' ὄλβιος ὅν τιν' ἐκεῖναι/προφρονέως φίλωνται ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· / αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα / Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν. The frequency of this *topos* means that we cannot presume an exact intertextuality between the two passages. The emphasis placed on the notion of abundance (ἄφενος) may have had a specific function in the hymnal context revolving around the cult of Demeter, but nevertheless its variance with the notion of wealth that Solon expresses in this fragment is telling. Wealth is no longer based on a simple surplus of grain or, more generally, an accumulation of foodstuffs in the house (cf. *HHom*. 30.10) which the genealogy of Ploutos as the son of Demeter in Hes. *Theog*. 969 also illustrated. Solon's idea of well-being is more dynamic, and he emphasizes the phase of the fruition of wealth itself in the company of boys and guests.

1 f. The μακαρισμός, a construction that introduces the formulation of the conditions of happiness, often (as in this verse) in the form of a nominal phrase with ὄλβιος "prosperous", εὐδαίμων "fortunate", or μάκαρ "blessed" followed by a relative clause clarifying the reasons for it, was very common in archaic and classical poetry: cf. e.g. Hom. *Od*. 11.450; *HHom.Dem*. 480–482 (and 486 f. cit.), *HHom*. 25.4 f. and *HHom*. 30.7 f.; Hes. *Theog*. 954 f.; Alcm. *PMGF* 1.37–39; Hippon. 43 = 5 Degani

and * 117.6 = °196 Degani; Theogn. 934, 1013, 1173, 1375; Pind. *Ol.* 7.10, *Pyth.* 10.22–24 and fr. 137; Bacchyl. 3.10 f.; Choer. *PEG* 2.1; Soph. *El.* 160 and *TrGF* F837; Eur. *Bacch.* 73, *Cyc.* 495–502 and *TrGF* (13)F256, (73)F789a, inc.fab. F910, inc.fab. F1057, see in general Gladigow 1967.

The expression παῖδες φίλοι exists in Homer (*Od.* 19.455), where it means "dear sons". It has often been suggested that the phrase also has the same meaning in Solon (cf. Harrison 1902, 111; Linforth 1919, 176 f.; also Bowra 1958, 74), but in light of the παιδοφιλεῖν of Sol. 16.1 G.-P.^{2} = 25.1 W.^{2} it is likely that it is one of the Homeric phrases which Solon reworks, and therefore has to be taken in an erotic sense. In this context παῖδες would thus mean "beloved(s)" (= παῖδες καλοί, *amasii*), as it does at least in Anacr. *PMG* 402c.1 = 22 Gentili and in Theogn. 1369 (so already de Heer 1969, 33). The variant παῖδες νέοι of ps.-Lucian, which should be excluded since it seems to be a banalization, is telling, however, about the interpretation of our passage by the ancients, as it seems intended to explicate the pederasts' appreciation of young(er) ἐρώμενοι.

φίλοι could be understood both as an attribute of "boys" ("happy is he who has beloved boys"), and as predicative of the same term ("happy is he who likes boys, horses, dogs"), or, in the unlikely way in which Plato takes it, in an active sense, "happy is he whom boys, horses, etc. love" (cf. Gerber 1999a, 145). I prefer the first interpretation, even if Theogn. 1255 f. ὅστις μὴ παῖδάς τε φιλεῖ καὶ μώνυχας ἵππους / καὶ κύνας, οὔποτέ οἱ θυμὸς ἐν εὐφροσύνηι serves as a re-interpretation/correction of our Solonian distich cited immediately before (1253 f.), and seems to favor the second interpretation (this other interpretation is supported, e.g., by Landfester 1966, 41 n. 4 and Skiadas 1966). But what Theogn. 1255 f. offers may be a factious correction of Solon's distich. For instance, Theognis may radicalize Solon's remark by affirming, in an even more exclusive way, that "whoever does not love lads, horses, hounds, must have a heart that never knows good cheer": cf. Vetta 1980, 58 f. In fact, the observation about the happiness of the man who *has xy* is more consonant with the character of Solon's distich, which seems to be a pure and simple μακαρισμός, whereas Theognis' advice about a life choice better matches the affirmation that only the person who *loves* xy can be happy (implying that one should not love other things as much).

μώνυχες ἵπποι is a very common epic formula (cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 5.236, 9.127, 11.708, *Od.* 15.46; Hes. fr. 30.4). The construction ξείνοισιν … ἀλλοδαποῖσι also already exists in Homer (cf. *Od.* 17.485). The two expressions confer epic sublimity on Solon's life-choice, which is itself far from the height of epic heroes. ἀλλοδαποῖσι may point to one of the most

relevant functions of the ξένοι in the archaic age, namely the spreading of information about events of remote *poleis* or the customs and events of different countries: see Introd.

18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2}

Stobaeus 4.33 frames this fragment as a comparison between πενία and πλοῦτος. Yet, as pointed out by Figueira 1995, 44, "it should be appreciated that the constituent items of wealth are never rejected in favor of their absence or poverty, but always for non-material goods". It is also significant that Solon rejects excessive wealth (l. 7), not material possessions themselves. Stobaeus' interpretation is certainly wrong, and in other fragments Solon himself is clearly not inattentive to wealth: see e.g. 1.7 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.7 f. W.^{2}, where the poet's prayer to the Muses undoubtedly includes a request for moderate prosperity. The archaic elegists pull no punches on the cruelty of poverty: see the sensible remarks of Theogn. 173–178, 179 f., 181 f. Rather, here the speaker will offer an ὑποθήκη, advising his addressees on how to live, like other speakers of the elegiac tradition: e.g. Theogn. 1007–1012 ξυνὸν δ' ἀνθρώποις' ὑποθήσομαι, ὄφρα τις ἥβης / ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχων καὶ φρεσὶν ἐσθλὰ νοῆι, / τῶν αὐτοῦ κτεάνων εὖ πασχέμεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνηβᾶν / δὶς πέλεται πρὸς θεῶν οὐδὲ λύσις θανάτου / θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι. κακὸν δ' ἐπὶ γῆρας ἐλέγχει / οὐλόμενον, κεφαλῆς δ' ἅπτεται ἀκροτάτης (see also Theogn. 903–930 on saving or spending).

The structure of the poem is simple. The initial axiomatic affirmation introduces the comparison between material wealth and physical well-being which is inherent in the person of the owner (as Linforth 1919, 211 well notes), defining the latter as "wealth" that is on par with the former (1), with an extension of the meaning of the verb πλουτεῖν which would be analogous to Solon's use of the term ἀγαθοί in 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2}: cf. ad loc. Since material goods and physical pleasure seem to be considered to be on the same level at the outset of the poem, the potential for happiness for whoever has the first and for whoever is capable of attaining the second is the same. There are differing lengths in their descriptions: material advantages occupy two and a half verses of the fragment, physical ones more than three and a half. At the end, Solon arrives at an affirmation which is an apophthegm (and is a nominal phrase like most apophthegms) reassuming in asyndeton what was stated above and what constitutes "true" ἄφενος wealth (7): see also van Groningen 1966 ad Theogn. 725.

The principal argument Solon uses for the futility of excessive material wealth, i.e. the fact that everyone eventually dies and no one can escape this fate, has seemed weak: it is true that no one can bring his wealth with him to Hades, but neither can one enjoy food or sex there. Furthermore, Plutarch's quotation of the poem (*Sol.* 2.3) does not include 7–10, although this fact should not cause serious doubts about the authenticity of these verses; Solon's reflections on death, serious illnesses, and old age, the three most well-known ills of the human race, cannot illustrate Plutarch's point here that Solon was not an admirer of wealth and are therefore cut out. The last two distichs were, however, actually athetized by Jacoby 1918, 302 n. 2, who considered them to be an interpolation responding to Mimnermus' pessimistic views on old age: see also ad 23 G.-P.[2] = 27 W.[2] By contrast, Masaracchia 1958, 312–314 defended the last distich's authenticity as a logical development of the poem's argument. In truth, all four verses allow Solon to further his argument.

Solon's clearest point is surely made in negative terms: wealth accumulated beyond what is necessary to satisfy one's pleasures, needs and desires adds nothing to life, since it confers no benefits for age, disease or death. There is no evident claim that pleasure offers any advantage either, after death or in proximity of death, and at least the opening ἶσον seems intended to state the equality of wealth and physical well-being. Linforth 1919, 211 thinks that, while wealth is powerless against all these foes (age, disease, death), it is implied that the physical well-being of bodily health will at least reduce the chances for disease. Linforth's argument seems to introduce an idea that is not present in the text. Solon's focus is on physical enjoyment and not on the collateral benefits of physical well-being for health. However, apart from the truism, which is underscored in 4–6, that pleasure, unlike wealth, cannot be accumulated, but is enjoyed instantly and is spontanueously generated by a biological mechanism only connected with age (6 f.), and thus cannot be confiscated by death, Solon hastens to overtake the equality of the opening ἶσον; he finds another way to compensate for the impression that death invalidates and equalizes the desire for pleasure as well as the desire for wealth, creating a sort of superiority of physical well-being and pleasure. In fact, from the very beginning of the fragment he emphasizes the contrast between excess of material possessions (πολύς, 1) and the essentiality/simplicity of physical pleasures, and thus recalls the other common experience, namely that excessive accumulation of material wealth had intrinsic implications of toil for and inexorable struggle towards the further accumulation of it. These statements had already been made explicit by Solon in 1.43–62

and 71–73 G.-P.^{2} = 13.43–62 and 71–73 W.^{2} The implication here is that material wealth in and of itself does not contribute to the opportunity for enjoying life; instead it is physical pleasure that does this (since it is instantly enjoyed).

Combinations of emphasis on the pleasures of the senses and *memento mori* are all but foreign to archaic and later sympotic poetry: cf., e.g., Theogn. 877 f. ≈ 107ab, 567–569; 973–978; 1155 f.; Alcae. 38; adesp. *PMG* 1009; *Anacreont.* 36.10–16; and also Eur. *Alc.* 782–793; Philet. *PCG* 13.4 f.; Amphis, *PCG* 8; Asclep. *Anth.Pal.* 5.85 and 12.50; Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 11.19. The best archaic parallel is, however, not supplied by a Greek text, but by the interest of the Greeks in the epitaph on the tomb of the Assyrian king Sardanapallus, whose luxury and daintiness became proverbial (καταγηράσαις Τιθωνοῦ βαθύτερον, Κινύρου πλουσιώτερος καὶ Σαρδαναπάλου τρυφηλότερος: *Suid.* σ 122.9 Adler). The epitaph was known, at least from the Hellenistic age onwards, in a hexametric translation that circulated under the name of Choerilus (perhaps Choerilus of Iasus, the court poet of Alexander the Great), *SH* 335.1–5 εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε, / τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι τοι οὔτις ὄνησις. / καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας. / ταῦτ' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος / τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια κεῖνα λέλειπται. Almost all of the much shorter prose versions of the epitaph, which are translated by a few Alexandrian historians (Amyntas, *FgrH* 122F2; Callisthenes, *FgrH* 124F34; Aristobulus, *FgrH* 139F9), actually claim that it would have included the exhortation: "eat, drink, and enjoy yourself, because all other things are not worthy of this" (meaning the snap of the fingers that would have been represented on his funeral monument: on Sardanapallus' dancing gesture, cf. Papadopoulou 2005). Phoenix of Colophon attributed similar contents to the epitaph of Ninus, another Assyrian king and predecessor of Sardanapallus: cf. *CA* 1.16–24. A few other epigraphic epitaphs of the imperial age develop the same line of thought: *GVI* 2015 (second/third century CE); additionally *GVI* 1905.14–21 = *SGO* 16/06/01 (third century CE) and 1978.17–22 (second/third century CE): see further Nisbet–Hubbard on Hor. *Carm.* i.9.13; Ameling 1985.

If considered on its own as a series of exhortations to pleasures that are within reach, this fragment would simply appear to be restating the value of hedonism which was diffuse throughout lyric poetry (cf. especially Simon. *PMG* 584 τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ θνα / τῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποί / α τυραννίς; / τᾶσδ' ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὸς αἰών). In particular, it would seem to document the motif of *carpe diem* in the form in

which it is exemplified by Mimn. 7 G.-P.[2] = 1 W.[2], Theogn. 973–978 mentioned above, *CEG* 482 (fourth century BC; cf. Sassi 1981), and Eur. *Supp.* 953 f. Callimachus probably read Solon's verses in this way if it is true (although this intertextual connection seems to have never been noticed before) that the declaration of faith in the instability of hedonistic luxuries and the persistence of knowledge found at the beginning of the second book of his *Aitia* (fr. 43.12–17) alludes to Solon's poem: καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ὅσσα καρήατι τῆμος ἔδωκα / ξανθὰ σὺν εὐόδμοις ἁβρὰ λίπη στεφάνοις, / ἄπνοα πάντ' ἐγένοντο παρὰ χρέος, ὅσσα τ' ὀδόντων / ἔνδοθι νείαιράν τ' εἰς ἀχάριστον ἔδυ, / καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν ἔμεινεν ἐς αὔριον· ὅσσα δ' ἀκουαῖς / εἰσεθέμην, ἔτι μοι μοῦνα πάρεστι τάδε. Callimachus' last verse seems to be a particularly explicit reuse of μόνα ταῦτα πάρεστι of Solon's line 3; the different sense in which πάρεστι is used ("they are available" in Solon, "remain" in Callimachus) would underscore the different emphasis placed by the Callimachean message on the permanence of the merits of knowledge.

Nevertheless, the (apparent) hedonism of Solon's message is not an end in itself, and it would be a mistake to consider the fragment an affirmation of arrogant individualism and almost cynical *ante litteram* (as argued, e.g., by Marzullo 1965, 126). The fragment should instead be read in the context of Solon's frequent criticism of the overvaluing of wealth: similar ideas can be found in Aristodemus, who was one of the Seven Sages according to the list of Andron of Ephesus, cited by Alcae. 360 (on which see the Introd. ad 6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2]); cf. also Hes. *Op.* 686 χρήματα γὰρ ψυχὴ πέλεται (with Santoni 1983, 97–104). If we consider Solon's fragment in this context, it appears to be a criticism of the 'worship' of wealth, similar to 6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2], but from a slightly different angle. In that fragment wealth without ἀρετή was contrasted with, and demonstrated to be inferior to, the merits of virtue, while our fragment shows its emptiness in comparison with sensual pleasure. Here Solon does not criticize wealth *sic et simpliciter*, but goods περιώσια 'in excess': this is consonant with the message expressed e.g. in 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2], where he claims not to desire unjust wealth (ll. 7 f.) and criticizes others' aspiration towards an excessive accumulation of goods (ll. 71–73).

Solon expresses his engagement in the criticism of conventional values by means of an astute linguistic strategy. The pair of synonyms πλοῦτος/ἄφενος (1, 7) had often been used in epic to define material wealth, sometimes in passages where the one who possessed it was called blessed (cf. in particular Hes. *Theog.* 969–974 and *HHom.Dem.* 486–489 quoted).

In Solon pleasures also receive the linguistic definition which epic had assigned to material wealth, and are consequently raised to an extremely sublime level.

Last but not least, as correctly remarked by Vlastos 1946, 78, the hedonism of the fragment, well known by other elegists, had political uses which had been unexploited before Solon: Solon's line of thought made the peasant equal to the great landowner, "for the latter's surplus (τὰ περιώσια) cannot be converted into immediate satisfaction and can therefore be crossed out of the equation of true wealth. And since the increase of wealth may not keep pace with an even greater increment of desire, cf. 1.72 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.72 f. W.^{2}, the quotient of satisfaction may decrease with the accumulation of property and the *pentakosiomedimnos* may be actually 'poorer' than the contended *thes*. Here, in all essentials, is a subjective conception of economic value".

1 f. τοι often addresses an audience, as in Pindar or, e.g., in Simon. *PMG* 542.39 (Denniston 1954, 537 f.). Here it has a persuasive function (~ "be sure"), and/or conveys a criticism of the statement of another symposiast. In fact, these lines are supposed to catch the attention of their audience and to stimulate wonder: see also this strategy being used by Solon in 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–4 W.^{2} The paradox the poem introduces will be fully developped only in l. 7, keeping up the suspence of the audience for more than three lines.

Gold and silver are often mentioned together as the most precious material goods (see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 10.438, 17.52, 18.475, *Od.* 10.35, 45, *HHom.Herm.* 249), and as such they are compared to ethical values affirming aristocratic qualities in the language of refining metals: cf. e.g. Theogn. 77 f. (a trustworthy man who deserves to be weighed against gold and silver), 199, and adesp. *PMG* 988. For anti-aristocratic lack of moral quality outside the boundary of the *hetaireia* Theognis will use the imagery of counterfeiting: see 119–128 along with Kurke 1999, 41–60.

2 f. Both πυροφόρος which is said of the earth (cf. also 1.20 G.-P.^{2} = 13.20 W.^{2}) and the nominal phrase ἵπποι θ' ἡμίονοί τε derive from the epic tradition. For the epithet, cf. *Il.* 12.314, 21.602, *Od.* 3.495; *HHom.Ap.* 228; for the phrase, cf. *Il.* 23.260, 24.350, 362, 442, 471, 576, 690. On the possession of horses as sign of wealth, see ad 17 G.-P.^{2} = 23 W.^{2}

3. Despite Hudson-Williams' approval, τὰ δέοντα of Theognis' mss. looks like a banalisation in comparison to Plutarch's μόνα ταῦτα or Stobaeus'

τάδε πάντα. The closest parallel for the second hemistich is Hor. *Epist.* 1.12.4 *pauper enim non est, cui rerum suppetit usus*, who seems, however, to presuppose Theognis, not Solon (compare the statement *pauper enim non est* with the explicit negation of the omnipotency of wealth which concludes in 717 f. of the poem preceding the reworking of Solon in the *corpus Theognideum*: ἀλλὰ χρὴ πάντας γνώμην ταύτην καταθέσθαι, / ὡς πλοῦτος πλείστην πᾶσιν ἔχει δύναμιν). On Callimachus' allusion, see Introd. above.

4 f. The minimalism and the generic terms which Solon uses in speaking of pleasures should be acknowledged. According to Lombardo 1983, 1085–1087, he avoids including the special delicacies offered by the luxurious aristocratic life and speaks of simple comforts (and satisfaction of normal human appetites), thus making his life-philosophy available to a wider range of citizens.

γαστρί … ποσίν are also imitated by Horace, *Epist.* 1.12.5 f. *si ventri bene, si lateri est pedibusque tuis, nil divitiae poterunt regales addere maius*, where the singular *lateri* does not support the variant πλευρῆι in Solon's text, since Horace could not have adopted *lateribus* in the dactlylic meter, as has already been remarked by Gentili and Prato; in any case, instead of the singular πλευρά, usually meaning "rib" (this meaning is not uncommon in the medical writers), the plural is usually adopted elsewhere to designate the "side": cf. e.g. already Hom. *Il.* 24.10. As Linforth 1919, 212 notes, the three parts of the body stand, by synecdoche, for the whole physique.

ἁβρὰ παθεῖν: cf., also in sympotic context, Theogn. 474 and Archestr. *SH* 191.1 ἁβροδαιτι τραπέζηι. In incert.auct. fr. 5 Voigt, which is usually ascribed to Sappho, the syntagm ἄβρα … πάσχης also seems to be attested. Before Solon, πάσχειν is found in reference to pleasing things for the first time in Tyrtae. 9.38 G.-P.^{2} = 12.38 W.^{2} πολλὰ δὲ τερπνὰ παθὼν ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην (see Prato 1968, ad loc.), and then in Archil. 14.2 οὐδεὶς ἂν μάλα πόλλ' ἱμερόεντα πάθοι, Pind. fr. 2 δυνάμενος ἁβρὰ πάσχειν. ἁβρός is a word foreign to Homer and only attested in archaic epic in Hes. incert. fr. 339, but it becomes common among the archaic poets (Sappho, Alcaeus, Anacreon, and Sem. 7.57); for a discussion of the word family consisting of ἁβρός, ἁβρότης, ἁβροσύνη, and ἁβρύνω see Kurke 1992. Solon's use of the word, and possibly the entire verbal phrase (especially if the incert.auct. fr. 5 quoted above was also known to Solon) may be a homage paid by him to the poetic tradition that had developed the theme of sensual hedonism.

παῖς denotes the junior partner in homosexual *eros*: see also ad 16.1 G.-P.² = 25.1 W.² and 17.1 G.-P.² = 23.1 W.² Solon puts pleasures from homosexual and heterosexual love on the same level, like e.g. Mimn. 7.9 G.-P.² = 1.9 W.² or Aristoph. *Nub.* 1073. The two genitives παιδός and γυναικός depend on ὥρη.

5 f. For the second hemistich of 5, Bergk suggested the emendation of καί to κατά in the text of Plutarch, against the variants ὅταν δέ κε (or καὶ) τῶν(δ'), presupposing that the subject of ἀφίκηται is the individual, arriving "at this point", namely the right season (ὥρη) for his/her male or female partner to be sexually enjoyed. Both West and Gentil and Prato keep καὶ ταῦτ(α) "and that too", which takes up a preceding idea (Smyth 1956, § 947), namely the pleasures of sex suggested by ἁβρὰ παθεῖν (4) and παιδός τ' ἠδὲ γυναικός … ὥρη (5 f.). For a possibly similar point and construction, see Eur. inc.fab. *TrGF* F897.9–11 τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν προλέγω τοῖσιν νέοισιν / μήποτε φεύγειν, / χρῆσθαι δ' ὀρθῶς, ὅταν ἔλθῃ, where the last temporal phrase has to be compared with Solon's ἐπὴν … ἀφίκηται, and it is likely that the subject of the last verb is τὸ ἐρᾶν ~ Solon's ἁβρὰ παθεῖν.

The idea that a right "season" ὥρα exists, namely youth, during which the pleasures derived from boys and women are most enjoyable, because at that time an individual is in the bloom of his or her beauty, is perfectly acceptable: cf. in particular Aristoph. *Av.* 705 πολλοὺς δὲ καλοὺς … παῖδας πρὸς τέρμασιν ὥρας / … διεμήρισαν ἄνδρες ἐρασταί and its interpretation in scholl. ad loc. πρὸς τέρμασιν· ἐν τῶι τέλει and πρὸς τέρμασιν ὥρας· μετὰ νεότητα or *Suid.* τ 346 Adler τέρμασιν ὥρας. μετὰ τὴν νεότητα—although it is debatable whether in Aristoph. τέρματα means beginning or end of the ὥρα (cf. Dunbar 1995, 448), the sense of ὥρα = "sexual maturity" is clear. Here Solon recalls the frequent lyric motif that one should never lose his or her height of beauty and sexual attractiveness, which is itself strictly connected to youth, since it is immediately followed by a "maturity" that no longer arouses sexual desire as it did before in others: cf. e.g. Archil. 196a.26–28 αἰαῖ, πέπειρα, δὶς τόση, / ἄνθος δ' ἀπερρύηκε παρθενήιον / καὶ χάρις ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆν, and Anacr. *PMG* 432 = 44 Gentili on a πέπειρα "mature" woman who is no longer desirable, or Mimn. 9.1 G.-P.² = 3.1 W.² on the fact that ἐπὴν παραμείψεται ὥρη, even the person who was once extremely beautiful becomes contemptible in the eyes of others, and Mimn. 8.7–10 G.-P.² = 2.7–10 W.² on ἥβη which lasts only a moment and therefore it would be better to die as soon as one has gone beyond the limit of ὥρη (also Pind. fr. 123.1); Theogn. 1287 f.

calls Atalante ὡραίην "in the right time for love" and in 1275 he has ὡραῖος … Ἔρως. Since it implies the idea of eventual physical decay, mentioning the desirable age introduces, in a veiled way, the ideas of death and illness, which the diffuse lyric motif of *carpe diem* had more openly connected to the pleasures of youth (cf. Introd.).

If we accept, with Gentili and Prato, Plutarch's ἥβη· σὺν δ'ὥρηι in the first hemistich of 6, the resulting image would be *facilior*, since it is obvious that the ἥβη of a partner is the most preferable time to enjoy him or her sexually, and also the explicative σὺν δ'ὥρηι … ἁρμοδία would hardly be a significant addition. Differently, if we follow Stobaeus' ὥρη· σὺν δ'ἥβηι, then σὺν δ'ἥβηι … ἁρμοδία explains why there is an ideal season for the enjoyment of sexual pleasures, because this season involves the youth of the partner, which is the "appropriate"/"fitting" moment for this kind of pleasure.

ἁρμοδία mss. (or rather -δίη of Schneidewin, accepted by West, in light of the prevailing Ionic vocalism) should be taken with nominative σὺν δ'ἥβη, and does not presuppose further interventions on the mss. The neuter ἁρμόδια (suggested Bergk and accepted by Gentili and Prato) would refer to ταῦτ(α) of 5, and is quite appealing, since it would gracefully close in ring composition the three lines dedicated to physical pleasures; however, it presupposes the slight change of ἥβη in Theognis' and Stobaeus' mss. into a dative (although after ὥρη an original dative could have been easily changed into a nominative in the course of the transmission). ἁρμονία of Plutarch and Stobaeus A is not defendable since the metaphorical meaning "harmony", "concord" appears only in Plato, *Resp.* 431e and the use of this abstract name as predicative instead of an adjective would be unparalleled in Solon's style.

ἁρμόδιος stresses the 'naturality' of sexual pleasure in the age of youth, showing once again Solon's interest in the tuning between human actions and the natural order to which they should belong: cf. 23.9 f. G.-P.² = 27.9 f. W.² Similar is Solon's emphasis on ἄρτιος and the social template in 3.32 G.-P.² = 4.32 W.² (see ad loc.).

7 f. The motif (see also the beginning of Hom. *Od.* 24) that no one who descends into Hades can bring his wealth with him, nor can he generate any more of it there, is very common and often serves to bring up the importance of values other than wealth (e.g. well-being in life, glory, etc.): cf. in particular Theogn. 1191–1194; then Pind. *Nem.* 7.19; Aesch. *Pers.* 842 and *TrGF* F161; Leon. *Anth.Pal.* 7.740; Phoenix, *CA* 1.22 f.; fr.lyr.adesp. *CA* 37.32 f.; [Phocyl.] 109 f. Derron; *GVI* 1655.3 (third

century BC); also Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.21–24; Prop. 3.5.13; Ov. *Tr.* 5.14.12; Mart. 8.44.9; Bible, *Ps.* 49.17(16)f. "do not be afraid because a man grows rich, because his house's glory increases, for he will not take all that away at his death; his glory will not go down after him".

Also recurrent is the idea that physical pleasures are a boon particularly important to human life: apart from the close parallel of Pind. fr. 126 μηδ' ἀμαύρου τέρψιν ἐν βίωι· πολύ τοι φέριστον ἀνδρὶ τερπνὸς αἰών, cf. Mimn. 7.1–5 G.-P.^{2} = 1.1–5 W.^{2}; Simon. *PMG* 584; Pind. *Isthm.* 7.40–43; Antiphan. *PCG* 318. In respect to these examples of the motif, however, Solon further carries out the linguistic operation described in the Introduction: he proclaims that physical pleasure is the true "wealth", animated as he is by his intention to devalue the pleasure of possessing enormous quantities of riches.

8. Giannini 1973, 17 notes that the verb ἔρχομαι is first used by the elegists for the idea "of descending to Hades". The accusative of the name of the god of the Afterworld is perhaps more common after εἰς in this kind of expression, cf. Tyrtae. 9.38 G.-P.^{2} = 12.38 W.^{2}; Mimn. 8.14 G.-P.^{2} = 2.14 W.^{2} (with Allen 1993 ad loc.); Aesch.*Prom.* 1028 f.; Soph. *OC* 1440. For the genitive, apart from the identical Theogn. 726, see also Hom. *Od.* 12.383 δύσομαι εἰς Ἀΐδαο; Theogn. 244 βῆις … εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους, 802 δύσεται εἰς Ἀίδεω, 906 εἰς Ἀΐδαο περᾶν; Eur. *Med.* 1110; *GVI* 1655.3 (3 BC) εἰ δ' ἦν ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου αὐτὸ πρίασθαι, [οὐδ]εὶς ἂν πλουτῶν εἰς Ἀίδου κατέβη.

9 f. The verses are reused with minor variations by Theogn. 1187 f. Death, illness and old age also form the quintessential triad of human sorrow in Mimn. 8 G.-P.^{2} = 2 W.^{2}; Sem. 1.11–14; Simon. 20.7f. G.-P.^{2} = 20.7 W.^{2}.; Pind. fr. 143. Exemption from old age and a gentle death uncomplicated by disease are features of a happy life in happy times (like the reign of Cronus) or utopian societies: see West 1978, ad Hes. *Op.* 111–116.

The recognition of old age as an "evil", along with the entire tone of the passage seems consonant with the lyric tradition (where κακός is conventionally said of old age: cf. Archil. 188.2; Mimn. 1.1f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.1f. W.^{2}; Theogn. 728, 1011), but would be in contrast with the much more positive attitude Solon demonstrates toward this period of life in 23, 26 and 28 G.-P.^{2} = 27, 20 and 18W.^{2}, where the diminution of physical capacities seems to be compensated for by the increased maturity of one's mind. In fact, here Solon defends a very different perspective. On the one hand, it is convenient for him to adhere to the lyric convention

of *carpe diem*, which is instrumental to his aim of undermining the importance of an excessive accumulation of wealth. On the other hand, it seems that here Solon the "politician" might also be reflecting on the unavoidability of physical decline as a social problem. Some attention to this matter is documented by his laws concerning the obligation of θρέπτρα ἀποδιδόναι, i.e. the children's duty to pay back to their parents the expenses incurred from their rearing (cf. test. 454–456 f. Martina = F104b Ruschenbusch). Not incidentally does Galen, *Protr.* 8.2 f., when expounding on the content of this law, write that old age lies in ambush for a man heading towards the end of his life, just like a harsh storm (ἐν τοῦ βίου τέλει γῆρας καθάπερ χαλεπὸν ἐφεδρεῦον[τα] χειμῶνα). One should therefore be careful to prepare himself for this time, as a helmsman does against a real storm (παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ πολλοῦ πρὸς χειμῶνα). Galen's presentation may conceal a paraphrasis of an unknown poetic fragment of Solon, or at least elaborate some similar phrase contemplated by Solon in the actual text of his law or in a poem pointing to its ideals: cf. Barigazzi 1978, 215–218.

19 G.-P.^{2} = 14 W.^{2}

The fragment reproposes the frequent *topos* of the laborious unhappiness of human life (probably within a list featuring at least two limitations which affect men's nature. This context is demonstrated above all by the initial negative correlation). Also the terms θνητοί and βροτοί, which recall the idea of "mortality", and thus the heaviest limitation on men's nature, seem to point to the opposition between the human condition and the undisturbed bliss of divine existence, as is made explicit, e.g., in Eur. *TrGF* inc.fab. F1075.

This *topos* was first attested in Hom. *Il.* 17.446 f.; cf. also Hes. frr. 248 and 249; Semon. 1.20–22; Mimn. 8.15 f. G.-P.^{2} = 2.15f. W.^{2}; Theogn. 167 f. and 441; Bacchyl. 5.53–55; Pind. *Nem.* 7.55 f. On the Herodotean *logos* of Solon and Croesus (Herod. 1.29–33.) which centers on the theme of human happiness see Introd. chap. 2.

1. In this form the adjective μάκαρ has strong religious implications and is usually connected to the gods, often antonomastically defined as μάκαρες. Solon recognizes a higher divine order which is divorced from the human world: see also de Heer 1969, 28 f. For humans the form μακάριος is usually adopted (the first documented occurrence is in Pind. *Pyth.* 5.46–49). For the lengthening of the final syllable of the word, cf. Hippon. 43, * 117.6 W.^{2} = 5, °196.6 Deg.; Diph. *PCG* 125.6 (hexam.); West 1974, 117. On the appellation μάκαρες θνητοί for the men of the Silver Race in Hes. *Op.* 141, see West 1978 ad loc.

The adjective πονηρός, meaning "miserable", "full of labor", evokes the πόνοι "toils" by which Simon. *PMG* 520.1–4 and Bacchyl. fr. 13 declare that human life is perennially afflicted (in Hom. *Il.* 4.26, 57 πόνος is associated with τελεῖν); see further Loraux 1982.

2. The complete correspondence between the duration of suffering and the whole span of human life is affirmed through the image of the light of the sun. The mentioning of the sun recalls the idiomatic concept of "seeing the light" as marking the beginning of life (cf., e.g., Hom. *Il.* 5.120; Bacchyl. 5.160–162), and perhaps also implies that a troublesome life is destined to be followed by the absence of light and the darkness of death.

The second hemistich is the model of two Theognidean distichs on the theme of human unhappiness: 167 f. and 615 f.

20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2}

Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.81.1 asserts that Solon's distich concerns the divinity (περὶ θεοῦ), but one should not give too much credit to Clement (who habitually cites from anthologies), especially because the other witness, Theodoret, *Graec. affect. cur.* 1.73.3 does not suggest any reference to the power of divine thought.

Man does not easily perceive the measure (for every sort of thing) because it is not evident, at least not always. In the case of human life (23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}), Solon seeks to individualize this μέτρον using the physiological limits expressed by birth, a phase of development and evolution (aging), and death as his parameters and the *hebdomads* as units of measure for these phases. Thus, the "measure" of human life, in 23.17 G.-P.^{2} = 27.17 W.^{2}, can be grasped because there are inherent physiological signs acting as boundary markers of its stages. Similarly in the case of rhythmical rules and verbal formulae, the poet can learn to own them because the Muses (who possess the "measure of wisdom") teach the poet technical skills: in 1.52 G.-P.^{2} = 13.52 W.^{2} Solon also uses μέτρον for the rules of poetry known to the expert poet; cf. already Hes. fr. 306 M.-W. παντοίης σοφίης δεδαηκότα (of Linus) and later Stesich. S 89.7 f. (of Epeios) δαεὶς μέτ[ρα] τε καὶ σοφίαν του[, where the same relationship between σοφία and technical rules seems to be found: see Lehnus 1972 for the latter passage.

We can understand Solon's concern for the extreme difficulty—though not impossibility—of the apprehension of μέτρον γνωμοσύνης, the crucial metaphor of the fragment, which is strategically separated so that the terms occupy both line beginnings of the distich. In fact, the "boundary of prudence/judgment" is also the solution to the problem of insatiable, unrestrained and indiscriminate human acquisitiveness and its regulation. Solon states elsewhere the connection between the failure of human νόος to adopt a correct "sizing" and the potential hitting of some anti-social behaviors: 1.71–73 G.-P.^{2} = 13.71–73 W.^{2} (πλούτου … τέρμα), 5.4 G.-P.^{2} = 4c.3 W.^{2} (ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον), 8.4 G.-P.^{2} = 6.4 W.^{2} (νόος ἄρτιος) (it was already apparent from 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} how tight the relationship is between a correct feeling for limits and *eunomia*, or between excess and injustice, see especially on νοεῖν ad 3.7 f.). Therefore, his notion of the extreme difficulty of being able to perceive the

"measure of wisdom" would actually be a more general *pendant* to the ethical idea of a connection between knowing the sense of moderation in both individual conduct and the management of the *polis* (attaining the correct perception of μέτρια seems to automatically improve the quality of one's social behavior). Both ideas follow from the principle that "*noos* works best within measures" (Prier 1976, 165). If this connection was at work in Solon's mind, then his ethic may have been already *in nuce*, before Socrates and Plato, an intellectual ethic according to which accurate knowledge was the foundation of upright actions and confusion or the absence of knowledge led to error (Masaracchia 1958, 319).

πείρατα (2) possibly has an athletic/agonistic connotation, like the τέρμα of 1.71 G.-P.^{2} = 13.71 W.^{2} (on which see further ad loc.), and may therefore suggest that the challenge posed to humans who try to reach the μέτρον γνωμοσύνης is so hard, as to be insurmountable: cf. Hom. *Od.* 23.248 f. ὦ γύναι, οὐ γάρ πω πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ' ἀέθλων / ἤλθομεν, ἀλλ' ἔτ' ὄπισθεν ἀμέτρητος πόνος ἔσται. This word is connected to the divine decisional power in Hom. *Il.* 7.101 f. αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε / νίκης πείρατ' ἔχονται ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν and Archil. 111 ἐν θεοῖσι πείρατα. Furthermore, Solon attributes the control of ends and outcomes to Zeus and the gods in 1.17 G.-P.^{2} = 13.17 W.^{2} in a general consideration, and in 1.63–66 G.-P.^{2} = 13.63–66 W.^{2} (in opposition to men's minds).

However, in our fragment Solon seems to diverge from the Homeric and Archilochean patterns, because the contrast between divine perfection (which should determine the πείρατα, since it completely possesses the γνωμοσύνη) and the limits of humans (who have to struggle to perceive it) remains implicit: cf. Bergren 1975, 135–139, 168. We cannot rule out the possibility that the original Solonian poem expressed the idea of the inferiority of the human condition with respect to the divine, which is clearly stated e.g. in 19 G.-P.^{2} = 14 W.^{2}, or in Theogn. 1171 f. γνώμην, Κύρνε, θεοὶ θνητοῖσι διδοῦσιν ἀρίστην / ἀνθρώποις· γνώμηι πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει, which appears to imitate Solon. In fact, the remark on the difficulty of perceiving the measure of prudence/judgment, because it is itself ἀφανής, reminds us of Solon's words in 1.71 G.-P.^{2} = 13.71 W.^{2} about human nature and the limit of wealth, πλούτου τέρμα. In that passage πεφασμένον has the passive meaning "revealed" (see comm. ad loc.) which probably presupposes a divine agent of revelation—although this agent is not made explicit, it would match the preceding mention of θεός in 1.69 G.-P.^{2} = 13.69 W.^{2} and the mention of Zeus in 1.75 G.-P.^{2} = 13.75 W.^{2}: the τέρμα of wealth, which should be revealed or made clear only by the gods, but is not, has the resulting force of a law that men cannot

understand to their disgrace. Although we do not have the context of our fragment, it is appealing to believe that, differently from the theodicy of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, in this fragment Solon pursues the issue of a more profane and human-centered gnoseology (cf. Bergren 1975, 136).

1 f. γνωμοσύνης μέτρον: γνωμοσύνη is a hapax, and the negative ἀγνωμοσύνη is attested only beginning with Theogn. 896; cf. subsequently e.g. Democr. *VS* 68B175 and Herod. 2.172.3. For μέτρον plus the genitive, cf. ad 1.52 G.-P.^{2} = 13.52 W.^{2}

The singular μέτρον was metaphorical for the complete measure = boundary/limit or perfect size of something, already in Hom. *Il.* 11.225 and Hes. *Op.* 131 ἥβης μέτρον (for the plural in the literal sense of "means of measurement": Hom. *Il.* 12.422).

ἀφανές: Solon uses the same adjective for the gods' mind in 21 G.-P.^{2} = 17 W.^{2} χαλεπὸν δὲ νοῆσαι is in Hes. fr. 324.

2. πάντων πείρατα … ἔχει: cf. Theogn. 1171 f. quoted above declaring that γνώμη πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει, where γνώμη stands as a synonym for σωφροσύνη (see van Groningen 1966 ad loc.).

The sense here is that only prudence/judgment has the correct way of achieving everything: cf. also Hom. *Il.* 23.350, slightly different from the Homeric *Il.* 6.143 ὀλέθρου πείραθ' ἵκηαι or 7.102 cited above, where πείρατα has the meaning of intrinsic "boundary, end, limits" and defines the coming-into-being or the fullness of each thing. Contrast this with Solon's reference to popular opinion in 23.8 G.-P.^{2} = 27.8 W.^{2} on physical strength as the achievement of excellence: see commentary ad loc. and the Introd. for Solon's divergence from the Tyrtaic concept of strength.

21 G.-P.^{2} = 17 W.^{2}

Another well attested *topos* since Hom. *Od.* 23.81 f. χαλεπόν σε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων / δήνεα εἴρυσθαι, μάλα περ πολυΐδριν ἐοῦσαν; Hes. *Op.* 483 f. ἄλλοτε δ' ἀλλοῖος Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο, / ἀργαλέος δ' ἄνδρεσσι καταθνητοῖσι νοῆσαι, fr. 16.7 f. ἀλλὰ Διὸς κρυπτὸς πέλεται νόος, οὐδέ τις ἀνδρῶν / φράσσασθαι δύναται (a lacuna follows), fr. 43a52 ἀλλ' οὔ πως ᾔδει Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο, fr. 303 μάντις δ' οὐδ' εἷς ἐστιν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων / ὅστις ἂν εἰδείη Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο; Pind. fr. 61.3 f. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως τὰ θεῶν / βουλεύματ' ἐρευνάσει βροτέᾳ φρενί. See also, e.g., Aesch. *Supp.* 1048 f. and 1057 f.; Eur. *Her.* 62, *IT* 476 f.; *TrGF* (2)F13a; adesp. *TrGF* F168.

ἀφανής is also said of μέτρον γνωμοσύνης in 20.1 G.-P.^{2} = 16.1 W.^{2}: see further ad loc. πάμπαν is attested twice with ἀφανίζεσθαι in works ascribed to Aristotle, and πάντηι once with ἀφανής in Arrian; but πάντηι of Clement of Alexandria should definitely be preferred to πάμπαν of Eusebius, who transcribed this passage verbatim from Clement.

22 G.-P.² = 22a W.²

According to Plato, *Tim.* 20e, Dropides II (son of Dropides I) was a contemporary and friend of Solon (Diog.Laert. 3.1 made the two men brothers), and according to Philostr. *VS* 1.16.2, he was archon μετὰ Σόλωνα, seven years after the archonship of (his brother) Critias I. His son, Critias II, is the addressee of this fragment. For the stemma of the main line of male descents from Dropides I, who was archon in 645/44 (Cadoux 1948, 90) to Critias IV, who was a member of the Thirty, cf. Davies 1971, 322–329.

Proclus reports these two verses in his commentary on Plato, *Tim.* 20e, where the family of Critias is remembered as being related by marriage to Plato himself (Δροπίδου τοῦ προπάππου). Plato, *Charm.* 157e also expressly says that ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῴια ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη … ὥς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῆι καὶ τῆι ἄλληι λεγομένηι εὐδαιμονίαι. The phrase ἥ τε … οἰκία of this passage may designate the series of descendants starting from Critias II, son of Dropides II. Alternatively, Plato may have made an error of chronology, superimposing Solon's Critias II and Critias III, whose lover was Anacreon (for whom cf. also schol. to Aesch. *Prom.* 128 (Ἀνακρέων) ἐπεδήμησε γὰρ τῆι Ἀττικῆι Κριτίου ἐρῶν, and Slings 2000, 60 n. 11), namely the son of Leaides, who was ostracized between 490 and 480 BC: see Davies 1971, 322–329; Rosenmeyer 1949, 408.

In his interpretation, Proclus uses the variant ξανθόθριξ for the epithet featuring in Solon's first verse. This term ξανθόθριξ may have been used as a praise for one of Critias' physical qualities. In fact, a word such as ξανθόθριξ may certainly stress the beauty of Critias' blonde hair, a much admired color, cf. Long. Soph. 1.17.3; schol. to Hom. *Il.* 4.141c.2; Hesych. *Lex.* ξ 7 Latte; see also Kober 1932, 57. Solon's praise in this fragment is given together with a piece of advice. As Masaracchia 1958, 322 plausibly assumes, the distich may have been part of a longer elegy where Solon elaborates Critias' γένος, showing that it combined mental merits as well as physical beauty (as Plato states in *Charm.*). In tune with this interpretive approach, I prefer not to distinguish the testimony of Plato, *Charm.* with its emphasis on eulogy, from the testimony of Proclus and Solon's distich, where advice is displayed, but eulogy may very well be

implied. West's opinion differs, as he numbers Plat. *Tim.* and *Charm.* as fr. 22, and Proclus' testimony as fr. 22a.

Aristotle's testimony includes the major variant πυρρότριχι. ξανθός and πυρρός, together with κροκωτός, αἴθων and σανδαράκινος, belong to the group of epithets which the ancient Greeks used to denote yellow-orange-brown color. However, more often these terms are separated from each other (cf. Plato, *Tim.* 68b, 68c πυρρὸν ξανθοῦ τε καὶ φαιοῦ κράσει γίγνεται, Aristot. *Metaph.* 1054b13, *Mete.* 375a11; Gal. 9.599 ἐγγυτάτω τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ πυρρὸν χρῶμα τῶι ξανθῶι· διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων τῶι τὸ μὲν λευκότερον εἶναι τὸ δὲ στιλπνότερον) than equalized (Hesych. *Lex.* ξ 9 Latte ξανθόν· πυρρόν. καλόν. εὖ εἰργασμένον. χλωρόν, π 1310.16 S. πυρσαῖς γένυσι· ταῖς ξανθαῖς θριξί, *Suid.* ξ 10 Adler ξανθὸς δὲ ὁ πυρρός); see also Kober 1932, 82 f.; Irwin 1974, 25 f. (according to Platnauer 1921, 158 "depth of color seems to be distinguished rather than quality of color, αἴθων and πυρρός seeming to come as a mean between the lighter κροκωτός and the darker ξανθός and ξουθός").

Aristotle's framing of the fragment is also in radical contrast to Proclus. In *Rh.* 1375b34–35 he cites the first verse as an example of recourse to the authority of poetic citations in legal discourse (on which see also ad 3 G.-P.[2] = 4 W.[2]), and maintains that it was used by Cleophon in the trial against Critias son of Callaischros, who was destined to become a member of the Thirty. We know virtually nothing about the background of the prosecution; however, since Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.15 and 36, *Mem.* 1.2.24), and later Philostratus (*VS* 1.16.502) mention Critias' exile in Thessaly (this was most likely after the battle of Notium, early in 406 BC, and during the Trial of the Generals after Arginusae, later in 406 BC) modern scholars have supposed that he was banished based on the prosecution of Cleophon (Németh 1988, 175; Avery 1963, 166 f.; Wade-Gery 1945, 25, 33 and n. 1; Krentz ad Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.15, and 2.3.36; Underhill ad Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.15). Cleophon quoted Solon when charging Critias with being ἀσελγής "insolent" like his ancestor of the same name, the Solonian Critias, son of Dropides.

The variant πυρρόθριξ in Aristotle's text may have been in tune with this function of Solon's quotation in Cleophon. Reddish coloring of the hair or skin was often viewed as a symptom of an insolent or mischievous disposition: cf. Ps.-Aristot. *Phgn.* 812a16; Long. Soph. 1.16.5; Adamant. *Physiogn.* 2.33; Anon. *Physiogn.* 25.8–10. The paraphrasis of the Aristotelian passage of the *Rhetoric* made by an anonymous commentator of Aristot. *Rh.* (= *Comm. in Aristot. Graeca* xxi 81.15 ff. Rabe), pushes the meaning of the adjective in another direction. According to this late

scholar, Cleophon accuses Critias of being effeminate. Effeminacy may have been perceived as one of the aspects, if not the most frequent one, of ἀσέλγεια, which broadly speaking is intended to mean impudence (cf. in particular schol.rec. ad Aristoph. *Nub.* 678a–b πάλιν σκώπτει ὁ ποιητὴς ἐνταῦθα … διότι δὲ ἦν ἀσελγής, θηλυκῶς ὑποφέρει τὸ ὄνομα … Σωστράτην τινὰ κατακόρως κωμωιδεῖ ὡς πάνυ θηλυπρεπῆ ὄντα), even if it is never connected with reddish color of the hair.

In any case, πυρρός often characterizes a beard sprouting for the first time (e.g. Aristot. *Col.* 797b30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἥβην καὶ τὸ γένειον, ὅταν ἄρχωνται τὸ πρῶτον ἡβᾶν καὶ γενειᾶν καὶ αὗται γίνονται κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν πυρραί; Eur. *Phoen.* 32 πυρσαῖς γένυσιν ἐξανδρούμενος; Theocr. 15.130; Parmeno, *CA* 8), and, at least in Theocr. 6.1 ff., it is considered to be an attractive feature of the *eromenos* in the etiquette of homosexual love. Cf. also ad 16.1 G.-P.^{2} = 25.1 W.^{2} and 23.5 f. G.-P.^{2} = 27.5 f. W.^{2} Independently from Aristotle's (and Antiphon's) intrepretation of πυρρόθριξ as being evidence of ἀσέλγεια, the epithet may have been originally adopted by Solon simply to point to the young age of Critias—young age which was possibly highlighted to justify the paternal advice which Solon was going to offer.

In conclusion, neither πυρρόθριξ nor ξανθόθριξ are implausible readings. Neither is attested in Homer, but Solon could have easily created the adjective from the epic material: cp. also βαθύφρων of 29^a.1 G.-P.^{2} = 33.1 W.^{2} which is similar to Hom. *Il.* 19.125 φρένα βαθεῖαν. After Solon, ξανθόθριξ is used in reference to men in Simon. 9.9 G.-P.^{2} = 22.9 W.^{2}, where it describes Echecratidas, and in Theocr. 18.1, where it describes Menelaus (also in Bacchyl. 5.37, where it is used to describe a horse). Furthermore, the blonde color of hair had already been appreciatively evoked in epic (see *Il.* 1.197 ~ *HHom.Dem.* 279, *Od.* 15.133; Hes. fr. 25.5 ξανθοκόμης). As a result of this tradition, ξανθόθριξ seems to be slightly better suited to the content of the fragment than πυρρόθριξ.

1. The imperatival infinitive suits didactic poetry and its use of named or anonymous addressees well: see Hes. *Op.* 336, 391 f. In fact, the jussive form of the verb is a clue to the tone which Solon (or the *persona loquens*) must have adopted for this poem, in accordance with the model of persuasion established, e.g., in the archetypal didactic poem of Hesiod.

Proclus has the variant εἰπέμεναι (which Gentili-Prato print), the Homeric-Aeolicizing form of the infinitive. For this infinitive in Solon and other elegiac poets, see ad 1.39 G.-P.^{2} = 13.39 W.^{2} Thus, the more colloquial phrase εἰπεῖν μοι of Aristotle (which West prints) may have

been a scribal normalization. Above all, the ethical dative μοι, which obviously refers back to Solon if Solon is indeed the speaker in the poem (in principle he may be narrating for another *persona loquens*), may have been a modification which was made based upon the negative reuse of Solon's verse by Cleophon. In such a case, the dative would have been evoked in a more direct way, like self-*deixis*, by the *persona* of the Athenian statesman and his judgment about the Critias of the past, linking him by analogy to the Critias on trial. Not only was Solon a lofty moral figure who, for example, could be evoked as the ideal prosecutor of ἀσελγεῖς "insolent" defendants (cf. Aeschin. 3.257), but he was also known as a φιλόδημος (Aristoph. *Nub.* 1187) and for this specific reason he could have been easily contrasted to Critias who was clearly of oligarchic orientation (he actually became a member of the brief oligarchy of the Thirty).

2. **οὐ … ἁμαρτινόωι**: The litotes underscores Dropides' intellectual qualities. Although the suggestion that Critias is in need of guidance could conceivably be an adverse comment, it may simply note his youth in order to provide a foil to his father's mature wisdom. The fact that a mature or relatively old person automatically had greater control of his νόος is a strong point in Solon's thought (cf. 23.11, 13 G.-P.[2] = 27.11, 13 W.[2]). The verbal root of ἁμαρτάνω "to miss" had already been connected to νόος in Homer: *Od.* 7.292 οὔ τι νοήματος ἤμβροτεν ἐσθλοῦ. Solon presupposes here that the compound had appeared in Hes. *Theog.* 511 (used of Epimetheus) where the schol. ad loc. explained: τὸν κακόβουλον καὶ ἀπρονόητον …, ἢ τὸν σφαλέντα κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν· τὸ γὰρ θυμικὸν καλύπτει τὸν νοῦν ἀναφλεχθέν. The members of Solon's audience who could remember the Hesiodic passage, as well as Critias, could have easily inferred that Critias was doomed to become another Epimetheus, had he not listened to his wise advisor.

πείσεται ἡγεμόνι: cf. Tyrtae. 10.19 G.-P.[2] = 19.11 W.[2] πεισόμεθ' ἡγεμ[ό, in the same metrical position. If Critias absorbs this argument he will be an ἐσθλός, in tune with the role which Hesiod ascribes in *Op.* 295 to the person who obeys the one who councils him well (the πανάριστος who αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει, / φρασσάμενος τά κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἦσιν ἀμείνω of 293 f.)—the man who can neither think for himself nor listen to the advice of another is totally useless, ἀχρήιος according to Hes. *Op.* 295–297.

23 G.-P.[2] = 27 W.[2]

The presentation of age grades in Greek literature displays considerable variety which is related to the social or economic worlds of the different works and the aesthetics of their genre and presentation. Solon's reflection on the ages of man and the male life course in this poem can be specifically contrasted with that of Hesiod, whose myth of the Five Races of human beings (*Op.* 106–201) provides an early parallel to Solon's Ten Ages of Man.

In the scheme of Hesiod, the sequence of the races that come after the Golden Race suggests respectively the four life stages: childhood, youth, maturity, and old age, so that "the history of the races resumes that of the individual" (Falkner 1995, 53). The description of the Five Races suggests that the poet situates human perfection in maturity (see the Golden Age as the first instance), not in childhood or old age; or rather, as Kirk 1971, 136 puts it, Hesiod places an emphasis on maturity as the need for adult responsibility without childishness or the debility and bitterness of age. The Silver Race is depicted as one of children (130 f.). As West 1978, 173 remarks, although they have the privilege of not aging until the end of their life, this stage is not described as anything to be desired, but in terms of mere childishness. The Iron Race, which describes the poet's own society (174–201), interrelates the natural evil of old age and the social evils that accompany it: Falkner 1995, 69. Such views as expressed in the myth of the Races are consistent with Hesiod's other statements on the life stages. His fr. 321 ἔϱγα νέων, βουλαὶ δὲ μέσων, εὐχαὶ δὲ γεϱόντων succinctly summarizes the functions of the male life course. The noun ἔϱγα is Hesiod's usual word for work for livelihood. The stage of νέος clearly begins with the measure of youth (*Op.* 132). The μέσοι (an expression for mature men: on problems regarding the consistency of terminology for maturity see Nash 1978) are appreciated for their βουλαί. Kirk 1971, 125 f. and 134 explains the attribution of wise counsel to the period of middle-age as arising from the fact that in a state run by βασιλῆες (who are depicted as strong and active) there is no need for wise aged counsel. The reference to the γέϱοντες in the same fragment may point more to the social vulnerability of the elderly, which is a frequent theme in Hesiod.

The Hesiodic construction of age, then, with its lack of appreciation of childhood or old age, and its stress on the vulnerability of the elderly, focuses on the individual who is more a producer for the *oikos* than a consumer: see also Edwards 2004. In the Hesiodic scale of excellence, the top rank belongs to the πανάριστος (*Op.* 293–297), the one who has a particular capacity for intelligence (νοέω) and perception (φράζομαι) (both characteristics link the πανάριστος with the gods, as pointed out by Marsillio 2000, 3 f.), and can speak well (295). The second in rank, the ἐσθλός, is the man who follows the good advice (given by the πανάριστος), while an ἀχρεῖος is the one who has neither of the two functions mentioned (see also ad 22.2 G.-P.^{2} = 22a.2 W.^{2}).

Walcot 1970, 82 f. comments on the convergence of practical advantage and social prestige in the accumulation of wealth in Hesiod: *arete*, together with *kudos*, accompanies prosperity (*Op.* 312 f.). The word occurs in one other passage, *Op.* 287–290, where the poet contrasts the road of κακότης (wickedness) with the road of ἀρετή (excellence): here, as West 1978 ad loc. insists, κακότης and ἀρετή are inferior and superior social standing, determined principally by material property. And, clearly, material property is the result of ἔργα. The ease and accessibility of the road of κακότης are contrasted to the sweat of the latter and the contrast will be reiterated in lines 312 f. in the opposition between indolent poverty and industrious wealth: αἰδώς belongs to the poverty and confidence or even insolence accompanies wealth. A successful farmer is a man of κῦδος and ἀρετή. In Hesiod the gaze of admiration is that felt by the poor for the prosperous man (478), and Hesiod warns Perses in 482 that in the event of a bad harvest no one will have consideration for him. As Edwards 2004, 114 points out "the *kudos* and *arete* available to members of Hesiod's community have little to do with inherited excellence or with heroic deeds on the battlefield. Rather they depend upon the vagaries of farming. Hesiod's confidence that even Perses could readily raise himself to prosperity demonstrates Hesiod's awareness of the mercurial nature of success on the farm and, therefore, of status within the neighborhood".

In the second half of the seventh century, the elegiac poet Tyrtaeus of Sparta spoke about his own criterion of excellence. In particular, in fr. 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} he has a clear disregard for certain periods of human age, in a similar way to Hesiod, and he indicates, also similarly to Hesiod, a single ἀρετή for man. Tyrtaeus 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2} leads off with two examples of ἀρετή, running and wrestling, which can be compared to the reference to the bodily ἰσχύς in the fourth hebdomad (8) of Solon's poem and which are paralleled in epic evaluations such as Hom. *Od.* 8.147–177,

according to which a man has no greater glory, while he lives, than what he achieves with his feet and his hands οὐ μὲν γὰρ μεῖζον κλέος ἀνέρος, ὄφρα κεν ἦισιν, / ἢ ὅ τι ποσσίν τε ῥέξηι καὶ χερσὶν ἑῆισιν. In all three poems (*Od.* 8.147, Solon, ll. 7 f. and Tyrtae. 9 G.-P.^{2} = 12 W.^{2}) these ἀρεταί are characteristics of ἄνδρες. It is remarkable, however, that in Solon "strength" ἰσχύς, and hence ἀρετή, is presented as belonging to everyman at a specific age in life (7 f.). Quite differently, like all the ἀρεταί in the priamel of Tyrtaeus' poem, the ἀρεταί in these first examples of Tyrtaeus are exceptional and possessed by exceptional individuals (Luginbill 2002, 412; the notion of exceptionality is accentuated by the mythical *exempla* of the poem which embody these ἀρεταί up to the point in the poem where Tyrtaeus will state that those are not the qualities which count in war: ll. 9–12). Tyrtaeus' poems are constantly concerned with the individual who has reached manhood (one who is an ἀνήρ), and how best to exploit one's manhood, but Solon's understanding of the notion of manhood is more inclusive. Solon takes into consideration previous stages (παῖς, etc.) because he values the physical but also the social contribution especially of the fifth hebdomad when a man should become a husband and father, and he also devotes much space to old age in his poem, which Tyrtaeus mentions all too briefly. For Tyrtaeus this last stage of human life is very passive: when his individual is old, he becomes a mere recipient of honors for the services to the *polis* which he accomplished in his youth. On the contrary, Solon's individual in the last stage of life is not passive (15 f.). We hear about eloquence: γλῶσσα is in Tyrtaeus too (8, 19) but we totally miss any reference in his poems to σοφία; and above all, eloquence is not connected to the old age in Tyrtaeus.

The connection that Tyrtaeus' individual has with the larger group of the community is glimpsed in 15 f. As correctly remarked by Prato 1968, 22 f.* from this passage we understand that for Tyrtaeus and for the ideal he represents what matters is not the individual achievement and the ephemeral success against one's competitor, but the conscious sacrifice of a group of soldiers. The city considers these fighters responsible for its destiny, and is ready to praise or to blame them (through the poet). The warrior of Tyrtaeus does not exhaust in himself and by himself the duties which he has as a member of the community. He is one ring of an unbreakable chain, where the individual act of heroism does not make any sense if it is not in accordance with the group's action. In this sense the Spartiate warrior is a common good; from him the city may request the maximum effort and the supreme sacrifice. It may happen that the good of the city and of the individual coincide, but it can also be the case

that the safety of the city depends upon the annihilation of the individual; in the latter case, if one fails to offer oneself, one is destined for dishonor.

In conclusion, according to Luginbill 2002, 407 Tyrtaeus describes ἀρετή as "(i) a quality that must be acquired through struggle (12.10 f.); (ii) a power in its own right, granting the ability to accomplish significant feats; (iii) a source of renown to its possessor (12.31 f.); and (iv) a benefit to the community as a whole (12.15)". Following Tyrtaeus' exhortations leads one to become an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός in war, like following Hesiod's exhortations would lead one to become a successful farmer. In both cases one's social contribution is first and foremost the result of the works of one's hands and body.

In contrast, Solon has very little 'specialized' advice to offer. His concept of man 'as an agent in society' (Adkins 1985, 131) (re)locates male identity differently from previous poets. Falkner 1995, 165 notes that "man as the subject of the elegy is conceived atomistically ... with no class or occupation, indeed without direct reference to the *polis* at all. Yet the perspective here is not so much philosophical as political: in the act of divorcing man from his occupational and generational relationships, from the narrow interests that distinguish one group from other, the poem reconstitutes him as individual citizen". The omission in 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2} of any direct reference to the *polis* reminds us of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} Solon's discussion of age here is no less constructed according to his own political ideas than his discussion of wealth. Both are consistent with the social and political values Solon developed, but both also reflect an intentional generalization. The poem should not be viewed too narrowly as "a rationale for the actual practice in Athens and other *poleis*" (as Adkins 1985, 132 understands it). First of all, Solon always speaks of man in general without ever proposing over-precise connections between the seven-year periods and the institutional 'rites of passage' in the political and military life of the Athenian citizen; doing so would have made his numerological abstraction less consistent. As in 1 and 3 G.-P.^{2} = 13 and 4 W.^{2}, Solon's objective is more to fix abstract concepts of atemporal validity, in a way that these can be employed on the tracks of public life, rather than to enter into the specifics of some project of his own. As Falkner 1995, 116 notes, in Athens military enrollment took place during the third hebdomad (which Solon only names in connection to events of physical growth), and eligibility for political office came about during the fifth (which Solon simply defines as the appropriate age for marriage). Solon's scheme also lacks provision for the two-years of the ἐφηβεία, which became, in Athens as in Sparta, the most important period in the

social development of a citizen: it would have taken place during the third seven-years (cf. Musti 1990, 25–30, also for the chronological debate over the introduction of the ἐφηβεία to Athens). The poem is thus silent on a series of civic events, and this contradicts current scholarly views that it depicts man as an individual citizen. Rather, Solon suggests a new understanding of human nature and of ἀρετή based on man as an individual. For Musti 1990, 20 the emphasis on the processes of growth and physiological maturation and the almost subordinated parallelism of the processes of social maturation and individual functionality demonstrate that the city itself asked for very little surplus of ritual from its citizens (natural and *polis*-rhythms coincided). Musti contrasts Athens to Sparta and Crete where, as he notes, nature is transcribed in a culture of ritual which is much more articulated and dominant in the comprehensive context of the citizen culture. This reading of the poem, however, is not completely convincing since the poem is clearly silent about civic institutional events taking place in Athens during the third hebdomad (see above). Furthermore, the poem totally avoids any indicators of place or period (the chronology is all internal to the individual development) and focuses on human life in general: if this were not by Solon, we would not think of it in civic terms at all. The clear prevalence of Solon's emphasis on physiological processes and their natural rhythms in human life, rather than on the scansion of human life in Athenian society, is thus a strategy which leads us to think not of the *polis* but of other arenas for obtaining excellence.

The word ἑβδομάς which appears here for the first time in extant literature, points out the novelty of the poem's ideological framework, especially since the word seems to be unknown in non-literary contexts: Falkner 1995, 158. The structure of the poem is very linear: a distich is dedicated to every hebdomad of seven years, except for the seventh and eighth, which are treated in one distich. This linearity is probably intended to be a formal mirror of Solon's idea that human life is a succession of functional stages, ruled by an internal μέτρον, measure, which is expressly named at 17 (cf. Steinhagen 1972, 276 f.).

The first four hebdomads concern the physical growth of a human being; marriage, a rite of passage that has both physical (sexual) and social relevance, characterizes the fifth hedbomad; the sixth witnesses the full maturity of human νόος "in every aspect" (continued in the seventh and eighth) and is regarded chiefly from a social perspective. At the completion of the tenth hebdomad it is stated that it is not unseasonable for someone to die—otherwise one would commence an eleventh hebdomad and (thus) destroy one of the poem's numerical

axes. Apart from this numerical need, opportunity and seasonability are indeed the features which characterize human life, as soon as the individual has reached full control of his νόος. As remarked by Falkner 1995, 161 f. here there is a "difference in the kind of necessity that governs the relationship between a given hebdomad and its contents: from the must that governs the physiological changes in the first four hebdomads to the should that recommends marriage and children at a time that is seasonable to the may that describes the growth and decline of social and cognitive skills in the next four (where exceptions are never difficult to find) to the aesthetic necessity that brings life to a conclusion with the tenth hebdomad".

Previous literature did not refer to chronological age, apart from a few cases which can be characterized as formulaic or notional figures, gathered by Falkner 1995, 157. Likewise, the division of life into ten phases does not appear to be attested again in the ancient world until late, in a poem anthologized in the sixth century AD (*Poetae Lat. min.* IV.217, p. 257 f. Baehrens): cf. Zacher 1891. The novelty of Solon's numerical quantification can be explained as the reflection of the high level of intellectual abstraction that characterized Solon's political thought and legislation at least in his poems (cf. Falkner 1995, 159). It may implicitly point to the political context of the elegy itself: as Fortes 1984, 114 notes "chronological age becomes significant when the political and legal framework takes precedence over familial and kingship relations for determining citizenship".

Solon's emphasis on the maturation of intellectual capacities implies in all probability some literary polemic against the perspective from which the lyric poets judged the evolution of human life, and thus in a certain way supplements Solon's "response" to Mimnermus in 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}: cf. Römisch 1933, 67–69, and Steinhagen 1972, 269 f. It was conventional to assert a dramatic dichotomy between the physical, aesthetic, and sexual maturity of youth on the one hand, and the purely negative attributes of ugly old age (which hinders one's vision, eyesight and mind: Mimn. 1.5–7 G.-P.^{2} = 5.6–8 W.^{2}) on the other. Solon opposes this viewpoint, with a decisive emphasis on the positive aspects of old age, i.e. on the progressive acquisition of full control over one's intellectual faculties, which constitutes a sort of new beginning after the progressive attainment of physical completeness during the first four hebdomads.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the poem limits itself to a mere literary polemic. As Schadewaldt 1933 = 1960 points out, Solon's attitude is not at all isolated on a diachronic level, and on

a synchronic level his regret over physical decline due to aging may have been a trope limited to lyric and elegiac poetry: the Homeric poems never even speak of such regret, but rather consider the defects of youth (reduced intellectual capacities) to be just as present as the limits of physical strength brought on by advanced age (see the image of Priam as an old man approaching death). The elderly Nestor who occasionally fights and is proud of his ability to make decisions and speak in public (*Il.* 4.310–325), an idea not far from Solon's viewpoint (11–14), is an anomaly of heroic poetry.

The attention given to the numerological element should also lead us to believe that Solon's ambitions very much surpass the polemic with lyric-elegiac poetry or conventional views. For Solon, this poem was probably a brief piece of didactic poetry: his agenda is animated by didactic intents analogous to those which prompted Hesiod in his *Works and Days* to create a rigorous chronological survey of the agricultural year and make frequent recourse to various other numerological elements.

Furthermore, Solon's attention to the progressive maturation of the νόος serves to emphasize a biological parameter that renders old age more tolerable than it had been for Mimnermus and the lyric poets (and for Solon as well, but in a different context: cf. 18.10 G.-P.^{2} = 24.10 W.^{2}). However, it is also instrumental from the perspective of Solon the politician in defining the moment of "social efficacy" (as Musti 1990 calls it) and in particular the moment of a citizen's maturity in respect to making decisions in the political assembly or in respect to the personal responsibility in familial and criminal matters. This perspective is particularly obvious in the connection found at 13 and 16 between maturity of thought and maximal competence at speaking (and evidently also at arguing in the assembly). But it is also evoked by the definition of a man's maturity as the moment from which he is no longer disposed to "carry out ἀπάλαμνα ἔργα" (12), which could refer to the full responsibility of his individual actions. Gentili 1988, 255, n. 21 points out the connection of the epithet with παλάμη, which usually designates the dexterity and skillfulness of the hand, and by extension, a person's ability in general. As opposed to the epic meaning of ἀπάλαμνος as "helpless" (cf. Hom. *Il.* 5.597; Hes. *Op.* 20), Solon uses the epithet in the sense of "not thoughtful enough", in reference to actions that are such either because whoever does them is morally despicable or culpable (cf. Theogn. 279–282 and Pind. *Ol.* 2.57 f.) or because someone is not capable of keeping one's mind under control, e.g., one wants something because one is drunk, one wants something because one is young: cf. in particular Theogn. 479–483 ὃς

δ' ἂν ὑπερβάλληι πόσιος μέτρον, οὐκέτι κεῖνος / τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώσσης καρτερὸς οὐδὲ νόου· / μυθεῖται δ' ἀπάλαμνα, τὰ νήφοσι γίνεται αἰσχρά, αἰδεῖται δ' ἔρδων οὐδέν, ὅταν μεθύηι, / τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν σώφρων, τότε νήπιος, and Callim. fr.inc. 737 φὴ νέος οὐκ ἀπάλαμνος.

Another piece of evidence for Solon's attempt at abstraction comes from his use of a numerological model that radically departs from the traditional designations for different ages, such as νέος, παῖς, κοῦρος = "child" or "youth", etc. By avoiding to use the traditional terms, he frees himself from the imprecisions and intrinsic fluctuations of the non-quantitative system which they presupposed (it is enough to remember that Aristophanes of Byzantium considered the vocabulary of age words complex enough to dedicate an entire treatise to it, entitled Περὶ ὀνομασίας ἡλικιῶν: see later Poll. 2.4–21). Different is the approach of the Hippocratic author of the treatise *On the hebdomads*, who, although animated by a strong numerological interest and very likely having Solon among his models, does not refrain from defining each of his seven hebdomads according to the traditional terms: παιδίον "small child", παῖς "child", μειράκιον "boy/youth", νεανίσκος "young man" etc.

Solon's interest in the numerological model for its abstract and exact nature can be inferred from his laws, in which the quantitative parameter probably serves to circumvent the potential bias (or corruption) that subjective discretion would have made easier for judges (as remarked by Falkner 1995, 157–159). It is enough to run through the list of Solon's laws as presented by Plutarch (*Sol.* 20–24) to recognize Solon's preference for the number "three", which he uses frequently in cases where it would have been impossible to depend on parameters defined by standard values or guided by specific pragmatic needs: the husband of a heiress had to make love with his wife at least three times a month, a bride could have no more than three dresses in her dowry, a dog that bites had to be held on a leash three cubits long, etc. The number three, just as the numbers seven and ten in this fragment, were the most recurrent 'magical' numbers in Greek culture. Thus, it is difficult to avoid the idea that Solon took advantage of the 'anthropological' conventionality of the numbers seven and ten, which was well documented in Athenian culture (cf. e.g. the practice of naming newborn infants on the seventh or the tenth day after birth, the δρομιάμφιον ἦμαρ / ἀμφιδρόμια: cf. schol. ad Aristoph. *Lys.* 757a; Harp. ω 2 Keaney s.v. ἑβδομευομένου; Hesych. *Lex.* α 3995 and δ 2400 Latte; the seventh is one of the three days of the month that Hesiod calls "holy", *Op.* 770; see de Vogel 1966, 173 ff.; Hamilton 1984). Belief in the 'magical' character of the numbers seven and ten

also became crucial to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, for whom they were a sort of principle of the intelligibility of things: cf. Hippon, *VS* 38A16; Philol. *VS* 44A13 and 16, 44B4 and 11; Aristot. *Metaph.* 987b11 f. and b27–29; Aristox. fr. 23 Wehrli (a treatise on the number seven was ascribed to the Pythagorean Prorus of Cyrene, *VS* 54A6, and one on the number ten to Archytas, *VS* 47B5).

Like Solon, the Hippocratic medical writers also made great use of the number seven in their attempts at quantitative interpretations of phenomena—cf. in particular the two treatises *Carn.* (plausibly datable to the fifth century BC) and *Hebd.* (from the same period, according to West 1971, 383–385; but of the Hellenistic era according to Mansfeld 1971) and the observations of the Pythagorean philosopher Hippon that a fetus would be mature for birth from the seventh month, or that a newborn baby would lose its teeth at the age of seven years and puberty would begin at the age of 14 years (*VS* 38A16). Hebdomadal subdivisions of human life are also owed to the Peripatetics Diocles and Strato (of the fourth/third century BC; we have a rather clear idea of them from Macrobius, comm. to Cic. *Somn.* 1.6.65–76, and from the *Theologoumena arithmeticae* of Nicomachus of Gerasa, known from the pseudo-Iamblichean tract of the same title, pp. 64–66 De Falco). A link between Solon's experiment and its successive Hippocratic parallels may have been the Pythagorean philosopher-doctor Alcmaeon of the sixth century BC: in fact this author, who seems indebted to Solon in other respects as well (cf. ad 3.17 G.-P.^{2} = 4.17 W.^{2} and 29^b.9 G.-P.^{2} = 34.9 W.^{2}), claimed that the sperm production began in boys during their fourteenth year: cf. *VS* 24A15 and cp. Solon's l. 4. For a detailed summary of the post-Hippocratic hebdomadal divisions of human life cf. Mansfeld 1971, 156 ff.

The number of witnesses to this elegy and the strong technical tones they employ in describing it are excellent proof of the interest that it provoked in the ancient world. During the nineteenth century the authenticity of the poem was questioned (e.g. by Porson, Gaisford, Ahrens, Usener), but an ancient piece of evidence for the reception of a concept formulated within the poem shows that such doubts are excessive, and proves that the poem existed at least by the beginning of the fifth century, when it was already considered to be Solon's. Herod. 1.32, ascribes the phrase ἐς γὰρ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτεα οὖρον τῆς ζόης ἀνθρώπωι προτίθημι to Solon during his conversations with Croesus, which seems to reflect line 18 of the poem: see further Introd. chap. 2. Aristotle's expression concerning the ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις … τῶν ποιητῶν … οἱ μετροῦντες

ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν (*Pol.* 1335b32–34) must have included Solon, and the plural "poets" may have been a generalization based on Solon's verses.

1 f. The adjective ἄνηβος is not attested before Solon, but it must designate a prepubescent child. The ἄναβος of Theocr. 5.87 is ἀγένειος and the scholia in Aeschin. 1.7.1 specify παῖδας τοὺς ἀνήβους, μείρακας τοὺς ἀρξαμένους ἡβᾶν, ἕως ἂν ἐκ τῶν ἐφήβων ἐξελθόντες ἐγγραφῶσιν εἰς ἄνδρας; at the beginning of the fifth century the adjective is documented as a legal term in the laws of Gortyn (*Inscr.Cret.* 4.72 col. XI.19 Guarducci: Perpillou 2004, 70 f.), where it identifies the age at which adoption was no longer allowed (it was evidently permitted for someone who had passed through puberty, provided that he was not yet an adult), and it recurs in Lys. 14.25.4.

νήπιος is frequently combined with παῖς in Homer (cf. *Il.* 22.484 = 24.726, *Od.* 19.530, 21.95). The interpretation of this epithet was debated even among the ancients, but in light of the clear opposition between being νήπιος and skillfully exercising one's intellectual faculties (see, e.g., Telemachus' statement in Hom. *Od.* 20.309 f. ἤδη γὰρ νοέω καὶ οἶδα ἕκαστα, / ἐσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρεια· πάρος δ' ἔτι νήπιος ἦα; also Hom. *Il.* 9.440, *Od.* 9.442; *HHom.Herm.* 163 f.; Hes. *Op.* 40, 456), it seems to have also specifically designated intellectual immaturity, i.e. the lacking of adult characteristics or virtues: cf. Hom. *Od.* 4.818; 19.530–534. Edmunds 1990, 59 correctly notes that "even where the word seems to mean simply child, the Homeric concept of childhood was emotionally charged in a way that our own concept of childhood is not. Homeric children, while not without the charm of the promise (Astyanax, compared to a star, is a household treasure), do not possess those strengths or virtues through which adults strive to achieve permanence or immortality". The term παῖς was therefore associated with the idea of an individual still unready for the adult world (an individual who was not an adult): cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 753 f. for the baby Orestes who τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν γὰρ ὥσπερεὶ βοτὸν / τρέφειν ἀνάγκη, πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τρόπωι φρενός. Solon integrated it with ἄνηβος, which refers to the stage of incomplete development, and νήπιος, which points to intellectual immaturity, perhaps to obtain a more complete picture of infancy as the age of "not yet".

2. Cp. the pun παρὰ προσδοκίαν in Ar. *Ran.* 418 ὃς ἑπτέτης ὢν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτερας where "members of the phratry" stands for φραστῆρας "the signal-teeth" of the age sixteen.

The verb ἐκβάλλειν was idiomatic for teeth in the fifth century (cf. Hippocr. *Hebd.* 5.3 West and Eur. *Cyc.* 644), but ἕρκος ὀδόντων, "barrier of teeth", is an epicism (the formula recurs at the end of verse in *Il.* 4.350, 9.409, 14.83, *Od.* 1.64, 3.230, 5.22, 10.328, 19.492, 21.168, 23.70). In epic, the phrase is used with the meaning that "the teeth look like a fence and should act like one against certain utterances" (Kirk ad *Il.* 4.350). The use of solemn Homeric phraseology may seem excessive for the normal events of human life, but elsewhere in this poem Solon also elevates the fundamental events that demonstrate and confirm his subdivisions of human age, transforming them into occasions worthy of divine control (cf. 3, 4), so that divine interest and epic language work together to provide a sublime level for his age landmarks.

3. That Zeus, or more generally, a "god", sees to the fulfillment of every thing is a fairly widespread concept (cf. ad 1.17 G.-P.^{2} = 13.17 W.^{2}). But the idea Solon expresses here is much more peculiar: the poet uses τελεῖν with the objective of time, meaning "when the god has "performed"/ "accomplished", "gone through the second span of seven years" (Waanders 1983, 68), so that the divinity emphatically appears to operate in terms of hebdomads. The only relatively close parallel is the *Odyssey* formula for the Dawn: 5.390 = 9.76 = 10.144 ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τρίτον ἦμαρ ἐϋπλόκαμος τέλεσ' Ἠώς, where we have, likewise, a god professionally in charge of beginning the days.

Solon's emphasis on the divine control over the procession of human life through the hebdomads is analogous to the poet's request to the Muses for protection at the beginning of 1.1–10 G.-P.^{2} = 13.1–10 W.^{2} and to the affirmation of Athena's protection of the city of Athens in 3.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.3 f. W.^{2}: see further ad locc. In this fragment the god confirms the Solonian 'interpretation' of the ages of human life, implicitly according divine approval to it.

4. "Signs", namely visible manifestations of the onset of puberty, were, according to different authors, the beginning of sperm-production (cf. Heracl. *VS* 22A18; Hippocr. *Ep.* 6.21; Aristot. *Hist.an.* 544b25 f. and 581a12–14; Philo, *De opif. mundi* 103; Ar.Byz. *Ep.* 1.68), the changes in the voice (Aristot. *Hist.an.* 581a17 f.), or the development of hair (Aristot. *Col.* 797b30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἥβην καὶ τὸ γένειον, ὅταν ἄρχωνται τὸ πρῶτον ἡβᾶν καὶ γενειᾶν; see later Alcae. *Anth.Pal.* 12.30, Phan. *Anth.Pal.* 12.31.3 hair on the thighs and beard on the face, Asclep. or Diotim. *Anth.Pal.* 12.36.2 hair on the thighs). For the first beard being

a symptom of the onset of puberty, cf. Hom. *Od.* 11.319 f. πρίν σφωϊν ὑπὸ κροτάφοισιν ἰούλους / ἀνθῆσαι πυκάσαι τε γένυς εὐανθέϊ λάχνηι (before they "grew beards", or before their beards sprouted: Aitchison 1963, 272) and 18.269 f. ἐπὴν δὴ παῖδα γενειήσαντα ἴδηαι, / γήμασθ' ὧι κ' ἐθέληισθα, Aesch. *Sept.* 665 f. οὔτ' ἐφηβήσαντά πω, / οὔτ' ἐν γενείου ξυλλογῆι τριχώματος (also 533 f.); Callim. *Hec.* fr. 45 Hollis; *GVI* 385; Schol. Ap.Rhod. 1.972; Lucr. 5.888 f. *puerili aevo florente iuventas occipit et molli vestit lanugine malas*. Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.4.3 calls γλυκερώτερον ἄνθος Ἐρώτων a youth of fourteen years (τὰ δὶς ἑπτὰ νέμων): he may thus have 'eroticized' the reminiscence of the Solonian hebdomads with the use of γλυκερός and of ἄνθος, terms which both occur in the homoerotic Solonian fr. 16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2}: on Strato's debt to Solon's homoerotic poetry, see also below ad 5 f.

The verbal phrase is modeled on σῆμα/σήματα φαίνειν, which in Homer and Hesiod is usually used for the manifestation of divine portents through which the gods make their will known to humans (cf. *Il.* 2.308, 353, 4.381, 9.236, *Od.* 21.413; Hes. fr. 141.25–28). Again, an extremely common physiological event in human life is elevated to the level of a sign from the divine; both portents and the natural processes that Solon is describing here can be natural and recurring phenomena. The epicizing γεινομένης printed last by West, would not be unsuitable to the register of the context, but all occurrences of the verb from the form of the radical γειν- refer to the concrete "birth" of human or divine beings (either intransitive or causative). And furthermore, rather than being an appealing *lectio difficilior*, it may just be an ancient itacistic mistake for γινομένης, an ionic Homerism which in this epicizing context may have been the original word of Solon (cf. the isolated variant γείνεται in Diog. Laert. Cod. B for 12.2 G.-P.^{2} = 9.2 W.^{2}, where all the other mss. of Diogenes have γίνεται).

5 f. For the aging process which hints at physical development being coincident with sexual awakening, and perhaps the transition from *eromenos* (παῖς) to potential *erastes* (νέος) like the one described by Solon in our distich, see Simon. 8.5–8 G.-P.^{2} = 21.5–8 W.^{2} ἐ]ξ οὗ τὰ πρώτιστα νεο[τρεφέ]ων ἀπὸ μηρῶ[ν / ἡ]μετέρης εἶδον τέρμ[ατα πα]ιδείης, / κ]υά[ν]εον δ' ἐλεφαντίνεον [τ' ἀνεμί]σγετο φέ[γγος, / .....] δ' ἐκ νιφάδων [.......... ἰ]δεῖν, with West 1993b, 11 f.

The verb λαχνόομαι is only here and in Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.178.3 ὅτε νυκτὶ λαχνοῦται "when the down of night overtakes him" (Tarán 1985, 104). The analogy of the context leads us to suppose that Strato's νυκτί, pointing doubly to the time when the "sun" of the *eromenos* (4) sets

and to the darkening of the skin because of the hair/beard, proposes with graphic detail the opposition of darkness of the hair and shiny whiteness of skin before the beard, an idea which remains implicit (but may be presuposed) in Solon: see below. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* 1.67–69; Callim. *Lav.Pall.* 75 f.; Philip, *Anth.Pal.* 11.36.

Strato's parallel is quite telling, and Solon's χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης may be saying something more here than merely "the skin changes its hue" (as Gerber translates the verse), although it is unclear which aesthetic judgment Solon assigns to this change. One possible meaning is: the beard which sprouts on the skin, makes it change (taking ἄνθος in its original meaning "that which sprouts on something else": Aitschinson 1963). A thick and well-growing beard which sprouts in the growth of manhood is εὐανθής in Hom. *Od.* 11.319 f. cited above; Pind. *Ol.* 1.67–69 πρὸς εὐάνθεμον δ' ὅτε φυάν / λάχναι νιν μέλαν γένειον ἔρεφον, / ἑτοῖμον ἀνεφρόντισεν γάμον; also Aristot. *Gen.an.* 728b27 ἐξανθεῖ ἡ τῆς ἥβης τρίχωσις; Orph. *Lith.* 255 αἵ δὲ νέαι περὶ βρέγμα τεὸν τρίχες; Anonym. *Anth.Pal.* 16.381.1 Ἴουλον ἀνθῶν (6 AD). In this case, the growing of the beard following full sexual maturity would be without negative erotic connotations. Alternatively, there may be an erotic subtext here in the sense that the physical change involves a move from *eromenos* to *erastes* which (can be but) need not be a satiric motif in our text. Solon may be referring to ἄνθος as the erotic beauty and the boyish bloom of the complexion which fades (with Linforth 1919, 147), i.e. is lost, as in Aesch. *Prom.* 23 χροιᾶς ἀμείψεις ἄνθος "you will change (lose) the bloom/gleam of your skin" (*LSJ*) (a passage for which Griffith 1983 ad loc. notes "in imitation of Solon"), or in adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.39.1 f. Ἐσβέσθη Νίκανδρος, ἀπέπτατο πᾶν ἀπὸ χροιῆς / ἄνθος, where the final words of the epigram (εἰσὶ τρίχες, 4) reveal that "a special sort of death is involved, that of boy's erotic charms" (Tarán 1985, 95); on ἄνθος as the gleam of skin, cp. also Theogn. 451 f. τοῦ χροιῆς καθύπερθε μέλας οὐχ ἅπτεται ἰός / οὐδ' εὐρώς, αἰεὶ δ' ἄνθος ἔχει καθαρόν which has no erotic undertones.

The erotic interpretation seems more likely, because ἄνθος recurs in 16.1 G.-P.² = 25.1 W.² and commonly elsewhere (cf. the parallels ad 16.1 G.-P.² = 25.1 W.²) as a metaphor for the bloom of youth. The idea that the growing of the beard and other secondary hair on the body means a dark skin (not a sign of boyish charm but of virility, cf. Irwin 1974, 129; Henderson 1991, 211 f.) and the loss of the soft tenderness or smoothness of boys' skin is consistent with the attention Solon shows elsewhere to the reality of homosexual love (cf. 16 and 17 G.-P.² = 25 and 23 W.²).

The sprouting of the beard conventionally signalled the age when boys ceased being desirable to their lovers and the moment that the (mature) *eromenos* passed into the stage of being an *erastes*, i.e. he stopped being the passive partner in a homosexual relationship: cf., e.g., Theogn. 1326f. Ὦ παῖ, ἕως ἂν ἔχῃς λείαν γένυν, οὔποτε σαίνων / παύσομαι, with Vetta 1980 ad loc.; Dover 1978, 85; Buffière 1980, 607–613; Halperin 1990, 88–90. Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.4, quoted above, feels the need to justify his anomalous perseverance with boys of every age (further Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.10; Plato, *Prt.* 309a and Plut. *Amat.* 770b–c).

If the imagery of homosexual beauty-values is present here, however, Solon's esthetical perception seems to be subordinated to the parameters of his scanning of the life of man mainly in view of his life and social role. In fact, Solon does not speak here of the first tender downiness of an adolescent, but of a youth twenty-one years of age and older, i.e. of an age when the beard was already well grown and the youths had lost, at least according to the etiquette of Greek homosexual love, their attractiveness to potential lovers. In fact, Solon prefers to focus his attention on the category of the νέοι, who in Homer had been the youths who fight for their city and participate in the assembly of the Argives at Troy, like Diomedes, in *Il.* 9.57, or the young full-citizens, like Telemachus when in *Od.* 2 he calls together the assembly in Ithaca (cf. Cantarella 1990, 39f.).

7. **πᾶς τις**, here for the first time, expresses the idea that nobody is exempt from the natural rhythm of aging as described by Solon: cf. Theogn. 22, 621; Pind. *Isth.* 1.49; Aesch. *Ag.* 791, 1205, 1651, *Supp.* 489, 972, 1004 etc.

The text of Clement's single cod. L, ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος, accepted both by West and Gentili-Prato, should be preferred to ἐν ἑβδομάδε(σ)σιν/ἑβδόμασιν ἄριστος which is found in three of four testimonies, cf. Gentili-Prato ad loc. The plural "hebdomads" is definitely erroneous, cf. the singular τῆι δὲ τετάρτηι at the beginning of the verse, but possibly is the trace, and the mechanical corruption of a text ἐν ἑβδομάδ' ἐστιν ἄριστος. This very text, which is not attested by our sources, was introduced by Sylburg's correction, and has the advantage of avoiding the lengthening of the final iota of ἑβδομάδι before μ—but such a lengthening would, however, be plausible as a Homerism, and, although rarely attested in elegy, is again found twice in Solon: cf. Gentili-Prato ad loc. For the non-offending repetition of μέγ' ἄριστος in 13 see ad loc.

8. For the extension accusative ἰσχύν, see e.g. Hom. *Od*. 8.116 = 11.469, 24.17 ἄριστος ἔην εἶδός τε δέμας τε. Gentili-Prato print the accusative of the relative ἥν, which is Sylburg's slight correction for the ἦν of Clement. The harshness of the plural σήματα as predicative of the relative referring to ἰσχύς, which is in the singular, seems excessive (although it does not lack parallels: Ps.-Hes. *Sc*. 312 f. and Eur. *Hipp*. 11). Therefore, (with West and Gerber 1999a) I prefer to accept the variant ἧι for the form of the relative.

σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς: Theogn. 1178 πεῖραν ἔχοις ἀρετῆς is a close formal parallel, which has led to Stadtmüller's emendation of σήματ(α) to πείρατ(α) in our passage. However, in Theognis ἔχειν has the common meaning "to have", while in Solon I prefer to take it to mean "to consider" (for this sense of the verb cf. Eur. *Supp*. 164; *LSJ* no. 14), so as to differentiate the common opinion from his own opinion, which remains unexpressed. In accordance with Solon's emphasis on the intellectual aspects of human aging the verb would thus reveal his scepticism about the popular opinion (ἄνδρες) that the physical strength of maturity is the sign of ἀρετή: cf. Anhalt 1993, 50 (Sparta in particular celebrated ἥβη as being the ideal military age: for differences between Athens and Sparta see Introduction and below ad 9). In fact, Solon may have had a different opinion as to who or what really ἔχει πάντων πείρατα, as he expresses in 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2}: see ad loc., and he possibly shared the opinion of, e.g., Theogn. 1325 f. δὸς δ' εὔφρονι θυμῶι / μέτρ' ἥβης τελέσαντ' ἔργματα σωφροσύνης, or Simon. 7.10f. G.-P.^{2} = 20.5 f. W.^{2} θνητῶν δ' ὄφρά τις ἄνθος ἔχηι πολυήρατον ἥβης, / κοῦφον ἔχων θυμὸν πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ. In any case, as Bowra 1958, 102 correctly highlights, Solon's conception of *arete* is wider than Tyrtaeus' in that Solon believes man is capable of excelling in more than one way: in particular Solon certainly transforms the Tyrtaic concern on how (in which way) best to die into the concern on how (in which ways) best to live.

9. For the idea that the right age for marriage was … μήτε τριηκόντων ἐτέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπων / μήτ' ἐπιθείς πολλά, cf. Hes. *Op*. 695–697; also Plato, *Resp*. 460e, *Leg*. 721b–d, 772e, 785b; Aristot. *Pol*. 1335a 29 etc. Solon's advice on marriage follows Hesiod and likewise accommodates this pattern of social life within the template of the patterns of the natural world, since both submit to dictates of temporality and both should be at the right time/season, ὥρα; cf. ὥριος used of marriage in *Op*. 697 and ὡραῖος in connection with marriage in *Op*. 695, with the other year's works, like plowing and sailing in *Op*. 616 f, 630, and with all Perses' sea-

sonal tasks in *Op.* 641 f. μιμνήσκειν also has a didascalic-Hesiodic aura: in the *Works and Days* (7×) this is the verb that directs Perses/the farmer to remember Hesiod's advice, see Marsillio 2000, 21 f. In fact, the importance of completing tasks in the proper season is continuously emphasized throughout the agricultural section of the poem. The concept of ὥρα occurs again in the poem in reference to death at 17 f.: see ad loc.

In Hesiod, marriage and children represent a long-term investment for the survival of the *oikos* and the filial support that is due to the parents in old age, a principle already attested in Hom. *Il.* 24.540 f., where Achilles regrets not having taken care of his father in his old age, and *Od.* 24.226–230 where the description of Laertes is characterized by neglect—self neglect and also neglect by others—and thus is "emblematic of old age in all its sorrow, loneliness and neglect" (Kirk 1971, 133). Hesiod's perspective is thoroughly utilitarian. He advises Perses to beget only one child (*Op.* 376 f.), who is instrumental for the continuation of the house, and considers as a symptom of the Iron age's depravity that children do not pay back their parents in old age the care for their rearing (187 f.): see Introduction. As Musti 1990, 20 points out, Hesiod had also detailed the ideal age for women to marry (*Op.* 698); differently, Solon's poem is only concerned with the biological rhythms of the men.

In fact, definitions of marriage as an institution in antiquity do not necessarily include mention of women: cf. Ps.-Demosth. 59.122: "this is what marriage is: when a man engenders children and presents his sons to the phrateres and demesmen and gives his daughters as being his own in marriage to husbands". The woman's role is often limited to references to procreation, as it is implied here. In any case, in the male-focused poem of Solon, women do not participate or their position is marginal, and Solon reasserts and/or readjusts men's social place not in relation to the women's place in society but in relation to themselves. Solon's (and Athens') attention to marriage is however noteworthy: Musti 1990, 26 f. correctly contrasts the practices in Sparta and Crete, whose institutions and rituals were based on collective norms according to which marriage was precocious and secondary to other obligations (at Sparta, in particular, marriage was consumed very rapidly and the groom immediately returned to his army companions).

10. Here as well as in *HHom.Aphr.* 104 ποίει δ' εἰσοπίσω θαλερὸν γόνον, εἰσοπίσω emphasizes the dimension of the future underlying the wish for procreation, at variance with the more objective ἐξοπίσω of Tyrtae. 9.30 G.-P.^{2} = 12.30 W.^{2} ~ Sol. 1.32 G.-P.^{2} = 13.32 W.^{2} or Theogn. 206 (cited in

the Introd. ad 27 G.-P.² = 21 W.²), which points to the obvious fact that children come after the fathers (*pace* Diehl ed. ad loc). Aristotle possibly had this verse and the following one on the maturity of the νόος in mind, when in *Pol.* 1335b25–40 he argued that the period of procreation should coincide with the time of maximum vigor of the mind. Solon's plural παίδων contrasts Hesiod's advice of an only son, see above.

11. The simple verb ἀρτύω had been used in Homer for the execution of actions depending on an intellectual "control"/"arrangement", but Solon probably adopts the compound καταρτύεται (here for the first time), because, as it appears from later authors, it means specifically "to tame" horses (e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 477 f.) or even human beings (e.g. Eur. *TrGF* (76)F818c.5; cf. Hesych. *Lex.* κ 1787 Latte κατηρτυκώς· τέλειος. κυρίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, ὅταν ἐκβάληι πάντας τοὺς ὀδόντας), and thus could have anticipated the idea of "stability" that is explicated in 13 for the mature *noos*. This same idea can be found in, e.g., Plato, *Leg.* 808d5 ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην.

12. For the meaning of ἀπάλαμνα, cf. Introd. Anhalt 1993, 51 correctly notes that the point is phrased as an example of positive development and is consistent with the poem's central proposition that aging is a positive phenomenon (the verses do not suggest, however, as Anhalt 1993, 51 also points out, that intellectual development is simply the result of a natural chronological progression). It is not surprising that the notion of misconduct is introduced here solely in the negative, at the moment when its potential disappears, and is not positively associated with the earlier stages: this is a highly normative-idealizing poem and Solon is evidently unwilling to introduce morally negative elements into his exemplary life-cycle.

ἐθέλειν here with the meaning "dare to"/"be capable of", which it already has in epic but in negative phrases: see Hom. *Il.* 9.356, 13.106 etc. Solon has always the epic ἐθέλ-, never the tragic, and later common θέλ-: 1.8, 13 G.-P.² = 13.8, 13 W.², 3.27 G.-P.² = 4.27 W.², 29a.6 G.-P.² = 33.6 W.², 30.22 G.-P.² = 36.22 W.² Apostolius will have sensibly corrected a very ancient banalization.

13. The combination νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν was already found in Hes. fr. 239.3, cf. also 150.14. γλῶσσα and νόος are also of great concern to Theognis, as the dichotomy between the two is connected with the theme of the insincerity between friends in the context of the symposium: cf. 87, 91–96.

The combination of two hebdomads in a single distich has met with wide disapproval by many scholars. Hudson-Williams 1926, 129 criticizes the poem on the grounds that Solon appears to have found difficulty in working out the tenfold division, since in lines 13 f. he is unable to distinguish clearly between the seventh and eighth hebdomads. Steinhagen 1972 suggested that in combining the seventh and the eighth hebdomads Solon intended to produce the odd number of couplets required by the poem's particular structure and symmetry. For Campbell 1967, 248 the lines are mere padding. Faraone 2008, 65–69 maintains that at some point in the transmission of the poem, an entire couplet dropped out of the text, and that at some later point a scribe rewrote lines 13 f. "with their telltale cardinal numbers, and in so doing enjected yet another pentameter".

That Solon might struggle to fit human life into a scheme based on spans of seven years is unsurprising; any such schema is bound to be coercive to some degree and this one does allow him to add more nuance to the age cycle than existing models allowed. I agree with Anhalt 1993, 51 and believe that Solon combines the two hebdomads and does not distinguish in detail between them because they both represent the apex of his construction and the two year periods help highlight the importance of νόος and γλῶσσα as the most significant values for Solon in human existence. The maturity of thought and eloquence of the seventh and eighth hebdomad serves as a *pendant* to the maturity of physical vigor in the fourth, and the parallel nature of the two is emphasized by the repetition of the final words μέγ' ἄριστος at 7 and 13. The specification of their duration (fourteen years) emphatically marks the span of life in which the individual's best abilities are at their best. Highlighting the greatest capacity for intellection and communication which accompanies human development must have been a momentous task in Solon's poetry, as he repeatedly points elsewhere to the disastrous results of intellectual failings or deficiencies on the part of the average Athenian: see ad 15.5–8 G.-P.^{2} = 11.5–8 W.^{2} and 29^b.3 G.-P.^{2} = 34.3 W.^{2}

As Falkner 1995, 61 points out about Hesiod's scheme of the ages, the Golden race and the race of Heroes represented ideas of perfection and relative perfection respectively conceived of the poet in terms of maturity and enjoyment of the pleasures of the physical and/or the social world: on the one hand the feasts of the former, and their good connection with the earth which bore abundant fruit, and on the other hand the settled lives of the latter, and their technology which requires the organized effort of the community at large (Fontenrose 1974, 9) grounded these two races

in their respective worlds. In Solon's poem, the lack of detail enables us to consider in terms of the *oikos*, both in personal and in economic terms, and also in terms of the extra-*oikos*, the arenas in which the capacity for intellection and communication could develop. In emphasizing maturity, Solon follows Hesiod who likewise showed a preference for maturity on the matter of human age: see Introd. Other lyric poets on descriptions of the age cycle, like e.g. Mimnermus or Theognis, do not devote any space to mature age. The coming of old age follows directly after brief youth: cf. Mimn. 1, 7, 8 G.-P.^{2} = 5, 1, 2 W.^{2}, Theogn. 527 f., 1129–1132.

15 f. For the first part of 15 and the continuity of Solon's thought see 28 G.-P.^{2} = 18 W.^{2} where old age is praised on the basis of the personal experience of the authorial "I", or anyway of the *persona loquens*. Some decline is already admitted with ἔτι … δύναται, promptly explained by μαλακώτερα κτλ. (Adkins 1985, 131), which is far from expressing a complete decay. Contrast with Solon's representation of old age, for instance, the nihilism of Mimn. 1.4–7 G.-P.^{2} = 5.5–8 W.^{2} τὸ δ' ἀργαλέον καὶ ἄμορφον / γῆρας ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς αὐτίχ' ὑπερκρέμαται, / ἐχθρὸν ὁμῶς καὶ ἄτιμον, ὅ τ' ἄγνωστον τιθεῖ ἄνδρα, / βλάπτει δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχυθέν; Xenophan. 8 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2} ἀνδρὸς γηρέντος πολλὸν ἀφαυρότερος. Comparable with Solon is Tyrtae. 9.39 G.-P.^{2} = 12.39 W.^{2} γηράσκων δ' ἀστοῖσι μεταπρέπει on the participation in the Gerousia, Council of Elders for the valient warrior who survived the battlefield to reach old age (sixty and over).

16. While realistically recognizing an element of reduction of powers in old age, it is interesting that Solon see 63–70 as a fitting time to die. There is nothing in this logical rationalism of the pessimism of 'not to be born is best'.

The repetition of ἀρετή resumes its occurrence in 8 for the physical strength (see above). Nearly all modern interpreters understand the expression of the first hemistich in the sense of (weaker) "in relationship to highly virtuous actions". This interpretation is definitely possible: for μεγάλη ἀρετή as a designation of intellectual and moral virtue, cf. e.g. Hom. *Od.* 24.193 and Theogn. 1074 (and for the limiting πρός in connection to μαλακός see Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.2). However, it seems that in its beginning the verse takes up in a nominal form the same idea expressed by μέγ' ἄριστος of 13, just as the phrase γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη takes up, with variation, νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν of the same verse, and develops further the idea of the νόος ἀνδρός of the sixth hebdomad of 11. The dif-

ference between the intellectual gifts of the ninth hebdomad and those of the sixth, seventh, and eighth hebdomads may have been the difference between wisdom as the result of experience, σοφίη, and sense, wit as a natural faculty, νοῦς. The meaning would then have been that, compared with (πρός) the apex of the value (μεγάλη ἀρετή)—not excellence in general, as is usually understood, but the excellence reached in the sixth hebdomad and preserved in the seventh and eighth—the capacities of eloquence and intellectual elaboration are weaker during the ninth hebdomad (Schadewaldt 1933 = 1960, 41 seemed to favor this type of interpretation).

After all, as Adkins 1985, 131 remarks, the chiastic order of ideas in νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν of 13—γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη of 16 on one hand and μέγ' ἄριστος of 13 on the other—and μεγάλην ἀρετήν of 16 "is elegant and marks off the seventh, eighth and ninth hebdomads as a subunit within the poem". A similar operation can be found in Solon's hymn to Eunomia (3.31–39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.31–39 W.^{2}) where repetition of key words rounds off that section of the poem: see ad loc.

Customarily the poets have made σοφίη their privilege, as Solon himself in 1.51 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.51 f. W.^{2} or Xenophan. 2.11–14 G.-P.^{2} = 2.11–14 W.^{2} declare. But what is suggested here is quite different: Falkner 1995, 166 f. notes that the qualities expressed are broad, imply no particular background, and are given in an inclusive perspective. This detached (and inclusive) point of view again reminds us of the tone of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, and fits a consideration of the social ἀρεταί of the individual.

In contrast with the emphasis on and details of the evolution of this broad range of intellectual virtues, Solon is completely silent on (and is perhaps relatively uninterested in) the decay of physical vigor—which he ceases to comment on immediately after citing its fulfillment during the fourth hebdomad. Quite differently, in their hebdomadal review of the ages of human life, which is similar in many relevant aspects to Solon's, Diocles and Strato specify the beginning of physical decline as occurring between the sixth and seventh hebdomads.

17 f. The thought that the end of human life coincided with reaching its natural measure is one that responds to the peculiarly Solonian ideology of the measure inherent in every thing (cf. Introd., and ad 20 G.-P.^{2} = 16 W.^{2}), and is conveyed through traditional language apparently intended to attribute a seal of ancient solemnity to Solon's opinion: τελέω is used in Homer for completing periods of time (*Od.* 10.470); for the clausula of this line cf. Hom. *Il.* 11.225 ἥβης … ἵκετο μέτρον ~ *Od.* 4.668

(*v.l.*), 11.317, 18.217, 19.532; *HHom.Dem.* 166; Hes. *Op.* 132, 438, 720 and fr. 205.2. Compare the similar phrase ἀρετῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι in Tyrtae. 9.43 G.-P.² = 12.43 W.².

18. By assimilating the end of human life to a physical process in the natural world (the cycle of age to the circle of the seasons) the poem follows a traditional pattern starting with the Homeric simile of *Il.* 6.144–151, which likens the human generations to the falling of leaves in autumn and their growing again when the season of spring arrives to show that "life is transient and that one generation succeeds the other" (cf. Kirk ad *Il.* 6.144–151); on the connection between the vegetal cycle and human life see also Hom. *Il.* 21.464–466, Mimn. 8 G.-P.² = 2 W.², Simon. fr.eleg. 7.2 G.-P.² = 19.2 W.², Bacchyl. 5.65–67, Aristoph. *Av.* 685, Ap.Rhod. 4.214–219. In Solon's presentation, death, as well as old age, is not affected by the radically negative/frightened perspective from which lyric and elegiac poets viewed it in their observations on human life. Rather, the litotes with which Solon describes arriving at "an age not unjust" underscores how death itself, like all other events of life, belonged to a natural order: cf. Burzacchini 1995, 77.

ἄωρος by Solon's time was probably already a technical term for the prematurely dead (cf. Griessmair 1966)—a sense not yet attested in epic, but cf. *CEG* 154.2 (fifth century BC); *skol. PMG* 884.4; Herod. 2.79.3. Compare this to the funerary trope which declared that "it is not death that is an evil, but dying before youth and ahead of one's parents" in the inscriptions *GVI* 1663–1669, dating from the third century BC to the third AD; see in general Vérilhac 1978–1982. ἄωρος ἐών reminds us of ἄνηβος ἐών of 1, which was used in connection with childhood: apart from the ring composition, it should be acknowledged that in both ages Solon does not highlight any specific social function.

μοῖρα θανάτου may have been a well chosen expression to point to the natural order much more than expressions such as κὴρ … θανάτοιο of Hom. *Od.* 11.171 or of Tyrtae. 8.5 f. G.-P.² = 11.5f. W.², 9.35 G.-P.² = 12.35 W.², which evokes the personification of the goddess of death: see Prato 1968 ad 8.5 f. For μοῖρα θανάτοιο (besides 26.4 G.-P.² = 20.4 W.² and Callin. 1.15 G.-P.² = 1.15 W.²), cf. already Hom. *Il.* 13.602 μοῖρα κακὴ θανάτοιο (in the second hemistich). Solon's phrase also occurs in *Od.* 2.100, 3.238, 17.326, 24.135; *HHom.Aphr.* 269; Hes. fr. 35.4.

The elegy ends conditionally leaving some flexibility to the scheme concerning the end of life: this may exceed the seventy years because one may "complete" the tenth hebdomad and go on to the eleventh. In fact,

the aorist τελέσας in the text puts emphasis on the terminated action, cp. ll. 3 f. ζωὴν δὲ ἔλιπον γηραιός . . . / [ἕνδε]κα πληρώσας ἑβδομάδας βιότου, in an inscription from Chios of the 2nd cent. AD. (Robert 1967, 282).

24 G.-P.^{2} = 26 W.^{2}

Here we find a list of the pleasures of the symposium, whose etiquette of moderation Solon had invoked and defended in 3.9 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 f. W.^{2} Anacr. eleg. 2 W.^{2} = 56 Gentili has a similar list of sympotic pleasures and an allusion to the appropriateness of moderation.

However, one must resist Plutarch's reading of the fragment as being written by Solon at an advanced age (πρεσβύτης) after having brought his life into the peaceful sea of marriage and philosophy (*amat.* 751e). There is no clear indication of Solon's marriage, and the reference to Aphrodite (1) may also point to pederastic courtship (see Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 430–432 on Aphrodite and homosexuality, as well as Theogn. 1307–1309, 1327–1334, 1337–1340; Ibyc. *PMG* 287; Pind. fr. 123; see Vetta 1980, 114 for parallels to this in Hellenistic and later epigrammists).

Solon's fr. 16 G.-P.^{2} = 25 W.^{2} also belongs to the same atmosphere of sympotic pleasures which are enjoyed by the poet-lover (see Introd. ad loc., especially for Plutarch's interpretation of the connection between 16 and 24 G.-P.^{2} = 25 and 26 W.^{2}).

1 f. The same triad of divinities is often associated with erotic contexts: Bacchyl. fr. 20b; Eur. *Bacch.* 402–416; *Anacreont.* 4(iii).11–21; Posid. 123 A.-B. = *Anth.Pal.* 5.134; Marcus Argent. *Anth.Pal.* 10.18; adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 5.135.3.

In particular, the motif of coupling wine with love has a long history, for which see Anacr. *PMG* 357 = 14 Gentili; Panyas. *PEG* 17.3; Eur. *Cyc.* 69–72; Plato, *Symp.* 177e; *Anacreont.* 5.12–15, 6.38.2–6, 44; Privitera 1970, 91 ff.; Giangrande 1968, 127 ff. For the association of Dionysus with the Muses / poetry, cf., e.g., Nicaenet. *Anth.Pal.* 13.29; Hedyl. ap. Athen. 11.472 f. and 11.473a (= *Hell.Ep.* 1853–1856, 1857–1862 Gow-Page); Antip.Sid. *Anth.Pal.* 7.27.9 f.; 'Diog.Laert.' *Anth.Pal.* 7.104; *Anacreont.* 50. For Dionysus Μουσαγέτης in Naxos, see Nilsson 1906, 306, n. 2. Aphrodite appears together with the Muses in *HHom.Ap.* 189–196, *Anacreont.* 19; for her connection with poetry, see Plato, *Symp.* 196e; Callim. *Anth.Pal.* 12.150; Nic. *SH* 566; Bion frr. 3 and 9 Gow.

1. The periphrasis "works of Aphrodite" being used to designate erotic activities is already well attested in epic: cf. Hom. *Il.* 5.429; Hes. *Op.*

521, fr. 124.2; *HHom.Aphr.* 1, 6, 9, 21. The same genitive "pertinentive" (Schwyzer-Debrunner 1950, 117) appears in ὕβριος ἔργα of Sol. 1.16 G.-P.^{2} = 13.16 W.^{2}

The phrase δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 3.54 f., *HHom.*10.2) includes beauty and ἔργα: cf. Theogn. 1381–1385 with Vetta 1980 ad loc.

2. τιθέναι + an accusative designating a feeling or a mind state + a dative of the affected person, or ἐν and the dative of an inner organ is a common phrase in Homer (*LfgrE* s.v. τίθημι, 16).

On the regulated pleasures of the symposium (εὐφροσύνη) as an ideal of the aristocratic life-style, cf. 3.9 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.9 f. W.^{2} and the note ad loc.; see also Oranje 1984, 105. For the term in Homer as the accompaniment of feasting and drinking, see Latacz 1966, 163 f. The elegists of the fifth century appear to use the term φιλοφροσύνη instead (Ion 26.11 W.^{2}, 2.8 G.-P.^{2} = 27.8 W.^{2}; Crit. 4.16 G.-P.^{2} = 6.16 W.^{2}), cf. Vetta 1980, 62.

25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2}

Both the ps.-Plato, *Just.* 374a and the schol. ad loc. report the three words of our fragment, defining them as an "old proverb". Only a scholium to Plato informs us that they were also a fragment of Solon. The fragment does not fit the beginning of any meter attested in Solon, and thus it is usually taken to be the second part of a hexameter. It should be stressed, however, that we are dealing with a hemistich of a particular metrical form, i.e. a paroemiac, which was one of the most widespread meters used for proverbial sentences. It is thus possible that Solon was quoting a proverb here, and inserting the preexisting *gnome* into one of his verses, just as we take it for granted that Hesiod did this in his hexameters of elevated or gnomic wisdom in *Op.* 383–828 (cf. Hoekstra 1950; Porter 1951, 31 f.; Sbardella 1995). If this hypothesis is correct, Solon may have deliberately followed Hesiod's practice, thus emphasizing also on a formal level the Hesiodic flavor of his views on the choice of poetic themes and the issue of poetic truth (on Hesiod's poetry as an example of a poetics of truth as opposed to a poetics of fiction, see *Theog.* 26–28 and Finkelberg 1998; Heiden 2007; Nagy forthcoming). In other words, by resorting to the Hesiodic practice of adopting proverbs in order to gain a gnomic aura in the most sapient section of a didactic work, and of inserting them as close as possible to their original metrical shape, Solon may be highlighting Hesiod's didactic epic as his guide in the exposition of his themes.

Because of the accidents of transmission, here the proverb is not accompanied by what paroemiologists have called the "explanation of a saying": see Lardinois 1997, 218 f. who quotes as an example the *gnome* in Hom. *Il.* 1.80–83 κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺς ὅτε χώσεται ἀνδρὶ χέρηϊ, which is preceded by an explanation of it in 78–80 ἦ γὰρ ὀΐομαι ἄνδρα χολωσέμεν, ὃς μέγα πάντων/Ἀργείων κρατέει καί οἱ πείθονται Ἀχαιοί. Nor can we say anything about the relationship between the speaker and the addressee apart from the fact that the text seems to be a third person saying, where the speaker or the addressee do not appear to be directly involved; furthermore, the generic plural ἀοιδοί in the *gnome* (i.e. the category of persons mentioned in it) shows that it applies to all of them; likewise for ἀρχῶν in the proverbial sentence of fr. 35 G.-P.^{2} = 30 W.^{2} (see ad loc).

We do not know the source of Solon's critique. In the wake of the fragment's interpretation by some of the ancients, the easiest hypothesis is that it is related to Solon's criticism of Thespis as a presenter of lies, which took place after Solon had attended the performance of one of his tragedies. See Plut. *Sol.* 29.6f. μετὰ δὲ τὴν θέαν ... ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τοσούτων ἐναντίον οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τηλικαῦτα ψευδόμενος. φήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Θέσπιδος, μὴ δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λέγειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πράσσειν, ... ὁ Σόλων ... "ταχὺ μέντοι τὴν παιδιάν" ἔφη "ταύτην ἐπαινοῦντες οὕτω καὶ τιμῶντες εὑρήσομεν ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις", and Diog. Laert. 1.59, according to whom Solon Θέσπιν ἐκώλυσε τραγωιδίας διδάσκειν, ὡς ἀνωφελῆ τὴν ψευδολογίαν. If we accept the interpretation of the anecdote by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, then according to Thespis, tragedy would have been assigned to the category of amusement and play. Thus according to Solon, the issue of truth in tragedy would be made irrelevant, which it should not be—perhaps, e.g., because in Platonic terms *ante litteram* lies are imitations of truth that can bring to mind realities and induce an acceptance of them. Solon must refer to fictionalizing here as the skill of creating a plausible narrative (i.e. fiction), and not as the deliberate speech-act of uttering falsehood. In other words, the Solon of this anecdote does not suggest that Thespis is trying to induce the audience to accept falsehood as truth, nor that Thespis is a liar/falsifier, a speaker of ψεύδεα per se: cf. Morgan 1993, 179f. Morgan also notes that the conceptual vocabulary of Solon's and Thespis' age could not yet provide a satisfactory account of the difference between fiction and lies and the fictional game of tragedy (παιδιά) played by two participants: the tragic poet/actor and the spectator.

The *Suidas* places Thespis' plays as being staged in the 61st Olympiad, 536/35–533/32, whereas the Parian Marble puts Thespis somewhere between 538 and 528: cf. West 1989b, 253. Therefore, the chronology makes it difficult for Solon and Thespis to have met: cf. Patzer 1962, 25; Kolleritsch 1968, 4 n. 14; Podlecki 1987. However, Martin 1995, 20 argues that they may have lived at the same time. It is clear that at least some of the ancients connected this fragment to the anecdote about Solon and Thespis, since both Plutarch and Diogenes insist on Solon's charge of ψεῦδος against Thespis, and the verb ψεύδομαι is found in our fragment. It is most likely that the existence of this phrase in Solon (whatever its context may be) gave impetus to the natural desire to bring together Solon and Thespis; for more on the tendency of biographers and collectors of anecdotes to bring together famous figures, see the discussions on Solon and Pisistratus: Introd., chap. 1, 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–4

W.^{2}, 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2}; and on Solon and Croesus: Introd., chap. 2. In fact, Solon's term *aoidoi*, 'singers', could perhaps include the earliest tragedians, since according to various ancient sources they performed as actors themselves: see Hall 2002, 9–12, especially in connection with Sophocles. On the deep effect of tragic drama on the Athenians in terms of ἀπάτη, cf. Plut. *glor.Ath.* 348c; on the emotional impact an ancient *tragoidos* could have on an audience see again Hall 2002, 35–37.

Along with the anecdote involving Thespis, there were at least two other late accounts of Solon's interest in theatrical 'fiction': his recourse to the deceptive histrionics with which, according to the unanimous ancient tradition, he himself performed his poem for the conquest of Salamis (cf. Introd. ad 2 G.-P.^{2} = 1–4 W.^{2}), and his response to Pisistratus' stratagem, when the aspiring tyrant pretended to have been the victim of a physical attack simply because he wanted a bodyguard. According to Plutarch (*Sol.* 30.1), Solon did not accuse Pisistratus of simply 'lying', but of fictitiously reciting, as an actor, the part of the Homeric Odysseus when as a spy inside Troy he operated under the false identity of a beggar (on which see Fantuzzi 1996).

However, more plainly, and in tune with its common meaning, in our fragment the *aoidoi* of Solon may also denote the epic poets or the performers of epic poetry. Dalby 1998, 206 in particular maintains that Solon originally intended to criticize the epic poets, which seems to be a likely interpretation. Collins 2004, 157 has seen in our fragment a rebuke of the epic tradition and its rhapsodes. In this rebuke Solon would have defined how dactylic poetry can be considered in terms of social utility. Indeed, in the proem of the elegy *To the Muses* Solon eloquently shows his distance from Homer and the bards of the epic tradition when he restrains himself from asking the Muses to be his guides for a song on themes related to stories of heroes and events of the past, a task for which the bards of the epic tradition usually invoked the Muses. The (heroic) past seems out of Solon's horizon: as Sider 2006, 339 points out, he "exhorted his fellow Athenians without reference to the past as template. This may be an accident of survival or it may have been part of a conscious effort on Solon's part as a radical legislator to turn his audience's eyes to the future without recourse to the past"; see also Introd. chap. 5.

If Solon's fragment expressed a criticism of some aspect of tragic or epic poetry, such a criticism would not have been unfamiliar in archaic poetry. Indeed, these kinds of statements were frequently made as a result of the competitive nature that was typical of archaic and classical Greek poetry and the consequent display of superior cleverness and verbal

dexterity which this involved. On the agonistic context and character of early poetry, see, e.g., Martin 1989, 65–77; Griffith 1990; Collins 2004, 61–163. The charge of ψεύδεα is recurrent in many of these statements, and it does not imply moral evaluation, as is clearly shown by the way in which the poet of the 'Homeric' first *Hymn to Dionysus*, 1–6, presents his version of the birth of Dionysus in opposition to his predecessors' version, οἱ μὲν γὰρ Δρακάνωι σ', οἱ δ' Ἰκάρωι ἠνεμοέσσηι / φάσ', οἱ δ' ἐν Νάξωι, δῖον γένος εἰραφιῶτα, / οἱ δέ σ' ἐπ' Ἀλφειῶι ποταμῶι βαθυδινήεντι / κυσαμένην Σεμέλην τεκέειν Διὶ τερπικεραύνωι, / ἄλλοι δ' ἐν Θήβηισιν ἄναξ σε λέγουσι γενέσθαι / ψευδόμενοι· σὲ δ' ἔτικτε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. What can be said of these accounts of Dionysus' birth is that they were more or less exclusive of one another because they make similar assertions: one can only accept one version at a time. In such a context a bard declares the other versions to be ψεύδεα. Interestingly, as Pratt 1993, 26 notes, the poet of the *Hymn to Dionysus* does not ask his audience to accept his account as being factually true, that is to say as an account of what actually happened. Likewise, the other versions were declared ψεύδεα, not because they referred to presentations of events that seemed unbelievable, but because they were alternative versions of the same event (no one in the audience could have verified whether this was accurate, and the author of this *Hymn* raised questions about their value only to show to his audience his own cleverness, ability to entertain, and originality: cf. Pratt 1993, 29, 43). A close parallel to the statement of the *Hymn* appears to have been Stesich. *PMGF* 193, a text which famously blamed (μέμφεται) Homer's and Hesiod's accounts of Helen, and which produced Stesichorus' version, in his *Palinode*, maintaining that the previous λόγος had not been ἔτυμος (*PMGF* 192.1).

Last but not least, it cannot be ruled out that in this fragment Solon made a distinction between imaginative invention (i.e. non-factual information = lies) and poetic narrative as an account of what really happened (i.e. factual information), if, for instance, the statement here came from a poem like Xenophan. 1.21–23 G.-P.^{2} = 1.21–23 W.^{2} There, Xenophanes rejects the Gigantomachies and other descriptions of fights typical of traditional epic in a meta-sympotic elegy which describes the symposium as the place that edifies good social relationships and cohesion in the city, in contrast to rhapsodic recitations that have no edifying social purposes: see further Vetta 1983, XLIX; Ford 2002, 46–66; Collins 2004, 147–151. Finally, aside from the suitability of their respective themes and content to the genre, an important difference between sympotic elegy and epic, is that the elegists cannot see themselves as "inventing" what they

sing, precisely because of the time frame for the material of their poetry. This could extend only up to the grandfathers of the poet's generation, as Tyrtae. 4.3–5 G.-P.^{2} = 5.6–8 W.^{2} clearly indicates (therefore the audience of the elegists is much more self-interested in accuracy when hearing poetry). Furthermore, in the case of the *ktisis* elegy, which narrates early material related to the foundation of one's own city, there are likely to have been tighter limits placed on the poets' freedom and fewer opportunities for change and variation than in Homeric epic because of the general acceptance that such stories had obtained in the city's collective memory: see further Bowie 1993. This difference in time frame could have easily caused elegiac poets to believe that the presentation of factual "truth" in epic was less attentive than the one used in elegy.

Because we have no knowledge of what genre was being targeted by Solon's criticism (early tragedy? epic poets/performers?), we do not have any concrete textual evidence to support that this was a real criticism of any sort. The self-referential statement made by the Hesiodic Muses of *Theog.* 27 f. ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, / ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι cautions against the strongly 'aggressive' character that we find in Solon's fragment. The Muses are introduced by Hesiod as the sources of his own inspiration, and their poetic activity (or even a part of it) can hardly have been presented by Hesiod in a seriously derogatory way. Therefore, this passage probably suggests that telling ψεύδεα was included in the notion of what the poetic profession entailed. Through an analysis of the early Greek sense of ὁμοῖος, which in epic meant "equivalent with respect to a quality", Heiden 2007, 171 argues that "the Muses did not tell Hesiod that they spoke two separate and different things, both lies and truth. They told Hesiod that they spoke only truth, because even their lies were somehow equivalent to truth. There is no polemic against poetic lies in *Theog.* 27 f. Nor is there a basis for one. On the contrary, the lines say that lies are good—as good as truth—when the Muses tell them. The Muses do not blame poets for telling lies; they blame the shepherds for not understanding what the Muses' lies are". If this interpretation of Hesiod is correct, and Solon's fragment alludes to Hesiod, then it may be anything but criticism, and it possibly speaks not of the lies or of the inferior fictions of the *aoidoi*, but, appreciatively of the variety of their fictional constructions which amount to truth. But, as Nagy forthcoming points out, at least in Homer and Hesiod ὁμοῖα always seems to point to the visual/perceptional, and not to the ontological dimension of substantial equivalence. Therefore, the most likely sense of Hesiod's phrase is that some of the fictions of

the Muses seem equivalent to truth in the eyes of the still uninitiated Hesiod (but they are not necessarily equivalent to truth in ontological terms). There should be a sort of internal opposition in the Muses' poetry between what is true and what seems true but in fact remains inferior to truth. In this case, the ψεύδονται of Solon's text will have to be considered as a sort of more or less derogatory charge.

Callim. *Hymn to Zeus* 7, 60, and 65 is a significant parallel for interpreting Hesiod and hence, Solon. Callimachus states that the ἀοιδοί of the old times were not ἀληθέες (60), and also charges derogatorily people who ἐψεύσαντο (7) in reporting facts, but he admits that what he does in his poetry is ψεύδεσθαι, although in a way that is as persuasive as possible (65). The meaning of ἐψεύσαντο of 7 is established with certainty in the first lines of the hymn, where the Cretans are called ψεῦσται since they have not properly constructed their fiction, having spoken at 8 f. of the death and the tomb of Zeus, who is eternal. However, at 65 Callimachus admits that what makes the difference between him and them, is that "he lies" = "he fictionalizes" well and persuasively (ψευδοίμην, ἀίοντος ἅ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀοιδοί, 1.65). Therefore, in Callimachus the verb ψεύδεσθαι appears to have both the derogatory sense of "lying", and a more technical sense of fictionalizing = narrating events which are not, or not necessarily, factual. We cannot rule out the possibility that this verb had already been used in the age of Solon or of Hesiod to express the weak and non-derogatory sense of "fictionalizing" which we find in Callimachus. But this latter sense seems to be too 'modern' for the age of Hesiod and Solon.Therefore, a definitive conclusion cannot be reached about the issue of whether or not Solon dealt with the *aoidoi* derogatorily, although the former interpretation is more plausible than the latter.

26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}

The fragment presents itself as a correction of Mimnermus' fr. 11 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} αἲ γὰρ ἄτερ νούσων τε καὶ ἀργαλέων μελεδωνέων / ἑξηκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου, which hints at the poet's preference for death over illness and old age, the fear of which is expounded in 1.4–7 G.-P.^{2} = 5.5–8 W.^{2} τὸ δ' ἀργαλέον καὶ ἄμορφον / γῆρας ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς αὐτίχ' ὑπερκρέμαται, / ἐχθρὸν ὁμῶς καὶ ἄτιμον, ὅ τ' ἄγνωστον τιθεῖ ἄνδρα, / βλάπτει δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχυθέν. Solon's thought is significantly in tune with 27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2} (as Plut. *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* 24.5 also recognizes), 28 G.-P.^{2} = 18 W.^{2} and, more indirectly, 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}

These close connections between the work and thought of Mimnermus and Solon's poetry have often led critics to postulate that a personal relationship existed between them, and thus to attempt various biographical reconstructions, or less often, to try to refute them as tales without any historical foundation: cf. De Marco 1939–1940, 318. According to Szádeczky-Kardoss 1942, 80 f., Solon wrote 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} during a visit to Ionia; but according to Steffen 1973, 95 f., Solon created the poem as a sort of gift for the sixtieth birthday of Mimnermus, who was then invited by Solon to correct the poem he had composed and the wish he had expressed for himself. Even the most recent commentator of Mimnermus, Allen 1993, 66, plays with the idea that if the two poets met in Ionia, the most likely setting would have been a symposium in Smyrna. A reasonable, but not unavoidable, biographical premise to this (pretended) request by Solon is that Mimnermus was a bit younger, and that thus Solon could poke fun at him and himself at the same time by hinting at the idea that, if Mimnermus had been a few years older, e.g. of the same age as Solon, he would have changed his ideas about the age limit of human life (Hagen 2007, 89 f.). But, of course, we can also suppose differently that Solon's (pretended) request was only dictated by Solon's new proposal about the 'ideology' of old age, independently of the difference in age between him and Mimnermus.

Every attempt at inferring details about a biographical reality from this fragment risks being a modern adventurous biographical fiction not far from the biographical inferences of the ancients, laid bare to us by Lefkowitz 1981, cf. also Lefkowitz 1976. In fact, the series of imperatives which seem to address Mimnermus as a physically present interlocutor

does not exclude, as Allen 1993, 66 admits, the possibility that Solon never actually met Mimnermus. It is simply the case that, within the frame of the frequent sympotic interactions between symposiasts and adoptions of mask-identities, Solon does not abstractly propose a new age for one's death, nor does he conceive of Mimnermus as an interlocutor *in absentia* who might have given, sooner or later, a παλινωιδία, but on the contrary, he asks him, or rather pretends to ask him, to carry out *hic et nunc* a μεταποίησις.

Such immediacy is also perfectly suitable to the stance of variation/correction of previous poetry (μεταποίησις) which was typical of the sympotic performance (see also below, ad 3). Thus, this Solonian fragment may be an invaluable testimony of the ways in which new poetry emerged out of the improvisational games at symposia, and the lively sympotic variations or corrections of pre-existing poetry that were most often the focus of the competition, see Ford 1981. Μεταποίησις was the most openly competitive form of adaptation that occurred during sympotic performances of poetry of the past. We can suppose that it mainly took place in the tit for tat recitation and response during which someone cited a passage and the next speaker continued it, correcting and adapting it along the way, as happens in various cases in the Theognidean *corpus* as well as in the *Wasps* or the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes: cf. Vetta 1980, XXVIII ff. 1983, 119–131; Palumbo Stracca 1996; Bowie 1997, 17. In such types of competition the competitors were forced to elaborate these variations on a passage of pre-existing poetry in an *ex tempore* way. They should therefore have trusted their powers of improvisation and displayed a significant poetic ability (cp. the collection of drinking songs in the fourth and third centuries BC, e.g., the Παροίνια of Praxilla of Sicyon, Athen. 15.694a, which was perhaps edited for the sake of those symposiasts who were less dexterous in improvisation). Solon's poem would fall into the recognizable pattern of responsive antitheses that took place in these kinds of sympotic recitations. As we may easily imagine, he would have picked up the argument ("the right age for one to die") of the performer that had preceded him, impersonating 'Mimnermus' (identity-'masks' were a common device of archaic, and especially iambic, poetry), and he would have linked his poem to what had preceded by echoing the prior symposiast and then correcting his statement. In his reference to Λιγυαιστάδης in 3, Solon would not have been addressing the real Mimnermus by name (indeed what Solon utters is not Mimnermus' name), but rather he would have been signaling—outside of the fiction—that he was going to introduce a quotation from 'Mim-

nermus'. In fact, apart from the expressions which Solon changes, he repeats verbatim Mimnermus' pentameter, refraining from paraphrasing or freely reelaborating it. A similar operation can be observed in Simon. 7.1–5 G.-P.² = 19 W.² = Hom. *Il.* 6.146 ἓν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χῖος ἔειπεν ἀνήρ· / "οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν"· / παῦροί μιν θνητῶν οὔασι δεξάμενοι / στέρνοις ἐγκατέθεντο· πάρεστι γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἑκάστωι / ἀνδρῶν, ἥ τε νέων στήθεσιν ἐμφύεται. This is a quotation from Homer (the man of Chios), repeating verbatim a line from the *Iliad*, but followed by an original comment by Simonides. Like Solon, Simonides does not name Homer; he only alludes to him in a way that will allow his audience to make the identification for themselves (on Simonides' habit of citing other individuals by naming or clearly echoing them, see the examples assembled by Sider 1996, 275 which include Pittacus, Stesichorus, Homer, Hesiod and Cleoboulus). Apart from conveying Solon's ideas, this fragment also proves the competence of Solon as a poet. The fact that Solon takes three verses to prelude to the minor variation that he performs on Mimnermus is remarkable in itself (for the dangers facing the symposiasts when they measured themselves against each other, see Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 618f with Collins 2004, 96–98). Solon's re-elaboration may not seem (to us moderns) terribly creative, but the change, although minor, is not negligible for the view it prospects on old age, and it clearly dramatizes how variations could emerge out of a lively competitive context during the symposia (for another sort of sympotic dramatization, cf. also the introd. ad 2 G.-P.² = 1–3 W.²). The fact that the competitive performance context of the elegy gave a surplus of value to even the slightest variations, thus allowing for minute changes instead of sharp divergences in meaning, is correctly stressed by Vetta 1984, 124 f. In conceptual terms, however, Solon's change is a substantial leap since it gives a positive value to old age. This places it in line with other fragments (see above), but it also places it in striking contrast not only to Mimnermus but to a whole strand of Greek thinking (see Intod. ad 23 G.-P.² = 21 W.² for the views of Hesiod on old age).

Apart from being perfectly understandable in terms of sympotic practice, Solon's fragment contains a precise rhetorical strategy. One can, in principle, simply surmise that a previous speaker has cited Mimnermus, and Solon has reacted to this quotation. But Solon's poem looks like a freestanding composition which englobes Mimnermus rather than presupposing him—and was presumably intended to do so. Solon's presentation of Mimnermus finds an interesting parallel in Simon. *PMG* 542.11–13 nor does that saying of Pittacus ring true to me, although it was spoken

by a wise man: he said that it was difficult to be good. As Easterling 1974, 42 has pointed out by relying on Aristot. *Rh.* 2.1393a19–33, it must have been an established rhetorical-poetic practice to cite an authoritative text in order to correct it and underline one's own distinctive message (*refutatio sententiae*). Solon achieves the same effect as Simonides: his challenge to the authority of Mimnermus, like Simonides' challenge to the well-known saying of the wise Pittacus, is an impressive way to give weight to what he has to say about old age.

1. The verb πείσεαι could be intended as a short vowel aorist subjunctive such as one often finds with εἰ + ἄν in Homer (see Chantraine 1958–1963, 1.454 f.) and rarely in Attic, without any need for altering the transmitted text κἂν (= καὶ ἄν) νῦν: then the verse could be understood in an elliptical way "even if eventually (if only) now you obeyed me", as G. Hermann wished *apud* Vigerus 1834, 922. Since, however, the aorist ἐπεισάμην is found only in late Greek, I accept Thiersch's emendation of κἂν νῦν into καὶ νῦν (with no potential nuances), which was last followed by West and Tuomi 1986, 20–25, "also now" taking πείσεαι as a future indicative "you will obey me".

ἐξαιρέω was perhaps a technical term for designating interventional eliminations of portions of poetic texts, as Plato, *Resp.* 394b "when one removes (ἐξαιρῶν) the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches" may prove.

It is worth asking whether or not we have the beginning of the poem here. Diogenes Laertius is unspecific, but it is possible (as some editors have supposed) that Solon may have previously cited the very words of Mimnermus (cf. Simon. *PMG* 542). As for τοῦτο, the demonstrative either recalled the single word ἑξηκονταέτη (cf. Tuomi 1986, 19) or meant "this line"/"verse"—the underlying meaning being ἔπος (cf. West 1974, 181 f.) and not the later στίχος "verse", for which see Aristoph. *Ran.* 1239; for this reason the variant τοῦτο, neuter, is preferable to the masculine τοῦτον (cf. Steffen 1973, 96 f.; West 1974, 181 f.).

2. Solon seems sure that he will outperform 'Mimnermus'. On open antagonism in the *skolia* game of the symposium see Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1228–1230; for the performances this involved see 1222–1249 (on the serious consequences of challenging and, even more, of besting one's antagonist, cf. Hes. fr. 278 M.-W.[2] who discusses the capping contest of Calchas and Mopsus which led to Calchas' death from grief because περιτυχὼν δ' ἑαυτοῦ κρείττονι μάντει ... Μόψωι).

The Attic adverb λῷον (Florens Christianus (Chrestien), Boissonade) is much better than λώιον' (στίχον) Ziegler, since Homer and Hesiod use λώϊον in the neuter or as adverb (e.g. *Il.* 1.229, *Od.* 23.109; *Op.* 350). One could also accept the neuter here with τοῦτο (ἔπος). The reading of the mss., σεῦ τοῖον (σ' εὖ τοῖον Allen 1934, 238) cannot be accepted, in spite of the defence of Tuomi 1986, 14–19. According to Tuomi, the pronoun τοῖον of the mss. anticipates the polysyllable of 3, and all of line 2 is a parenthetical invitation to Mimnermus not "to envy/grudge me (Solon) because I found out such a name for you"; but we would expect that Solon's invitation concerned the change in Mimnermus' verse, and not the new 'name' of Mimnermus, and at any rate the syntax would be exceptionally harsh, with καὶ μεταποίησον resuming the main thought of the fragment expressed in 1.

3. μεταποιεῖν is not attested before Solon. It became common for marking changes within texts, as demonstrated by its frequent use in the scholia. See also, e.g., Gal. *diff.resp.* 7.834.10, *In epidem.comm.* 17b93.11. Sometimes μεταποιοῦμαι in the sense of "change" or "alter by substituting one word for another" also appears in contexts of more creative adaptations: [Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 110B8.

In Homer and Hesiod the verb ποιεῖν designates material "building", and has nothing to do with poetry, since poetic activity is considered to be the result of divine inspiration, not of τέχνη "craft", and the epic singer has no creative freedom: cf. Valesio 1960; Ford 1981, 300 ff.; Finkelberg 1998, 1–67; Murray 1981. Solon's use of this verb reveals a new profane valuation of poetry, which by now conceived of itself as a "construction" set in place by procedures no longer distinguishable, on the linguistic level, from those of professions founded on technical-professional knowledge (cf. Gentili 1971, 60 ff., and 1988, 50; also 2.2 G.-P.[2] = 1.2 W.[2]). It seems appropriate that this new idea of poetic activity features with particular clarity in this fragment: it would actually have been almost blasphemous on Solon's part to ask Mimnermus to "change" poetry that had already been created, if the halo of sacredness that the inspiration of the Muses, or the idea of the poet-seer, had conferred were still left upon it. Compare this to the much more traditional vision that Solon exhibits in 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2], both in the prayer of the proem and the definition he gives of the poet at 51 f.

Λιγυαιστάδη: for the use of polysyllabic words in Solon see also ad 2.6 G.-P.[2] = 2.4 W.[2] In the elaborate communicative system of sympotic poetry, as Pellizer 1990, 179 notes, the vocatives of direct addresses can

be names, but also other indicators of the name which help to determine the real or fictitious context of the address and the relationships expressed. Neither the sense nor the form of the name by which Mimnermus is called is clear. The spellings (ν)α(ι)γιασταδη(-δὶ) provided by the mss. of Diogenes Laertius are probably incorrect. The forms to which the name is usually emended, Λιγυαστάδη Bergk, Λιγυαιστάδη Diels 1902, 482, Λιγιαστάδη West, derive from the testimony of *Suidas*, where Mimnermus is the son of a certain Λιγυρτυάδης and had the nickname Λιγειαστάδης (*v.l.* Λιγιστιάδης) διὰ τὸ ἐμμελὲς καὶ λιγύ "for the fact of being harmonious and sonorous". Unless we discard the testimony of *Suidas* and believe, with Hudson-Williams 1926, 127, that Λιγυαιστάδης was a patronymic, and that thus Mimnermus was the son of a Ligyastas, the nickname should be interpreted as a pun on λιγύς "sonorous" + the root ἄιδειν "to sing" (cf. λιγυάοιδος attested in the grammarian Arcadius, 86.23 f. Barker). The patronymic suffix would thus jestingly stress sonority as an inherent (and distinctive) peculiarity of the personality of Mimnermus, like the mocking polysyllables with patronymic endings of later comedy: e.g. ῥακιοσυρραπτάδης of Aristoph. *Ran.* 842 (Diels 1902, 482), and *Thensaurochrysonicochrysides* of Plautus, *Capt.* 285. It might also, in particular, fictionalize a connection between Mimnermus and the 'family' of the clear voiced singers (Allen 1993, 16; compare the qualification used by Corinna for the poetess Myrtis, *PMG* 664.2 λιγουρὰν Μουρτίδ(α)). Apart from expressing sonority in general, the epithet may also have associated Mimnermus with the instrument of the *aulos* (on the use of λιγύς for the sound of instruments or for song cf. Kaimio 1977, 42 ff.; other sources connect Mimnermus and elegy in general to the sound of the accompanying flute, the earliest witness being Hipponax, fr. 153: cf. Bowie 1986, 14; West 1974, 13 f.; Allen 1993, 16 f.). In light of this evidence, I am quite sceptical about the negative interpretation of the adjective, advanced by Tuomi 1986, 12–14, according to whom Solon is criticizing the excessive musicality of Mimnermus' style or his excessive reliance on musical accompaniment.

Alternatively, -αδ- of the suffix may be connected with the root of ἁνδάνειν: the nickname would then play with a different idea, namely that Mimnermus "pleases" because of his "sonority" (Hagen 2007, 94). In any case, even if this etymological interpretation is correct, the shadow of the patronymic suffix -αδης could not be removed from this nickname, which would involve a more complex play between the patronymic form and the sense of "pleasing".

The fact that Solon does not address Mimnermus as the son of a particular father (not by his *genos*) has also led to the hypothesis that this nickname was meant to emphasize the obscurity of Mimnermus' birth (cf. Wilamowitz 1913, 280) or, alternatively, to highlight the nominal suffix of the name of his father, Λιγυρτυάδης (*Suid.* μ 1077 Adler), if he was of Anatolian origin: cf. the Asiatic characters Hyrtios son of Gyrtios and Hyrtakos in Homer. The latter case would thus jokingly recall the non-Hellenic origins of the poet: see Allen 1993, 14f. However, the adjective (whether patronymic or a pun) is unlikely to have any negative connotations; for the rhetoric of competition to work, Mimnermus has to have a respected authority, one worthy of refutation.

27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2}

The optatives indicate that the prohibition of 1 (μηδέ μοι ἄκλαυτος θάνατος μόλοι) and its opposite in 1 f. (ἀλλὰ φίλοισι / καλλείποιμι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς) carry a general force; the poet is not speaking of a death which is imminent. Furthermore, although this fragment focuses on grief, it gives the impression that Solon is interested less in grief than in what grief expresses, namely the depth of Solon's relationship with his φίλοι. Solon wishes to be a friend of such quality that he is deeply mourned. The opening conjunction makes it clear that the unwept death is part of a larger wish, which may (like it is in other Solonian poems) have been focused on what makes the good life. In other words, we do not have to think that Solon is actually *asking* his φίλοι for extrovert lamentation or that this was the main subject of the poem (although judging by Archil. 133 the affection of one's friends in death was far from given; cf. also Stesich. *PMGF* 245 θανόντος ἀνδρὸς πᾶσ' †ὄλλυτ'† ἁ ποτ' ἀνθρώπων χάρις.

It is unsure whether this fragment belongs to the same poem as 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2} although Allen 1993, 66 thinks that it is likely that Solon, after his correction of Mimnermus' line, may have added "to live until the age of eighty and—'may death not come to me unwept …' (i.e., 'and may grief at my death prove that my long old age was fully productive and valued')". After all, Plut. *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* 1.5 puts this in the context of Solon's exchange with Mimnermus: ἔτι τοίνυν, οἷς πρὸς Μίμνερμον ἀντειπὼν περὶ χρόνου ζωῆς ἐπιπεφώνηκε.

The terms of affection, such as φίλοι here, had a broader range in ancient Greece than that of their modern counterparts. Xenophon, *Hier.* 3.7 for instance identified the strongest φιλίαι as those which unite parents to children, children to parents, wives to husbands, and *hetairoi* to *hetairoi*: see Herman 1987, 18 f.

Here Solon is not speaking of ritual lamentation where, as in Homer, it would be women playing the leading role of laying out the dead and formally expressing the grief. In that case, the protagonists were often not the loved ones of the dearly departed, but paid mourners: cf. Phot. *Lex.* κ 196 Theodoridis, *s.v.* Καρικῆι μούσηι (professional mourners had been employed at the funeral of Hector, cf. *Il.* 24.720 f.; also *Il.* 18.339 f. and Alexiou 1974, 11–15 = 2002 for hiring of professional threnodists;

excessive threnody was barbaric and Asiatic: see most recently Hardie 2005, 21). Tears were the "privilege" (γέρας) of the dead, as Achilles tells his companions about the dead Patroclus, *Il.* 23.8 f.; cf. also *Od.* 24.190; 296 (however, see also the opposite call for moderation in the length of the mourning period expressed by Odysseus to Achilles who suffers for the death of Patroclus in *Il.* 19.216–237). In fact, the display of emotions by men in Homer is far more extroverted than in the classical age, and Homer is especially powerful in presenting intense reactions of grief where men are as equally prone to tears as women: see the analysis by van Wees 1998b and the examples cited. Compare, for instance, Archilochus' response in fr. 13 to a shipwreck which took the lives of many men; the context there, like in Solon, is of a spontaneous, and not a formal, reaction to human loss: κήδεα μὲν στονόεντα Περίκλεες οὔτέ τις ἀστῶν / μεμφόμενος θαλίῃς τέρψεται οὐδὲ πόλις· / τοίους γὰρ κατὰ κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης / ἔκλυσεν, οἰδαλέους δ' ἀμφ' ὀδύνῃς ἔχομεν / πνεύμονας. ἀλλὰ θεοὶ γὰρ ἀνηκέστοισι κακοῖσιν / ὦ φίλ' ἐπὶ κρατερὴν τλημοσύνην ἔθεσαν / φάρμακον. ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει τόδε· νῦν μὲν ἐς ἡμέας / ἐτράπεθ', αἱματόεν δ' ἕλκος ἀναστένομεν, / ἐξαῦτις δ' ἑτέρους ἐπαμείψεται. ἀλλὰ τάχιστα / τλῆτε, γυναικεῖον πένθος ἀπωσάμενοι. Other later poets of the sixth century give voice to the opportunity of restraining the emotions during mourning: e.g. Theogn. 1069 f. Ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι καὶ νήπιοι, οἵτε θανόντας / κλαίουσ', οὐ δ' ἥβης ἄνθος ἀπολλύμενον, Semon. 2 τοῦ μὲν θανόντος οὐκ ἂν ἐνθυμοίμεθα, / εἴ τι φρονοῖμεν, πλεῖον ἡμέρης μιῆς; for this issue in the Attic theater, cf. Foley 2001, 19–55; Fantuzzi 2007.

In epic to weep and to groan while crying tears is normally accompanied by sounds of wailing, as is implied in *Il.* 7.426–428 when the Trojans are instructed not to "weep" (κλαίειν), and so they shed tears in silence: van Wees 1998b, 14. Clearly ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς are not part of the formal expression of grief in funerary ritual (see also below ad 2); θρῆνος and γόος are used for the formal expression of grief after the death of an individual (see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 24.719–724), the former being the type of lament most often associated with male mourners and considered to be more controlled and less emotionally powerful than the female γόος: see Johnston 1999, 100–102; Blok 2006, 216. Solon's funerary legislation often had been thought to be directed at limiting the luxury and ostentation of funeral ceremonies, which according to Demetrius of Phaleron had become particularly expensive just before Solon's time: Aristoph. *Ran.* 1302 f.; Plato, *Leg.* 800d–e; Hesych. *Lex.* κ 824 Latte; Ampolo 1984,

93; Engels 1998, 77–96. However, more recent scholarship observes that Solon's laws were not sumptuary laws "since they say nothing about the size or cost of the tomb monuments and only incidentally limit the cost of the funeral (e.g., one could not sacrifice an ox at the grave). Rather they are concerned with conduct": Shapiro 1991, 630–633; similarly Blok 2006, 219 and 230. Plutarch (*Sol.* 21.6) tells that in one of these laws, Solon forbade laceration of the flesh by mourners, the use of set lamentations, and the bewailing of any one at the funeral ceremonies of another; according to another source, Ps.-Demosth. 43.62, one of Solon's laws prevented women who were not close relatives of the dead (i.e. at least cousins) from attending funerals. For Johnston 1999, 100–102 funerary legislation of the late archaic and classical periods which restricted both *goos* and *threnos*, apart from establishing the growing distance between the living and the dead, also fulfilled the needs of social precaution and aimed at discouraging vendettas over the death of the individual. As Foley 2001, 24 observes, it may be significant that Plutarch in his *Life of Solon* (chap. 12) "implies a link between the sixth century legislation and a feud between the followers of Megacles and Cylon", even though, as she also points out, we have no evidence that formal clan vendettas were practiced in Athens.

The specific mentioning of the φίλοι in Solon clearly represents an elite attitude and reflects Solon's taste for an aristocratic-sympotic quality of life; cf. also 1.5 G.-P.² = 13.5 W.² (and above). Solon's ideas are profoundly different from the epic vision of the end of life, not only because he makes no mention of the immortal κλέος, which the death of the hero brings and which the epic hero wished most to leave for himself after his death, but also because (as noted by De Martino-Vox 1996, 760), in epic "to leave mourning" behind oneself is sometimes said of characters who, because of their unlucky fate, can do nothing else—because they are dying, they cannot, of course, positively orient the lives of those who will survive them (Odysseus, believed to be dead, can do nothing for Telemachus; Oedipus' mother can do nothing for Oedipus): cf. *Od.* 1.242–244; 11.279 f. τῶι δ' ἄλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσσω, / πολλὰ μάλ(α) κτλ. Solon's verses are also very different from the (public) celebration of the dead warrior in Tyrtae. 9.27–34 G.-P.² = 12.27–34 W.² τὸν δ' ὀλοφύρονται μὲν ὁμῶς νέοι ἠδὲ γέροντες, / ἀργαλέωι δὲ πόθωι πᾶσα κέκηδε πόλις, / καὶ τύμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίσημοι / καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω· / οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ' ὄνομ' αὐτοῦ, / ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίγνεται ἀθάνατος, / ὅντιν' ἀριστεύοντα μένοντά τε μαρνάμενόν τε / γῆς πέρι καὶ παίδων θοῦρος Ἄρης ὀλέ-

σηι or his virtual contemporary Callin. 1.17–19 G.-P.[2] = 1.17–19 W.[2] τὸν δ' ὀλίγος στενάχει καὶ μέγας ἤν τι πάθηι· / λαῶι γὰρ σύμπαντι πόθος κρατερόφρονος ἀνδρὸς / θνήισκοντος, ζώων δ' ἄξιος ἡμιθέων.

Solon's interest in his friends' recollection of him after his death reminds us of Sappho's attack upon her unnamed enemy in the well-known fr. 55, on which see also Yatromanolakis 2007, 333 and n. 214: κατθάνοισα δὲ κείσηι οὐδέ ποτα μναμοσύνα σέθεν / ἔσσετ' οὐδὲ †ποκ'†ὔστερον· οὐ γὰρ πεδέχηις βρόδων / τὼν ἐκ Πιερίας· ἀλλ' ἀφάνης κἀν Ἀίδα δόμωι / φοιτάσηις πεδ' ἀμαύρων νεκύων ἐκπεποταμένα. Sappho's πεδέχηις (2) in this fragment as well as in 44Ab.9 demonstrates her awareness of her association with a group experience. The verb, which is also used in Alcae. 70.3 for participation in the symposium, describes the sharing that took place in various archaic associations (and more generally it is also used for descriptions of the common experience of things with others). This awareness that Sappho has, however, is especially clear in 150 οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἐν μοισοπόλων †οἰκίαι† / θρῆνον ἔμμεν'· οὔ κ' ἄμμι τάδε πρέποι. As was remarked by Hardie 2005, 16, in this fragment Sappho's society proves to have taken the form of an association (ἑταιρεία), and μοισοπόλοι, which is identifiable with ἄμμι, makes it clear that Sappho addressed precisely this society (for Sappho's companions as ἑταῖραι see frr. 142, 160.1 and Parker 1993, 341 f.; on the implications of the term ἑταιρεία in Sappho see most recently Klinck 2008). By referring to his friends/companions, Solon also makes an implicit reference to his ἑταιρεία, while at the same time differentiating his "theory" of the ideal mourning from the one of Sappho, who seems to suggest the total abolition of mourning and funeral celebrations in her "household" (on reasons why Sappho forbids θρῆνος in the house of the μοισοπόλοι, see Hardie 2005, 21–32, who considers the New Sappho (P. Köln 21351.1–8), about her music-making in the underworld, to be a sign of the continuity of existence between this world and the world of the dead). The stance of Sappho's fr. 150 may also have been the background for Enn. fr.var. 17 Vahlen *nemo me lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu faxit. cur? volito vivos per ora virum*, since the Latin author presents the same strict relationship between the negotiation of funerary honors and faith in the immortality of poetic glory (apart from repeating, especially with the verb *volito*, Sapphic fr. 55, as Lennartz 1999 points out). I would not rule out the possibility that Ennius' *nemo … lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu faxit* may also have presupposed polemically the combination of ἄκλαυτος and ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς of Solon's fragment (the latter phrase was translated by Cicero (see below) as *celebrent funera cum gemitu*). In fr. 150

Sappho is probably giving instructions as to how her death should be treated when the time comes (*contra* Wilamowitz 1913, 20 n. 1). Both Solon and Sapph. 55 aim at the establishment of μνημοσύνη about themselves, but Sappho, reflecting a different ideological stance about death, forbids threnody (like the later Posidippus, *SH* 705.21 who forbids tears at his funeral) because of her belief that her devotion to the Muses will secure her personal survival. She insists that the memory of her will relate to her role as a poet (which her unnamed target lacks). Solon, however, speaks as any social being, and does not include this "religious" belief in the Muses' power.

Solon's attitude may find several parallels in the ancient world, but it may have had a specific motivation in its own age. Through the reference to the φίλοι, the fragment could in fact explicate Solon's criticism of what he perceived to be the radical pessimism and gloom of other lyric poets on the topic of both death and the twilight of human life—a pessimism which may have even involved for the dead the loss of the affection of one's closest φίλοι: cf. in particular, besides Archil. 133 mentioned above, Mimnermus, who said that when old age arrives, one οὐδὲ πατὴρ παισὶν τίμιος οὔτε φίλος (9.2 G.-P.^{2} = 3.2 W.^{2}; cf. also 1.6 G.-P.^{2} = 5.7 W.^{2}) and Theogn. 1069 f., cited in the Introduction above, in which Blass 1888, with a tempting although shaky hypothesis, identifies a re-elaboration of a text of Mimnermus that would have been the polemic objective of this fragment of Solon.

In any case, Solon the politician seems to have acknowledged the need for an externalization of grief and a social dimension of grief in the presence of φίλοι (present already in Homer: cf. *Il.* 18.233 ff., 19.4 ff.). In fact, he was ascribed with the institution of a public festival, the *Genesia*, in commemoration of the dead (cf. Jacoby 1944 and Manville 1990, 148 f.); this festival perhaps laid at the root of the Athenian institution of the funeral oration to those who had fallen in war (cf. especially Weber 1935, 61 f.; *contra* Stupperich 1977, 201–205).

Solon's distich was translated into Latin by Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.117 *mors mea ne careat lacrimis: linquamus amicis maerorem ut celebrent funera cum gemitu* (cf. also *Sen.* 73). It is not impossible that Sen. *Phaedr.* 881 also had Solon in mind when he said *mors optima est perire lacrimandum suis* (cited already by Gerber 1970, 138).

1. I accept, although with some scepticism, van Herwerden's emendation of the transmitted ἄκλαυστος to ἄκλαυτος, because forms of the verbal adjectives from κλαίειν with sigma are attested with certainty (and

rather diffusely) only beginning in the Hellenistic age. Archaic and classical attestations always contain the sigma-less variant, and thus e.g. the ἄκλαυστος of the papyrus is emended to ἄκλαυτος in Alcman as well, *PMGF* 1.39. Cf. however Soph. *TrGF* **1133.56.1].λαυστῃ [, integrated by Turner as a compound in -κλαυστος.

Greek culture often assigned the same relevance to the absence of lamentation as it did to the lack of a tomb (as was the case with deaths in the sea: Hom. *Od.* 5.306–312, Hes. *Op.* 687): cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 22.386, *Od.* 11.72; Soph. *Ant.* 29, *El.* 870; Eur. *Andr.* 1159 f., *Hec.* 30.

The closest parallel to the entire distich is Aesch. *Pers.* 674 ὦ πολύκλαυτε φίλοισι θανών. The language of the pentameter seems particularly traditional, since the second hemistich is modelled closely on *Il.* 2.39 (Zeus to the Trojans and Greeks) θήσειν γὰρ ἔτ' ἔμελλεν ἐπ' ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε, *Od.* 5.83 = 157 δάκρυσι καὶ στοναχῇσι καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἐρέχθων (Odysseus on the island of Calypso) and 14.39 (Eumaios) καὶ δέ μοι ἄλλα θεοὶ δόσαν ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε.

For λείπειν + acc. cf. Hom. *Il.* 5.156 f. ἀμφοτέρω, πατέρι δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρὰ / λεῖπ', *Od.* 1.242–244 οἴχετ' ἄϊστος ἄπυστος, ἐμοὶ δ' ὀδύνας τε γόους τε / κάλλιπεν· οὐδέ τι κεῖνον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω / οἶον, ἐπεί νύ μοι ἄλλα θεοὶ κακὰ κήδε' ἔτευξαν. The expression, however, became idiomatic in the language of funeral commemoration: cf. *GVI* 77.1 f. (fifth century BC), 1913.5 f. (third BC), 1121.4 (second/first BC?), 762.5 (first BC), 1122.1 (first BC).

28 G.-P.^{2} = 18 W.^{2}

The fragment conveys, from the perspective of the individual life, the positive attitude which Solon had expressed in 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2} towards the maturation of intellectual faculties as the effect of a person growing older. The process of human aging is regarded as a period of continuing ability for learning. The qualification κακὸν γῆρας in another Solonian fragment, 18.10 G.-P.^{2} = 24.10 W.^{2}, may initially seem contrary to the view of old age expressed here, but there this sad remark was due to the realistic acknowledgement of the closenesss of old age to death and of the "social problem of old age" (see ad loc.). Furthermore, due to the different generic context of 18 G.-P.^{2} = 24 W.^{2}, which is mostly erotic, the idea of physical decay unavoidably matters more.

Wisdom and experience were already connected to old age in Homer, where the most senior were regularly presented as having better judgment because of their age (cf. especially *Il.* 19.218 f., where Odysseus tells the younger Achilles: "in counsel (νόημα) I would surpass you by far, since I am the elder-born and know the more".) Old people were privileged by their age to intervene as wise counselors in moments of perplexity and were the authors of the most respected and often followed plans when it came to making decisions (besides Nestor in the *Iliad*, cf. in *Od.* 2.15 Aegyptus, who is bent with old age but knows countless things, 7.155 Echenous, 11.342 Echenous, 24.52 Nestor again; see also Hes. *Theog.* 233 Nereus, the only positive appreciation of old age to occur in Hesiod). Therefore, here Solon could be relying on the epic tradition in representing old age as a worthy part of the human life against the background of erotic lyric poets. For the latter old age was actually deemed to be the source of fading faculties, physical and intellectual alike: cf. in particular Mimn. 7.5–9 G.-P.^{2} = 1.5–9 W.^{2} ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὀδυνηρὸν ἐπέλθηι / γῆρας, ὅ τ᾽ αἰσχρὸν ὁμῶς καὶ καλὸν ἄνδρα τιθεῖ, / αἰεί μὲν φρένας ἀμφὶ κακαὶ τείρουσι μέριμναι, / οὐδ᾽ αὐγὰς προσορέων τέρπεται ἠελίου, / ἀλλ᾽ ἐχθρὸς μὲν παισίν, ἀτίμαστος δὲ γυναιξίν.

Solon's motif is often repeated: e.g. Aesch. *Prom.* 981; Soph. *OC* 7 f., *TrGF* F260.1 f., 664, *694; Eur. *Phoen.* 528–530, *Hipp.* 252, *Supp.* 419, *TrGF* (18)F291.2 f., (44) vel (45)F508.2, (55)F619; Men. *Georg.* fr. 5 Sandbach. However, the opposite negative attitude to old age surfaces no less often: for the classical period see, e.g., Herod. 3.134.3; Soph. *Ant.* 681 f.,

TrGF 949; Eur. *TrGF* (2)F25.2–4 and (44) vel (45) F509; Aristoph. *Nub.* 129 f. and 854 f.; Plato, *Resp.* 536d (who expressly criticizes adherence to Solon's position), *Euthyd.* 272c, *Lach.* 201a–c.

29, 29^{a}, 29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 32, 33, 34 W.^{2}

These large political fragments in elegiac distichs, which were likely written before Solon's archonship, have greed as their principal target; in particular the wealthy, ruling aristocratic class was their main addressee. Some of the shorter elegiac fragments (7, 8, 12, 13, 15 G.-P.^{2} = 5, 6, 9, 12, 11 W.^{2}) may presuppose a different and broader implied audience, which from time to time appears to be the members of the leading class or to coincide with the *demos* (although the assembly does not need to be the real place of performance, and the *demos* may have been an imagined sympotic audience), since after all, for the most part they investigate the dynamics between different political agents. The fragments of political content in tetrameters and iambs seem intended to justify Solon's reforms or prior conduct in a defensive/retrospective way, since they mainly reply to criticism, possibly by Solon's earlier supporters who had favored Solon's accession to archonship, but believed he had not gone far enough in protecting their interests.

Indeed, it is less than certain whether or not Solon deliberately developed a politics of the "middle class", as maintained by Aristotle (see Introd. ad 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}), but it is likely that the rich and advantaged Athenians trusted Solon, or at least favored his legislation, because he was one of them, and the poor and disadvantaged trusted Solon because he had criticized the rich and advantaged—but in fact, he did more than the rich and advantaged hoped, and less than the poor and disadvantaged hoped. The way, for instance, in which Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 5.2 frames 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}—"Solon did battle on behalf of each of the groups against the other and then mediated", and "urged them to abandon their ambitions"—suggests that Solon seemed to share both the aims and recriminations of each group, but did not commit his legislative measures to the interests of any single group. Similarly, according to Plut. *Sol.* 14.4, Solon uttered the maxim τὸ ἶσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ, which pleased all factions, because it is open to various interpretations: the rich took τὸ ἶσον to refer to the equality between peers endowed with the same ἀξία, while the poor understood τὸ ἶσον in terms of equality between people of different social levels. Given what happened with the aristocrat Alcaeus, who felt betrayed by Pittacus, it was likely that Solon provoked the same feelings in some faction(s) of his fellow-citizens. Both

Aristotle and Plutarch (*Ath.Pol.* 6.3; *Sol.* 16.1) maintain that Solon became the enemy of every faction in Athens—a statement which reflects Solon's self-representation in his poetry, rather than the actual political fortune of Solon's reforms (cf. McGlew 1993, 94–98).

Solon's fragments suggest that these critics in particular accused him of refusing to accept absolute power, possibly because of the ability it would have given him to advance their objectives. In fact, according to Plut. *Sol.* 14.6, Solon would have had a concrete chance of attaining hegemonic power in Athens, and a Delphic oracle had even invited him to accept it: ἧσο μέσην κατὰ νῆα, κυβερνητήριον ἔργον / εὐθύνων· πολλοί τοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπίκουροι. The anecdote, which may very well be a later addition—it certainly sits well with the other tradition of oracles given to the Cypselids (cf. Introd. ad 12 G.-P.^{2} = 9 W.^{2})—linguistically reflects the archaic imagery of the tyrant as a temporary "guide" who is mainly intended to rescue the city from some temporary difficulty (mainly the aristocrats' *hybris*): cf. Theogn. 39 f. Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκηι ἄνδρα / εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης (but the whole of Theogn. 39–52 is a very close parallel to 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}); von der Lahr 1992, 80–86. In the case of Solon, tyranny might be a measure intended to further the great power he had acquired during his legislation, instead of leaving Athens and allowing his laws to stand for themselves: "had he stayed, his personal position would have created similar problems even if he had positively resisted any attempt made by his fellow citizens to elevate him to a position analogous to that of a tyrant. In these circumstances, his enemies would have called him a tyrant, just as Alcaeus called Pittacus a tyrant" (Salmon 1997, 69). Fr. 29a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} would suggest that there was a strand of criticism which taunted him with weakness. This aspect of the criticism may be invented or exaggerated to suit Solon's own rhetorical needs. Fr. 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} may create a straw man designed by Solon to demonstrate the moderation with which he had used, and then abandoned, power.

Solon's apology for turning down the opportunity to become a tyrant would not seem as natural a choice to his contempories as it does to modern audiences, who almost automatically connect violence and abuse of power with the notion of tyranny. In Solon's time, these implications were not at all inherent to the term τύραννος, having been associated with it only after the fall of the Pisistratids (on the significance of the tradition of the Tyrannicides in Athens as evidence for the semantic shift in the idea of *tyrannos* in Athens and elsewhere, see Anderson 2005, 213 f. with fur-

ther bibliography; it is only with Plato and Aristotle that tyranny becomes wicked in principle). In Solon's time, the term was free from negative associations in archaic Greece: at least one version of the list of the Seven Sages included two tyrants, Periander of Corinth and Thrasybulus of Miletus (Yerly 1992), and the question of whether or not tyranny was good was still openly debated: cf. Catenacci 1996, 203 ff.; O'Neil 1986; Anderson 2005. Like Solon in our fragment, the carpenter Charon, the *persona loquens* of Archil. 19, also seems to have been aware of maintaining something heterodox when he affirms οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει, / οὐδ' εἷλέ πώ με ζῆλος, οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι / θεῶν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος· / ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν (and the reason why he does not aim for tyranny seems to be anything but ethical: tyranny seems to be considered out of reach for him: cf. also Anderson 2005, 203 ff.). Differently, Hegy 1965, 310, sees contempt in this first occurrence of the term, and White 1955, 2, sees some suggestion of despotic power based on violence in the reference to the usurper Gyges who killed his predecessor, married his queen, and established the power of the Mermnad dynasty in Anatolia. Later on, Simon. *PMG* 584 τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ θνα/τῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποί/α τυραννίς; / τᾶσδ' ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὸς αἰών clearly implies that being *tyrannos* was, according to public opinion, a positive thing and a more than desirable status (although he adds that tyranny may interfere with the enjoyment of life). Also very interesting is Archil. 23.20 f., in which a female character who has conquered a city is exhorted: κείνης ἄνασσε καὶ̣ τ̣[υραν]ν̣ίην ἔχε̣· / π̣[ο]λ̣[λοῖ]σ̣[ί θ]η[ν ζ]ηλ̣ωτὸς ἀ[νθρ]ώ̣πων ἔσεα̣ι—a call not far perhaps from the one made by Solon's supporters: see also Yerly 1992, 6.

In fact, the ethically negative assessment of tyranny as violent, absolute and (usually) illegitimate power, which Solon personally chooses to emphasize, may have been less generally recognized than its material advantages, i.e. power and wealth. Only in the fifth century, although some authors still occasionally refer to the privileges inherent in absolute power (cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1168 f. and *OT* 380; Eur. *Alc.* 286, *TrGF* (21)F332.7) and its great wealth (cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 3.85), does the anomaly of individual power prevail in the idea of "tyranny"; in fact, it came to be intimately linked with the idea of political abuse and the sort of behaviors that are the opposite of good kingship or democracy (cf. e.g. Herod. 3.80; Plato, *Plt.* 276c; Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12, *Hier.* 4.6; Aristot. *Pol.* 1279b, 1295a, 1311a, *Eth.Nic.* 1160b; White 1955, 3; Blomqvist 1998; Mitchell 2006, 179–182). Pind. *Pyth.* 11.52–56 τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὑρίσκων

τὰ μέσα μακροτέρωι / {σὺν} ὄλβωι τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων· / ξυναῖσι δ' ἀμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι· φθονεροὶ δ' ἀμύνονται. / ⟨ἀλλ'⟩ εἴ τις ἄκρον ἑλὼν / ἡσυχᾶι τε νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὕβριν / ἀπέφυγεν, κτλ. is a particularly important passage because it combines a radically negative judgment of tyranny with a preference for a Solonian mean (Gentili 1988, 148 f.); also Eur. *Hipp.* 1013–1015, *TrGF* (11)F172, (54)F605, inc.fab. F850. Simonides' concern that being a tyrant may impinge on the enjoyment of life also becomes an undiscussed certainty in Plato, *Resp.* 576b–c and Xen. *Oec.* 21.12.

We do not know how many of these fifth century reasons for doubting the greatness of the tyrants' power were already shared by Solon. Apart from what is said in the tetrameter fragments, according to Plut. *Sol.* 14.8, Solon would have considered the pros and cons of the prospect, agreeing that καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον, οὐκ ἔχειν δ' ἀπόβασιν. By speaking of a "dead end", Solon may merely mean that the absolute power of tyrants was hardly ever continued after the generation following the individual who had seized power (with few exceptions, like the Cypselids at Corinth): an observation which certainly was clear to Aristot. *Pol.* 1312b21–23. On the contrary Solon may mean that his legislation was destined to last; as Nietzsche comments about Solon (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* (1886), now in *Id.* 1969, I.606), "to be a lawgiver is a sublimated form of tyranny" (quoted by McGlew 1993, 111, who further adds: "more important still, when Solon's laws and *politeia* were no longer dependent on him, they retained some of the more important aspects of the tyrant's power: his demand for unquestioned obedience, his authority, and his exclusive hold on political matters"). It also seems especially telling that in both the endings of 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} and 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2}, Solon defends his refusal of tyranny in terms of future perspectives: note the future νικήσειν in 29.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 32.3 f. W.^{2}, and ὕστερον in 29^a.7 G.-P.^{2} = 33.7 W.^{2} In accordance with the dictum ascribed to Solon is Xen. *Hier.* 7.12, who describes the life of the tyrant as the most wretched one, since it can never be relinquished, καὶ ταύτηι ἀθλιώτατόν ἐστιν ἡ τυραννίς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπαλλαγῆναι δυνατὸν αὐτῆς ἐστι.

Frr. 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–33 and 34 W.^{2} are trochaic tetrameters, 1–28 G.-P.^{2} are elegiac distichs, and 30–35 G.-P.^{2} are iambic trimeters. Solon's polymetry recalls Archilochus', who likewise wrote elegiac distichs, trochaic tetrameters, iambic trimeters and epodes (Solon also wrote epodes, according to Diog. Laert. 1.61). Given that we know nothing about the Athenian poetry of Solon's day, it is very difficult to say

whether his use of the various meters was the norm or a novelty. Certainly during the archaic period variation in meter did not necessarily denote a strong change of *ethos*, i.e. of the themes or characters, and/or of attitude the author held towards them, although it could. In Solon's work iambus and elegy overlap (in that both can address the same political issues) but it is striking that it is elegy which is chosen for positive programmatic statements. Although the opposite has been often argued (see Gerber 1999a, 6 who commenting on Solon's trochaic and iambic trimeters says that "their contents do not differ from many in elegiac meter, an indication that the distinction usually found between elegy and iambus in Archilochus no longer applies" and Kantzios 2005, 25), it seems to me that Solon assigns certain meters to certain kinds of content: as remarked by Dalby 1998, 201 Solon's iambics are "lighter, more controversial, more personal; his elegiacs, expressions of moral philosophy and memoirs and histories told with a moral purpose—thoughts that others are expected to share". This ties in, after all, with the perceivable divergence and convergence between the forms in Archilochus; for modern discussions of the generic aspects of elegy and *iambos* in the archaic period see Dover 1964; West 1974; Bartol 1993; Rotstein 2010, 67–68, 188–201. Solon's elegiac distichs have both ethical and political content and are bound together by a programmatic perspective on the future. Differently, the three fragments in trochaic tetrameters and the political iambs have no legislative impetus, but instead hang on the apologetic evocation of Solon's actions during a period when he seemed to be on the defensive, probably in a phase of his career following his archonship. Even more remote from any political-programmatic intent are the various sympotic fragments written in trimeters and dealing with food.

In particular, the fragments written in tetrameters appear uniform in their self-referential tone (the first person of Solon, who replies to the third person plural of his accusors, is predominent in these fragments) and in their past temporal perspective. Furthermore, Plutarch presents 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} as being addressed to some otherwise unknown Φῶκος—from Plutarch's expression πρὸς … Φῶκον we can infer that Solon's poem was a reply to/against Phocus. Unless this name is an invention by some biographer (as von der Mühl 1942, 335 suggested; but this invention does not seem to be easily explainable) or is true but was transmitted separately by a historical source, we have to suppose that Solon mentioned this intended addressee Phocus in his verses—possibly a member of Solon's sympotic ἑταιρεία, who probably preceded Solon in the sympotic exchange by speaking of Solon's change and refusal to

become a tyrant and perhaps eulogizing tyranny and accusing whoever refused it of stupidity. In fact, it is conceivable that the place of performance of the tetrameter poem(s) was the *symposion*, as it was for the elegiac or the iambic poems. In that case, the mentioning of a specific addressee, Phocus, in the poem from which 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} is extracted, would be a feature of intimate exclusivity which is quite common in iambic poetry, but is at variance with Solon's other fragments, above all the elegiac poems, where Solon seems to pursue the fiction of a much broader audience (including at least the members of his own governing class, or the *demos*).

Plut. *Sol.* 14.8–15.1 quotes 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} just a few lines after concluding the quotation of 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} Since both frr. deal with Solon's stance on not agreeing to become a *tyrannos*, and Solon deals with the same topic again at the end of 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2}, which is quoted by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 12.3, Wilamowitz 1893, II.309 f. advanced the idea that the three fragments might belong to the same poem (in the order: 29^a, 29, 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 33, 32, 34 W.^{2}). But Solon can be somewhat repetitive as Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 6.4 (πολλαχοῦ μέμνηται) makes note of, and thus he may be referring to his refusal of tyranny in more than one poem (as noted already by Mülke 2002, 329 f.). In any case, there is a substantial affinity of mood—especially with the strong concentration on the authorial first person—, as well as themes joining 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} and 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} In particular, 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} may belong to Solon's rebuttal to the critic presented in 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} (as most recently argued by McGlew 1993, 103). Fr. 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2}, however, does not belong to the same mood: it is as different from 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} and 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} as 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} or 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4c W.^{2} are different from 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2} It may be telling, therefore, that Plutarch knows 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} and quotes its ll. 4–5, but mentions them in a completely different context—to prove that Solon had to contrast opponents who expected different things from him than what he did. In fact, this different focus may imply that Plutarch did not consider that the rejection of tyranny in 7 f. was the crucial point of the poem.

The apologetic stance, which joins 29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2} to 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} and 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} and which seems to denounce the isolation in which Solon had come to find himself, is represented in the longest iambic fragment (30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}) and thus clearly distinguishes the political poems in tetrameters and iambics from the fragments of a similar character written in distichs. The impulse to self promote is surely a constant between the two, but the propaganda in distichs concerns

Solon's ethical ideas and/or political program, while that of the political tetrameters and iambics is an apology for the past.

Other characteristics common to Solon's tetrameters and iambs are the rareness of expressions taken from Homer and the frequent use of neologisms (cf. βαθύφρων, ἰσομοιρία, or βουλήεις, a hapax), colloquialisms, and even of expressions found later, particularly in comedy (e.g. ἀσκὸς … δεδάρθαι and ἐπιτετρῖφθαι), as well as morphological elements connoting, by their Atticness, a distance from the language of epic (cf. ad 29^b.1 G.-P.^{2} = 34.1 W.^{2}). It would be banal simply to explain these characteristics by the fact that epic diction was less suitable to trochaic and iambic meter. This tone is actually in agreement with another recurrent characteristic of Solon's tetrameters, i.e. their tendency, typical of the *psogos* poetry (and iambs in particular), to play on frequent changes of the *persona loquens* and to make the antagonists seem ridiculous by using mimicry to caricature their positions.

In Solon's poetry we see the iambic trimeter and trochaic tetrameter in use in Athens, both of which are meters that we know to have been used earlier in the Ionic literary setting of Archilochus. It is also certain that, at least according to Aristotle's interpretation, the evolution of the meters of Attic theater was determined by a progressive shift in the adoption of their diverse connotations: "to begin with they used the tetrameter because the poetry was satyric and more associated with dancing; but when spoken dialogue was introduced, tragedy's own nature discovered the appropriate meter. For the iambic trimeter, more than any other meter, has the rhythm of speech: an indication of this is that we speak many trimeters in conversation with one another, but hexameters only rarely and when diverging from the colloquial register" (*Poet.* 1449a22–25); on the contrary the hexameter distinguished itself from both theatrical meters, the trochaic tetrameter and iambic, for its greater solemnity: "the hexameter has proved apt by experience. If one were to compose a narrative mimesis in some other meter, or in several, the incongruity would be plain, since the hexameter is the most stately and dignified of meters (hence its great receptivity to loan words and metaphors …), while the iambic trimeter and trochaic tetrameter are rhythms for movement, the latter suiting dancing, the former action" (*Poet.* 1459b31–39). It is impossible to ascertain whether in the Athens of Solon's time similar distinctions existed already between the *ethos* of meters, but there is no reason to exclude the possibility that they did exist in some form: some poets of the sixth century certainly seem no less aware of, above all, the iambic's specialization for the stage and/or

personal attack than did Aristotle, and Archilochus had already adopted the tetrameters in at least two poems (114 and 115) concerned with public figures. From this perspective we can easily understand why Solon does not use the dactylic rhythm of elegy and hexameter for his poems of self-defense, given that this self-defense was rooted in an anything but solemn debate with his critics, with its emphasis (also markedly mocking) falling on their defects or the inadequacy of their logic.

In tune with Solon's perception of the different *ethos* of hexameters, trochaics and iambs might be not only the limitation on the number of epicisms in the trochaic and iambic poems and the frequent adoption of compounds or other words unknown to epic (discussed above), but also a more markedly Attic coloring of the vocalism. Apart from the Attic declension -αισι(ν) for the dative plur. of the nouns ending in long alpha, which appears to be preferred in Solon's poems written in iambs and tetrameters (ἁρπαγαῖσιν 29^{b}.1 G.-P.^{2} = 34.1 W.^{2} and πολλαῖσιν 30.27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.27 W.^{2}), while in his elegiac poems the Homeric -ηισι is the rule, Solon seems to have done something similar, but more extensively, with the vocalism of the endings of substantives in -ᾱ. The transmitted texts sometimes conform to the Attic practice of writing -ᾱ as an α when pure (i.e. preceded by ρ, ε, ι), and as an η in other cases, but more often they have the Ionic -η for the -ᾱ sound (for a review of the forms, cf. p. XI in Gentili and Prato, who appear to believe that the oscillations between the Ionic and Attic coloring of alpha are a result of the tradition). It seems acceptable to at least hypothesize that this variation reflects a choice on the part of the author. According to Hoffmann 1898, 345–347 the vocalism η often would have been restored at the hands of later grammarians: since Solon was considered an Ionic poet he would not have, for themes in -ᾱ, originally used -η endings. These endings, which the grammarians deemed to be typical of the Ionic dialect, would have been introduced in Solon's text in the phase of transmission. But Hoffmann's thesis does not explain why Plutarch (or his source) regularly would have Ionized forms in his quotations of elegiac fragments, at variance with Demosthenes for 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} and Aristotle for 4 and 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4a and 4c W.^{2}; or why Plutarch (or his source) would have almost always left Atticizing forms in the citation of, e.g., tetrameters 29 and 29a G.-P.^{2} = 32 and 33 W.^{2} In fact, in the declension of substantives ending in -ᾱ, the final -ᾱ is written, Ionically, as -η in the *paradosis* of almost all of the elegiac fragments, and only sometimes as -ᾱ in 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} (ἡμετέρα, λαμπρᾶς, δυσνομία, εὐνομία) and regularly in 4 and 5 G.-P.^{2} = 4a and 4c W.^{2} (γαῖαν Ἰαονίας, φιλοχρηματίαν, ὑπερηφανίαν). On the contrary, in

the tetrameters and iambs (although the testimonia vary among Plutarch, Aristides and Aristotle, and thus also the normalizing trends of each; in fact it is certain that Aristotle tends to Atticize: see 4 and 5 G.-P.² = 4a and 4c W.²) the final vocal is Attically -ᾱ about ten times and Ionically -η in only three cases: βίης: 29.2 G.-P.² = 32.2 W.², ἀναγκαίης: 30.10 G.-P.² = 36.10 W.² (an imitation of Homer, *Il.* 8.57), δουλίην: 30.13 G.-P.² = 36.13 W.²; in 30.16 G.-P.² = 36.16 W.² the testimonia are divided between βίαν and βίην. In any case, although the distribution of ᾱ and η had reached its final form in Attica before our earliest inscriptions, archaic metrical inscriptions of Attica often provide evidence of pseudo-epical diction with the Ionic η in cases where Attic has an ᾱ (cf. Threatte 1980, 130 f.) Therefore we should doubt that the normalization in Solon of a coherently Attic or Ionic vocalism of -ᾱ (as practised by most modern editors, and with particular coherence by West) is historically correct. Rather, we may suppose that Solon selected a stronger Attic coloring of the endings of the substantives in -ᾱ in order to complement the non-epic nature of the lexicon of his poems in tetrameters and iambs. This should be another indication of his thoughtful linguistic choice to limit the Homericity of his poems in these meters.

There have been many attempts at evincing citations of Solon's tetrameters from the prose text of Plutarch's *Life of Solon*. From the mid nineteenth century onwards, many scholars, from I. Bekker onwards, have tried to extract a tetrametric Solonian sequence from Plut. *Sol.* 15.1 = test. 59 G.-P.² = *IEG* 33a, which describes Solon's avoidance of any harshness in his work as a statesman, and according to Wilamowitz 1893, II.309 n. 7 comes from the same poem from which 29–29ᵇ G.-P.² 32–33 and 34 W.² derived: οὐκ ἐπήγαγεν ἰατρείαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ συγχέας παντάπασι καὶ ταράξας τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστῆσαι πάλιν (West's reconstruction: φοβεόμενος / μή ποτ', εἰ συνέχεια πάντηι κἀτάραξα τὴν πόλιν, / ἀσθενέστερος γενοίμην τοῦ καταστῆσαι πάλιν). While acknowledging that caution is necessary when undertaking this kind of operation (see e.g. the correct criticism of Martina 1972 apropos of den Boer 1966), these words might actually be another example of the metaphorical application of clinical-medical language to describe the state of the *polis* (and its politician), which is also found in 3.17 G.-P.² = 4.17 W.², cf. ad loc. (ἀσθενής is used quite often for the conditions of a *polis* in fifth century Athens: cf. Herod. 7.101; Thuc. 8.76.4; Soph. *OC* 1032 f.; Isocr. *Archid.* 58.5; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.41; Lys. *Erat.* 70, *Agor.* 5.2; the synonymic combination of συγχεῖν and ταράττειν occurs at least 14 times in Galen). For the metaphor of ταράσσειν,

cf. 31.7 G.-P.[2] = 37.8 W.[2], again in a context in which Solon says what he could have done, but did not, in order not to harm Athens, and may be alluding to his refusal of tyranny. It is true that συγχεῖν is not attested with reference to political institutions or the *polis* as an object in the archaic age (Mülke 2002, 348), but Hom. *Il.* 4.269 σύν γ' ὅρκι' ἔχευαν Τρῶες conveys a similar sense, and "the metaphor's origin is perhaps in the symbolic confusion or invalidation of formal libations" (Collard 1975, 190), so that it might very well belong to those motifs of sympotic imagery which often surface in Solon's poetry, and which, e.g., in 3.9 f. G.-P.[2] = 4.9 f. W.[2] are regularly adopted to convey the behavior of *hybris* (see ad loc.). It is intriguing to suppose that precisely a Solonian phrase may underlie the combination of συγχεῖν and καθιστάναι in the very similar *polis*-context which we find in Eur. *Supp.* 308–312 ἄνδρας βιαίους καὶ κατείργοντας νεκροὺς / τάφου … / ἐς τήνδ' ἀνάγκην σῆι καταστῆσαι χερὶ, / νόμιμά τε πάσης συγχέοντας Ἑλλάδος παῦσαι. The verb καταστῆσαι has in Euripides the slightly different sense of "bringing to a certain state" ("necessity"), whereas in Solon it means "to bring to order". Moreover, in Euripides the "necessity" to bury the dead is depicted as the natural "ordered" state to be re-established, and the similarity of the civic context is substantial in the two authors. In any case, καθιστάναι is used for "setting in order" a πολιτεία at least in Plato, *Resp.* 590e (the middle voice is more commonly used for this sense: *LSJ*), and apart from the Euripides quoted above, the metaphorical συγχεῖν seems to be fully idiomatic in classical Athens for "demolishing" civic institutions: cf. Herod. 7.136 and Antiph. 3.1.1, 3.1.6, 2.2.7 (νόμιμα); Eur. *Med.* 794, *Hipp.* 813, *Ion.* 615 ("house(s)"); Demosth. 21.173 τὰ σύμβολα συγχέων τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐχθρὰν τῆι πόλει πεποίηκεν, 23.62 τί δ' ἄλλο τὸ συγχεῖν ἢ ὅταν ἑξῆς οὑτωσὶ πάντα τἀναντία τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τις γεγραμμένων γράφηι;, 24.91 (πολιτεία). The only clue that specifically Plutarchean language is at work in the supposed quotation of Solon is the synonymic combination of the two verbs συγχεῖν and ταράττειν, which is never attested before the Imperial age but then becomes extremely frequent afterwards: apart from the 14 occurrences in Galen, it can be found at least 4 times in Plutarch (for a civic context, see *Arat.* 2.1 ἡ Σικυωνίων πόλις ἐπεὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ Δωρικῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ὥσπερ ἁρμονίας συγχυθείσης εἰς στάσεις ἐνέπεσε …, οὐκ ἐπαύσατο νοσοῦσα καὶ ταραττομένη καὶ τύραννον ἐκ τυράννου μεταβάλλουσα), and from Pollux's *Onomasticon* onwards it is frequently attested in the lexicographers and the scholia. This synonymic phrase may very well be Plutarch's, although the

other words possibly reflect Solonian words and thought. Therefore the reconstruction of the text of a Solonian fragment can only be a guess at best.

Much less plausible is the reconstruction of a tetrameter and a half of Solon from a passage of Plutarch (*Sol.* 29.5) where Solon is said not to have treated Pisistratus as an enemy and to have told him "and others" that "if the desire for pre-eminence could but be banished from his soul, and his eager passion for the tyranny be cured, no other man would be more naturally disposed to virtue, or a better citizen", οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος εὐφυέστερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδὲ βελτίων πολίτης. The last phrase presents an unusually regular alternation of long and short syllables, which seem almost metrical, and von Leutsch 1872, 138 suggested that we might reconstruct from it the lines: οὐκ γάρ ἐστ' ἀνήρ ποτ' ἀρετὴν ἄλλος εὐφυέστερος / οὐδὲ βέλτερος πολίτης. Independently of the plausibility of von Leutsch's reconstruction (West prefers to print the text of Plutarch as fr. 35), it is questionable whether the phrase really includes Solonian thought or indeed any of Solon's words at all. Mülke 2002, 360 has observed that πολίτης does not appear to be used for the ideal of the good/bad citizen before the fifth century (Thuc. 3.42.5). The ideal, however, was already circulating as early as Theogn. 41 = 1082a ἀστοὶ … σαόφρονες, and in principle an original ἀστός in Solon may have been replaced by Plutarch with the more common πολίτης (Plutarch's prose adopts ἀστός only five times, but πολίτης several hundred times). And it is not true that πρός with the accusative being used to mean "in terms of" is only found from the fifth century onward (Mülke 2002, 360 f.): cf. at least 23.15 f. G.-P.² = 27.15 f. W.² μαλακώτερα … πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετήν. For more than linguistic considerations, the attribution of the phrase to Solon seems especially doubtful because it necessarily involves aspects of Solon's activity (the collaboration with Pisistratus, cf. Plut. *Sol.* 31.2: see also Gottschalk 1980, 132; for Solon's erotic relationship with him, cf. *Sol.* 1; Lavelle 2005, 194–198, or for at least Solon's non-hostility to him, *Sol.* 29.5 quoted above), which were probably a complete fiction invented by Hellenistic biographers and which find no parallel in Aristotle (cf., e.g., *Ath.Pol.* 17.2 on the lovestory between Solon and Pisistratus and the bibliography at p. 311) or in the democratic tradition of the fourth century, which made a neat opposition between Solon and Pisistratus by presenting them as radically different to each other (Manfredini and Piccirilli 1977, 115 f.; Lavelle 2005, 198).

29 G.-P.² = 32 W.²

Independently of whether or not frr. 29 and 29ᵃ G.-P.² = 32 and 33 W.² belonged to the same poem, they focus, on the two different stages of a (sympotic/fictional?) spat between Solon and one of his critics (Phocus?): the critic's reproach of Solon at 29ᵃG.-P.² = 33 W.², and Solon's self-defence at 29 G.-P.² = 32 W.² As far as we can understand from the surviving portion of text, Solon is quite fair in presenting the accusation: two and a half lines are devoted to it. What Solon says of his convictions about his past conduct might be very brief, but this fragment is the first case where a character is presented as reconsidering his past actions in terms of αἰδώς (αἰδέομαι is used here retrospectively: Erffa 1937, 62 f.). Furthermore, here Solon is relying on his own sense that his conduct is positively honorable in contrast to anothers' claim that it is dishonorable, and thus defending it and opposing the common standard of αἰδώς with his own standard. He does this quite differently, e.g., from the suitors of the *Odyssey*, who simply ignore the reproaches about their being shameless: "he rejects the belief that he has, through lack of initiative, lost an opportunity to increase his honor, and instead relies on his own conception of the honorable, directly controverting the belief that failure to achieve competitive success is dishonorable with a claim that such success, improperly gained, is itself dishonorable" (Cairns 1993, 166 f.). The establishment of a non-conventional new standard of αἰδώς is pursued (as remarked by Mülke 2002, 332) in the frame of a broader, strategic mobilization of some of the most crucial key-values of traditional aristocratic ethics (πατρίς, which is strongly opposed to the supposedly positive τυραννίς, κλέος, αἰσχύνη, αἰδώς, νίκη). These values, like αἰδώς, are redefined through Solon's ethical and non-conventional perspective. Solon, however, does not argue for this definition: he reuses the same words used by his critics, implying that his own interpretation is the "true" one.

1–3. The sequence πατρὶς γαῖα (or, in the genitive, πατρίδος αἴης) is formulaic in Homeric and Hesiodic epic for the "fatherland". The only exceptions to this arrangement are a few cases of anastrophe of the preposition, where the word "land" comes first: see γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος in *Il.* 13.696, 15.335, *Od.* 10.49; Ap. Rhod. confirms this use, cf. 3.1136

λιποῦσ' ἄπο πατρίδα γαῖαν, but 1.535 γαίης ἀπὸ πατρίδος (the wording γῆ/γαῖα πατρίς in absence of anastrophe only surfaces in poetry other than dactylic, e.g. in Euripides). In agreement with the word order of epic tradition, Solon has the substantive γῆς and the following πατρίδος divided by a word, which is not a preposition but a verb and which isolates πατρίδος in enjambement. The result is that strong autonomy is given, at the outset, to the idea of γῆ. This emphasis on γῆ comes as no surprise, since Solon endows this word with the important pragmatic-economic value of being the basis for sustenance, as its epithet πυροφόρος in 1.20 G.-P.^{2} = 13.20 W.^{2} and 18.2 G.-P.^{2} = 24.2 W.^{2} demonstrates (cf. Vox 1984, 70 f.), and it has a very affective connotation in 4.2 G.-P.^{2} = 4a.2 W.^{2} Hence, the choice of the economically and affectively global image of the "fatherland" is more probable than that of, e.g., ἄστυ as in 3.21 G.-P.^{2} = 4.21 W.^{2}, or the "divine and public properties" as in 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2} (see below): the "fatherland" is an irreplaceable ground on which citizens live, and harming it means loosing everything. Moreover, by placing the omnicomprehensive πατρίδος at the end of the phrase, Solon creates a strong opposition between this idea and the τυραννίδος of the following phrase. This opposition is unlikely to be casual, since it highlights the alternative between the public interests of the πατρίς and the private interests of a single individual as well as the party supporting him—this will be the central theme of the following verses.

Solon's morality "spared" the integrity of the Athenian land, differently from the *hybris* of some aristocrats of his class, who according to 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2} (see ad loc.) did not spare the properties of the gods and the "public" properties. Behind the idea of Solon's "sparing" there is of course the idea of the bad kings of Homer or Hesiod, who are δημοβόροι/δωροφάγοι; in connection to this is the tyrant δημοφάγος of Theogn. 1181 (see Vox 1984, 71, after Nagy 1999, 313). The possible connection of γῆς ... οὐ καθηψάμην to 29^b.7–9 G.-P.^{2} = 34.7–9 W.^{2} led Masaracchia 1958, 342 to suggest that in our verses Solon also has in mind his refusal to pass a redistribution of the land for the sake of the poor. But this interpretation is not conciliatory at all, even for 29^b.7–9 G.-P.^{2} = 34.7–9 W.^{2} (cf. ad loc.). As for our verses, the importance of "sparing" the "fatherland" can certainly be explained without this hypothesis.

The first occurrence of the word τυραννίς is in Archil. 19, cited in the Introd. (cf. also τυραννίη in his fr. 23.20). The word τύραννος was thought to have been imported into Greece in Archilochus' time: cf. Hippias of Elis, *VS* 86B9. In fact, the ancients often argued (from Euphor. fr. 177 van Groningen up until *Etym.magn.* 771.54) that it was initially

used to define Asiatic despots like Gyges, the protagonist of Archil. 19: indeed the word is found elsewhere in archaic epic, at least in Xenophan. 3.2 G.-P.^{2} = 3.2 W.^{2} = *VS* 21B3.2, in reference to Asiatic (Lydian) despots; see later Eur. *Her.* 643 f.; cf. O'Neil 1986, 34 f.; Anderson 2005, 203–205. But Alcae. 348, who describes Pittacus as a "tyrant" in Mytilene elected by his fellow-citizens (ἐστάσαντο), shows that at the beginning of the sixth century it was possible to label someone who held absolute power in a city-state as a τύραννος, even if he had not gained this power by violence or contrary to the law. The frequent synonymic interchange between τύραννος and "king", documented by Semon. 7.69, Herodotus, and the tragedians further shows that the concept of tyranny did not necessarily imply negative or violent undertones: cf. in particular Hegy 1965; Parker 1998; Anderson 2005, 173–210 who adds that Solonian fragments such as 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} suggest that some kind of sanction from the community for these leaders was needed.

The scope that tyranny gives for self-aggrandisement and self-enrichment explains the ease with which Solon can present the tyrant in negative terms without extensive argument; he can draw on some degree of anxiety in his audience. Solon's 29.2 G.-P.^{2} = 32.2 W.^{2}, and likewise 29^b.8 = 34.8 W.^{2}, strongly connect the concept of tyranny to "violence". In fact, in our line, τυραννίδος and βίας ἀμειλίχου constitute a hendyadis which "explains" Solon's refusal of seizing tyrannical power—as if he were reminding us that the former cannot be separated from the latter. Fr. 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} explicates what tyrannical "violence" is by using the image of the churning up of the milk and taking away its butterfat. Tyrannical power is thus not only the tyrant's general abuse of power that is uncontrolled by the city's traditional institutions, but also the capacity of the party who had supported the tyrant to prevail unlawfully over the other social components of the city, especially the aristocrats (on these social dynamics of tyrannical power: Andrewes 1982, 390 f.; Raaflaub 1993, 73; Salmon 1997, 61, 68 f.). The word βία also has this social dimension in 8.2 G.-P.^{2} = 6.2 W.^{2} and 31.4 G.-P = 37.4 W.^{2}

The verb καθάπτεσθαι is used here with the common Attic sense of the simple ἅπτεσθαι "to lay hold of". In epic, however, the verb meant "to address", hence the Herodotean sense of "appealing to". Solon treats recourse to tyranny as a type of physical contact with an impure object, contact of the kind that brings on "contamination" (cf. below). But we cannot rule out the possibility that a faint echo of the epic sense occurs here: there has never been any dialogic communication between Solon and tyranny.

The usual association of καταισχύνειν with the object γένος "lineage" designated, from Homer onwards (cf. e.g. *Il.* 6.209, *Od.* 24.508; Tyrtae. 6.9 G.-P.^{2} = 10.9 W.^{2}) a traditional aristocratic (anti)value. Solon opts for a variant of the traditional construction and substitutes γένος with κλέος, a term that mainly pertained to the individual and which encompassed the idea of "fame" which the Homeric heroes so ardently desired to secure for themselves through their heroic actions. Solon wanted to guarantee this for himself through his political action.

According to some modern scholars, starting from Wilamowitz 1893, II.309 (cf. most recently Pellizer 1981; Vox 1983b, 310; Vox 1984, 73 and 76 f.), here Solon is claiming to have muddied his reputation by refusing to become a tyrant. Given the different, and rather negative idea that Solon had of tyranny, this affirmation could only have been justified had he meant to attribute it to his critics—and indeed this perspective of presentation cannot be ruled out, since Solon lets his critics speak in *oratio recta* in 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} But the point of view expressed in our verses seems to be uniformly Solon's, and not his critics': cf. the adjective ἀμείλιχος for tyranny and his awareness of having "spared" the fatherland by not accepting the tyranny. Furthermore, the word μιάνας seems too strong for the hypothetical reproach of neglecting to seize a political opportunity: cf. Shorey 1911, 217 f.; Linforth 1919, 216 f.

A plainer interpretation, which is followed by the large majority of modern scholars, is that οὐ not only negates the finite verb καθηψάμην, but also the two participles μιάνας and καταισχύνας (cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 5.233; *HHom.Dem.* 157; Tyrtae. 9.11 G.-P.^{2} = 12.10 W.^{2}; Theogn. 371; Pind. *Nem.* 3.15; Kühner-Gerth II.199; Shorey 1911, 218; Oguse 1962, 271–273). On the contrary, the syntax joining μιάνας … κλέος to the principal οὐδὲν αἰδέομαι is very unlikely: the analysis by Mülke 2002, 335 shows that in archaic trochaic tetrameters transitions from principal to subordinate clauses (or from one clause to another at the same level) usually take place after the fifth arsis (and also in that case with some particle or conjunction emphasizing the switch), and are extremely rare after the third. A construction of the negative *apo koinou* with both the verb and the participles would also help to explain why the verb is negated in a conditional phrase with οὐ and not with the expected μή (the negation can also be explained by the causal, factual nature of the proposition, so that the εἰ approaches the idea of ἐπεί "since", cf. Smyth 1956, § 2698; or, alternatively, as suggested by Mülke 2002, 334, Solon may presuppose here a statement of his own: "if it is true what I said 'I did not touch', etc.", cf. Kühner-Gerth II.189). In not turning to tyranny,

Solon has not muddied his reputation but has instead obtained everyone's recognition (4 f.), thus reaching the condition of δόξα ἀγαθή which he had made his aim in 1.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.3 f. W.^{2} The verb μιαίνω usually designates physical contamination (in epic cf. e.g. *Il.* 16.795 f. and 23.732) and is often accompanied by explicit references to the hands responsible for the impure contact (cf., e.g., Eur. *El.* 322, *Her.* 1324, *Or.* 517, 1563, *IT* 946, 1047, 1226 f.; Antiph. *caed.Her.* 82.3). The strong connection of the participle with its usual ingressive value to καθηψάμην (which is also strong because of the negative *apo koinou*) has a connotative effect: Solon feels that his reputation would have been automatically contaminated by even the slightest contact with tyranny.

καταισχύνειν κλέος or **μιαίνειν κλέος** are not commonly used phrases (they appear elsewhere only in Eur. *Hel.* 845 and 999 f., respectively, up to the end of the classical age). καταισχύνειν γένος is, however, idiomatically common: cf. Hom. *Il.* 6.209 (see also above), *Od.* 24.508 and 512; Tyrtae. 6.9 G.-P.^{2} = 10.9 W.^{2}; Eur. *Bacch.* 265; Aristoph. *Av.* 1451; Plato, *Menex.* 246d5. But 29^a.7 G.-P.^{2} = 33.7 W.^{2} focuses on tyranny as the cause of spoiling the honor of the γένος—the family dimension of honor. If 29 and 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 32 and 33 W.^{2} belonged to the same poem, as is plausible (see above Introd. ad 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}), it would make sense that there is some permeable overlapping between individual honor and honor of the family, which is presented in parallel as the two arguments against tyranny.

4 f. The tyrant's βία (2) against the party opposing him would have coincided with the behavior of the victor in a Homeric duel, who held the life of his opponent at his mercy, and was fully entitled to harm him. In fact, these two Solonian verses seem to imitate the pompous and proud declarations of Homeric dueling before battle (cf. e.g. Ajax's vaunt in *Il.* 7.191 χαίρω δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς / θυμῶι, ἐπεὶ δοκέω νικησέμεν Ἕκτορα δῖον), or to resume one of the key-principles of epic-martial ethics (*Il.* 6.208 f. αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων, / μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν), not without presupposing the ethical correctness, and almost necessity, of the wrong-doing of enemies (and the well-doing of friends): cf., e.g., Aesch. *Prom.* 1041 f.; Eur. *Bacch.* 877–880, *Heracl.* 881 f., *Andr.* 438, and ad 1.5 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.5 f. W.^{2} Although here Solon instead "wins the favor" of everyone—thus winning a more radical and complete victory than a rather harmless one over the enemies alone. This unfamiliar use of the word νικᾶν in the non-hostile sense of psychologically "winning"—not by defeating and harming an enemy, but rather by

positively "enthralling" someone who may or may not be an enemy—is reproposed by Xenophon, where Socrates describes Critoboulos as having decided that ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς (*Mem.* 2.6.35).

Solon's formal similarity to the language of the epic values, however, conveys a new spirit. This spirit emerges forcefully from the resemantization of the verb νικᾶν, which here no longer means "to win" in battle or to be superior to one's companions in arms, but to "prove (Solon's self) superior" in terms of opinion—regarding his refusal of the tyranny, but perhaps also his choice to give a lawful new legislation to Athens. Adkins 1972, 55 remarked that Solon is aware that his refusal to aim at tyranny is considered αἰσχρόν by his critics, and for this reason he uses the verb νικᾶν, which refers to a positive value of self-affirmation, and not of renouncement: this verb, in fact, would make Solon's refusal καλόν by implication, since victory is conventionally something which is καλόν. Balot 2001, 97 suggested that Solon may be offering a new understanding of individual success according to which victory is won when the individual restrains his desires and uses power appropriately: Solon's interest in self-restraint would thus foreshadow the Socrates of Xenophon.

Solon's πάντες hints at the usual target of largest renown pursued by the aristocratic κλέος, and proves that Solon has hit it in his own way: cf. Hom. *Il.* 10.212 f. μέγα κέν οἱ ὑπουράνιον κλέος εἴη / πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, *Od.* 24.94 f. τοι αἰεὶ / πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους κλέος ἔσσεται ἐσθλόν, Ἀχιλλεῦ; *Od.* 1.298 f. κλέος ἔλλαβε δῖος Ὀρέστης / πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους; 19.333 f. τοῦ μέν τε κλέος εὐρὺ διὰ ξεῖνοι φορέουσι / πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, πολλοί τέ μιν ἐσθλὸν ἔειπον; Theogn. 22 f. ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· "Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός", 313 f. ἐν δὲ δικαίοις / πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ δικαιότατος. Last but not least, Solon's desire for his views to be unanimously recognized as the best and thus to enjoy the consensus of everyone should also be compared with idea of the tyrant attaining the ζῆλος "envy" of everyone (πάντες), which is one of the positive aspects of tyranny in common opinion as it is reflected by Archil. 23.19–21 quoted above.

29^{a}G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2}

This fragment, spoken in the voice of one of Solon's critics, concerns his refusal of tyranny, which is considered by the critic to be utter folly (not a new charge against Solon: cf. 14 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}). After Plutarch, who presents the authors of these kinds of charges against Solon as πολλοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι, it has been often assumed that the *persona loquens* of our fragment belonged to the popular party, which was the party that stood to benefit most from Solon's seizure of absolute power (see especially Linforth 1919, 217; Masaracchia 1958, 339). However, 5 f. expresses an idea of political competition and primacy very much in tune with aristocratic ideology (it is an almost mockable hyperbolic perversion of it: cf. ad loc.); moreover, since archaic tyrannies often appear to have been initiatives of aristocrats in search of popular support, it seems more plausible that Solon composed this fragment with members of his own class in mind, and that the criticism formulated in the fragment came from them (Mülke 2002, 340). For an aristocratic audience the hetairic symposium would have been the most likely place of performance and one quite suitable for the typical literary forms of archaic poetry such as the variance between the authorial "I" and the *persona loquens*, the blameful tone (the one of the critic), and the scoptic derision of the issues prompting this blame (the one pursued by Solon's presentation of the critic's speech).

Structurally, line 1 expresses the negative opinion of the critic about Solon in very clear terms; l. 2 partially clarifies the reason for this negative opinion, but in vague terms avoiding clarity and detail (Will 1958, 302); it is as if the critics were too coy to utter the name of the great gift that Solon had been offered but refused, or alternatively, Solon was so silly as not to understand what he had been given (quite differently, the critic knows well what it is, and soon calls it by name at 6). After the vague periphrasis expressing Solon's choice in 2, in 3 f. the "guilt" of Solon is presented through a metaphor that emphasizes in a more graphic way how coward (θυμοῦ, 4) and stupid (ibid.: φρενῶν) Solon's refusal of the big unexpected gift had been. In the last three verses the ironical intentions of Solon's "quotation" of the critic's words are made explicit: the critic contrasts Solon's choice with his own quite different stance about the gift, which only in the penultimate verse is identified as the gift of tyrannical power. Being allowed, after criticising Solon, to show his own attitude

and values, the critic promptly reveals how corrupt his values are: he not only greedily aims at that unlimited wealth whose pursuit Solon had criticized in 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2] (see also below), but above all he is ready to humiliate himself and his *genos*, if only he can obtain tyranny and wealth.

Here, Solon adopts the presentation practice, commonly used in archaic poetry (especially in archaic blame poetry), in which the poet does not speak directly in his own authorial "I", but lets a different *persona loquens* speak. However, he inverts the usual target of this presentation. Aristotle (*Rh.* 3.1418b24–26) observed that this kind of presentation was intended to preserve the author from, e.g., the others' envy or the charge of prolixity or contradiction, when someone speaks of himself or from the accusation of abuse or boorishness, when someone speaks of other people (interestingly enough, one of the two Archilochean examples cited by Aristotle is fr. 19, where, in contrast to common opinion, Charon denies that he desires the wealth and absolute power of Gyges). On the contrary, by making himself the object of criticism of the *persona loquens*, Solon distinguishes himself, on one hand, from the *persona loquens* of the critic in the most graphic way, and on the other, he overcomes the suspicion of being biased in commenting upon the criticism leveled against him, thus making the depravation conveyed by the critic's words especially credible—in reality they are of course words which Solon has chosen to put in the critic's mouth, but this form of presentation (direct quotation) presents them as the critic's words (their hyperbolic tone in 7 also contributes to making them sound very realistic and spontaneous: see Beck 2008, 163 regarding direct speech in the *Iliad*). The critic ruins his reputation with his own words, and appears beyond any doubt to be "someone whose own standards are so corrupt as to indicate that he has forfeited the right to utter praise or blame—or, at any rate, to be listened to as he does so" (Anhalt 1993, 105).

From another point of view Solon also turns the critic's utterance to his own advantage. The critic is made not only to express values which will appear corrupt to everyone since they are not tempered, but he expresses them in terms which remind the audience of the radically different principles formulated by Solon himself in the same poem (if 29 G.-P.[2] = 32 W.[2] belongs to the same poem, as is possible) or in other poems, and thus are a very useful foil for them—the more the ideas of the critic are felt to be corrupt, the more reliable Solon's ideas turn out to be. The egocentric way in which the critic thinks about his own seizure of tyranny, without regard for the interests of the city (or even his own long-term interests: the critic is concerned with the achievement of tyranny

even for a single day, and does not mind facing the destruction of his τιμή in the near future) is in tune with the aristocratic habit of coveting κράτος and superiority, but radically opposed to Solon's stance, whose declared task is to defend all the factions of the citizens from each other (7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}) and to conquer the favor of his citizens, without resorting to the "violence" which is intrinsic to tyranny (29 G.-P.^{2} = 32 W.^{2}).

Another aspect of tyranny, as the critic depicts it, is unlimited wealth (5), whereas Solon's ideology advocates for moderate wealth (1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} begins with a prayer to the Muses for a limited amount of wealth (1–10) and ends with an indictment of wealth that has no τέρμα (71–73)). In addition, the prayer itself in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} includes preliminary directions about the dimension of wealth and social identity that Solon recommends. The critic, who shares the greedy common opinion, is shocked that Solon does not accept all the great gifts with which god has presented him (29^a.2 G.-P.^{2} = 32.2 W.^{2}), but Solon has demonstrated in 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} that he was eager to tailor divine gifts to suit his own purposes. He also states that "wealth which the gods give remains with a man, secure from the lowest foundation to the top" (9 f.), whereas the sort of power and wealth sought after by the critic are likely to last for only the length of a day, and will be followed by the utter destruction of his person and honor. In the same fragment Solon reaffirms the principle that divine gifts cannot be avoided (64). As Mülke 2002, 340 remarks, 29^b.7 G.-P.^{2} = 34.7 W.^{2} seems to be a concrete example of the terrible consequences of ἄτη, which according to 1.11–26 G.-P.^{2} = 13.11–26 W.^{2} Zeus' ἄτη has in store for the ill-gotten profits that have not been approved from on high. Maybe in another part of the poem Solon might have corrected the statement of the critic about tyranny as a god-sent gift: by re-affirming that he would have never refused a god-sent gift, according to his principle in 1.64 G.-P.^{2} = 13.64 W.^{2}, he will have implicitly denied that tyranny could be a god-sent gift (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 340). Alternatively, Solon may have presupposed, and reminded his audience, that some divine gifts can be dangerously poisoned: the emphasis on Solon's refusal of the gift, motivated by the opposition between the god who wished to grant it and Solon who did not accept it (διδόντος/οὐκ ἐδέξατο), was possibly meant to oppose Solon's caution to the notorious *non*-refusal of the divine gift of Pandora, made by Zeus to Epimetheus, as reported by Hes. *Op*. 84–90 εἰς Ἐπιμηθέα πέμπε πατὴρ κλυτὸν Ἀργεϊφόντην / δῶρον ἄγοντα, θεῶν ταχὺν ἄγγελον· οὐδ᾽ Ἐπιμηθεὺς / ἐφράσαθ᾽ ὥς οἱ ἔειπε Προμηθεὺς μή ποτε δῶρον / δέξασθαι πὰρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου … / αὐτὰρ ὁ δεξάμενος,

ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ', ἐνόησε. Solon would be the equivalent of Prometheus (Vox 1984, 90 f.), whereas his critics, on the contrary, appear all the more ridiculous, and even more stupid than Epimetheus: they knew the grave consequences of that gift, yet they accepted it all the same.

Furthermore, Solon's decision not to accept the divine gift finds a parallel in a stance which appears to have been shared by the Seven Sages according to the legend narrated by Diog. Laert. 1.27–33 and Plut. *Sol.* 4. The legend concerns the gold tripod which had been accidentally hauled up in a net together with fish by some Milesian fishermen. When the oracle of Delphi was asked who should get the tripod, the answer was: "whoever is the most wise". This tripod (or cup or bowl) was thus presented first to Thales, who passed it to another whom he decided was wiser than himself; this second sage promptly found another worthier recipient, and from sage to sage the tripod went finally to Solon, who stated that the god was the most wise, and decided to dedicate it to Apollo at Delphi. According to other versions, the Arcadian Bathycles left at his death a bowl with instructions that it should go to the wisest, or alternatively, some Coan fishermen hauled a gold tripod, and the Milesians sought the advice of Apollo, who determined that it should go to the wisest man; so the cup/the tripod went to Thales, who refused it, and after going around to all of the Sages came back to Thales, who sent it to Apollo at Didyma (the cup)/to Delphic Apollo (the tripod). There are some points of contact between this legend, the tradition of the Delphic oracles about Solon's tyranny, and the imagery presupposed by our fragment (the gift fished in a net, Delphic Apollo, Solon's refusal). It is impossible to ascertain the antiquity of this legend in all its different versions (cf. Wiersma 1934; Martin 1993, 120 f.), although the version involving Solon as the last recipient will have likely had Athenian origins (Wiersma 1934, 152). In any case, it represents the fact that at some point of the legend of the Seven Sages the refusal of self-delusory claims to wisdom was ascribed to them as well as to Solon as the condition necessary to obtain lasting fame: "the Sages do not reject honor: like Solon … they redifine it" (McGlew 1993, 110).

1. **βαθύφρων** "deep in thought" appears here and in Alcm. *PMGF* 3.82 for the first time, in connection to the Homeric πολύφρων "of many thoughts", perhaps to emphasize the idea of profundity and intensity in thought rather than versatility; later Theogn. 1051 f. βαθείηι / σῆι φρενὶ βούλευσαι σῶι τ' ἀγαθῶι τε νόωι; Heracl. *VS* 22B45 ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο … οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει; Pind. *Nem.* 3.53

βαθυμῆτα, 4.8 φρενὸς … βαθείας, 7.1 Μοιρᾶν βαθυφρόνων; Aesch. *Supp.* 407 βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου, *Pers.* 142 φροντίδα κεδνὴν καὶ βαθύβουλον. This idea would be in line with the progressive awareness of the cognitive-spiritual faculties as being endowed with a deep, hidden, and unlimited = non-physical dimension, which seems to have come about/arisen after Homer—indeed in the only Homeric passage where βαθύς is used in connection with φρήν, *Il.* 19.125 (τὸν δ' ἄχος ὀξὺ κατὰ φρένα τύψε βαθεῖαν), "deepness is not … the specific dimension of the soul; rather, the pain penetrates in the concrete organ as a sharp spear" (Snell 1977, 38), i.e. the sense of the epithet is mainly physical. See Snell 1953, 17f. (focusing on Heraclitus' fragment); 1977; Zucker 1938, 54–56, Treu 1955, 114, 272; Vox 1984, 99f., and the objections to Snell's interpretation by Marcovich ad Heraclitus' loc.cit. and Sullivan 1988, 35.

βουλήεις: *hapax*, modelled on the Homeric τιμήεις, cf. Pelissier 1911, 37.

2. For Solon the tyrannical road to the ultimate satisfaction of greedy desires was a road open but not taken (see most recently Balot 2001, 96). Quite differently, in the minds of Solon's adversaries the possibility of obtaining tyranny was a sort of divine benefit, and this stance largely reflected common opinion: compare the recommendation that, according to Herod. 3.53.4 (mentioned above), the tyrant of Corinth Periander, by now an old man, made to his son when he called on him to assume his position in the city: τυραννὶς χρῆμα σφαλερόν, πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐρασταί εἰσι … μὴ δῷις τὰ σεωυτοῦ ἀγαθὰ ἄλλοισι (for tyranny considered an ἀγαθόν, cf. also Herod. 3.52.11, 3.80.17f.; Isocr. *Evag.* 40.3 τυραννίδα καὶ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητότατον εἶναι).

For more on the idea that it would be the act of an inept person to accept only one part of the advantages potentially derived from power, cf. e.g Eur. *Phoen.* 504–510 and 524f.; Plato, *Gorg.* 483a–c and *Resp.* 344a–c. The absolute genitive is also used in Hom. *Od.* 1.390 Διός γε διδόντος, and becomes conventional in fifth century Attic (Aesch. *Sept.* 719; Eur. *Hipp.* 1434, *IA* 390, 702, [*Rh.*] 103; Plato, *Leg.* 835a1; Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.10, 5.1.23, 8.7.11, *Mem.* 1.2.16); ἐσθλά is used for the divine gift in *HHom.Dem.* 225 θεοὶ δέ τοι ἐσθλὰ πόροιεν.

Apart from ridiculing the critic, Solon also advertizes that it was a common opinion that his seizure of power would have been a distinguished divine dispensation. Assuming that the story about the Delphic

oracle having exhorted Solon to take the helm of the ship of state is not a later invention (cf. Introd.), we may suppose that Solon has his adversary allude precisely to that oracle.

3 f. The metaphor of the seizure of power as a great catch (μέγα / δίκτυον, μέγα emphatically in enjambement) made by a fisherman with his net is attested throughout classical Greek literature: cf. Vox 1984, 97; Lavelle 1993; Catenacci 1996, 201 f. The instances closest in time to Solon are in Herodotus: in 1.62, where Pisistratus' victory in his attempt at re-entering Athens and seizing the power there for the third time is announced by the soothsayer Amphilytos through the oracle: ἔρριπται δ' ὁ βόλος, τὸ δὲ δίκτυον ἐκπεπέτασται, / θύννοι δ' οἱμήσουσι σεληναίης διὰ νυκτός: cf. Lavelle 1991, 321–324 on Pisistratus being presented as the "fisherman" and the Athenians as "tunnies". In 1.141 Cyrus presents his behavior towards the Aeolians and Ionians, who had previously resisted his attempts at subduing them, and were now finally ready to surrender, through an allegorical fable: an *aulos*-player tried to draw fish out of the sea water by playing the *aulos*, but did not succeed, and so λαβεῖν ἀμφίβληστρον καὶ περιβαλεῖν τε πλῆθος πολλὸν τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ ἐξειρύσαι.

ἄγραν of 3 can designate the prey either from hunting or fishing (cf. Hom. *Od.* 12.330 f.), for both of which δίκτυα could be used, but in light of these parallels, Solon's net and catch more easily match the imagery of fishing: cf. also Magurano 1999, 45 f. with bibliography.

The three aorist participles in asyndeton governed by ἐπέσπασεν have different syntactic roles. περιβαλών designates an action which comes before the action of the principal verb; ἀγασθείς and ἀποσφαλείς, on the contrary, convey two circumstantial psychic conditions which coincide with the action of the principal verb and cause it (see already Mülke 2002, 342). ἀγασθείς has sometimes been considered suspect and consequently emended, and in fact, the verb (ἄγαμαι) is usually accompanied by the participle or infinitive of a verb, or the genitive of a name which identifies the cause of the astonishment (only Masaracchia 1958, 341 seems to have suggested to take ἄγραν with ἀγασθείς). These doubts do not seem well founded, because ἄγραν can be governed *apo koinou* by both περιβαλών and ἀγασθείς—so already Mülke 2002, 243. Alternatively, as suggested by Masaracchia 1958, 341 (followed by Mülke 2002, 342 f.), ἄγραν can be connected to ἀγασθείς. Usually, however, it has been used with περιβαλών, cf. Herod. 1.141 quoted above; in this case the specification in the dative of the hunting instrument to be thrown around, which appears to be idiomatic (Men. *PCG* 28 ἀμφιβλήστρωι

περιβάλλεται; Aristot. *Hist.an.* 533b.25 τοῖς δικτύοις … περιβάλλωνται; Plut. *Sull.* 6.5 τύχην δικτύωι τὰς πόλεις περιβάλλουσαν, *Herod.mal.* 858b1 δικτύωι περιβαλὼν τὸν ἄνδρα), would be inferred from δίκτυον of 4, and ἀγασθείς would be absolute, as it is in Hom. *Od.* 18.71. However, the participle explains the feeling of fear and respect that characterizes the Solonian context: in front of such an extraordinary, unexpected divine gift, Solon would have had a reverential fear of touching it, just as Odysseus had when he was going to embrace the knees of Nausicaa in a gesture of supplication: ἄγαμαί τε τέθηπά τε, δείδιά τ᾽ αἰνῶς (*Od.* 6.168–170).

The action of hauling the net with this unexpected catch of tyranny, and the specification "great" suggest the weight of the net itself: besides his reverential fear, Solon would have also felt impeded by his suspicion that the net was too heavy for him. Compare this to the image of the fisherman depicted on the cup of Theocr. 1.40 f., who similarly μέγα δίκτυον ἐς βόλον ἕλκει and is κάμνοντι τὸ καρτερὸν ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς.

Verbs such as the uncompounded σπᾶν, or ἀνασπᾶν/κατασπᾶν, or ἕλκειν would have been far more idiomatic for the action of "drawing up" the net (and in fact Xylander wanted to correct Solon's ἐπέσπασεν to ἀνέσπασεν; see however Aelian. *nat.anim.* 14.29 τὸ δίκτυον ἐπισπῶσιν). In any case, the preverbial ἐπί, which often designates the person in whose favor the action of the verb is completed, might effectively recall here that Solon's critics viewed the opportunity of tyranny as something he should have accepted for the "benefit" of both himself and his supporters.

φρένες here most likely refers to the seat of good judgment, but the phrase with ἀποσφάλλειν was still foreign to Homeric language, where the verb was only used with a concrete meaning (the same can be said of the parallel *HHom.Aphr.* 254 ἀπεπλάγχθην δὲ νόοιο: Jarcho 1968, 171 f.). The figurative sense of the verb is common in fifth century Athens: Aesch. *Prom.* 472 ἀποσφαλεὶς φρενῶν, *Pers.* 392 γνώμης ἀποσφαλεῖσιν; Aristoph. *Ran.* 962 ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἀποσπάσας; Eur. *IA* 742 ἐλπίδος δ᾽ ἀπεσφάλην. The polysyndeton θ᾽ … καί emphasizes the combination of a lack of courage and of judgment; ἁμαρτῆι emphasizes the contemporaneity of the negative consequences of these two faults. The latter adverb was probably an ancient instrumental of a verbal adjective from the root **sem/som*, from which, e.g., the Greek word ἄρτιος derives. According to this derivation the word would have been accented originally as ἁμαρτῇ (an accentuation defended, but with the support of the wrong derivation from ἁμαρτήδην, by Aristarchus ad Hom. *Il.* 5.656); the form ἁμαρ-

τῆι, which is defended by most of the ancient grammarians and is the more common form for this adverb in the mss. of every author (including Homer), would have been the result of the analogical influence of adverbs in -ηι from pronominal or nominal roots: e.g. ταύτηι, ἡσυχῆι: cf. Wackernagel 1953 (1902) 132 n. 1. It is likely that Homer adopted the original accentuation, but it is completely impossible to know whether Solon wrote the term Homerically or under the influence of the adverbs in -ηι. In light of the scant number of Homerisms in the trochaic fragments, I prefer to write the adverb with the accentuation with which it was perhaps pronounced in his days.

θυμός is mainly the seat of emotions, and especially of emotions promoting actions ("voluntativ": Jahn 1987, 21; also Jarcho 1968, 152 f.); also when used as a synonym for φρένες, as is often done in Homer, it appears to designate the presence of an emotional element within the function of cognition. In Homer and Hesiod it is imagined to reside in the φρένες, inside the chest (*Il.* 8.202); when the φρένες cannot contain the θυμός any longer, and it expands beyond their bounds (see e.g. *Il.* 9.462 f.), the intellectual function is impaired and feelings become so intense that behavior itself can no longer be controlled (Caswell 1990, 11–50). The joined mastery of θυμός and φρένες in conditions of normal reflexivity is expressed in the quite common Homeric formula for inner debate, κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (cf. ad 3.30 G.-P.^{2} = 4.30 W.^{2}), or in the Hesiodic formula ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν, in whose wake Solon's line, or the close parallel Theogn. 1050 σὺ δ' ἐν θυμῶι καὶ φρεσὶ ταῦτα βάλευ must be considered. Here the removal/suspension of θυμός and φρένες will mean their inability to function; in Homer the loss of θυμός usually results in fainting or death (Sullivan 1994, 157), and it is described here in the way in which φρένες are usually spoken of in post-Homeric archaic poetry (Jarcho 1968, 166–172; Sullivan 1988, 45–53), possibly in a zeugma.

5–7. Again, as in 3 f., there are a series of three participles predicative of the finite verb ἤθελον: κρατήσας and πλοῦτον λαβών are the premises to the culminative τυραννεύσας, which finally expresses the topic of the critic's whole speech and expands in a whole line (whose second part makes clear the paradoxical and unexpected brevity of tyranny: the *aprosdoketon* is left to the very end). The three aorists are opposed to the perfect infinitives of 7: the former tenses are not strongly characterized in terms of duration, but the perfect tenses evoke the definitive character of the consequences of desiring tyranny "for one day only", thus contribut-

ing to the characterization of this desire as paradoxical. The finite verb is transmitted as a third person singular, ἤθελεν, and if we accept this text we have to suppose that the last three verses are the apodosis of the counterfactual apodosis of an unreal condition, with an implied protasis which can be inferred from the second hemistich of the preceding line. Solon makes his critic seem ridiculous through a comment which includes a hyperbolic formulation of the motif "I am ready to die, but after having reached ..."—indeed this motif can highlight pathetically the relevance of the target, as it does in one of its first known instances, Hom. *Od.* 7.223 f. (Odysseus would be ready to die, if only he could touch again the soil of his fatherland), but here the concrete details about the forms of self-destruction, which the critic would be ready to accept, contribute to emphasize the excessiveness of the critic's greediness and to ridicule him. The wording also emphasizes the irresistible appeal of absolute power and therefore, by contrast, the almost superhuman self-control of Solon. If one instead accepts the intervention of Xylander, who emends ἤθελεν to ἤθελον, the last three verses continue to express the thoughts of Solon's critics in tune with the first part of the fragment. This continuity in point of view would be more expected than a change of *persona loquens*, since γάρ establishes a logical continuity between the first four verses and the last. Furthermore, if set in Solon's mouth, the prevision of the danger of death is less laughable than in the critic's mouth: Solon's words would be a bitter comment about the dangers of tyranny based on the history of other tyrants; on the contrary, with ἤθελον, the critic's apparent awareness of the enormous consequences of temporary satisfaction of lust for power makes him all the more contemptible and ridiculous (on the particular weakness of the opponent's arguments see also Magurano 1999, 48).

For the association of tyranny with great wealth, after Archil. 19, cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 3.85–89; Soph. *Ant.* 1168 f.; Eur. *Alc.* 286, *TrGF* (21)F332.7. In none of these passages, however, does the combination seem to contribute to a pejorative image of tyranny (as remarked by O'Neil 1986, 28 f.). The negative evaluation is, however, certainly apparent in the debate on the constitutions in Herod. 3.80 ἄνδρα γε τύραννον ἄφθονον ἔδει εἶναι, ἔχοντά γε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά· τὸ δὲ ὑπεναντίον τούτου ἐς τοὺς πολιήτας πέφυκε· φθονέει γὰρ τοῖσι ἀρίστοισι περιεοῦσί τε καὶ ζώουσι, κτλ. (on the sense of ἄφθονος in this passage, Perysinakis 1987, 170). A much later instance, which is clearly influenced by Archilochus and Solon, is the homoerotic variation of the anonymous epigram *Anth.Pal.* 11.3 Ἤθελον ἂν πλουτεῖν, ὡς πλούσιος ἦν ποτε Κροῖσος, / καὶ βασι-

λεὺς εἶναι τῆς μεγάλης Ἀσίης· / ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐμβλέψω Νικάνορα, κτλ. The epigram was considered to be an imitation of Archil. 19 by Cataudella 1928, 252, and the reference to Croesus and Asia surely originated in this model, but the author of the epigram also appears to have made a window-allusion to Solon in the frame of the Archilochean imitation, since Solon is most likely the origin of ἤθελον.

6. A late testimony, listing the strong favor for autocratic power by the Pythagoreans, reports that τυραννίδος ὀρέγεσθαι παρακαλοῦντας κρεῖττον εἶναι φάσκειν γενέσθαι μίαν ἡμέραν ταῦρον ἢ πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα βοῦν (Iambl. *VP* 260.6). But already by the fifth century it was commonplace that Pythagoras' and his followers' interest in the political life of Croton was dictated by their desire to become tyrants over it: cf. Theopomp. *FgrH* 115F73; Posidon. fr. 253.113 f. Kidd; Diog. Laert. 8.39; App. *Mith.* 28; Burkert 1972, 188 f.

7. This verse may apply the same dichotomy of individual and family which appears in the formal execratory formula that is often attested at least in inscriptions, of which the oldest dates back to about 470 BC (*GHI*, 30.3–5 Meiggs-Lewis κε̃νον ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος τὸ κένο; see also, e.g., from the third century BC, *IG* XI.4,1296.A.6–8, A.12 f., B.6 f., B.11 f., Dittenberger, *Syll.* 366.13), and in the orators of the fourth century, such as Andoc. *myster.* 98.10, 126.8; Demosth. *falsa leg.* 71.4, *Conon.* 41.7; Aeschin. *falsa leg.* 87.9 (ἐξώλη αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ γένος, ἐξώλη εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἐξώλη αὐτὸν καὶ γένος καὶ οἰκίαν). Mentioning the ruin of the γένος involves the widespread archaic idea that not only the culpable individual was responsible for his various transgressions, but also his descendants as well (see ad 1.29–32 G.-P.^{2} = 13.29–32 W.^{2}, and Bourriot 1976, 309–326). In particular, we also know of an Athenian law that sanctioned ἀτιμία for anyone who had sought to become tyrant and for his descendance as well: cf. Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 16.10 (some form of legislation about this issue may date from the age of Draco: cf. Ostwald 1955, 106–109, followed by Rhodes 1993, 220–223).

To be "skinned into a wineskin" was perhaps already a proverbial expression by Solon's time, and certainly δείρειν with ἀσκός/ἀσκόν (the proleptic predicative of the subject or of the object), or with εἰς ἀσκόν, appears to have been common in the fifth century: cf. Herod. 7.26; Aristoph. *Nub.* 442; Plato, *Euthyphr.* 285c; Diogenian. *CPG* 2.14.1 f. Therefore, being flayed alive is perhaps in Solon merely a figure of speech for an especially painful death. This specific form of the penalty was per-

haps also chosen because it was evocative of the *hybris* which had characterized Marsyas' challenge to Apollo and justified his horrible penalty. If the shadow of this mythological sinner—the paradigmatic archetype of the man skinned alive: cf. Herodotus' and Plato's passages quoted above—underlies the imagery of being skinned alive, then the greedy wish of the critic would bear with it the dimension of a hybristic incapacity to understand one's human limits. On the understanding that hyperbolic effect and hybristic connotation are the most likely interpretations of our passage, we cannot be sure that this "has never been a penalty to be inflicted on a tyrant or any other criminal in any law code" (Flacelière 1949, 123). Solon may perhaps be referring to a specific historical event, namely the capital punishment inflicted on another tyrant, Antileon of Chalcis, if in Alcae. 296a8 we accept the text proposed by Maas 1956, 200 (cf. also Lloyd-Jones 1975 = 1990, 55): μᾶλλόν] κ̣' ἄξιος Ἀντιλέοντ[ος ..] ἦς ἀπυδέρθην, where, however, ἀντὶ λέοντος "in place of a lion" is the reading more widely accepted by modern editors.

ἐπιτρίβεσθαι can also be maledictory: cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 557. In light of the parallels for the ἐξώλης execrations quoted above, where the extinction of the individual is connected to the extinction of his γένος or his οἰκία, in agreement with Linforth 1919, 218 (*pace* Mülke 2002, 347) it may be preferable to suppose that γένος is the subject in accusative of the second infinitive phrase, and not an accusative of respect of the same subject "I" as δεδάρθαι (nominative, as it is coincident with the subject of the governing ἤθελον); for the succession of two infinitives of which the first has the subject in nominative and the second has the subject in accusative, see 29^b.2 f. G.-P.^2 = 34.2 f. W.^2

29^{b}G.-P.^{2} = 34W.^{2}

Both 8 and 29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 6 and 34 W.^{2} (plus 7.3–6 G.-P.^{2} = 5.3–6 W.^{2} before 8 G.-P.^{2}, and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} after 29^{b} G.-P.^{2}) are chosen by Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 12 to illustrate the fact that after Solon's reorganization of Athens' constitution both factions of the rich and the poor were dissatisfied and disappointed with him. In particular, *Ath.Pol.* 12.3 quotes 29^{a} G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2} as a reply to the people who wanted the redistribution of land, to be identified as the πλῆθος, the popular faction, whose behavior Aristotle had also presented as Solon's topic when introducing 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2} quoted immediately before. Aristotle's presentation of 29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} relied perhaps on Solon's statement that he did not want to bring it about that the ἐσθλοί could have the same πιείρας χθονός / πατρίδος … ἰσομοιρίαν as the κακοί. Differently, Plut. *Sol.* 16.3, quoting only ll. 4 f. which are not concerned with the ἰσομοιρία of 9, states that the two verses prove that "the majority" (πλεῖστοι) of his fellow citizens took offence at his actions. That in Plutarch πλεῖστοι, which is unclear in social terms, meant the masses, is made clear by the continuity (καίτοι φησὶν ὥς, κτλ.) established by Aristotle between the concern of 29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} and the fragment he introduces immediately afterward, 31.6 f. G.-P.^{2} = 37.7 f. W.^{2}, where Solon objects to the criticism from the *demos*.

Aristotle's interpretation, which is followed by many modern scholars, has been recently brought into question. On the one hand, although we do not have sure evidence, it seems plausible that the criticism from which Solon defended himself in this fragment came once again from the disappointed supporters and friends of the class of the rich, to which he belonged. At the beginning of the fragment, the greedy intentions of Solon's former supporters, and now critics, closely parallel the behavior of the hybristic rich stigmatized in 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2} Furthermore, according to, e.g., Brandt 1989, Rosivach 1992 it is highly unlikely that the project of land redistribution was conceivable in the age of archaic tyrannies. On the other hand, Aristotle's precise terminology ("not the poor" but "those who wanted him to redistribute the land"), although it can be an inference on his part from the closing section of the fragment, inclines one to accept his reading, and therefore to admit that some form of redistribution was conceivable, if not a redistribution from which even the poorest inhabitants of Attica would profit (van Wees 1999, 16 f.,

for instance, does not rule out the possibility that some land from the common fields of the state or of sanctuaries—perhaps the public land which 3.12 f. G.-P.^{2} = 4.12 f. W.^{2} describes as plundered by the hybristic rich—was liberated from its illegitimate "boundary stones" (30.6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 W.^{2}) and redistributed). Against that, and in favor of my reading of lines 8 f., (see below) it could be argued that Solon is rarely precise in his descriptions of political situations and factions; his approach is less like policy debate. It is also unlikely that the people who, as Solon says, had been expecting to get "great wealth" (2) were actually the poor, since they would be more likely to think in terms of no longer being poor, not suddenly becoming rich (as Bacchylides remarks in 1.172–174, ἶσον ὅ τ' ἀφνεὸς ἱ/μείρει μεγάλων ὅ τε μείων/παυροτέρων): cf. Ferrara 1964a, 120–122; Rosivach 1992, 154 f. Thus, we can imagine a scenario where, at the outset, some of Solon's aristocratic supporters counted on the loyalty of the "poor" in order to increase their power and wealth to the detriment of other aristocratic clans, and thus would have liked it if Solon seized absolute power (cf. 7 f.). In fact, archaic tyrannies were also primarily the fruit of rivalries between aristocrats, who sought support from the poor and middle classes against their rivals: cf. Ellis and Stanton 1968; Stahl 1987, 77–105; Cawkwell 1995; De Libero 1996, 400–403; below ad l. 1. Therefore the κακοί of l. 9 probably designates here not the "poor" but the corrupt aristocrats or the corrupt *nouveaux riches* like the ones of 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2}, namely those "non-nobles" by birth who had been made rich by commerce and would have begun to aim at the agricultural property traditionally concentrated in the hands of the aristocrats (καλοί): the new rich were often felt to be liable to offensive garishness, not having had enough time to become accustomed to moderation in the use of riches: cf. Fisher 1992, 103 f.; also Introd. ad 6 G.-P.^{2} = 15 W.^{2} Since one of the effects of Solon's reforms was the definition in terms of wealth of the criteria regarding eligibility for public office (although this wealth continued to be measured mainly in terms of agricultural production) it is possible that 9 f. reflect the attempts of these emergent individuals to acquire part of, and thus to erode, the lands which were in the hands of the aristocrats. Cf. Rosivach 1992, 156; Robertson 1997, 153.

It is plausible that the critics whom Solon mimics in this fragment are the same people he criticized in 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} A clear point of contact, in terms of stylistic strategy, is the sketch of the customary behaviors of each of them (ἕκαστος: 15.5 G.-P.^{2} = 11.5 W.^{2}, 29^b.2 f. G.-P.^{2} = 34.2 f. W.^{2}) and an accompanying evaluation of their poor rationality (σύμπασιν 15.6 G.-P.^{2} = 11.6 W.^{2}, πάντες 29^b.5 G.-P.^{2} = 34.5 W.^{2}). Also,

the common definition of this poor rationality is made clear through the (uncommon) epithet χαῦνος. Furthermore, both the interlocutors of 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} and the critics of 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} appear to have the problem of failing to comprehend the real meaning of what they are told. In fact, they seem to understand what they want, but not to be able enough to interpret what is being said in accordance with the character of their interlocutor—quite dangerously, because the ἔργα affecting them could be quite different from what they had poorly interpreted them to be. In the case of the αἱμύλος ἀνήρ of 15 G.-P.^{2} = 11 W.^{2} they are so focused on believing his deception that they cannot acknowledge what he is actually doing (15.7 f. G.-P.^{2} = 11.7 W.^{2}). In the case of Solon, however, they believed that his words were only temporarily sweet and accommodating towards everyone, but that he would have known how to be "tough" (29^b.3 G.-P.^{2} = 34.3 W.^{2}) at the right moment (evidently with their enemies, whom they considered to be his enemies as well); but Solon kept his word, and did what he had promised (29^b.6 G.-P.^{2} = 34.6 W.^{2}), nothing more nor less. They believed that Solon was like the αἱμύλος ἀνήρ, but he was not—the words of the αἱμύλος, unlike Solon's, differed greatly from his actual deeds and plans (see 15.8 G.-P.^{2} = 11.8 W.^{2}); by blindly following the αἱμύλος ἀνήρ the Athenians had been reduced to "slavery" (15.4 G.-P.^{2} = 11.4 W.^{2}), whereas Solon did not want tyrranical power (29^b.7 f. G.-P.^{2} = 34.7 f. W.^{2}). Solon was not to blame for the disillusionment of his ex-supporters, and they fell short of their preposterous conjectures, χαῦνα ἐφράσαντο, like the stupid citizens of 15.6 G.-P.^{2} = 11.6 W.^{2}, with their χαῦνος νόος. His ex-supporters reasoned poorly and according to popular parameters without acknowledging that these provisions were subject to revision, and above all without understanding that Solon had, in fact, criticized them (on Solon's avoidance of τραχύτης toward enemies, cf. below ad 2 f.). Once again Solon presents the reproaches of the critics in such a way that they also function as a foil to highlight how correct his own political programs and behavior had been.

1. The connection between the hope of becoming rich and the wish that a tyrant seizes power is found again in Plato, *Resp.* 344a ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθραι καὶ βίαι ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην. Eur. *Heracl.* 588–591 πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῶι λόγωι / δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει, / οἳ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν / ἐφ' ἁρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας offers a very close parallel to Solon's lines 1 f.,

especially if the subject of Solon's 1–3 is the predatory behavior of some members of the rich leading class: the supporters of the usurper Lycus are rich people who have squandered their wealth, thus becoming poor, although still appearing well-off. Solon's 6 G.-P.[2] = 15 W.[2] shows the Athens of his time as being affected by the impoverishment of some aristocrats. This phenomenon is often considered to be the origin of coups d'état. Plato, *Resp.* 555d, for instance, presents the sad sight of these rich who "sit within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened by debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution". Aristot. *Pol.* 1305b39–42 also observes that "revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or suborn somebody else" (historical examples of tyrants at Syracuse, Amphipolis, and Aegina follow); see also *Pol.* 1316b18–20 "when some of the leaders have lost their properties, they stir up innovations, when men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens", and 1266b13 f. "it is a bad thing that many citizens who were rich should become poor, for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates of a new order".

The opening pronoun plus the particle δέ of 1, with its slightly adversative sense, supports the possibility that our fragment was preceded by a presentation of the motives and results of Solon's conciliatory policy, here contrasted with his ex-supporters' greed and narrow concern with their own personal interests. Another less attractive possibility is that it may suggest that there was a preceding critique of another group. The initial monosyllable has been accented both as a demonstrative (for οἱ δ' without an accent: cf. e.g. Richards 1893, 212; Ziegler 1928, 507; West ed.), and more commonly, as a relative (οἳ δ' … ἦλθον would then be a subordinate relative to ἐλπίδ' … εἶχον, with the governing demonstrative omitted, = οὗτοι οἵ). The former interpretation seems preferable since it is more in keeping with the frequent asyndeta of archaic syntax, on which cf. Maehler 2000. The two verbs of the line would thus be asyndetically coordinated, not subordinated, and thus the variance of their tenses would be more acceptable. In fact, the imperfect εἶχον would express the persistence of hope, and the aorist ἦλθον would express the concrete momentary movement determined by that hope: when an aorist phrase is occasionally juxtapposed with an imperfect one, the aorist form has a focusing function (meaning it contains the answer to the question "what did they do?") whereas the imperfect does not (cf. Mülke 2002,

350, after Sicking 1991, 27–33). In our fragment the attention would shift from the factual information that someone came as a predator (ἦλθον) to the motivation of that action (εἶχον), and for the sake of this informative hierarchy it is more likely that the phrase with ἦλθον is coordinated, and not subordinated to the phrase with εἶχον.

The plural is paralleled in poetry (again in Eur. *Heracl.* 591 quoted above), although the singular ἐφ' ἁρπαγήν seems to be more idiomatic (twice in Thuc., thrice in Xen.). The morphology of the dative ἁρπαγαῖσι (originaly Pamphilian, Lesbian, Doric) can be defended in principle as being an Aeolizing Homerism, which is often attested in epic, although it is almost never unanimously transmitted by the mss. (cf. Ruijgh 1957, 15–17; Wathelet 1970, 243–250; Richardson 1974, ad *HHom.Dem.* 368; Bowie 1981, 114 f.). But in light of the Atticizing *facies* which the trochaic fragments seem to provide evidence of (see Introd. ad 29–29^{b} G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}), ἁρπαγαῖσιν can also be seen as an anticipation of the ending -αῖσι which is common in choral lyric and Attic tragedy (especially, but not only—cf. Barrett 1964, 178 f.—in choral parts) and is paralleled in inscriptions: first in the hexametric *CEG* 291 (from Corcyra, end of the sixth century), then in *IG* I^{3}.974 (Attic from around 450/25 BC?), and in some other inscriptions, especially in meter, from the fourth century onwards (Hoffmann-Debrunner 1953, 58 f., 118 f. (where the idea is suggested that Solon's ἁρπαγαῖσιν may forerun tragic datives in -αισιν); Threatte 1996, 99 f.). It is true that in 1.37 G.-P.^{2} = 13.37 W.^{2} and 3.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4.5 W.^{2} the homometric Ionic ending -ῃσιν is transmitted, which is common in Homer and documented in Attic inscriptions from the first half of the fifth century (but it is less common in Attica rather than the standard endings -ῃσι(ν)/-ασι(ν): Threatte 1996, 97 f.). And, it would not be difficult to argue that ἁρπαγαῖσιν arose as a banalization of ἁρπαγῇισιν, since the ending -αισιν became a widespread poeticism from the fifth century onward. But the same ending -αισιν is also transmitted in 30.27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.27 W.^{2} πολλαῖσιν by Aelius Aristides, and the London papyrus of the *Ath.Pol.*, although its reading is uncertain on this point since it also seems to have πọλλạι.[.]. (the Berlin papyrus does not preserve the last distich of the fragment). Therefore, I do not follow the radical normalization of West, who emends the endings here and at 30.27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.27 W.^{2} to conform with the Ionic forms in -ῃισιν of 1.37 G.-P.^{2} = 13.37 W.^{2} and 3.5 G.-P.^{2} = 4.5W.^{2}, nor the inconsistent choice of Diehl, who accepts ἁρπαγαῖσιν for our verse but prints πολλῇισιν in 30.27 G.-P.^{2} = 36.27 W.^{2}

In light of a long series of parallels (collected by Mülke 2002, 352), the object of these wishful ἁρπαγαί was probably not land (as Càssola 1964,

36 maintained), but movables, like cattle or wealth. But the implied object may also be the members of the other factions. It is important that Solon does not make the object explicit, cf. also the absolute ἀφαρπαγῆι of 3.13 G.-P.[2] = 4.13 W.[2] Rather, he wants to stigmatize the ethically reproachable action of ἁρπάζειν: this verb, which in Homer means simply "to snatch away" with force, already in Hes. *Op.* 38 acquires the negative ethical connotation of seizing something which is not one's own and describes the bribery of the bad kings (Hoffmann 1914, 109; *LfgrE* s.v.).

ἐλπίδ(α) … ἀφνεάν = ἐλπίδα ἀφένου "hope of wealth". It is quite common that genitives of possession are replaced by an adjective; the phenomenon is rarer with objective genitives, and is almost limited to poetic language, especially in tragedy (examples in Kühner-Gerth I.262; a parallel to ἐλπίδ(α) … ἀφνεάν is Aesch. *Ag.* 262 εὐαγγέλοισιν ἐλπίσιν). The adoption of this syntactical poeticism (one of the most foreign ones to the standard language found in Solon) may imply a mocking pun against the critics, especially if the group of citizens Solon has in mind are the predacious newly impoverished rich. Solon possibly scorns the fact that the only "wealthy"/"abundant" thing they have is hope. Solon does not think positively of the idea of "hope": cf. 1.35 G.-P.[2] = 13.35 W.[2] κούφαις ἐλπίσι (where examples of the "hopes" are introduced by κατεφράσατο at 38 and δοκεῖ at 39 and 42, to which one can compare our κἀδόκουν at 2 and ἐφράσαντο at 4).

Lines 2 f. reveal that Solon's ex-supporters believed that they would become rich at the expense of the citizens of the opposite factions; in their expectations Solon would have had to loot their opponents ruthlessly, thus showing his true revengeful temper, despite his conciliatory appearance. εὑρήσειν is not uncommon with names designating "wealth", cf. Aesop. 89.3 Hausrath-Hunger; the choice of another verb pointing to personal participation of the ex-supporters, possibly scorns their laggard reliance on Solon's initiative. The epithet πολύν may also focus on Solon's disappointment for the mentality of the ex-supporters, here as well as in 29[a].5 G.-P.[2] = 33.5 W.[2], in light of his option for a moderate quantity of wealth (cf. ad 29[a].5–7 G.-P.[2] = 33.5–7 W.[2]).

Hybris against the citizens was often ascribed to tyrants, from Solon's 29.2 G.-P.[2] = 32.2 W.[2] to Soph. *OT* 873 ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον (cf. Fisher 1992, 27–31); in particular taking revenge on one's opponents was not an uncommon practice among ancient tyrants (e.g. Theagenes of Megara slaughtered the cattle of the rich before his seizure of power: Aristot. *Pol.* 1305a25 f.). The tyrant was also expected to enjoy great wealth (cf. Introd. ad 29[a] G.-P.[2] = 33 W.[2]), and of course to share at least some

of it with his supporters. In any case, the tyrant was expected to behave according to the widespread principle of "harming enemies" (cf. ad 1.5 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.5 f. W.^{2}, 29.4 f. G.-P.^{2} = 32.4 f. W.^{2}). Solon's ex-supporters shared and followed these common expectations, and thus interpreted overtures of conciliation between factions as insincere pronouncements uttered merely for the sake of obtaining power (the verb κωτίλλειν had already been connected with the practice of "deceiving" and the intention of "reaching" a hidden target in Hes. *Op.* 373 f. μηδὲ γυνή σε νόον πυγοστόλος ἐξαπατάτω / αἱμύλα κωτίλλουσα, τεὴν διφῶσα καλιήν, and ἐξαπατᾶν and κωτίλλειν are again together in Theogn. 852). Thus, they believed that he was like the politician described in 15.7 G.-P.^{2} = 11.7 W.^{2}, whose seductive eloquence is defined with the same epithet αἱμύλος which accompanies κωτίλλειν in Hes. loc.cit., but he was not (see Introd. above). Rather, Solon implies, especially through the use of the word λείως, which does not have the negative connotations of κωτίλλειν, that he had been trying to minimize through his bland language the harsh contrasts between the opposite factions in order to implement Eunomia's function of smoothing over the harsh (3.34 G.-P.^{2} = 4.34 W.^{2}): cf. Stehle 2006, 95. Furthermore, Solon had been nuanced enough to accept the social rule of helping friends and harming enemies only in part. He never declared himself to be τραχύς towards his enemies. Differently from Pind. *Pyth.* 8.10 f. τραχεῖα δυσμενέων / ὑπαντιάξαισα κράτει and fr. 52b.31 f. εἰ δέ τις ἀρκέων φίλοις / ἐχθροῖσι τραχὺς ὑπαντιάζει, who opted for this τραχύτης (see also Aristoph. *Lys.* 802 f. τραχὺς ... τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἅπασιν), Solon had expressed the wish to be nothing more than πικρός and δεινός toward his enemies (1.5 f. G.-P.^{2} = 13.5 f. W.^{2}), and had advertised *eunomia*, whose effect was to τραχέα λειαίνειν (3.34 G.-P.^{2} = 4.34 W.^{2}). Alternatively, Solon may be implying that he had never considered his political adversaries as his enemies, and had tried rather to remain neutral between the opposite factions and to defend them from one another without harming either of them (7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}); therefore once in power he would not have to exact revenge from any of the factions, since he was, before and after his action, πᾶσι φίλος (the model of Odysseus in *Od.* 10.38 f. may be understood to be in the background; cf. Vox 1984, 148–152).

Both λεῖος and τραχύς are attested here for the first time in a metaphorical way, and Homer had used them only in their material sense; also metaphorical is λοξός in 5 (see Gerber 2003). The oxymoron magnifies the deceptive behavior which the ex-supporters ascribed to Solon and contributes to Solon's indignant rejection of this stance in 4.

For ἐκφαίνειν νόον cf. Theogn. 967 ἐκφαίνει πάντων χρόνος ἦθος ἑκάστου, where the action of time is opposed to the attempt of individuals at concealment (κρύπτουσ' ἐνθέμενοι θυμὸν ἐφημέριον, 966).

4f. On χαῦνα ἐφράσαντο here and χαῦνος νόος in 15.6 G.-P.[2] = 11.6. W.[2], see Introd.

χολούμενοι: the ex-supporters are affected by that feeling of χόλος, determined by strife, which Solon's *eunomia* intended to extinguish: cf. 3.38 G.-P.[2] = 4.38 W.[2]

λοξὸν … ὁρῶσι: "they look in disfavor"/"anger". Callim. 1.37 f. Pf. "for the Muses do not reject as friends in old age those on whom they looked with an eye that is not oblique (ὄθματι … μὴ λοξῶι) as children" and Ap. Rhod. 4.475 f. λοξῶι ὄμματι are the closest parallels for expressions of disfavor, disapproval and anger. Cf. also Tyrtae. 8.2 G.-P.[2] = 11.2 W.[2] on Zeus' continual support of the Spartans (because he has not averted his head yet) οὔπω Ζεὺς αὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει. Anacr. *PMG* 417.1 λοξὸν ὄμμασι βλέπουσα has the same redundant dative as Solon's text (but it is used for an inaccessible girl; Theocr. 20.13 similarly of female contempt towards a suitor). For Greek ways of looking to convey disrespect, see Cairns 2005, 123–155; Gerber 2003 (also for passages involving the eyes of non-humans).

δήϊος may be here instead of, e.g., the more commonly used ἐχθρός just to avoid hiatus. But it can also have been chosen because the epithet not only designates a person who belongs to the opposite faction (cf. Hom. *Il.* 10.358, where δήιοι is opposed to ἑταῖροι), but also connotes the danger inherent in him and the need of caution; hence the use of this epithet for the potentially destructive πῦρ (cf. Graz 1965, 109–112).

6. The parenthesis of the accusative absolute οὐ χρεών "not properly", recalls the error of Solon's ex-supporters: their logic was not consequential, because his promises should not have allowed them to believe that he shared their values. And to prevent the further (possible or actual?) accusation of having "betrayed" them by filling them with false illusions, he specifically maintains that he does not belong to the group of people who say one thing and do another (like the αἱμύλος ἀνήρ of 15.7 f. G.-P.[2] = 11.7 f. W.[2]).

In Hom. *Il.* 9.312 f. Achilles had stated that he considered this kind of person especially ἐχθρός: ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλησιν / ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθηι ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπηι (I would not rule

out that Achilles' phrase could be in Solon's, or his audience's mind: the idea evoked through this allusion would be that he has become δήιος for his ex-supporters precisely in order not to become ἐχθρὸς to the haters of duplicity, like Achilles or himself). Also similar is Theogn. 93–96 Ἄν τις ἐπαινήσηι σε τόσον χρόνον ὅσσον ὁρώιης, / νοσφισθεὶς δ' ἄλλην γλῶσσαν ἵηισι κακήν, / τοιοῦτός τοι ἑταῖρος ἀνὴρ φίλος οὔ τι μάλ' ἐσθλός, / ὅς κ' εἴπηι γλώσσηι λεῖα, φρονῆι δ' ἕτερα.

7–10. These verses implicitly contrast the divinely sanctioned integrity of Solon's projects with any other ones Solon could have theoretically pursued—including the assumption of tyranny, which his ex-supporters had desired and tried to present as being offered to Solon by god (29^a.2 G.-P.^{2} = 33.2 W.^{2}). Divine assistance is conventionally mentioned for human actions (in order to avoid human *hybris* and, consequently, divine punishment for boasting of one's successes) in brief formulas like this one here or σὺν θεῶι (Hom. *Il.* 9.49, 24.430; Archil. 221.1, *SLG* 478a18 Page; Pind. *Ol.* 8.14, etc.). Solon's statements about the divine favor for his actions are especially frequent, cf. Introd. ad 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} For the possibility that Solon's electoral propaganda had objectives different from those which the legislator actually achieved cf. ad 30.17f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.17 W.^{2}

In light of this underlying thread of thoughts we have to assume that οὐ negates the verb, and not the adverb μάτην (as maintained only by Maharam 1993, 159f.). μάτην will also indirectly resume the sense of ἤνυσα, and thus possibly designates "vain"/"useless", or "unaccomplished" endeavors. But it is more likely that it opposes σὺν θεοῖσιν, in the sense, attested in the epithet μάταιος, of "rash"/"irreverent" (cf., e.g., Aesch. *Eum.* 336f. αὐτουργίαι … μάταιοι which is said of the matricide). The implication (suggested already by Mülke 2002, 356) is that the "other things", which Solon did not accomplish, would not have been provided with τέλος by gods, who survey the outcome of human actions (cf. ad 1.17 G.-P.^{2} = 13.17 W.^{2}). In this sense, the adverb would at least in part anticipate the two "roads not taken" by Solon, which are expressed in 7b–9 (foolishness of choosing tyranny is amply discussed in 29 and 29a G.-P.^{2} = 32 and 33 W.^{2}).

9. Solon's choice of the word χθών, the world where humans live, and not γῆ, more clearly relating to the agricultural dimension, implies that the ἰσομοιρία of which Solon speaks is not a redistribution of the tillable land between rich and poor, but an equal division of the τιμαί inside the

institutions of the fatherland between the new rich or the bad aristocrats on the one hand and the old leading aristocratic class on the other—this is in tune with the use of the word *moira* in particular in Homer or in Simonides, where (as remarked by Mülke 2002, 359) the words μοῖρα/μέρος appear to be connected to the idea of personal τιμή and personal assignment (*Il.* 9.318 f. ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι· / ἐν δὲ ἰῆι τιμῆι ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός; 15.208–210 τόδ' αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἱκάνει / ὁππότ' ἂν ἰσόμορον καὶ ὁμῆι πεπρωμένον αἴσηι / νεικείειν ἐθέληισι χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν; *PMG* 520.4–6 ὁ δ' ἄφυκτος ὁμῶς ἐπικρέμαται θάνατος· / κείνου γὰρ ἴσον λάχον μέρος οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ / ὅστις τε κακός). The expression certainly has some material concreteness (especially in πιείρας), which may lead one astray, but the same level of concreteness can also be found in the designation of the fatherland in 4 G.-P.^{2} = 4a W.^{2}, where the *polis* as a whole organism is certainly at stake and certainly not (or not only) its tilled fields (see especially γῆν).

ἰσομοιρία does not appear before Solon (but cf. the adjective ἰσόμορον in Hom. *Il.* 15.209 quoted above), although it is not rare as a philosophical term (cf. Empedocl. *VS* 31A72) or as a term used in medical and political language: cf. Mau and Schmidt 1964 and Triebel-Schubert 1984. On the similarities and differences between Solon's ideal of εὐνομία and the political ideal of ἰσονομία, cf. ad 3.32–39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32–39 W.^{2} On the economic significance of the term in our passage, cf. Introd. ad 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32, 33 and 34 W.^{2} The subtle political ideal of Solon's project is clearly distinct from the egalitarian constitution founded on ἰσονομία or ἰσομοιρία, even if it would seem to anticipate a few vital instances of it. In effect, the Solonian *eunomia*, which sought to extend participation in political life to a greater number of citizens, is the premise behind the birth of ἰσονομία—a plan which perhaps was already partially set in motion by Solon's legislation (cf. 30.18–20 G.-P.^{2} = 32.18–20 W.^{2}), yet was certainly only realized in the post-Solonian δημοκρατία of Cleisthenes (see, e.g., Meier 1990, 41–50).

30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}

Fr. 30 has been presented by the ancient sources which preserved it (Aristotle and Plutarch), and many modern historians alike, as evidence of Solon's σεισάχθεια "shaking off of burdens", which is taken to mean the elimination of debt and the liberation from debt slavery (Aristot.) or liberation from debt slavery and the demolition of the ὅροι erected on mortgaged property (Plut.). But it is certainly not clear that 10 f. of this fragment refer to debts, and the ὅροι of 6 might not be mortgage indicators at all: cf. Introd. chap. 3, for both ancient testimonies and modern discussions. This does not necessarily mean that Aristotle's and Plutarch's interpretations are wrong, although they may be after all, given that the problem of farmers' debt was a pressing reality in the fourth century and that the Atthidographers and Aristotle could have read Solon's words backwards, since for them "Solon and his laws were a political football which belonged to their own times" (as Foxhall 1997, 113 nicely presents the problem).

In fact, Solon does not explain what is so humiliating for those impoverished citizens reduced to slavery at home or abroad (some of whom he claims to have brought home, 8–15). This shows us that in looking back on his political successes, Solon loved to point to those instances in which he acted on behalf of the poor. Other measures that he might have looked back on receive distinctly less attention—for instance those legislative measures that had to come before he could work for the poor. The same lack of substantial details characterizes Solon's proud statements about establishing a single standard law for everyone's benefit (18–20) and checking the δῆμος (22). Thus, the main image he wanted to project was that of a mediator between the opposing desires of the rich and poor factions (ll. 20–25; cf. also 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}). In terms not very different from the "ideological" emphasis of the programmatic fragments in elegiacs, what we have in these fragments is mainly the ethical background with which Solon frames his political actions.

Rhetoric determines the structure of the fragment (a most refined structural analysis appears in Blaise 1995; cf. also van Groningen 1958, 137; García Novo 1979–1980, 201; Maguarano 1992; Maharam 1993, 451–462; Fernández Delgado 1999). This structure does not obey the elaborate ring-composition of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2} (divine justice at the

beginning and at the end) or the mirror-composition of 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2} (beginning with what is happening now and concluding with what can happen if Solon's *eunomia* prevails). The pace of the argumentation in 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} is much more straightforward, and it is quite telling that almost all of the main syntactical transitions and the transitions from the description of one action to another take place not at the end of the verse, but within it, with a series of quick but hard-hitting enjambements. Furthermore, the completely permeable boundaries between verses and the absence of self-contained distichs to which we are accustomed, leave room for frequent subordinate phrases, and thus long complex sentences, especially in the core of the poem which describes Solon's actions in the most nuanced way (on the use of narration as being characteristic of early Greek iambus see the remarks of Bowie 2001).

Apart from the brief interrogative phrase at the beginning of the poem, three other sentences cover 17 lines, and are in size, respectively, 5 lines: 3–7, 7.5 lines: 8–15a and 5 lines: 15b–20a (this syntactical complexity appears to be a Solonian feature at variance with at least Semon. 1 and Archil. 23: Mülke 2002, 364). Likewise, the fragment also completely lacks the Homeric vocabulary that characterizes most of Solon's elegiac verses (as observed e.g. by Masaracchia 1958, 355) apart from two phrases which have a clear epic resonance, ἀναγκαίης ὕπο χρειοῦς of 10 f. and δουλίην ἀεικέα ἔχοντας of 13 f. (cf. ad locc.), which seem designed to "heroicize" the humiliating situation of the enslaved citizens, and thus, consequently, also Solon's operation. However, several features of the fragment recall the assertiveness that we tend to find in Homeric speeches: the repetitions of ἐγώ and the frequency of verbs in the first person (Anhalt 1993, 118). Even the alternative to Solon, evoked to exemplify a political behavior different from Solon's prudence in restraining his own faction, the opposite faction, and the *demos*, is not simply an ἄλλος ἀνήρ, but ἄλλος ὡς ἐγώ κτλ. (21).

A rhetorical interrogative question introduces the fragment (1 f.). The precise sense is ambiguous (cf. below), but must be "why/what did I stop achieving of what I had promised?". Thus, Solon might seem to agree with his critics that he failed to achieve (all of) what he had promised. No direct or general answer follows, but a list of concrete achievements consisting of various specific and concrete "actions" (ἔρεξα, 17), which goes from 3 to 15a and seems to have "freeing" as its cohering theme. These concrete actions are mainly designated in generic terms, like ταῦτα

in 2 and 15 (for ταῦτα of 3, cf. ad 3 f.), starting from the most material one, which the Earth herself experienced and thus can be empirically verified; the liberation of the land is followed by the presentation of the liberation of men (note the parallelism between δουλεύουσα … ἐλευθέρα and δουλίην … ἐλευθέρους of 7 and 13b & 16a; cf. also ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας and ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας … πολλαχῆι πλανωμένους of 6 and 9 and 12). Then, in 15–17, the concrete actions are given an institutional/theoretical common frame. In terms of concrete contents they all belong to the plans advertised by Solon before his legislation; in terms of quality they reflect the harmonization of the opposing principles of force and justice (as Mülke 2002, 363 correctly puts it, they dwell on the "how" of Solon's political actions, while 2–15a describe their "what"). Furthermore, at 18 the same actions are made out to belong to precise and permanent institutional assets, since they turn out to have been structured by laws, and above all, "written" laws of 20 (the transition from the extremely generic ταῦτα to the more concrete θεσμοί has been noted already by Beltrami 1895, 104): note the parallelism between ἔρεξα of 17 and ἔγραψα of 20, not to mention between ξυναρμόσας (force and justice) used to describe Solon's initiatives (16) and ἁρμόσας (laws that are good both for the rich and poor) used of Solon's laws (19). Finally, Solon foreshadows what would have happened if a statesman inferior to himself or unscrupulous had been in power (20–22a), and then what would have happened had he gone all the way in satisfying one or the other of the political factions (22b–25). The hint at the consequences of the alternative of yielding completely to the *demos* or to the interests of the favorable faction for the sake of one's own interests (21 φιλοκτήμων) makes it clear that Solon's actions have been the only ones capable of saving the city from catastrophe, even at the expense of his own personal hardship and criticism (26 f.); like 29–29^b G.-P.², this fragment also highlights that Solon's particular coherence about some goals was the only alternative to utter ruin, despite later criticism. In perfect ring composition, τῶν οὕνεκ(α) of 26 resumes the unexplained τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα of 1, and thus the audience is left with the image of the decimation of the citizenry being averted (25) as the ultimate goal of Solon's political activity and the warrantless origin of the later complaints against him.

Independently of relative chronology, the complementary relationship between poems 30 and 29^b G.-P.² = 36 and 34 W.² is evident. They appear to deal with similar issues from different angles. In 29^b G.-P.² = 34 W.² Solon takes a clearer polemical attitude towards the behavior and motivations of his critics (ex-supporters?), but in 30 G.-P.² = 36 W.² he is

more detailed in his defence of his actions: apart from the first two verses, and in part the last two ones, in our fragment the critics who probably prompt his initial rhetorical question seem to be almost forgotten, and in the name of the image of equality he ascribes to his laws, Solon projects a stance of absolute equidistance from the κακοί and the ἀγαθοί: the opposition between κακοί and ἀγαθοί must be intended here in the purely technical sense of non-nobles/nobles, this being one of very few such instances of these words in this sense (cf. ad 6.1 G.-P.² = 15.1 W.²). The presentation of the spirit of his legislation in a different light may also derive from this difference of perspective. In 29ᵇ G.-P.² = 36 W.² he claims not to have wanted to effect the equal distribution of power which was expected of him by some (he defends himself from an accusation), but in 30 G.-P.² = 36 W.² he claims to have wanted and to have obtained balanced justice for poor and rich alike (he positively states what he had planned to do and did).

Our fragment also seems to be connected to 3, 5, and 7 G.-P.² = 4, 4b–c, and 5 W.² The slavery of "many" Athenians, which is the main topic presented as having been solved by Solon at 1–15a, had been predicted by Solon in 3.23–25 G.-P.² = 4.23–25 W.² Our fragment focuses mainly on this phenomenon, whereas in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² greater attention goes to the description of the *hybris* of the "leaders" of the *demos*, which seems to have been a cause or the only cause of it in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² (cf. Introd. chap. 3). However, it is certain that both fragments call "slavery" one of the situations of social stress in Athens on which Solon appears to be willing to intervene or is proud of having intervened. Therefore we cannot rule out, in principle, that what Solon calls "slavery" in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² was something different from what is "slavery" in our fragment, and that, consequently, the origin of the slavery described in it may have been debts (we simply do not know). However, lexical consistency invites us to draw a connection between our fragment and 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², with the result that the audience understands both that Solon's prediction came true and that the Athenians have been insensible in not listening to him. In light of this probable intertextuality between 30 and 3 G.-P.² = 36 and 4 W.², the enslaved Athenians of 30 G.-P.² = 36 W.² appear to be "a great image of the totality of the debilitating and corrupting effects" of the contrasts between classes and factions depicted in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.² (Almeida 2003, 227). In 3.9 G.-P.² = 4.9 W.² Solon presents the ἡγεμόνες δήμου as being unable to κατέχειν κόρον (and in 5 G.-P.² = 4b–c W.² he had wished that they could); in 30.22 G.-P.² = 36.22 W.² he maintains that he has managed to also κατέχειν δῆμον. Solon's ability in 30 G.-P.² =

36 W.^{2} to ξυναρμόζειν violence and justice, and to ἁρμόζειν the rights of both the rich and the poor may be seen as the effect of making everything ἄρτια with everything else, which was the first and last expected result of Eunomia in 3.32 and 39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32 and 39 W.^{2}; after all, denouncing *hybris* and the violations of Dike is the focus of 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, which proclaims the restoration of *dike* to be the focus of at least the second part of 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} The last image of 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}, the shield-bearer also appears to resume the image of the wolf among the dogs in 30.26 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.26 f. W.^{2} (on 3 and 30 G.-P.^{2} = 4 and 36 W.^{2} see above all Stehle 2006, 89–94).

Apart from the first and last two verses of the fragment, the presence of the critics is less pervasive in our fragment than in 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2} and Solon's own voice dominates throughout. At the same time Solon filters all the criticisms through his own ideology, and does not let any hostile voice surface in direct quotation (differently from what he had done elsewhere, especially in fr. 29^a G.-P.^{2} = 33 W.^{2}). He also refuses to identify his actions and intentions with any of the existing factions ("they are all dogs": Stehle 1997, 259). The δέ of ἐγὼ δέ may (but does not necessarily) presuppose that Solon conceived of this poem as the answer to another symposiast, perhaps challenging Solon to admit his failure or criticising his results as falling short of the plan of reforms which he had originally advertized. In any case, the initial question only pretends to challenge the audience and to give up their criticism about what had not been done, since Solon spends the following 17 verses describing what he has concretely done and ends up rebutting the criticism only from 20b to 25. The context of the performance of our fragment was probably that of the ἑταιρεία at a symposium, as it is quite difficult to suppose that this poem was written for public performance at Athens, since Solon's proud reference to his ability to "restrain" the *demos* at 22 makes it less plausible than for any other fragment the idea that he had among his audience of 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} the ex-supporters from the popular party (Fernández Delgado 1999).

Apart from letting the critics' voice come less directly and frequently than in 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}, our poem lays out the main lines of Solon's political life, restates their coherence, and proclaims their permanence through the medium of written laws (cf. ad 19 f.), much more than it defends them from specific criticism. Solon mainly seems to find his own way to (re-)locate himself within a plurality of inclusive ἡμεῖς, and to deliver to his fellow-citizens a kind of political testament with a substantial lack of interest in their criticism. I agree with Mülke

2002, 366 that this self-encomium hardly seems to be designed to provide a διδαχή for them and for the future politics of Athens, as was maintained by Aelius Arist. 28.141: cf. Ferrara 1964a, 90 f.; García Novo 1979–1980, 202; Anhalt 1993, 138. In fact, the solitary hoplite of 7 G.-P.[2] = 5 W.[2] sets himself between the Athenians of the opposite factions: he defends both himself and them with his shield, and in a way he is the paradigm of how citizens should fight in the interest of a city and of its factions. But our fragment presupposes a less constructive imagery of more extreme isolation: it is difficult to suppose that Solon the wolf of 30.26 f. G.-P.[2] = 36.26 f. W.[2] is any longer interested in persuading and teaching the bitches attacking him on all sides.

1 f. τῶν is an article used as a relative pronoun (common: cf. at least in Hom. *Il.* 1.125; Theogn. 255 f., 583 f., where the relative clause is anticipated to the principal clause, as here). The prepositional οὕνεκα seems to be attested here for the first time, but it is common in fifth century tragedy. Unless the beginning δέ is correlated to μέν of ἐγὼ μέν (see below), the quotation in Aristotle can be considered to be a whole poem only if we assume that it belonged to a "sympotic chain" with Solon's verses taking up the remarks of a preceding symposiast, who might have performed the role of a critic of Solon's reforms (on the inceptive δέ, see ad 3.1 f. G.-P.[2] = 4.1 f. W.[2]).

Indeed it is commonly assumed that δέ 1 implies some opposition (e.g. Chambers 1990, 192), and ἐγώ, placed emphatically at the beginning of the verse, displays an apologetic stance. Solon may distinguish himself from the expectation of his critics, who are his implied interlocutors in this poem—a distinction which can be found in explicit terms between ll. 1–6a and 6b–9 of 29[b] G.-P.[2] = 34 W.[2] It may also imply the opposition between Solon's straightforward behavior and the inequality between promises and accomplishments which other inferior politicians would have exemplified. Another kind of opposition is at work, although more implicitly, in our fragment and in 29[b] G.-P.[2] = 34 W.[2]: in 29[b] the variance is between Solon and the αἱμύλος type of politician (cf. Introd. ad 29[b] G.-P.[2] = 34 W.[2]), whereas in our fragment the variance is between Solon and the ἄλλος ὡς ἐγώ of 20. It seems less likely that Solon also presupposes and reproposes here the opposition between Zeus and Hesiod's didactic plans in *Op.* 1–10 (cf. Mülke 2002, 369).

μέν in τῶν μέν seems to open another μέν-δέ opposition, of which no δέ follows. Jebb 1897, 103 suggests that the particle points to the distinction between the goals for which Solon "gathered the people" and

the actual results of his political efforts, which are left implicit in the text (so that δέ would also remain implicit). Mülke 2002, 369 considers the isolated μέν as emphasizing the relative τῶν, coll. Denniston 1954, 361. I agree that the opposition between the action of advertising goals for the "gathering of the people" and the action of (non) achieving results is most likely to be expected in these verses, and I wonder whether the δέ … μέν opposition conveys this more explicitly than is assumed by Jebb. Since τῶν μὲν … ξυνήγαγον is a subordinate relative that anticipates the τούτων of 2, ἐγὼ δέ should be taken more naturally with the independent interrogative phrase τί τούτων … ἐπαυσάμην of 2, from which it is separated by the relative pronoun. The underlying primary order of the interrogative phrase τῶν μὲν … ξυνήγαγον …, ἐγὼ δὲ τί τούτων … ἐπαυσάμην would thus have been altered by the emphatic anastrophe of ἐγώ to the beginning of the poem, involving the anticipation of δέ as well. The result would be the apparent inversion of the usual sequence μέν … δέ, as this δέ of ἐγὼ δέ in 1 would be accidentally inceptive and just a follow-on of the anastrophe.

τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον is paralleled e.g. by Hom. *Il.* 20.21 ὧν ἕνεκα ξυνάγειρα, Herod. 8.59 τῶν εἵνεκα συνήγαγε τοὺς στρατηγούς (also 9.82), or Thuc. 2.60 ἐκκλησίαν τούτου ἕνεκα ξυνήγαγον. Solon may have also just referred to the reasons for which he called the specific citizen assembly of which he speaks, or much more probably, he imagines himself speaking within a sympotic performance (so Campbell 1967, 251; Rhodes 1993, 174f.; Mülke 2002, 370f.), since the verb is commonly used for this action: e.g. Thuc. 2.60 (ἐκκλησίαν); Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 43.3, 44.2; *Hell.Oxy.* A.6.2 (δῆμον). But perhaps Solon also wanted to recall his institutional summoning of the entire people into one assembly; this would constitute a reference to the enlargement of the ἐκκλησία with the addition of the lowest social class of the *thetes*, if such an enlargement was really legislated by Solon (Introd. chap. 3): so, e.g., Vox 1984, 111. Finally, Solon may be referring to his having metaphorically "unified" the Athenian people by reducing the divisions which separated the various orders of the state (Sandys 1893, 44) for the sake of his projects. Less likely (although more likely in the opionion of Sandys 1893, loc.cit.) is the idea that here Solon recalls his achievement of creating a single popular party—but there is no hint in Solon's fragments at a lack of unity of the popular faction (nor specific historical testimonies).

All modern editors, from the third edition of Diehl's *Anthologia Lyrica* onwards, accept the punctuation proposed by R.C. Jebb *apud* Sandys 1893, 44, and later reaffirmed in Jebb 1897. With this interrogative punc-

tuation of 2, we can interpret τί as an interrogative adverb, with τούτων constructed with τυχεῖν: here Solon would be addressing the question posed to him by the malcontents who believed that he should have done more against the opposing faction: "why did I desist before I had attained those ends for which I gathered the people" (cf. Jebb 1897, 104). Or we may take τί as a neuter pronoun meaning "what?" and the object of τυχεῖν, and τούτων as a genitive partitive with τί, and have a more rhetorical interrogative with a negative sense equivalent to the assertion: "I did not stop until I realized all of the objectives which I had posed". This latter interpretation, which is the most common (argued for by Jaeger 1945, 452 n. 59, and last defended by Blaise 1995, 27), seems more consonant with the declarations of l. 17 and 29^{b}.6 G.-P.^{2} = 34.6 W.^{2}, where Solon maintains that he actually carried out all that he had promised. Now he perceives that he is being accused of not having done more, but thanks to his statement about the "completeness" of his action, he seems to imply that if the problems still remain unsolved, the fault lies with the citizenry and not himself (hence the emphasis on ἐγώ).

Diehl, in the second edition, had marked a semicolon after δῆμον and left only the remainder of 2 as an interrogative. This text presupposes that the τῶν of 1 summarizes preceding motivations, while we do not actually know if the poem had already begun before this verse, and can doubt this since various motivations are actually presented later on in the poem. Blass, up to the fourth edition of *Ath.Pol.* of 1903, puts a question mark after τί and one at the end of 2 (coll. Demosth. 20.160), thus introducing a very nervous couple of rhetorical interrogatives (the first anacolouthic, the second without interrogative particles or adverbs). This, as Masaracchia 1958, 346 has already noted, would be at variance with the thoughtful and unexcited persuasive stance that characterizes the rest of the poem.

3–6. συμμαρτυρεῖν is not attested before Solon, and it is not commonly used for calling a god to serve as witness and guarantor (but cf. Soph. *Ant.* 844f. Διρκαῖαι κρῆναι … ξυμμάρτυρας ὔμμ᾽ ἐπικτῶμαι). Also oath-making with the optative and ἄν is not common, and is a kind of replacement for the usual imperatives of this kind: ὅρκια ἴστω "let the god know my oath" of Hom. *Il.* 7.411; *HHom.Ap.* 84 etc: cf. also Magurano 1992, 202 n. 55 with further parallels. Both the adoption of this verb and the soft politeness of the optative may simply express the submission of Solon to the goddess Earth. Or they might convey the idea that the role of the voluntary pledge of Earth is to corroborate,

which follows from the evidence of Solon's arguments (Linforth 1919, 185). Or, alternatively, the soft tone of the optative might remind us that the testimony to which Gaia is called is not immediate, but set in the dimension of possibility and future time (cf. ἐν δίκηι χρόνου): Mülke 2002, 372. In any case, the preverb συν- stresses the certainty of Ge's future testimony against the concrete evidence of Solon's profitable results. Already in Homer the earth and chthonic divinities were often invoked as witnesses to oaths: cf. *Il.* 3.278 (rivers and earth), 14.274 (οἳ ἔνερθε θεοί), 15.36 (earth and sky), 19.259 (earth, Helios, Erinyes), *Od.* 5.184 (earth and sky, and the water of Styx). In particular, implying Ge as the guarantor of an oath was considered to be especially effective, since the perjurer risks rendering the land utterly sterile: cf. Aeschin. *Ctes.* 109–111 and Dieterich 1925, 54f. In Solon's context, apart from the primary function of being the most obvious personal witness for the liberation of the land, Ge may have connotations of special reliability as a witness, as a cult of Ge Themis existed in Athens, and is recorded by at least one inscription (Ge also had an altar near the sanctuary of Themis at Olympia: Pausan. 5.14.10), and according to Aesch. *Prom.* 209–211 Prometheus' mother was "Themis and Gaia, of many names but one form" (cf. Stafford 1997, 163f.). Finally, Solon's choice of this goddess was also determined at least in part by Ge's political connotations, which are understandable as a consequence of her being *kourotrophos*: when she dispenses her favor to a city, according to *HHom.* 30.11–13, αὐτοὶ δ' εὐνομίηισι πόλιν κάτα καλλιγύναικα / κοιρανέουσ', … / παῖδες δ' εὐφροσύνηι νεοθηλέϊ κυδιόωσι (*eunomia* is a term of obvious relevance to Solon's ideology, cf. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}); cf. also Aesch. *Sept.* 16–20; Plato, *Men.* 238b.

Solon's emphasis on Ge's divine might operates on a few different levels. Solon's introduction of the divine personification of Earth and her liberation greatly contributes to the sublimity of Solon's achievement. Beyond solving a social or economic problem, Solon has relieved the soil of the fatherland from burden and pains, and had thus acted as its liberator, as in the past the Earth had liberated herself and the other gods with the help of Cronus or as Zeus had liberated his brothers from the subjugation to Cronus (Hes. *Theog.* 160–188 and 492–506); in a way, Solon has a position towards Ge comparable to that of Zeus, who helped her out of her most recent captivity (Blaise 1995, 33). Cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 74f., where a plea is addressed to Zeus, Ge and the gods who are protectors of the city that ἐλευθέραν δὲ γῆν τε καὶ Κάδμου πόλιν / ζυγοῖσι δουλίοισι μὴ δῶτε. The idea that Ge is a natural pro-

tector of the fatherland underlies Solon's metaphorical identification of divinity and physical earth, and her special authority in the matter of fatherland "overrides" (Stehle 1997, 259) the criticism of Solon's opponents.

The earth, however, regularly attracts Solon's fondest attention (cf. 1.21 G.-P.^{2} = 13.21 W.^{2} 18.2 G.-P.^{2} = 24.2 W.^{2}, 37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2}; ad 27 G.-P.^{2} = 21 W.^{2}), as is understandable in a society where a strong concern for the agrarian dimension of wealth still characterizes the aristocracy to which Solon belongs; for Solon's specific veneration of the Attic earth, cf. Rudberg 1952. Ferrara 1964b, 66–68 even sees in our verses evidence of a sort of institutional religious cult of the Earth, which recalls the "Homeric" *Hymn to Demeter* and the mysteries of Ge organized by the Athenian *genos* of the Lycomidae at Phlya (Paus. 1.31.4; Hippol. *Conf.haer.* 5.20.5 f.).

The goddess Earth was especially important for the Athenians, who claimed to be born from the earth (autochthonous: cf. e.g. Plato, *Menex.* 237e–238a) and—probably not from the beginning but only at a certain point (cf. Rosivach 1987)—associated this ideal reconstruction of their past with the stories of their primeval kings Erichthonius/Erechtheus or Cecrops as being likewise born from the earth (Erechtheus was born from the ἄρουρα already according to Hom. *Il.* 2.546–549; cf. Miralles 1982; Vox 1984, 104). Thuc. 2.15.4 mentions a ἱερόν to Ge among the buildings of the pre-Theseus Athens, which may coincide with the *temenos* of Ge Olympia recorded by Pausan. 1.18.7, and the *Suidas* (κ 2193 Adler) ascribes to Erichthonius (nursling of Ge) the erection of an altar to Ge on the Acropolis. The same Pausanias (1.22.3) quotes a shrine of Ge Kourotrophos (cf. ad 37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2}) near the one of Demeter Chloe in the vicinity of the entrance to the Acropolis. In Gaia's honor athletic competitions were held in Cyrene (Pind. *Pyth.* 9.101 ff.).

The epithet μεγίστη was not common for the Earth goddess, but we do find it in Eur. *TrGF* (78)F839.1; cf. also *HHom.* 30.2 πρεσβίστην. μεγάλη occurs as an epithet for the non-personified earth e.g. in Hes. *Theog.* 622; Bacchyl. 5.24. According to Paus. 1.31.4 Ge was venerated at Phlya (see above) as "Megale Thea".

Solon's phrase δαίμονες Ὀλύμπιοι is without parallel. But the plural δαίμονες is used instead of θεοί in Hom. *Il.* 1.222 and 6.115. The reason why Solon adopts this phrase, whose common epic equivalent is θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσι, may certainly be for metrical convenience (so Mülke 2002, 372). But Solon could also have taken the word δαίμων to express, as it usually does in Homer, the divinity when it manifests itself as a super-

human uncontrollable force ("mana") actively modifying human life, in either positive or negative terms (cf. e.g. Bianchi 1953, 116–132)—the vitalism of nature may have been an important aspect of the cult of Earth within an agrarian society.

In any case, Ge does not seem to have been one of the Olympian gods, therefore δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων must be the objective genitive of μήτηρ, not the partitive genitive of μεγίστη (cf. Linforth 1919, 185; Mülke 2002, 373); on Ge μήτηρ, cf. *P.Derv*. 22.12. For the idea that the Olympian gods descended from Ge, cf., e.g., Hes. *Theog*. 45 and 105 f. (also *Op*. 563); *HHom*. 30.17; Soph. *TrGF* F269a51; Eur. *TrGF* (12)F182a; Ap.Rhod. 3.716. But Ge had a much larger progeny: Solon "telescopes" the progeny of Ge by emphasizing only the Olympians, and thus associating the primeval dimension of Ge with the city that the Olympian goddess Athena presides over, and who is promptly named at 8 (cf. Almeida 2003, 232).

The epithet μέλαινα evokes the idea of the physical visible color of the earth and in fact the relative pronoun τῆς refers to its concrete surface: Ruijgh 2004, 87 f. This emphasis on the physicality of the earth draws a stark contrast to the personificated goddess of 4, to whom a precise divine identity is provided (compare the physicality of a human shape which Hes. *Theog*. 106 consistently evokes, calling Ge εὐρύστερνος). This personified and markedly physical dimension of the goddess will be revived at 7, where the earth is made to share the condition of the peasants who till it (δουλεύουσα, ἐλευθέρα): cf. Römisch 1933, 80 f. Solon uses the epithet "black" for the (non-personified) earth in 32.5 G.-P = 38.5 W.² The earth is represented as being black as early as Achilles' shield in Hom. *Il*. 18.548 f. ἡ δὲ μελαίνετ᾽ ὄπισθεν, ἀρηρομένῃ δὲ ἐώικει, / χρυσείη περ ἐοῦσα (where the Σ ad loc., coll. already by Mülke 2002, 374, remarks: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν διαβολὴν τῶν βώλων μελανοῦται ἡ γῆ). "Black earth", which is widespread in archaic epic (cf. Hom. *Il*. 2.699, 15.715, 17.416, 20.494, *Od*. 11.365, 11.587, 19.111; *HHom.Ap*. 369; Hes. *Theog*. 69 and fr. 90.4; Asius, *PEG* 8.2), became one of the most frequently used epic phrases among the lyric poets: cf. Sapph. 1.10 and 20; Alcae. 38.10 and 130b14; Archil. 130.2; Semon. 1.14; Alcm. *PMGF* 89.3; Theogn. 878; Pind. *Nem*. 11.39; Bacchyl. 13.153; "Simon." *Anth.Pal*. 13.20 = *FGE* 945; *Anacreont*. 21.1; for other adjectives associating dark coloring with γῆ or with χθών, cf. Irwin 1974, 189 n. 77 and Ferrini 1979, 176 f.

The frequency of this epithet has led some scholars to assume that there are religious connotations at work in the adjective, which would contrast the goddess Ge with the sky in terms of brightness (cf. Harvey 1957, 216 f.; Irwin 1974, 187–193 more specifically connects the

opposition between the colors of the sky and the land with Parmenides' and the Pythagoreans' theory of opposing elements). The epithet may also recall the fertility that renders the earth worthy of our veneration. In fact, we can suppose that the adjective specifically indicates the rich and fertile soil of *humus*, in contrast to the clearer soil of clay, which was known to be comparatively less fruitful (cf. e.g. Theophr. *Caus.pl.* 2.4.13). For the interpretation of van Effenterre 1977 and L'Homme-Wéry 1996, both of whom identify the "black Earth" as the plain of Eleusis and believe that here Solon is evoking the partition of that recently conquered area cf. Introd. chap. 3 and n. 102.

Any attempt to emend the transmitted ἐν δίκηι χρόνου (e.g. ἐν Δίκης θρόνωι of Bergk and Wilamowitz in Bergk's third ed., which is then accepted by Hiller) seems unjustified. On the "justice of time", beyond 3.16 G.-P.[2] = 4.16 W.[2] τῶι δὲ χρόνωι, which also appears at the end of the verse (meaning the goddess Dike mentioned in 14), and in general 14 G.-P.[2] = 10 W.[2], see e.g. Anaximand. *VS* 12B1 διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (on which cf. Bernabé 1990); for the phrase πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὗρε δίκην, which is said to have been inscribed on the tomb of Aristocrates, cf. ad 1.8 G.-P.[2] = 13.8 W.[2]; Soph. *OT* 1213 f. ὁ πάνθ' ὁρῶν χρόνος … δικάζει; Eur. *TrGF* (12)F222 τήν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ' εἶναι Χρόνου, / δείκνυσι δ' ἡμῶν ὅστις ἐστὶ μὴ κακός. We can think of Chronos here as a divine personification who is going to impose the rule of justice, as Ziegler 1963, 647–653 suggests, especially on the basis of the contemporary Pherecyd. Syr. F14, F60, F65 f. Schibli = *VS* 7A8 f. and B1, which featured the triad of Zeus, Chronos and Chthonie "Earth" as the proto-divinities. It certainly seems to be the case that Dike and Chronos are personified in Eur. *TrGF* (12)F222 quoted above. But in the frame of the materialistic "naturalization" which *dike* undergoes in Anaximander (which is well described by Vlastos 1946, 174–178), and since in Solon *dike* cannot be a personification (in light of its syntactical function), it seems more plausible that "time" is likewise not a divine personification. The sense of the phrase would thus be "when time delivers judgment" (Rhodes 1993, 175) or "in the court of time" (if this specific sense of *dike* as a court of justice was already in use in the procedural law of Solon's time, as discussed by Gagarin 1974, 193 and 1986, 72–75), or "during a just procedure carried out in the course of time". In any case, this "judgment" may be taken metaphorically, and there is no need to think, along with Lewis 2006, 52, that Solon had actually been put on trial and perhaps even convicted in Athens, and that here he is appealing to a later exoneration.

The earth could not immediately testify to the substantial positive results of Solon's removal of the ὅροι, because the recovery of its full productivity would have taken time, in the course of which the blossoming earth would have set the record straight herself (so Havelock 1978, 255; a similar interpretation has been proposed by Blaise 1995, 32). The sense of δίκη as a norm to be followed to ensure the welfare of the city was also established in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², and is probably not absent from our fragment: here *dike* may mean both the formal procedure of justice and the principle of justice informing that procedure. In fact, in 3.14, 16 G.-P.² = 4.14, 16 W.² the action of *dike* inevitably coming and exacting the fitting punishment is also presented as being dependent upon the progression of time—in 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², however, the political behavior of failing to conform to *dike* is destined to lead Athens to ruin; in 30 G.-P.² = 36 W.² Solon's political behavior, which conforms to *dike*, is destined to prove salvific; both cases demonstrate the effectiveness of the procedure of *dike* for the stability of the city: cf. Almeida 2003, 202 and 233.

The relative clause τῆς ἐγώ ... πεπηγότας is an insertion interrupting the description of the might of Ge, which is resumed in the nominative case at 7—the syntax also helps to emphasize the sharp contrast between Ge's divinity and the indignity of the enslavement to which she had been reduced before Solon's reforms (Fernández Delgado 1999, 28–31; of course a goddess who is enslaved is an oxymoron, as remarked by Almeida 2003, 223). At the same time 7 explains the effect of Solon's liberation from the *horoi*, and through the continuative δέ (Denniston 1954, 163), which naturally picks up the nominatives of 5, it restates the indignity of Ge's past serfdom.

τῆς ἐγώ: the closeness of the article/relative and the subject syntactically connotes Solon's familiarity with Ge; also the adoption of the perfect participle πεπηγότας (focusing on the standstill of the ὅροι: this verb also appears with *horoi* in Lycurg. *Leoc.* 73; Aristophon, *PCG* 9.7; Lycoph. *Alex.* 1343) and the adverb πολλαχῆι contribute to the graphic effect of Solon's emphasis on the quantity and solidity of the *horoi*, and highlight both the gravity of the pre-existing problem and the difficulty of Solon's achievement.

This achievement is summarized in the contrast that is depicted in 7: the land that was "beforehand enslaved" is "now free". δουλεύειν, which is never attested before Solon, appears thrice in Herodotus, and is common in tragedy, and is most probably an Atticism (Pelissier 1911, 23). It is a legal word used for people who do not belong and are therefore not protected, essentially the subjects of those who wield power over them.

It seems harsher than the epic δμώς and δμώη, which designate the "dependents", usually referring to a servile condition, although the latter terms do not really seem to focus on that condition: Gschnitzer 1976, 2–13, 46–72; Beringer 1985, 48 f. By liberating Ge, Solon has reinstated her in her full capacity as a member of the Athenian community, thus entitling her again to be an authoritative witness of his operation (Blaise 1995, 31). The emphasis on the freedom of Ge, which is at the end of the passage concerned with her (7), is reiterated again at the end of the passage concretely describing the serfdom and liberation of the citizens (15), which the liberation of Ge anticipates metaphorically.

This liberated land has usually been assumed to be the land of the indebted peasants, the *hectemoroi*, which would have been marked by ὅροι "mortgage stones"; Solon would have "liberated" their land, and thus them, from the oppression of debt and its symbols. But the majority of scholars in the last few decades agree that there is no evidence in our passage to suggest a connection between *hectemoroi* and ὅροι: rather, the land liberated by Solon may be the common (or sacred) land upon which private aristocrats had encroached, in which case the ὅροι would be the boundary markers signalling the expropriated land, and "liberating it" would merely mean returning it to the service of the common weal (for more details about past and current interpretations, see Introd. chap. 3). The obscurity of the concrete legal function of the ὅροι is in contrast to their symbolic value, which is quite obvious: they are an entity foreign to the *polis*, disruptive of its unity and calm, and radically at variance with the σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα of 3.14 G.-P.² = 4.14 W.², which should not be altered or challenged: Almeida 2003, 223.

Also the verb designating Solon's action is ambiguous: according to two of the possible meanings of ἀναιρεῖν (cf. *LSJ*) the verb can mean that Solon had the ὅροι "removed" or physically "destroyed", but it is also possible that Solon simply "nullified"/"abolished" the sense and fuction of the ὅροι (Ober 2006, 454). However, this distinction may not apply to a culture where the monumental aspect of the record matters quite a bit, and records were invalidated by removing or destroying them: see Thomas 1989, 50–59, who *inter alia* reminds us of the case of Timotheus (as narrated by Demosth. 49.12), who tried to defraud his creditors simply by digging up the *horoi* on his estate, in an attempt at invalidating the creditors' claims.

8–12. The verses dwell, in a descending climax, on the two most "dramatic" recoveries of citizens which were brought about by Solon: the

people who had been exiled and the people who had run away voluntarily (I see no good reason to believe that these two groups of people should coincide, and thus I accept the emendation of δ'ἀναγκαίης to τ'ἀναγκαίης, which is suggested by B. Snell and followed by Gentili and Prato). Concerning the exiles, Solon makes it clear that some had been "sold abroad" according to the law, but others without the enforcement of the law (in any case, their expulsion had been determined by other people: note the passive verb πραθέντας). A similarly distressing phenomenon (perhaps the same one) is described, as being a still unresolved problem, in 3.23–25 G.-P.^{2} = 4.23–25 W.^{2}, where the same participle πραθέντες at 25 appears. Concerning the runaways, Solon emphasizes that escaping had been their own initiative (note the intransitive diathesis of φυγόντας), although dictated by "necessity". 13–15a describe a third category of serfdom which Solon brought to freedom, namely the serfdom of those who had lost their rights as citizens, but who did not leave the Attic fatherland. We are given a clear description of each group's cause of suffering and their degradation: to have been sold abroad, to have lost the Attic dialect (cf. Colvin 1999, 52), and to fear their owners/leaders. In fact, the emphasis on the indignity of their serfdom and on their physical liberation transforms Solon's political operation into a sort of heroic action in favor of his fellow-citizens (Stehle 1997, 260). But no explanation is provided for why they have been so distressed: for historical attempts at justifying their hardships (it is particularly difficult to understand the slavery abroad), cf. Introd. chap. 3. The same emphasis on the acuteness of the problem and consequently the difficulty of his work, which Solon pursues in respect to the liberation of Ge at 6 πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας (cf. ad loc.), is also found in reference to the citizens whom Solon liberated: the exiled are πολλοί and the fugitives are πολλαχῆι πλανώμενοι; there is no specification needed for the quantity of the people "enslaved" at home, since, differently from the exiles or the fugitives, their problem would have been well known to everyone in Solon's Athenian audience. The imagery that Solon constructs in the audience with these correspondences is at least in part that the citizens "brought back" to the fatherland (8) positively replace the disappointing burdens of the *horoi* which were "taken away" from the Earth of the same fatherland.

θεόκτιτος displays the *topos* of the divine foundation of Athens, which will later be one of the typical ideological motifs of Attic drama: cf. the parallel adjective θεόδμητος of Soph. *El.* 707; Eur. *IT* 1449 and *Hipp.* 974, already attested for the ramparts of Troy in Hom. *Il.* 8.519 (in fact

the -η- of θεόδμητος could not fit in the eleventh element of the trimeter, but Solon might have placed it in the first, fifth or ninth element, as the tragedians do). θεόκτιτος is again only attested much later (of Athens in Limen. *CA* 36 f.; of Troy in Munatius, *Anth.Pal.* 9.103.3; also adesp. *TrGF* F85; *GV* 1485.5 = *SGO* 01/20/26, in the first/second century AD), although it may be compared with the Homeric ἐϋκτίμενος and ἐύκτιτος of Anacr. *PMG* 358.5, which is usually applied to individual architectural elements (tower, altar, wall etc.), but also to the entire city of Αἰπύ in Hom. *Il.* 2.592 and the cities of Argos in Hes. fr. 129.10 and Iolcus in Hes. fr. 211.5 (εὔδμητος is used of Troy in *Il.* 21.516 and in Hes. fr. 235.4). The different usage of Hesiod, who uses the Homeric εὔδμητος for Troy but ἐύκτιτος for the existing Greek contemporary cities, may lead us to suppose that the latter word was more "fashionable" in the age of colonization, since κτίζειν and its derivatives had a relevant role in this process (cf. also 11.5 G.-P.^{2} = 19.5 W.^{2} οἰκισμῶι), as the (mainly post-Homeric) designation of the primeval settlement in a land and the first material foundation of a city on the ground (Casevitz 1985, 222–239). On the contrary, the epic δέμειν was probably less evocative, since it mainly seems to deal with the quality and mode of the "building" of single architectural units (houses, or more often, single rooms or walls: Rougier-Blanc 2005, 312 f.). The focus on the religious greatness of Athens is perfectly suitable to Solon's usual feelings for his fatherland, and it also reflects the wishful nostalgia of the exiles.

The verb ἀνάγειν, usually meaning to "lead" something "up" from a low position towards a high one, is certainly not the most banal verb one could use for "bringing back" people from abroad to their homeland, although this sense of the verb is paralleled by Mimn. 10.1 G.-P.^{2} = 11.1 W.^{2} and a few Homeric passages (see *LfgrE* I.122), in particular Hom. *Il.* 15.29 f. However, since this verb is often used for the raising of the dead (cf. Hes. *Theog.* 626; Aesch. *Ag.* 1023; Plato, *Resp.* 521c; Nagy 1973, 175), here it might be loaded with some emotional resonance: it is as if Solon had lifted his citizens out from the shadows of the underworld. Many foundation myths presented the oecists as being supported by divine help: here Solon seems to present himself as re-doing what the founders (divine as presupposed by the widespread poetic epithet θεόκτιτος used for Athens) had first accomplished. According to Vox 1984, 112 Solon celebrates, contrary to the mainstream values of the age of colonization, his abnormal enterprise of not having founded a new city, but of having re-founded Athens. *Pace* Mülke 2002, 381, Vox's hypothesis is even more plausible, if we consider that this contrariness to the mainstream values of

the other colonizing cities seems to have been broadly shared by Athens in the sixth century, when this city did not colonize almost at all. I would not exclude the possibility that this detail of Solon's self-image constitutes a further point of differentiation from Mimnermus. The poet from Colophon, whose views on other topics Solon certainly addressed and criticized at least twice (cf. Introductions ad 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2} and 26 G.-P.^{2} = 20 W.^{2}), had actually been among the lyric authors of the poetics of colonization as well as one of the initiators of the historical-*ktisis* elegy (cf. Mazzarino 1966, 37 ff.; Dougherty 1993 and Dougherty 1994).

At least in the classical age the dichotomy of ἐκδίκως/ἀδίκως ... δικαίως belongs to judicial language: cf. the distinction between just and unjust murders in Antiph. *Or.* Bβ.9 (p. 110 Decleva Caizzi) μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ~ *Or.* Γα.3 (p. 123) and *Or.* Δδ.8 (p. 129); cf. also καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως in Andoc. 1.1 and 1.135. Also δίκαιος and ἔκδικος (instead of ἄδικος *metri gratia*: Gagarin 1974, 192; it would have a different nuance from ἄδικος according to Mülke 2002, 381, but the frequency with which the two epithets gloss one another in lexicographers and scholiasts does not support this idea) likely focuse here on the formal aspect of justice. As is correctly remarked by Linforth 1919, 187, Woodhouse 1938, 132 and Blaise 1995, 32, the two adverbs refer to δίκη as the custom of the community and mean "legally"/"illegally", in formal terms, and not "deservedly"/"undeservedly", enabling Solon to refrain from expressing his opinion about the righteousness of selling citizens as slaves abroad. Lewis 2004, 26 f. and 2006, 119, who considers the enslavement of citizens to be a product of the raids of gangs or small parties, explains that the two adverbs refer to the fact that in some cases these actions would have been authorized by magistrates (δικαίως), and in other cases unauthorized.

On ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ χρειοῦς see Introd. chap. 3. van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 66 connect this to ὑπ' ἀνάνκας ἐκόμενος "retained by obligation" in the Gortyn code (6.46 f.), describing the motivation (kinship obligations?) according to which someone may ransom someone else who has been captured in a foreign city. But the Gortyn phrase refers to the ransomer and not to the slave/prisoner to be ransomed.

γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικήν: Ionic, if the Athenian refugees had emigrated to the flourishing Ionic cities of Asia Minor (Mülke 2002, 380; but 4.2 G.-P.^{2} = 4a.2 W.^{2}, which defines Athens or Attica as γαῖα Ἰαονίας, leaves little room for this hypothesis) or Doric, if the Athenians were sold as slaves or took refuge in Megara, Aegina, or central Greece (see Figueira 1993, 82, who tries to reconstruct a network of connections

between the Aeginetan and the Athenian nobles favored by Draco's laws, versus the anti-Aeginetan trends of Solonian "democracy"). The dialect is defined by the region where it is spoken, not from its political/cultural center (named at 8), according to a distinction which is paralleled in Herod. 6.138 γλῶσσάν τε τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τρόπους τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἐδίδασκον τοὺς παῖδας.

The verb ἵημι is used in Homer for the production of sounds: cf. e.g. *Il.* 3.152 and 221, *Od.* 12.192. For γλῶσσα = "language", cf. *Il.* 2.804; for γλῶσσαν + adjective of nationality + ἱέναι, cf. Herod. 1.57 and 9.16; Choer. *PEG* 6.2; Thuc. 3.112.4.

ὡς ἂν ... πλανωμένους is not easy syntax, and the emendation of the first two monosyllables to ὥστε following Platt 1896, 251 f., or to ὡς δή following West (*IEG*) would make it easier. The construction of ἄν with a participle or an infinitive is post-Homeric (all the examples with a participle seem to date from the classical age in Kühner-Gerth I.242 f.). However, the single parallel of Theogn. 1034–1036 οὐκ ἂν ῥηϊδίως θνητὸς ἀνὴρ προφύγοι, / οὔτ' ἂν πορφυρέης καταδὺς ἐς πυθμένα λίμνης / οὔθ' ὅταν αὐτὸν ἔχηι Τάρταρος ἠερόεις (where 1036 shows that the participial phrase in 1035 was understood to be as equivalent to a finite subordinate) makes Solon's *paradosis* defendable. Thus, Solon's verse would have the sense "as wanderers far and wide like them would do" (ὡς ἂν γλῶσσαν ἱεῖεν πολλαχῆι πλανώμενοι, according to the paraphrase suggested by Stahl 1907, 336): they have been wanderers and thus the dialectal coloring of their language is muted, as indeed one might expect would happen to a wanderer. In my interpretation ὡς has both comparative and causal nuances, and ἄν highlights the likelihood (= not certainty) in Solon's explanation of the reason why these citizens have lost full mastery of their original linguistic intonation. The phrase is an indication that a precise perception of *polis*-identity was already at work (Bowie 2007, 48). In turn, this perception justifies why the life of a refugee abroad as presented by Solon was perceived as such a painful situation (compare also Tyrtae. 6 G.-P.^{2} = 10 W.^{2}), and it explains why reconstituting the Athenian linguistic community with the return of those who had forgotten their Attic dialect (Ker 2000, 323) was felt to be such a great achievement.

13–15a. The citizens described in these verses may be the farmers oppressed by debt bondage, or even reduced to *atimia* as a consequence of debt slavery, but not (yet) sold abroad; these verses might also refer to the poorest class, unable to defend themselves against the *hybris* of the rich despotic leaders, such as the lawless ἡγεμόνες of 3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}; cf.

Introd. chap. 3; for the sense of δουλοσύνη as the condition of the people who are "without strength vis-a-vis those who have power over them", see above ad 3–6. Solon's reference to the "temperament" of the δεσπόται slightly favors the latter interpretation (if debts, rather than hybristic raids and other vexations, were the only problem in the relationship between enslaved citizens and enslaving δεσπόται, then perhaps ἤϑη, pointing to the patience or lack thereof in exacting payments, would be a rather indirect way to describe the problem). The semantics of δεσπόται does not help us to decide. δέσποινα in Homer simply designates the "house-lady", as opposed to the servants, thus applying only to the sphere of the *oikos* (Klees 1975, 14–24); cf. Hippon. 40.2 = 49.2 Degani for δεσπότης as a (violent) owner of slaves; in the classical age it is the technical term for the antithesis of "slave". It seems to have a political sense already in Archil. 3.5, where it refers to the military leaders of Euboia; the negative political sense of δεσπότης is usually considered to date from Herod. 3.89, but cf. Theogn. 849 δῆμον φιλοδέσποτον. In conclusion, the Homeric, and most common meaning, favors the idea that the relationship described here is between (debt) slaves and their owners, but the Archilochean meaning leaves room for the idea that Solon's δεσπόται are hybristic aristocrats.

ἐνϑάδ' αὐτοῦ is an idiomatic Attic expression (after the Homeric ἐνϑάδ(ε) αὖϑι: *Il.* 23.674 and *Od.* 5.208): cf. Soph. *OC* 78; Eur. *Tr.* 716 (*v.l.*); Aristoph. *Vesp.* 765 f., *Plut.* 1187; Eup. *PCG* 392.4. The sequence δουλίην ἔχοντας … ἐλευϑέρους picks up on the result already achieved by Solon with Ge, as described at 7.

ἀεικής in Hesiod already seems to be a specialized term for "slavery" and what comes with it, e.g. the bonds of 3.25 G.-P.^{2} = 4.25 W.^{2} (cf. ad loc.).

The middle form τρομεῖσϑαι is already used in Homer for expressing a particularly intense terror, namely the fear of death: *Od.* 16.446.

The hemistich 15a is a clue to the whole passage 8–15, and is set most emphatically at its end. As Raaflaub 2004, 54 f. and Lewis 2006, 121 f. have made clear, Solon certainly knows and uses the abstract term δουλοσύνη (3.18, 12.4, 15.4 G.-P.^{2} = 4.18, 9.4, 11.4 W.^{2}) and speaks of "free" individuals (both here and in 7). But the word for the opposite idea, ἐλευϑερία, never appears in his extant fragments. It is possible that this other idea of ἐλευϑερία had not been completely conceptualized yet: Solon's views of freedom seem to merely "reflect the fundamental distinction between a man whose person is subject to the forcible necessity of another, and one who is not under such compulsion" (Lewis 2006, 121 f.). It is perhaps for

that reason that Solon dwells on the different degrees and consequences of "slavery" quite a bit (8–14 of our fragment, and 3.23–25 G.-P.[2] = 4.23–25 W.[2]), but never on the blessings of "freedom".

15b–17. These verses repeat the rhetorical content of the beginning of the fragment, which is concerned with concrete actions and results, and oppose this to Solon's activity as a legislator, developed in 18–20a. In addition to the correlation of μέν in 15 and δ(έ) in 18, the connection and difference between actions and results "without the feature of iterability" on the one hand (Mülke 2002, 388) and laws on the other is emphasized by the use of the compound ξυναρμόσας in 16, the simple ἁρμόσας in 19, and the parallelism of ἔρεξα in 17 and ἔγραψα in 20. At stake is the opposition/parallelism between concrete action, combining βία and δίκη, and thoughtful legislative activity. The juxtaposition of the latter to βία is less paradoxical than it may seem to us, because in Greek θεσμός also implies the idea of imposition (cf. Blaise 1995, 29f. and n. 21, correctly etymologyzing the word as coming from τίθημι: thus the sense of the word is a rule imposed upon those for whom the authority of the imposing party makes the θεσμός a sort of obligation, as described, e.g., by Ostwald 1969, 12–19 and Papakonstantinou 2008, 133–135)—although the θεσμοί are an imposition consisting of the very smooth ἁρμόζειν of a δίκη suitable for everyone and unaccompanied by βία. A completely different interpretation is offered by L'Homme-Wery 1996, according to whom ἔρεξα refers to Solon's activity as a militaty leader in the liberation of the fertile land of Eleusis; hence what he would have harmonized are his activities as a leader in war and as a legislator; but in order to agree with this interpretation we must first accept the identification of the land which was "liberated" by Solon at 7 as the Eleusinian land seized from Megara, which is quite speculative (cf. Introd. chap. 3).

Between the two variants κράτει νόμου "with the force of law" (having united violence and justice) of the London Aristotle papyrus and κράτει, ὁμοῦ "in the exercise of power together" (having united violence and justice) of the Berlin papyrus, of Aristides and Plutarch, the latter has won greater favor. The "force of the law" never seems to have been an idiomatic expression in Greek, whereas there are numerous parallels for the *hendiadys* linking κράτος "political power/authority" to βίη (Hom. *Od.* 4.415, 6.197, 13.143, 18.139; Hes. *Theog.* 385, 437). Furthermore, immediately afterwards Solon uses a different term, θεσμοί, for his laws, while νόμος expresses the idea of law being the collective endorsement

of the people, and is thus used mainly for decrees made by the people's assembly (= not imposed by a legislator), which probably entered into use in the post-Clisthenic era (it is certainly never attested before it). It is not by chance that in a late fifth century inscription reporting verbatim the text of the homicide law of Draco, the inscription refers to the law as νόμος while introducing the text of this ancient law, but the text itself of the ancient law refers to itself as θεσμός: *IG* I³.104.4 f. (νόμος) and 20 (θεσμός): cf. Ostwald 1969, 20–56 and Papakonstantinou 2008, 133–135. Nor should the pleonasm ὁμοῦ + a verb composed with συν- (ξυν-) be a problem: cf. Hom. *Od.* 12.424; Soph. *Trach.* 545; Eur. *Hel.* 104; Jaeger 1957, 378–380.

Hesiod contrasts the concepts of justice and force/violence (cf. *Op.* 275 f., where Perses is asked to give heed to Dike and to put βίη completely out of his mind; *Op.* 276–285 theorize a behavioral distinction between men and animals according to the reliance on *dike* by the former and βίη by the latter: cf. Vox 1983b, 307 f.; see also, later, e.g., Theogn. 547 f.). Solon leaves Hesiod's perspective of individual ethics behind in the name of a more concrete *Realpolitik*, and uses βίη in its Homeric sense of "force" without hybristic connotations to identify one of the prerogatives he ascribes to the leading class in 31.4 G.-P.² = 37.4 W.² (cf. ad loc.); cp. also πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται in 1.41 G.-P.² = 13.41 W.² Moreover, the idea that justice and force can be linked in a leader's governing actions is anything but rare: cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 16.542 (Sarpedon rules Lycia δίκῃσί τε καὶ σθένει); Pind. fr. 169a.1–3 νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς / … / ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον (whatever *nomos* means here); Aesch. *TrGF* 381.1 ἰσχὺς συζυγοῦσι καὶ δίκη, *Ch.* 244 (Electra predicts that Kratos and Dike will come together to avenge her father); Soph. *El.* 475 f. δίκαια κράτη. Solon adapts the traditional opposition, allowing for a triangle of concepts, where the necessary κράτος of the politician frames and justifies the synthesis of force and justice (ξυναρμόσας and ἁρμόσας are coincident aorist participles that define a specific nuance or a modification of the action expressed by the leading verb: Smyth 1956, § 1872). The resulting statement is that his κράτος (superiority/power) consists not only of βία, but also of *dike*—differently from the pure βία of the τύραννος, which Solon never endorses: cf. 29ᵇ.7 f. G.-P.² = 34.7 f. W.²; Zunino 2004, 9. Therefore, it is true that "the speaker's use of βία for his own action signals the failure of πειθώ and challenges the implied audience to recognize from the pre-reform poems that Solon has tried the non-violent method" (Stehle 2006, 92). But the term βία may also focus on a criticism leveled against him and reflect the mentality of these critics—either

members of the leading class, who may have felt the imposition of Solon's δίκη over their past ὕβρις most acutely, or people of lower classes, whose attempts at changing the *status quo* Solon admits to have "restrained" in 22. In any case, the specific features of Solon's endorsement of βία is very much in tune with his ideals: differently from the expectations of his ex-supporters, who favor his seizure of tyrannical power, Solon passed from κωτίλλειν λείως not to τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον (29^b.3 G.-P.[2] = 34.3 W.[2]), but to synthetizing δίκη and βία.

As observed already by Vox 1984, 135 and Blaise 1995, 29, in 15 f. κράτος evokes Zeus in his capacity as κράτει μέγιστος (Hes. *Theog.* 49; also μέγα κρατεῖ *Theog.* 403), and thus emphasizes his unconquerable status; Zeus is the father of Dike, but at the same time Kratos and Bie are inseparable from him (*Theog.* 385–388 "they have no house apart from Zeus nor any seat, nor any path except that on which the god leads them, but they are always seated next to Zeus etc."). Therefore, at 17 Solon might also propose that he is the human equivalent of Zeus τελεσφόρος (the epithet appears in *HHom.Jov.* 2, but this capacity of Zeus is already expressed in 1.17 G.-P.[2] = 13.17 W.[2]).

This is the second passage, together with 29^b.6 G.-P.[2] = 34.6 W.[2], in which Solon asserts that he has done what he promised to do. In fact, according to Phanias of Eresus (fr. 20 Wehrli), in order to become archon Solon had promised different things than those which he actually accomplished, and thus cheated both the poor and the rich (cf. Introd. ad 5 G.-P.[2] = 4b, c W.[2]): for instance he may have told the poor that he wanted to divide all the land between them and the rich that he would defend the credit they held against the poor. Of course the fact that he states twice the straightforward immutability of his plans does not exclude the possibility that Solon may have resorted to some occasional episodes of κωτίλλειν λείως—these episodes would simply be another "Odyssean" feature of Solon: cf. Vox 1984, 139 f. Or, here Solon is trying obsessively to avoid the risk of being charged with perjury, as Archil. 173 charged Lycambes, or Alcae. 129.22–24 charged Pittacus when the latter broke his promise to support the faction of Alcaeus and joined Myrsilus (as we see from l. 25 of Alcaeus, perjury clearly added a surcharge of blame to the existing charge of damaging(?) the city). Apart from the question of the correctness of his actions and laws, he would also turn out to be an unreliable politician.

18–20a. The verses clarify in concrete terms what is also maintained abstractly in Sol. 7 G.-P.[2] = 5 W.[2] See also the Introd. ad 40 G.-P.[2] = 31 W.[2]

This is the only hint that Solon makes in his surviving poetry toward his non-economic-social reforms, i.e. his legislative activity. As Blaise 1995, 31 remarks, here the law is presented for the first time as presupposing a complex relationship between the one who legislates it and those who will be subject to it, as opposed to the relationship between the lawmaker and the divine order handed down by Zeus (as in Hesiod): the law is seen as natural product of order based on its beneficial conformity to the needs of its subjects. The concept of a law's aptness for all of its subjects is obviously different from those of equality before the law or democracy, but is, however, an antecedent to these concepts: cf. ad 3.32–39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32–39 W.^{2} and 29^b.9 G.-P.^{2} = 34.9 W.^{2}

Apart from the different chronology (see ad 15b–17), the more ancient ϑεσμός differs from νόμος principally in its associations with the sacredness and superior authority of the imposing agent, who is the legislator, but sometimes also a god: cf. Hirzel 1907; Ostwald 1969, 9–54; Gschnitzer 1997, 5–10; Papakonstantinou 2008, 133–135. From Plut. *Sol.* 19.4 (ὁ ϑεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὅδε), one of the laws of the ἄξονες ascribed to Solon seems to have referred to its text as ϑεσμός, and certainly one of Draco's laws labeled itself in this way (cf. *IG* I^3.104, discussed above ad 15b–17); in a fragment from Cratinus' *Nomoi* (*PCG* 134) where Solon seems to speak of his law, the term ϑεσμός is used.

ἁρμόσας resumes ξυναρμόσας of 16, in the same sense of the former compound, according to a stylistic device which is widely attested in Greek and in other Indo-European languages from, e.g., Hom. *Il.* 5.842–844 (cf. Watkins 1967; Renehan 1969, 77–87 and 1976, 11–27), and likewise indicates an action coincident with ἔγραψα (cf. ad 15a–17). Whereas ξυναρμόσας of 16 expresses the combination of two lines of conduct framed by the exercise of κράτος (cf. ad 15b–17), ἁρμόσας of 19 expresses the "fine-tuning" of δίκη to the specific needs of everyone. The result is, clearly, that the uniqueness of δίκη as the aim and means of Solon's activity is emphasized no less than its suitability to every individual. In my opinion, the definition of δίκη as εὐϑεῖα "straight", since it is singular, achieves the same end, although it evokes the terminology of Homer's and Hesiod's δίκαι "sentences" which are σκολιαί "crooked" (*Il.* 18.508, 23.580; *HHom.Dem.* 152; Hes. *Theog.* 86, where see West 1966b ad loc., *Op.* 36, 226, fr. 286.2; Tyrtae. 1b.6 G.-P.^{2} = 4.6 W.^{2}). Differently, in 3.36 G.-P.^{2} = 4.36 W.^{2} (cf. ad loc.) the Hesiodic plural has been adopted without changes (although already with the verb εὐϑύνει). It has been argued that δίκη means here, as well as in 3.36 G.-P.^{2} = 4.36 W.^{2}, the concrete "procedure" or "sentence" of the trial, as in Hesiod

(e.g. Römisch 1933, 46 f.; Blaise 1995, 30). It seems simpler to assume that, whereas in 3.36 G.-P.^{2} = 4.36 W.^{2} δίκας has the traditional sense of procedural sentences passed by individual officials, in 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, Solon presents the abstract principle of "justice" as the objective of his laws, so that the operation of individual magistrates and their procedures are consequently eclipsed and therefore become less crucial (cf. Almeida 2003, 229–232; Lewis 2006, 124): cf. Theogn. 329 f. καὶ βραδὺς εὔβουλος εἷλεν ταχὺν ἄνδρα διώκων, / Κύρνε, σὺν εὐθείῃι θεῶν δίκηι ἀθανάτων (δίκη is also singular in the two other passages from the classical age where it takes the epithet εὐθύς: Pind. *Nem.* 10.12 καρπὸν εὐθείαι συνάρμοξεν δίκαι; Aesch. *Eum.* 433 κρῖνε δ' εὐθεῖαν δίκην). If δίκη refers here to the procedure of the trial, the singular number, rather than the more common Homeric-Hesiodic plural, probably emphasizes the idea of a single procedural standard of the law and the "ideal administration of justice" (cf. Munding 1959, 12–24). Therefore, Solon relies on a single standard of law (or of procedure) for the rich and poor (on the value of the social distinction between κακοί and ἀγαθοί here, cf. Introd.) from the perspective of the "similarity" of the citizens—but his is a standard of justice (or of procedure) suitable for citizens of all classes, just like νόος ἄρτιος of 8.4 G.-P.^{2} = 6.4 W.^{2} and the Eunomia of 3.32 and 39 G.-P.^{2} = 4.32 and 39 W.^{2}, who knows how to render all things ἄρτια in diverse situations (Vox 1984, 136 f.). This statement has often been assumed to advertise Solon's idea of the equality of all citizens before the law (cf. most recently Almeida 2003, 231). However, the fact that here Solon uses the adverb ὁμοίως "in a similar way" and not something like ἴσως (cf. the future Athenian ideal of ἰσονομία), but at the same time in 29^b.9 G.-P.^{2} = 34.9 W.^{2} he denies having aimed at ἰσομοιρία, must lead us to evaluate Solon's idea of equality before the law with the greatest prudence (cf. Raaflaub 1996b, 164 n. 53, and Cartledge 1996 on the differences between the political meaning of ἴσος and ὅμοιος).

As one might expect from a poet-politician, it is in view of his laws that Solon makes the most explicit affirmation of his own activity as an author, i.e. his *sphragis* (see the case, partially parallel, of Critias fr. 3 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}); he also uses a verb which refers to the medium in which his laws were fixed, and thus has a specific impact on his activity as an "author": ἔγραψα. Compare the equally explicit way in which, radically at variance with our fragment, Solon the poet refers to his poetry as "song" in 2.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 1.2 W.^{2} Solon the legislator shares this authorial (literary) "pride of writing" with many epigraphs of the archaic age where laws

or regulations are inscribed, often brimming with references to τὸ γράφος, τὰ ἐγραμμένα, the letters (φοινικήια) etc., or their permanency and monumental impressiveness, which is a specific privilege of epigraphical writing that stands in contrast to the mutability of the oral tradition: cf. e.g. Hölkeskamp 1992a, 1992b; Eder 1986; Musti 1986; Camassa 1988; Thomas 1995. Indeed, writing down the law causes its unalterable fixity and thus favors the equality which in 18 f. Solon presents as a key feature of his legislation (see in particular Hedrick 1994, 167–174). As Stehle 1997, 260 finely observes, the use of writing emphasizes the originality of Solon's operation no less than the unconventional synthesis of βία and *dike*, since writing "sets itself above exchange of speech in assembly or symposium", so that the poem "is designed to replace the speaker by an internally constructed, fixed figure whose activity is past and whose significance is established". In fact, if we take into consideration that the poem from which this fragment derives was in all likelihood actually performed orally at a symposium, it seems likely that Solon's reference to the medium of writing would have neatly reminded his audience of the multi-layered character of his activity, and in particular of his activity as a lawgiver, which his poetry only presupposes and "ideologizes" in an implicit form.

20b–22a. These verses confirm and explain why it was necessary to join βία and *dike*: the κέντρον, clearly symbolizing some strong use of power, would not have been enough to "restrain" the *demos*—we are to infer that only the combination of prodding and justice could succeed at this. The prodding introduces rather violent animal imagery and a scaring atmosphere, which culminates in the wolf-and-dogs simile of the last two verses. Within this imagery, however, only in 26 f. does Solon play the passive role of a victim (although it appears that after all he knows very well how to defend himself). The one who plays an active role in the dirty and disquieting political job described in the preceding lines 20b–25 is the ἄλλος ἀνήρ, the negative alternative to Solon. Solon, however, remains a political actor in the scene of Athens—and thus fuels the relief of the audience of the poem, who would have been assured by the contrafactual conditional οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε, and would have better appreciated both Solon's past history of abstinence from factious partisanship or egoism, and his present statement in 1 to have "gathered together" the people (whatever ξυνήγαγον means there, it unavoidably implies the "keeping under control" of the people). As remarked by Mülke 2002, 391, the ἄλλος ἀνήρ exemplifies the mentality

of the ex-supporters of Solon who according to 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2} would have liked to see Solon's τραχὺς νόος become operative, him seize power as a tyrant, and his tyrannical reliance to exploit the support of the unleashed mob. In our verse, as well as in the identical 31.6 G.-P.^{2} = 37.6 W.^{2}, in 31.1 G.-P.^{2} = 37.6 W.^{2}, in 3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}, in 8.1 G.-P.^{2} = 6.1 W.^{2}, and in 12.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 W.^{2}, Solon seems to use *demos* in the specific sense of "majority of the people" as opposed to the "biggest and more powerful" citizens (31.6 G.-P.^{2} = 37.6 W.^{2}), namely the people's "leaders" (3.7 G.-P.^{2} = 4.7 W.^{2}, 8.1 G.-P.^{2} = 6.1 W.^{2}), or to its μόναρχος (12.3 f. G.-P.^{2} = 9.3 f. W.^{2}). This is not an oligarchic or elitist distancing from the mob, of course, but certainly, as a member of the class of "leaders" of the *demos* and of the "biggest etc.", Solon appears to be constantly unable to refer to the *demos* without stressing the fact or the opportunity that it is or must be regimented, and restrained.

Used already in Homer as the goad for horses, the κέντρον is not attested in a metaphorical sense before Solon. As a metaphor for the harsh and tyrannical capacity of the politician to move the masses and compell them in whichever direction he wishes, the goad also occurs in Theogn. 847 f. λὰξ ἐπίβα δήμωι κενεόφρονι, τύπτε δὲ κέντρωι / ὀξέι καὶ ζεύγλην δύσλοφον ἀμφιτίθει / οὐ γὰρ ἔθ' εὑρήσεις δῆμον φιλοδέσποτον ὧδε / ἀνθρώπων, describing the tyrant's control over the mob; see later Soph. *TrGF* F683.3 f. λαβὼν / πανοῦργα χερσὶ κέντρα, again of something bad forced upon the *polis* by a bad politician κωτίλος; also Pind. *Pyth.* 2.95; Eur. *Bacch.* 795; *TrGF* (54)F604 for the idiom πρὸς κέντρα/ον λακτίζειν; Catenacci 1991, 30 f.; Fileni 1983.

The problem is, as remarked by Anhalt 1993, 123, that both in Hom. *Il.* 23.387, 430 and most clearly in Theognis, the goad is used to incite, concretely the horses or metaphorically the mob, and in Theognis it is placed side by side with the yoke, ζεύγλη, which more explicitly points to a restraining form of control. But in Solon the κέντρον seems to be quoted in connection with the action of restraining (κατέσχε) the mob, for which the image of the bridles or of the yoke would be more expected (e.g. to κατέχειν the people the metaphor of the χαλινός is adopted in Plut. *Prae.ger.reip.* 802d4). The metaphor used by Solon is not fully focussed, perhaps, precisely because the kind of political action which Solon had to endure was difficult and unusual: "he has had to push people, but he is well aware of the danger of pushing them too far—and of the subsequent difficulty of restraining them" (Anhalt 1993, 123).

From what did the people need to be "restrained"? Probably from motions of rebellion, like the *demos* which, according to Plut. *Phoc.*

22.5, Phocion was able to κατέχειν and παρηγορεῖν "dissuade" when he perceived their intention to revolt (νεωτερίζειν). Sol. 35 G.-P.² = 30 W.² may reflect the *parainesis* to the *demos* made by Solon when trying to prevent the risk of a mutiny against the magistrates.

κακοφραδής already existed in Hom. *Il.* 23.483. φιλοκτήμων is new, but cf. the Homeric φιλοκτέανος and πολυκτήμων and the Theognidean φιλοκερδής.

22b–25. γάρ equalizes the catastrophic behavior of yielding to the wishes of each faction and the behavior of the ἄλλος ἀνήρ in 20–22a, with the result that the decimation of the city becomes the expected consequence of unleashing the *demos*: Solon knows what this ἄλλος ἀνήρ would have provoked if he had …, because he knows what he himself was going to provoke, if he had … (Linforth 1919, 189). This phrasing is a rhetorical way of presenting the specific action of the ἄλλος ἀνήρ (readiness to unleash the popular turmoil) within a broader category of behavior (readiness, either for personal profit or from lack of thoughtful consideration, to yield to the requests of every specific faction). It is difficult to identify the political groups that Solon is speaking of here. According to Linforth 1919, 190 the ἐνάντιοι of 23 are the adversaries of the *demos*, i.e. the noble/rich, and the "others" of 24 are the mob, but it is difficult to assume that Solon labels the aristocratic class to which he belongs as "adversaries", especially in a context where he keeps a distance from the *demos* more clearly than anywhere else. Without contextual specifications, I think that ἐνάντιοι should be taken to refer to the faction of the nobles/rich opposing Solon's political action; they are the hybristic aristocrats, the new rich, or the aspiring new rich described as the cause of the ruin of the *polis* at the beginning of 3 G.-P.² = 4 W.², from which Solon distinguished himself, even though they may have tried to win Solon to their side. The ἕτεροι of l. 24 would then be the "extremists" who had favored Solon's political orientation, but settled on a more drastic course of action in regard to the ἐνάντιοι (τοῖσιν, cf. 7.4 G.-P.² = 5.4 W.²), when the ἕτεροι (αὖτις) prevailed together with Solon, and tried to impose their views on him. The lack of details and ambiguity of the designation may be intended to anticipate the presentation of the opponents in the image that follows of the dogs assailing Solon the wolf; he does not care to distinguish between the various targets originally held by different factions, as now they all unanimously blame and prosecute him.

ἐναντίος (23) is attested as a noun for the first time here; it was mainly predicative in Homer and Hesiod. When used in a hostile sense it focuses

on the physicality of staying or moving "in front"/"against", and thus better than other more abstract designations of the enemies (like ἐχθροί, πολέμιοι, etc.), it graphically evokes the turmoil of the civil war.

For ἀνδρῶν ... ἐχηρώθη πόλις (25) cf. already Hom. *Od.* 9.124 (see below); but the phrase is common later: cf. Herod. 6.83; Eur. *Cycl.* 304. For the idea—economic as well as ethical—that a city is first and foremost its citizens and that reducing their number is harmful to it, cf. Eur. *TrGF* (76) vel (77) F828 αἱ γὰρ πόλεις εἴσ' ἄνδρες, οὐκ ἐρημία; also Alcae. 112.10 and Thuc. 7.77.7 for the idea that "men are the cities (not their walls)"; van Effenterre 1985, 24f. The great potential for wealth represented by the goat-island of Hom. *Od.* 9.116–141, which is close to the Cyclopses' land, remains unrealized because the island ἀνδρῶν χηρεύει (9.124) as the Cyclopses do not have ships, and do not plough nor sow, so that the island (and its state of being inhabited) is a sort of appendix of their barbarian world (cf. Clay 1980).

26 f. The image appears in the wake of the animal war similes of Homer and in particular it may be modeled on *Il.* 12.41–46 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἔν τε κύνεσσι καὶ ἀνδράσι θηρευτῇσι / κάπριος ἠὲ λέων στρέφεται (cf. the Solonian ἐστράφην of 27) σθένει βλεμεαίνων· / οἱ δέ τε πυργηδὸν σφέας αὐτοὺς ἀρτύναντες / ἀντίον ἵστανται καὶ ἀκοντίζουσι θαμειὰς / αἰχμὰς ἐκ χειρῶν· τοῦ δ' οὔ ποτε κυδάλιμον κῆρ / ταρβεῖ οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, κτλ. (the point of comparison is Hector, who fights in defense of his city; because of the different animal, it is difficult to agree with Anhalt 1993, 126–128, who sees in this simile an attempt by Solon to liken himself to the figure of Hector).

In Homer the wolf was a metaphor for the fearless combatant: cf. *Il.* 4.471 f., 11.72, 16.156–166. In this last passage the wolf is defined as being endowed with ἀλκὴ ἄσπετος "fighting courage"; ἀλκή can also be used of a dog's fierceness in fighting wild beasts or of its tenacity in the chase of less ferocious animals: cf. Lilja 1976, 32 and 51; Marcinkowski 2001. A special ἀλκή is also ascribed to the wild boar in a simile for warriors, συὶ εἴκελος ἀλκήν: *Il.* 4.253 and 17.281–283. In the latter passage the simile is extended, and Solon could certainly have had it in mind no less than *Il.* 12.41–46: ἴθυσεν δὲ διὰ προμάχων συῒ εἴκελος ἀλκὴν / καπρίωι, ὅς τ' ἐν ὄρεσσι κύνας θαλερούς τ' αἰζηοὺς / ῥηϊδίως ἐκέδασσεν, ἑλιξάμενος (cf. Solon's ἐστράφην) διὰ βήσσας. However, quite differently from the ἀγηνορία "courage" of the wild boar or the lion of 12.41–46 (which are going to be killed by this courage) or the aggressive ἀλκή of the wild boar of 17.281–283 (which manages to scatter the hunters), what

the harmless Solon needs to arm himself against the assaults of his opponents will be the ἀλκή in the sense of a self-protective "defence" (also in 7.5 f. G.-P.² = 5.5 W.² the only armament which Solon is willing to use is a defensive shield). This meaning of ἀλκή is not common in epic, but it does have this sense in those Iliadic passages in which it occurs as an object in the accusative: constructed with δῦναι (9.231, 19.36) or with ἐπιέννυσθαι (7.164, 8.262, 18.157), the verb designates the "defensive/fighting strength" which the epic heroes adopt like a cuirass to wear, which is capable of preventing the enemy from attacking (*LfgrE* I.495 f., s.v. and Collins 1998, 63 f.). Solon does not use δῦναι or ἐπιέννυσθαι, which imply the idea that this ἀλκή was something close at hand for the Homeric heroes, almost like a piece of their arms; his isolated use of the verb ποιεῖσθαι may convey the opposite idea that this defensive ἀλκή was for him less familiar and a bit more difficult to seek than for the epic heroes (for a formal parallel for the phrase cf. Soph. *OC* 459 ἀλκὴν ποιεῖσθαι, although there the verb is not reflexive but active, "succor"). In tune with this lexical strategy is the suggestion of Mainoldi 1984, 128, that Solon, although he was aware of the simile of *Il.* 12.41–50, chose to avoid the Homeric lion for its aristocratic associations, in as much as it was a symbol of bellicosity for the military aristocracy (see Schnapp-Gourbeillon 1981, 38–131). Note that wolves never appear in Homeric similes in the singular—they are always a group (e.g. *Il.* 16.156–163; 352–355, cf. also 4.471, 11.72)—and therefore never appear in the stock simile of the beleaguered single wild animal, while on the contrary lions and boars are the animals of choice; hence the isolation of Solon-the-wolf, where his choice of this symbolic animal will have been all the more notable (Mainoldi 1984, 101 f. and Irwin 2005, 246).

Anhalt 1993, 131–134 and also, independently, Blaise 1995, 33–35, have suggested that Solon purposefully chose an animal other than the lions or the wild boars of Homer, and emphasized his choice by setting λύκος in the final position of the verse. In particular, the wolf was an animal connoting radical alienation from the human world, especially when presented, as here, alone (cf. Alcae. 130b.8–10 ἀπελήλαμαι / φεύγων ἐσχατίαισ', … / ἔ̣ν̣θα[δ'] ο̣ἶος ἐοίκησα λυκαιμίαις; Buxton 1987, 63 f.; Detienne and Svenbro 1989, 150–158). Therefore this choice would imply that Solon had not attempted to defend his city as it was, as Hector had done; "rather, in trying to save the *polis* he has had to redifine it, and, in so doing, he has placed himself outside of it, beyond its protections", as a sort of *pharmakos* whose exclusion from society has the function of promoting social cohesion (Anhalt 1993, 131–134). But the

connotations implicit in the image of the wolf are more complex. They include first of all the idea of cunning, which becomes stronger especially in post-Homeric times (cf. Mainoldi 1984, 97–103; however, the wolf's pelt which is put on by Dolon, with his speaking name from δόλος, in *Il.* 10.334, and Autolycus, the grandfather of Odysseus, prove that this idea was not absent in Homer: Gernet 1981, 125–139). Straightforwardness is also probably implicit in the imagery of the wolf, and the refusal to be duplicitous when it comes to the principle of reciprocity. This last idea, which is especially useful for Solon, is evident in the case of Pind. *Pyth.* 2.81–85, a passage recalling Solon in various ways: ἀδύνατα δ' ἔπος ἐκβαλεῖν κραταιὸν ἐν ἀγαθοῖς / δόλιον ἀστόν· ὅμως μὰν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντας ἄταν πάγχυ διαπλέκει. / οὔ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν· / ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἅτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι, / ἄλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς (cf. in particular Nagy 1999, 241 f.; Vox 1983b, 306 f.; Bell 1984, 25 f.; Mainoldi 1984, 98, 129); for the wolf which does not fawn (ἄσαντος), differently from the dogs, cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 421 f.

In antiquity, wolves were also believed to share their hunt εἰς ἴσα among themselves (Timotheus of Gaza: cf. Haupt 1869, 8), and a fable of Aesop (348 Perry) portrays a wolf-lawgiver who lays down the law that whatever each animal took in the hunt should be put in the middle and shared by everyone, but when asked by the ass to do the same with his own prey, he refuses to share it and thus dissolves his own law; the behavior of this wolf-lawgiver would be strikingly similar to the operation of the tyrant Maeandrius in Herod. 3.142 f., who also decides to keep some privileges for himself before putting everything else under communal control; in fact, Plato advances the idea that a tyrant would be a sort of man transformed into wolf (*Resp.* 565d–566a): on the werewolf figure and its adoption into the ancient political vocabulary, see Kunstler 1991. For attempts at demonstrating how these other associations may be at work in the ideological background of 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, cf. Irwin 2005, 245–261 (attempts at different levels of likelihood: Solon after all is not a wolf-tyrant, but the opposite of this idea). More convincingly, Miralles and Pòrtulas 1983, 53–60 have shown that the wolf already existed as an animal symbolic of the ψόγος ideology in the Archilochean iambs (Lycambes is in all probability a speaking name: "he who walks with the steps of a wolf", or "wolf-walker"): thus Solon's iambic self-identification as a wolf may involve a meta-literary message in this iambic poem.

Dogs often receive a bad reputation in ancient imagery. κύων and its derivatives play an important role in passages of Homer where epic

overlaps with the language of blame, especially in the narrative of quarrels, and seem to designate shamelessness in particular: cf. *Il.* 1.158 f., 225, 3.180, 6.355 f. (Helen, also *Od.* 4.145 f.), 13.623 (in the last passage Menelaus defines the Trojans κακαὶ κύνες because they persist in fighting even though they are clearly wrong and what characterizes them is a shameless battle-greed); Lilja 1976, 21–23; Graver 1995; Nagy 1999, 226. The dog is treacherous for Hippon. 66 W.^{2} = 32 Degani; Soph. *TrGF* F885; voracious in e.g. Hom. *Il.* 10.502–506, *Od.* 20.18–20; Aristoph. *Pax* 24 f., 481 f. In any case, the wolf could be considered to be better than dogs in Aesch. *Supp.* 760 f. (which appears to be a proverb). As for the gender adopted by Solon, Pindar declares the Laconian to be the best hound, referring to it as female (Λάκαιναν κύνα, fr. 106; cf. also Aristot. *Hist.an.* 608a23–28). Both Xenophon and Arrian write about hunting dogs in their cynegetic treatises, referring to them as female: e.g. Xen. *Cyn.* 3; Arr. *Cyn.* 3.2. Arrian says explicitly (*Cyn.* 32.1) that bitches are faster.

31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2}

Verses 1–5 and 6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 1–5 and 6–10 W.^{2} are cited separately, although at only a short distance from each other, by the testimony of Aristot. *Ath.Pol.* 12.5, as instances of Solon reproaching the opposing factions. Aristotle is not explicit about the fact that the two passages belong to the same poem, but he connects 6–9 to 1–5 through γάρ, thus presenting the former as an explanation/support for the latter (εἰ *γάρ* τις ἄλλος, φησί, ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν; this passage has been supposed to be a paraphrasis of a Solonian verse, reconstructed by Kaibel 1893, 152 as τιμῆς δὲ ταύτης ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ τυχών; but for Solon to use the word τιμή in the sense of "public office" is anachronistic: cf. Mülke 2002, 403). Leading us to the same conclusion is the similar καίτοι with which Plut. *Sol.* 16.4 introduces his quotation of 6 f. (most likely relying on the *Ath.Pol.* or like the *Ath.Pol.* using a common source for the period ending with Solon). We cannot rule out the possibility that Aristotle quoted from another iambic poem with more or less the same contents or the same tone; but in three cases in Aristotle where the first quotation of a fragment on a specific topic is followed by the quotation of a second text on a similar or connected topic from a different poem the transition is marked by πάλιν (*Ath.Pol.* 12.1 introducing 8 G.-P.^{2} = 6 W.^{2}, or 12.4 introducing 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}) or even more explicitly by πάλιν δὲ ἑτέρωθι (12.3 introducing 29^b G.-P.^{2} = 34 W.^{2}). Furthermore, the logical sequence presupposed by 6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 6–10 W.^{2} coming after 1–5 within a single text would be quite similar to 30.20b–25 = 36.20b–25 W.^{2} coming after 30.1–20a G.-P.^{2} = 36.1–20a W.^{2} There the statement about the groundlessness of the criticism raised against Solon, supported in 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, proceeds through a detailed evocation of the main results of his actions and is concluded by the reaffirmation that he has operated in favor of both the rich and the poor; in 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} we have no trace of a historical recapitulation of the outcome of Solon's actions, but 1–5 may have belonged to the part where Solon defended himself against criticism (roughly equivalent to 30.1 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.1 f. W.^{2}) or positively presented himself as being attentive to both the interests of the rich and of the poor (roughly equivalent to 30.18–21a G.-P.^{2} = 36.18–21a W.^{2}). Solon joins to this statement a descriptive hint at the terrible consequences which could result from an alternative political behavior, one that does

not care to restrain the *demos* (30.20b–25 G.-P.^{2} = 36.20b–25 W.^{2}, 31.6 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.7 f. W.^{2}), and concludes with an image that is suggestive of his political middle ground (30.26 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.26 f. W.^{2}, 31.8 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.9 f. W.^{2}). Moreover, in both poems the transition of the sequence would pivot around the phrases of 31.6a G.-P.^{2} = 36.7a W.^{2} ~ 30.22a G.-P.^{2} = 36.22a W.^{2} (and thanks to the testimonies of Aristotle and Plutarch, we know that the subject of κατέσχε would have been an indefinite ἄλλος ἀνήρ in 31.6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.7 W.^{2} as well as in 30.20b–22 G.-P.^{2} = 36.20b–22 W.^{2}).

In fact, the similarities between 30 and 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 and 37 W.^{2} have led some scholars to point them out as instances of the archaic fondness for the repetition of key-ideas (van Groningen 1958, 138), and Wilamowitz 1893, II.310, who was among the first to suggest the unity of 31.1–5, 31.6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 36.1–5 and 36.7–10 W.^{2}, suggestively remarks that, if the idea that this was a single poem did not have to prevail, we might have thought of 31.6–9 G.-P.^{2} = 37.7–10 W.^{2} as a second version of the ending of 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} Frr. 30 and 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 and 37 W.^{2} have also been believed to belong to the same poem: see in particular Chambers 1990, 192 f., who tentatively suggests that 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} belongs to the prior part of a poem, followed by the part including 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} (more prudently Linforth 1919, 182 and Rhodes 1993, 178). But Chambers' idea is not likely, since such a precise repetition inside the same poem is hardly feasible (Masaracchia 1958, 358).

There is no doubt that the final image which Solon offers of his political stance is one of the mean, here as well as in 30.26 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.26 f. W.^{2} and in 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}; although in 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2} he seems to stress the troubles of this position, he hardly ever engages with the criticism from the opposite factions in the whole fragment (cf. Introd. ad 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}), and he never distinguishes the criticism according to the complaints of the rich or of the poor, but he very briefly and generically calls the two factions by name (κακός, ἀγαθός, 18). However, in the final simile (26 f.) he highlights his passive attempts at defending himself from their attacks (his opponenents are as undistinguishable from each other as the dogs are at the end of the poem); differently, in 31 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, just as in 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}, he interacts with both factions, presenting their identity in full detail (1–5), and for the final simile he creates an image which highlights his role as an active διαλλακτής (8 f.): see also Introd. chap. 5.

However, as Vox 1984, 141–146 correctly emphasizes, the way in which Solon interacts with the opposite factions does not display the perfect lack of bias which would be desirable in a mediator. Apart from

confirming in 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} his recurrent idea that the *demos* must be regimented by someone else (belonging of course to Solon's leading class: cf. ad 30.20b–22a G.-P.^{2} = 36.20b–22a W.^{2}), Solon introduces the *demos* as a political subject whom it may be necessary to ὀνειδίσαι (1; however, see below on the adverb διαφάδην, which presupposes familiarity), and responds to their complaints through an expression which singles out their shortsightedness with some elitist distance ("they could not even dream of what I accomplished for them"). Unless Aristotle has missed more than a hemistich in his quotation (as supposed by Kaibel 1893, 152), the second hemistich of 3 could not include a more substantial charge. On the contrary, the rich receive a most flattering definition (4) and a most polite invitation to consider Solon a friend = one of their class (5). In an age where poetry of ψόγος and poetry of αἶνος were clearly defined in the system of the literary genres, the ὄνειδος announced for the *demos* and the most honorable definition of the rich seem to be opposite instances of, respectively, a ψόγος address and an eulogistic address. Once again, this form of address makes it very unlikely that the sociological place of performance for which Solon created the poem was a public meeting with the participation of the *demos* and it most likely qualifies the poem for a sympotic performance amidst Solon's ἑταῖροι; thus line 5 would involve an indirect appeal made by Solon to his φίλοι (the actual sympotic interlocutors and through them all the members of his class) to let go of their diffidence or hostility towards him, thus passing from the ψόγος of the criticism to the αἶνος explicitly evoked in αἰνοῖεν (cf. Mülke 2002, 402).

The mode of this fragment allows for the possibility that here Solon is taking the didactic stance which has been suggested for 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}, but which seems to me improbable in the case of this other fragment, because of the lack of attention which Solon appears to pay there to the criticism of his opponents (cf. Introd. ad 30 G.-P.^{2} = 36 W.^{2}). In particular Solon may have conceived of the last image of the poem in order to let the members of his class understand that he substitutes the κράτος of the city, of which Solon-the-ὅρος becomes a concrete incarnation in the last line, for the κράτος of the leading aristocracy, which is expressed by the multiplicity of the ὅροι fixed in the earth (cf. Loraux 1984, 212).

1. If this is not the incipit of a poem (it is impossible to say), certainly it is the beginning of a well demarcated section, concerned with the criticism Solon received after his reforms or with a statement about Solon's fair attention to both opposite factions (cf. Introd.).

εἰ χρή is a nice touch, in that it might suggest some reluctance, as though the criticism is forced on him by the behavior of the *demos*, and not by any pugnacity on his part (see also below). διαφάδην is foreign to epic and may be borrowed from the language of lyric, since the word is also found in Archil. 128.4, and Alcman, as seen already by Kontos 1891, 334 f., who emended the διαφράδην of the pap., which is not attested elsewhere (although it is not metrically impossible, as maintained by Platt 1896, 255). In Alcman as well διαφάδην is similarly linked to a verb of speaking to express the *praeteritio* within a eulogy, and thus appears in a context which is the mirror image of Solon's: *PMGF* 1.56 διαφάδαν τί τοι λέγω; Clarity, and frank criticism, is actually a duty owed to friends, as Theognis would say (87–92): μή μ' ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε, νόον δ' ἔχε καὶ φρένας ἄλληι, / εἴ με φιλεῖς καί σοι πιστὸς ἔνεστι νόος. / ἤ με φίλει καθαρὸν θέμενος νόον, ἤ μ' ἀποειπών / ἔχθαιρ' ἀμφαδίην νεῖκος ἀειράμενος. / ὃς δὲ μιῆι γλώσσηι δίχ' ἔχει νόον, οὗτος ἑταῖρος / δεινός, Κύρν', ἐχθρὸς βέλτερος ἢ φίλος ὤν, in the frame of the well established distinction between the treacherous, Odysseus-type of person who χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθηι ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπηι and the more reliable Achilles-type whom we find already in Hom. *Il.* 9.312 f.: cf. Vox 1984, 142–146; De Martino and Vox 1996, 768; Mülke 2002, 400 also compares the openness of fighting as a token of respect for the enemy: cf. *Il.* 7.242 f. οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέειν τοιοῦτον ἐόντα / λάθρηι ὀπιπεύσας, ἀλλ' ἀμφαδόν, αἴ κε τύχωμι (spoken by Hector to Ajax, about open fighting). Therefore, this adverb not only points to Solon's egalitarianism and straightforwardness, but it also reveals that Solon deals with the *demos* faction as he would deal with friends—which is reasonable, since after all this is probably the faction that supported his legislation. Some familiarity is also revealed by the conditional form in which the necessity of uttering the ὄνειδος is formulated, as if Solon would have preferred not to find himself having to utter that ὄνειδος (see also above). Finally, with his use of the impersonal χρή, Solon seems to be attributing the criticism he lodges against the people to a broader need for moral order (only formally similar is the case of εἰ χρή *captationes benevolentiae* from a position of inferiority of, e.g., Euripides, *pace* Mülke 2002, 400). Of course, all of these strategies also indirectly reinforce the strength of Solon's ὄνειδος (if it comes despite Solon's friendly feelings, it must be truly unavoidable); in fact, ὄνειδος is an unequivocally strong word, one of the key-terms with which epic alludes to the discourse of ψόγος: cf. Nagy 1999, 223–232.

2 f. "Not to see even in one's dreams" was regularly used for the idea of "not expecting" or "not hoping", which is said in relation to something that was considered out of one's horizon: cf. e.g. Eur. *IT* 518; Demosth. 19.275. Formally, the use of εὕδοντες εἶδον for "dreaming" is paralleled (e.g. by Herod. 1.209.2 and 16), and the redundancy ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδεῖν is quite common (more than 20x in the *Iliad*; Hes. *Theog.* 451 and 701; Sol. 29^b.5 G.-P.² = 34.5 W.²; Tyrtae. 7.26 G.-P.² = 10.26 W.²; Pind. *Nem.* 7.66, etc.). The combination of the two phrases is not attested before Solon, but it is possible in light of the common Homeric idea that dreams are experienced through sight: ὄναρ ἰδεῖν. However, since the eyes are closed during sleep, Solon's stress on them may imply some sort of caricature of the shortsightedness of the *demos* (cf. Ap.Rhod. 4.128 ἀύπνοισι προϊδὼν ὄφις ὀφθαλμοῖσιν).

Because of the lacuna, we cannot ascertain whether the inability to understand what they have achieved with Solon's reforms, and therefore to conceive of the broader horizons for themselves, is the only ὄνειδος to be brought against the *demos*: cf. Introd.

4 f. After 5, the text of Solon's poem may have included a protasis such as "if the nobles were to learn the real moderation of my plans for reform" (Linforth 1919, 191 f.). If this is right, this poem was structured in a way similar to 7 G.-P.² = 5 W.² in that it argues against both sides. Although there is a difference in tone between the two cases, the poem does represent Solon as a disinterested mediator, despite having an element of aristocratic *hauteur*. A conditional sentence with this kind of protasis and the apodosis of 4 f. would explain the γάρ with which Aristotle introduces 6–9 (so Mülke 2002, 402). In any case, it is telling that 4 f. is potential, whereas 2 f. is unreal. Of course, the inability of the *demos* to anticipate Solon's reforms takes place in a more remote past than the nobles' inability to acknowledge the great moderation of Solon's reforms and thus to praise him for his achievements. The different temporal perspectives make up for the different level of potentiality. But, thanks to this difference the audience is left with the impression that the nobles can wisely change their opinion, while, according to the text we have, the *demos* seems to be utterly blind, as if they were doomed not to acknowledge what they have (ἔχουσι).

The definition of the leading class ennobles the μεγάλοι of 12.3 G.-P.² = 9.3 W.² (which is probably more technical), possibly using the model of Hom. *Il.* 15.139 βίην καὶ χεῖρας ἀμείνων. βίη has no negative hybristic undertones in our verse, as it does in the Homeric passage or elsewhere, e.g., *Il.* 6.478, 9.498.

Solon's appeal for affection in return for his political work may have been the background for Anacreon's wish to be "loved" for his work as a poet: cf. *PMG* 402c = 22 Gentili ἂν φιλέοιεν: cf. Vox 1990, 39.

6 f. Solon's emphasis would have been on the first hemistich, which is identical to 30.22 G.-P.[2] = 36.22 W.[2] (cf. Introd.). Therefore, Aristotle's text is preferable to Plutarch's οὔτ' … οὔτ', which correlates the two phrases at a level of equality. Plutarch's text is also certifiably inferior in the case of ἐξέλῃι, since πρίν with the subjunctive (without ἄν, as in Homer and commonly in fifth century authors) refers to the future or to present time in general (Smyth 1956, 552).

The image of 7 is well-rooted in the tradition of accusations that tyrant-kings devour the property of the people (Hom. *Il.* 1.231; Hes. *Op.* 39, 221, 264; Alcae. 70.7; Theogn. 1181; cf. De Martino and Vox 1996, 768) and in the practice of archaic tyrants prosecuting and killing members of the aristocracy (cf. Salmon 1997, 62–64), but Solon's imagery is experimental. We would actually expect "milk" to be the object of ἀνταράξας, and "fat'" to be the object of ἐξεῖλεν, but it is not the case, nor can we simply ignore the actual order of the transmitted words (as Bergk, 4th ed. II.54 seems to want to do so). Furthermore, if fresh milk sits, the cream will separate, so the easiest way to get the cream is simply to skim it at that point. Stirring the milk makes it impossible to do this.

Solon's metaphor recalls a Homeric precedent which similarly pairs πῖαρ with ἐξελέσθαι, *Il.* 11.550. There the farmers, keeping vigil by night, prevent the lion from βοῶν ἐκ πῖαρ ἑλέσθαι—this precedent implies that Solon's public would have easily inferred an analogy between the politician motivated by personal gain and the lion who pounces upon the livestock in their pen. In light of this parallel we can exclude the reading πῦαρ "colostrum" (the very thick milk of a cow who has just given birth) which present in the London papyrus of *Ath.Pol.* and supported, e.g., by Platt 1896, 256 and Masaracchia 1958, 358. But we should also avoid the risk of hammering out interpretations of Solon based on Homer, thereby neglecting the fact that in Solon the verb occurs in the active voice and thus cannot have the Homeric meaning of "taking for oneself", as Allinson 1880, 458 f. and Masaracchia 1958, 357 interpret it. According to them, the people of 6 are the object of ἀνταράξας, so that πῖαρ/πῦαρ must be the epithet of γάλα (or in apposition to it, if πῖαρ can only be taken as a noun: but cf. *Od.* 9.135), "until, having stirred it up (the *demos* named in the preceding line), he has removed the fatty milk". Linforth 1919, 193, West 1974, 182 and Stinton 1976, 1599 f.

understand ἐξεῖλεν in its more common sense of "removing" something from someone or something else with the double accusative, although elsewhere the middle diathesis of the verb is adopted, and the objects are usually a person and his life/soul, in phrases such as μιν ἐξαιρεῖσθαι θυμόν/ψυχήν/φρένας; in this way, in Solon the milk stands as metaphor for society, and its fat is the aristocracy, which in light of the common usage of the verb with the double accusative could then be more easily interpreted as the society's vital organ. Then the sense of 7 would be "until, having stirred the people, he has removed the cream from the milk"; or, if Solon did not share the idea that stirring milk does not separate the cream (Allinson 1880, 458; Edmunds 1987, 8), but rather agreed with "Hippocrates" quoted below that stirring milk can separate the cream, "until, having stirred the milk, he has removed the cream from it" (with γάλα depending *apo koinou* from ἀνταράξας and from ἐξεῖλεν, in the first case as an object and in the second as an accusative of respect).

By means of this metaphor Solon would thus seem to attribute not only general disorder to the bad politician, but a particular type of societal "agitation", which separates its factions instead of keeping them amalgamated, or at least less separated from each other. As the ps.-Hippocratic description of the preparation of a sort of Schythian cheese demonstrates (*De morb.* 4.51 = 7.585 Littré = p. 108 Joly), the Greeks, at least in the classical age, believed that repeatedly stirring the milk leads to a *separation* of its components: when the milk is agitated ("Hippocrates" also uses the verb ταράσσειν, which is evidently a technical dairy term), it foams, and its components are divided (διακρίνεται), and the fatty part, τὸ πῖον, since it is lighter, rises to the surface and separates from the more liquid part remaining in the middle and the heavier part which sinks to the bottom. In light of Solon's opting for a political activity consisting of a reconciliation of the social parties (cf. especially 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}), it is tempting to think that he attributes the creation of a strong division/opposition between the components of society, the milk of his metaphor, to this "anti-model" of his own politics: the cream stands for the rich, who would be eliminated by a *demos* no longer restrained and by the wicked politician who unleashes it. The fact that at this point in his political career Solon would call the nobles the "cream" of Athenian society is not surprising. It would have been very difficult to imagine an expression of this sort coming from the Solon of 3 G.-P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}, but following his legislation Solon seems to have felt compelled to defend himself especially from the dissatisfaction of those who would have wished for a more populistic or populistically-

based conquest of tyranny (cf. 29–29^b G.-P.^{2} = 32–34 W.^{2}) and for the unrestrained conditions of the *demos* (cf. 30.20b–22a G.-P.^{2} = 36.20b–22a W.^{2}). Thus, it is logical that in our fragment, where Solon expressly boasts of having stopped the *demos*, and addresses the rich of the leading class with a most honorable definition, he may have wanted, by means of his metaphor, to draw attention to the relevance of aristocratic "opulence" for social stability. It is difficult, however, to be sure that the cheese explanation accurately reflects the lactic realities of the poem, since in the preparation of cheese, the cheesemaker, after heating the milk and adding renet, produces a separation of curds (solid) and whey, which is not milk, but a watery liquid (no longer milk) and the stirring needed is not particular vigorous. Thus, Solon may be saying that this "other" person would thoroughly (ἀνα-) stir up the milk-cream mixture until the butter, the richest part, has separated out to be taken away. πῖαρ is frequently glossed as λῖπος, λιπαρός (cf. schol. ad *Il.* 17.660; Hesych. *Lex.* ε 1619, Latte, π 2243 Schmidt); see also Gal. *De simplic. med.* 12.271 ἔχειν δ' ἐρρέθη τὸ γάλα καὶ λιπαράν τινα καὶ οἷον ἐλαιώδη φύσιν ἐν ἑαυτῶι, καὶ πλείστην ταύτην ἔφην ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῶι βοείωι, κἀιπειδὰν ἀποχωρισθῆι τοῦ λοιποῦ γάλακτος, αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ γενόμενον τὸ λιπαρὸν τοῦτο βούτυρον ὀνομάζεσθαι. This other person profits from the *demos*' turmoil. The πῖαρ in this interpretation is not the "cream" of society, but the wealth wrongly taken from the people, who, to push this metaphor, are now like low-fat milk. This is a more powerful image than the cheese interpretation and would agree with the usual image of a tyrant or unlawful king devouring the people (see the parallels cited above).

8 f. These verses have much in common with 7.5 f. G.-P.^{2} = 5.5 f. W.^{2} In 30.6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 W.^{2} ὅρος had probably signaled the confines of property (cf. also Introd. chap. 3), but here perhaps it is not the best term for designating a marker positioned on land belonging to no one (literally "the land between the spears"): Stinton 1976, 161 f. noted this and proposed the very light emendation to οὖρος "protector"/"watcher", by relying on the simile of Hom. *Il.* 12.421–424 ἀλλ' ὥς τ' ἀμφ' οὔροισι δύ' ἀνέρε δηριάασθον / μέτρ' ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες ἐπιξύνωι ἐν ἀρούρηι, / ὥτ' ὀλίγωι ἐνὶ χώρωι ἐρίζητον περὶ ἴσης, / ὣς ἄρα τοὺς διέεργον ἐπάλξιες, and assuming that this last image of the ἐπάλξεις "bulwarks" influenced Solon's verses: Solon would have defined himself as the "guardian" of the constitution he had framed. In particular, according to Stinton, he would not be the guardian of both factions (from one another), as he has probably claimed to be in 7 G.-P.^{2} = 5 W.^{2}, and thus τούτων would not refer

to the opposite parties of society, as scholars usually agree, but instead τούτων would point to the last faction mentioned by Solon, namely the aristocracy.

Stinton's last suggestion has met with little favor, and was already criticized by Giangrande 1989. Solon proclaiming himself to be the guardian of a single faction would be too strikingly in contrast with the image of a mediator that he had built for himself, and above all, in the context of our verses μεταίχμιον reproposes the idea of two opposite fronts with Solon in the middle. In fact, τούτων may be constructed with both ἐν μεταιχμίωι and ὅρος, especially if the simile goes from ὥσπερ to ὅρος ("I stood like an ὅρος in no-man's-land between them", Campbell 1967, 251)—alternatively, as suggested by Römish 1933, 77–81, ὅρος can be a metaphorical proleptic predicate of ἔστην, "I set myself up so as to become a ὅρος", which qualifies the location at which Solon stands, and is separated from the simile ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίωι, which specifies analogically the same collocation. Furthermore, the traditional sense of ὅρος, "boundary stone" (more likely than "mortgage marker", cf. Introd. chap. 3) makes perfect sense,—it is not necessarily the case that Solon insists on the image of the Homeric ἐπάλξιες (hence Stinton's οὖροι) within the Homeric simile.

Perhaps Solon has in mind the image of the markers erected on a thin strip of debatable land demarcating the boundary line between two tracts of land (ἐπιξύνωι ἐν ἀρούρηι would have to be understood as this thin strip of earth—cf. Richter 1968, 13 n. 57—and compared to Solon's ἐν μεταιχμίωι); the ἀμφί of Hom. *Il.* 12.421–424 might then be understood in the sense that the people arguing with each other physically stand "around" the boundary stones that are the subject of their dispute and which each person would like to move in his own favor, just as the opposing parties around Solon may try to do with him. Solon places himself on the same level as the Athenians but in an impartial position. This attittude and role of the lawgiver can be contrasted with Near Eastern lawgivers: see Harris 2006. As Lewis 2006, 113 remarks at first sight Solon's image could support a criticism of the poet's own claims to virtue, "since he tore up the stones only to become one himself". But by overlapping the ὅροι which in 30 G.-P.[2] = 36 W.[2] Solon claims to have removed from the Earth in order to liberate her with his own self-image as an ὅρος, he suggests the idea of the replacement of the plural oppressive symbols of slavery with the single κράτος of the constitution passed by him, favorable to every faction because it is external to all of them (Loraux 1984, 212). Finally, the martial connotations inherent to the most common sense of

μεταίχμιον, the space between two armies before the battle, probably reminded Solon's audience of the danger of internal στάσις, which Solon explicitly evokes in 3.19f. G.-P.² = 4.19f. W.² (Loraux 1984, 202–206; Harrris 1997, 105; Mülke 2002, 408f.) and visualized the threat of the strong polarities of the feuding parts as armies on the verge of a clash; for good comments on the semantics of μεταίχμιον see further Martin 2006, 164–171, and in fifth century drama see Goldhill 2007, 141–143; Garvie 1986, ad Aesh. *Cho.* 63. Thus, ὅρος and μεταίχμιον are likely joined by Solon suggestively in order to neutralize the negative connotations which are usually inherent in them: with the ὅρος-Solon there is going to be no humiliation of the land and no enslavement of peasants, and as long as he guards the μεταίχμιον there will be no danger of *stasis* and no clashing between the opposite αἰχμαί (cf. Loraux 1984, 212). As Martin 2006, 168 puts it "Solon is, emphatically by his own account, the only source of direction in the *polis*": see also Introd. chap. 5 (for another interesting and unusual use of the semantic connotations of *horos* by a dithyramb composer, *IG* I³ 833, *c.* 500–480 BC, see Martin 2007).

33, 32, 34, 36 G.-P.^{2} = 39, 38, 40, 41 W.^{2}

It is worth asking whether these tiny fragments belong together, since they come from different sources, and whether we should preserve the order of the most recent editors of Solon in numbering them. The predominantly lexicographical concerns of the testimonies of these fragments (Pollux, Photius and Phrynichus) and their interest in unusual words or grammatical forms have left us without any idea as to their pragmatic function and narrative context. Athenaeus 14.645 f., who preserves 32 G.-P.^{2} = 38 W.^{2}, places it in the context of an extensive discussion about cakes, and specifies his citation of Solon as ἐν τοῖς ἰάμβοις (as does Pollux for 33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2}; differently, for 34 G.-P.^{2} = 40 W.^{2} Phrynichus speaks of Solon's ποιήματα), while the rest of the fragments seem to be unexciting lists of food names (on Athenaeus' citations of early elegiac and iambic poetry, and his usual lack of concern with the quotations' context, see Bowie 2000: Athenaeus' true interest is not for the banquet itself, which is the performative context of our poem(s) as we will see, but for all the lexical evidence connected to the banquet-theme).

On one hand, it is entirely possible, in principle, that we have here fragments from as many as four distinct poems, since we cannot exclude the possibility that Solon treated the consumption of food in more than one poem since food recurs in his poetry as it does in other archaic poets. On the other hand, both the identity of meter and the similarity of subject matter (theme of food) are compatible with the assumption that we are looking at the *disiecta membra* of a single poem (Noussia 2001a; Kantzios 2005, 40 f.). Three out of the four fragments also share a third-person narrative, the description of an activity as in process (it matters little for the moment whether we take the present tenses as continuative or customary), and the use of subdividing the activities represented between "some"/"others" (but 36 G.-P.^{2} = 41 W.^{2} is too brief for any consideration of its structure). The fragments thus seem to be poetry describing the immediate context of the banquet. Meta-sympotic literature, that is the presentation by the poet of the symposium to itself, is connected in particular with Xenophanes (frr. 1; 13) in elegiac poetry; in the field of choral lyric with Alcman (see *PMGF* 19); in the monodic genre to the drinking song of Alcaeus and Anacreon. Solon's poem(s) show(s) that the description of the symposium must have been an inherent feature

of the earliest stage of iambic poetry. Certainly, in comparison with the other fragments of meta-sympotic poetry known to us, they are characterized by a specific feature, since they focus on a sequence of material details belonging to the banquet, whereas even Xenophanes only devotes a fraction of his poem to the specifics of the party. This variance is very clear in itself and may be indicative of generic differences between elegy and iambic or monodic poetry. From the perspective of the continuity between iambic poetry and comedy (see Aristot. *Poet.* 1448b24–49b8, who schematizes pre-dramatic poetry into epic and iambus and considers tragedy and comedy to have been created respectively from epic and iambic poetry; Degani 1988; Degani 1993, 1–49; Rosen 1988, 9–35 on comedy as the direct descendant of archaic iambus; more sceptical about this relationship is Bowie 2002), the parallelism between our fragments and the exuberant lists of food which often characterize the carnival atmosphere of comedy (examples in Noussia 2001a, 353 n. 1) can also be considered to be significant. It is not expedient, however, to overvalue the unquestionable analogies between our fragments and comedy. In fact, Crusius 1897, XX connected the emphasis on overabundance of foods in 32 G.-P.^{2} = 38 W.^{2} to descriptions of the pleasures of the legendary banquets in comedy: see Aristoph. *Eccl.* 1169–1175, Metag. *PCG* 18, Nicoph. *PCG* 6; Philyll. *PCG* 12; Anaxandr. *PCG* 42 (on food as one of the most recurrent themes in ancient comedy, cf. in general Fauth 1973; for a repertory of food and its literary evidence, Dalby 1996, 57–92). Yet, since the comic device of food-lists is much later than Solon, it is more reasonable to investigate the fragments within the genre of iamb and compare them with Sem. 22–24, Anan. 5, and Hippon. 26–26a (further Noussia 2001a, 354).

Fr. 33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2} shows that there was more variety than appears at first. The fragment, which refers to the preparation of a sauce, clearly implies that the kitchen was its setting, and not the symposium (see also the commentary ad loc.). In other words, Solon's narrative must have included preparation as well as consumption, similarly to the scenes in, e.g., Hom. *Il.* 9.174–177, *Od.* 3.338–342 (see also Introd. ad 33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2})—one may wonder whether the combination of preparation and feasting derived from the Homeric set piece descriptions. Therefore, 33 G.-P.^{2} = 39 W.^{2} should be put first when numbering the fragments. In any case, the coexistence of the presentation of both preparation and of consumption, together with the recurrent opposition of "some" and "others", means that the account was vivid and complex, with changes of scenes and activities.

From κεῖθι at 32.3 G.-P.^{2} = 38.3 W.^{2} we can conclude that the speaker is describing events at some distance. In turn, this suggests that the fragment is not a description of an event at which speaker and audience are present. In this respect this sympotic fragment seems to be unlike the sympotic poems of Anacreon, Alcaeus, and Xenophanes, which refer to their immediate context (contrast Xenophan. 1.1 G.-P.^{2} = 1.1 W.^{2} νῦν γὰρ δή). Since the distance of the speaker from the scene could be either great or small, the description could refer to events taking place e.g. in Athens, either conceived of as happening now or represented as being habitual. If referring to Athens, the description could refer to the blessed state of the δῆμος. Already Crusius 1897, XX supposed that Solon wished to present this overabundance as an effect of his reforms to be enjoyed by the members of the δῆμος, to whose improved conditions he refers in 31 G.-P.^{2} = 37 W.^{2} (see ad loc.). More recently West 1974, 32 and Podlecki 1984, 137 understood the situation in similar terms. According to Podlecki, Solon wants to present an abundance which was the result of his liberation of the earth from mortgage markers (30.6 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 f. W.^{2}) and was capable of matching that of the "golden age". West argues that Solon's tetrameters and trimeters cannot be regarded as true iambi, and believes that they cannot be separated from Solon's elegies; therefore, he suggests that perhaps Solon was merely describing the prosperity that his measures had brought to the δῆμος. The problem with these interpretations is that 32.4 f. G.-P.^{2} = 38.4 f. W.^{2} would be wildly unrealistic as an account of the life of the poor: Hippon. 26 which is about a man who has wasted his patrimony and is now forced to eat poor food, speaks of σῦκα μέτρια … καὶ κρίθινον κόλλικα, and Aristoph. *Pax* 1140–1158 gives a vivid and realistic account of what is a more humble "luxury". Solon could be exaggerating here for rhetorical purposes, but in fact, Solon's rhetoric elsewhere is that he gave the δῆμος enough, not that he made it rich or fulfilled its dreams of richness.

Rather, Solon's description might refer to the material excesses of the rich as evidence of their *hybris* (in fact, the examples before and after Solon for the use of sympotic terminology as an ethical metaphor are numerous: see Noussia-Fantuzzi forthcoming a). Hartung 1859, 104 considers Solon here to be ridiculing the gluttony of the rich; Hammer 1902–1903, 48 is of a similar opinion and thinks that our fragments, with their references to refined foods and flavors, belong to a discourse meant to dismiss the complaints of the rich and show that the effect of Solon's reforms was anything but that of leading them to hunger. However, it is difficult to believe that (were our fragments satirical) we could find so

much detail with no explicit sign of censure: in other passages in which Solon describes excess in terms of feast imagery, e.g., in 3 G.-P.[2] = 4 W.[2], he uses value-laden language. Another possibility is that this is a paradise; so recently Ceccarelli 1996, 116 n. 22 and De Martino-Vox 1996, II.769 who read this as a snapshot of an utopian land or of the golden age. While it is true that feasts are often used in such contexts (see, e.g., Scheria in Homer, or the Hyperboreans in Pind. *Pyth.* 10), the details of our fragments lack key paradisiacal elements and the description remains within the realm of the possible: they are luxurious but realistic.

κεῖθι may also refer to a place at a significant distance from Athens: for accounts of the feasting of other peoples in elegy and iamb, cf. Crit. 1 and 4 G.-P.[2] = 2 and 6 W.[2] The poem could then recount the life of a people that Solon met on his travels. He could be describing the pleasures enjoyed there—hence the near-perfect welfare which the protagonists of 32.3–5 G.-P.[2] = 38.3–5 W.[2] appear to enjoy. Masaracchia 1958, 360 considers the fragments to be a piece of evidence for Solon the traveler's curiosity about the customs of the cities and peoples he had visited; what we get in our fragments would be "a picture of the foods consumed in a country characterized by notable prosperity and consequently by a refined lifestyle". Wilamowitz 1893, II.314 imagines that these fragments describe lavish goods imported from the East. In this direction, Cyprus might be another possibility, both because we know that Solon visited it from his farewell to Philocyprus and Soloi (11 G.-P.[2] = 19 W.[2]), and because passages in authors like Strabo 14.6.4 show that it might be seen as a place blessed by nature. Alternatively, since the farewell to Philocyprus and Soloi is brimming with *Odyssey* allusions, it is conceivable that Soloi is presented in such a way as to remind us of the Phaeacians, and an overabundance of refined foods would not be inappropriate to this presentation. If our fragments deal with people who were seen by Solon on his travels, the symposium may be more than an entertaining description and it might involve ethical aims, since it is possible in principle (even if it is unprovable in the case of our fragments) that the blessings these people enjoy are justified by their way of life. This would explain the absence of critical language. This argument, however, is likewise unprovable. And all the foods mentioned by Solon were very common in Athens.

As for the distance of the speaker from the scene, there are two possibilities which suggest themselves. In the case that κεῖθι does not indicate a great distance, Solon's fragment could be the kind of invitation which included a tantalizing description such as the ones found in Aristophanes (e.g. *Acharn.* 1084–1096). If so, the present tense might be con-

tinuative and point indirectly to the situation of the banquet in progress ("they are now drinking etc."); but the fact that people are described as eating and nibbling suggests that this is an event already in progress, which makes an invitation unlikely. The second possibility is that the distance from the scene presupposed by κεῖθι is not real but fictional. The most prominent defining characteristic of these fragments (even if this feature seems to have been missed by most modern scholars, with the isolated exception of Romagnoli 1898, 58, Torné Teixidó 1993–1995, 74f. and De Martino-Vox 1996, II.769—although their mention of this is cursory and lacks textual grounding) is that the foods Solon lists are all typical of the sympotic moment within the complex formula of δεῖπνον-συμπόσιον-κῶμος. They are mainly cited among the τραγήματα, the delicacies (cakes, desserts, fresh and dried fruit, and small portions of meat) that were meant for nibbling on during the so called "second tables", the after-dinner phase, and constituted the ἐπιδορπισμός "dessert"; the condiments that Solon names were used for flavoring spiced sauces which stimulated thirst during the symposium. In this case, these iambic fragments, together with the sympotic themes of Solon's elegiac poems 16, 17, 18, 24 G.-P.[2] = 25, 23, 24, 26 W.[2], bring to light Solon's specific interest in the symposium, which is also seen in 3.9f. G.-P.[2] = 4.9f. W.[2]: see ad loc. The precedent of this fragment may be the most reasonable frame for interpreting the context of these fragments. As in 3 G.-P.[2] = 4 W.[2], it is possible that here Solon describes the event as if he is not present at it, because such a removal from the described event contributes to the impression of detachment from and disapproval of it.

Since spices were not ground at table in antiquity (they were either added during cooking, Archestr. *SH* 140.8 f., Alex. *PCG* 193, Axion. *PCG* 4.8–11, Sotad. Com. *PCG* 1.4, 17, Timocl. *PGG* 3 or placed before diners, Archestr. *SH* 153.5 f., 154.6, 164.3, Pollux 10.93, who speaks of the ἡδυσματοθήκη 'spice box' in which cumin salt or perhaps pure ground cumin was served), this fragment implies that the kitchen was the space where the described activity takes place: see further the Introd. above and Sem. 24 where a cook, μάγειρος, shows off his skill in the profession and his knowledge of the sacrificial art. Slaves were also expected to stay outside of the room as the symposium takes place, unless they were serving or cleaning up: see Olson 2007, 132 on fragments from Middle Comedy. In other iambic poetry as well, we have many instances of objects of an everyday nature; if we restrict ourselves to tableware, ἀρυστήρ, ποτήριον, τράπεζα, κύλιξ are mentioned in Sem. 25, 26, 27, κύλιξ and πέλλη in Hippon. 13.3 and 14.1 = 21.2 and 22.1 Degani. Differently, Lewis 2006, 87 places this fragment in the broader frame of the human pursuit of material goods needed for survival of which Solon has spoken in 1.43 G.-P.² = 13.43 W.², and thus reads the dainty treats mentioned here as "the final causes that men think of and then struggle to obtain, all for the sake of making life better". The realism of the scene is remarkable, see below ad 1.

1. **σπεύδουσι**: Casaubon's conjecture for the text (σ)πευσι(δα) of the manuscript tradition should be understood as being connected to a participle like φέροντες, which would have been expressed in the lost context: "they hurry to bring". The scene must refer to kitchen-slaves (some of them probably cooks). Cp. the passionate exhortation towards a slave in Plato Comicus, *PCG* 71.1–3 (A) ἄνδρες δεδειπνήκασιν ἤδη; (B) σχεδὸν ἅπαντες. (A) εὖγε. / τί οὐ τρέχων ⟨σὺ⟩ τὰς τραπέζας ἐκφέρεις; ἐγὼ δὲ / νίπτρον παραχέων ἔρχομαι. The juxtaposition of different tasks suits the context of the preparation of a feast and adds a touch of realism to the scene that reminds us of comedy.

ἴγδις is both a mortar (Hesych. *Lex.* ι 145 Latte; Moritz 1958, 22 and n. 4; Sparkes 1962, 125) and a type of dance (Hesych. *Lex.* ι 144.1 Latte;

Etym.magn. 464.51). Despite Masaracchia 1958, 360 and Gerber 1999a, 163, who suspect the first meaning and incline towards the second, I see no reason to doubt that here ἴγδις is a mortar, as Pollux believed: the fragment describes the preparation of a sauce with silphium and vinegar.

Silphium, an aromatic root whose most precious variety came from the area of Cyrene (Theophr. *Hist.plant*. 6.3.1–6 and Plin. *NH* 19.41), seems to have been one of the most appreciated spices in Athens. Solon's text is the first to document its alimentary use; on its therapeutic use see Roselli 2001, 14–20. Siplhium was thought to go well with vinegar: cf. Aristoph. *Av*. 534; Anaxandr. *PCG* 42.58; Philem. *PCG* 113.3; Archestr. *SH* 176.14 f. and 192.8. From the combination of the two (sometimes together with other spices) a sauce was obtained which was meant to go with meats, cheese, and also (what is most important for our general interpretation of fragments 32–34 G.-P.² = 38–41 W.²) courses that were served as τραγήματα: see in particular Archestr. *SH* 192.6–9 with Olson & Sens 2000, 230 f. This sauce was typically prepared with a mortar, as Anaxipp. *PCG* 1.4–7 demonstrates with the mention of vinegar and silphium in connection to a mortar.

32 G.-P.^{2} = 38 W.^{2}

1. The verse refers to a well-documented part of the symposium, the so called "second tables", that is the consumption of wine and delicacies that were usually distinct from the "first tables", i.e. cheese, vegetables, eggs, fish, meat, etc., or the actual dinner: cf. Plato, *Resp.* 2.372c; Aristot. fr. 675 Gigon; Galen 6.550.5 K.; Bowie 1997, 2 with bibliography. A comic echo of this practice is to be found in adesp. *PCG* 1062.3 f. in reference to Cronus who is cast as a big glutton by the use of compound verbs to intensify the sense of the greatness: πάντα μοι γέρων Κρόνος /τὰ παιδί' ἐκπίνει καὶ κατεσθίει.

The most ancient explicit testimony on τραγήματα / τρωγάλια / ἐπιδορπίσματα / ἐπιφορήματα is Pind. fr. 124c. For the idea of the "second tables" (cited with this term by Athen. 14.639b–643e) see Davidson 1996; Dalby 1996, 23, 103; Olson and Sens 1999, 138. Particularly important in this regard is Solon's use of the verb τρώγω, which means "to nibble" and is specifically used for τραγήματα / τρωγάλια (both terms derive from the root τρώγω). Here the verb is explicitly combined with the verb πίνω, and the combination of "to eat τραγήματα and drink" probably sounded like some sort of hendiadys that, at least for the Greeks of the classical period (Homer only mentions the onion as an accompaniment to wine in *Il.* 11.630; see however already Xenophan. 13.3 ὑποτρώγοντα and Demosth. 19.196 f., Diod. *PCG* 2.9–13), would have automatically recalled the foods of the symposium—therefore, the semi-colon which appears in the text of West between the two verbs should be rejected.

The ἴτριον was a cake made from honey and sesame seeds, mentioned together with wine in Anacr. *PMG* 373.1 f. = 93 Gentili. It is recorded among the τραγήματα in Aristoph. *Ach.* 1092, Ephipp. *PCG* 8.3 and among the ἐπιφορήματα/τραγήματα in Archipp. *PCG* 11.

2. Wine and μᾶζα are found together in Hes. *Op.* 588–596 ἀλλὰ τότ' ἤδη / εἴη πετραίη τε σκιὴ καὶ βίβλινος οἶνος / μάζα τ' ἀμολγαίη γάλα τ' αἰγῶν σβεννυμενάων / καὶ βοὸς ὑλοφάγοιο κρέας μή πω τετοκυίης / πρωτογόνων τ' ἐρίφων· ἐπὶ δ' αἴθοπα πινέμεν οἶνον, / ἐν σκιῇι ἑζόμενον, κεκορημένον ἦτορ ἐδωδῆς, / ἀντίον ἀκραέος Ζεφύρου τρέψαντα πρόσωπα· / κρήνης δ' ἀενάου καὶ ἀπορρύτου ἥ τ' ἀθόλωτος / τρὶς ὕδατος προχέειν, τὸ δὲ τέτρατον ἱέμεν οἴνου (an obscure passage that could

refer to a banquet or even to a symposium after lunch: see ll. 592–596 with Colesanti 1999, 71) and in Archil. 2 ἐν δορὶ μέν μοι μᾶζα μεμαγμένη, ἐν δορὶ δ' οἶνος / Ἰσμαρικός· πίνω δ' ἐν δορὶ κεκλιμένος.

The "wheaten bread" could have been a sort of treat in Solon's time, if it is true that he made a law that magistrates were to be served the μᾶζα, but ἄρτον during the days of the ἑορταί "festivals" (Athen. 4.137e = F89 Ruschenbusch; cf. Jardé 1925, 123 f.). μᾶζα was, however, a coarse food made from barley meal, compounded with milk, water, salt, oil that was tougher and more compact than bread (cf. schol. ad Aristoph. *Pax* 565; *Suid.* μ 34 and π 167 Adler), cp. Zenobius 1.12 = *Paroem.Gr.* 1.4 ἀγαθὴ καὶ μᾶζα μέτ' ἄρτον; on the distinction between ἄρτος and μᾶζα see also Braun 1995, 25–32; Olson 1998, 67 f. Baking was connected to Solon's name and his law that a bride should bring with her the φρύγετρον for the roasting of barley is mentioned by Pollux 1.246.

The transmitted ἄρτον αὐτῶν is not entirely clear, and so, was emended by Schweighäuser to ἄρτον αὐτόν (accepted by Bach), which would mean "plain bread", i.e. without sauces or spreads. But it seems that ἄρτον μόνον would convey this meaning more conventionally: cf., e.g., Galen 6.412.8 K. In any case, the lack of context might be responsible for this lack of clarity: κεῖθι "there" of 3 also shows that the poem could have had a strong practical component of which we are unaware, but which may have identified the people referred to by the deictic αὐτῶν.

3. γοῦρος is a sort of πλακοῦς "flat cake", according to Athen. 14.656 f. (cf. also Hesych. *Lex.* α 401 Latte) and so was πέμμα (cf. Herodian. *Partit.* 106.2; Hesych. *Lex.* π 1374 f. Schmidt; schol. ad Lucian, *Conv.* 11 and *hist.conscr.* 56; *Suid.* π 957 Adler). For flat cake as being counted among τραγήματα cf. e.g. Diph. *PCG* 80; Philox. *PMG* 836e. Archestr. *SH* 192.14–16 includes among the τραγήματα boiled chickpeas, fava beans (cf. Solon's "lentils", φακοί) and πλακοῦς. Without any clear reason, Hammer 1902–1903, 47 seeks to discount the authority of Athenaeus' testimony and, on the basis of Hesych. *Lex.* γ 1045 Latte, sustains that here γούρους would mean "pieces of meat". Lentils were served both as a staple (Aristoph. *Plut.* 1004 f., *Vesp.* 811) and as dessert (Pherecr. *PCG* 73, Strattis, *PCG* 47.2).

4 f. ἄρουρα (or γῆ) φέρει is found already in Hom. *Od.* 4.229, 9.357, 19.111 f.; cf. also Tyrtae. 5.3 G.-P.^{2} = 6.3 W.^{2} ὅσον καρπὸν ἄρουρα φέρει. On Solon the politician's attention to the agrarian dimension of the earth, and hence its fertility, cf. Introd. ad 37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2} For πάντα δ'

ἀφθόνως πάρα, cf. *HHom.Ap.* 536 τὰ δ' ἄφθονα πάντα παρέσται (~ *HHom.* 30.8 τῶι τ' ἄφθονα πάντα πάρεστι). Also γῆ ... μέλαινα in 30.6 G.-P.^{2} = 36.6 W.^{2} occurs in Hesiod as well (cf. ad loc.). Solon must have intended for his imitation of archaic-epic language to elevate his material, as it does elsewhere in his poems (cf. esp. the notes to 23 G.-P.^{2} = 27 W.^{2}). Nevertheless, one should not forget that the entire later tradition of Greek gastronomic poetry would configure itself as a linguistic imitation of Homeric epic: cf. Degani 1982; Olson & Sens 1999. The notion of abundance is frequently used by Athenaeus himself for the banquet given by the wealthy Roman named Larensis and it also appears in the literature Athenaeus chooses to cite: see Lukinovich 1990, 267 and n. 16.

34 G.-P.² = 40 W.²

Frr. 34 and 36 G.-P.² = 40 and 41 W.² mention aromatic seeds used as flavors or garnish: see Dalby 1996, 51 f. The pomegranate, ῥο(ι)ά, whose seeds were called κόκκωνες (cf. Hesych. *Lex.* κ 3300 Latte), is recorded as belonging to the "second tables" by Matro, *SH* 534.113 and as food that one "nibbles on" (τρώγειν) "after eating" (μετ᾽ ἄριστον) in Men. *PCG* 83—otherwise τρώγειν seems to have been the verb conventionally used for the action of "eating" pomegranates: cf. Herod. 4.143. Sesame seeds (σήσαμα) are often cited as ingredients in the preparation of various desserts named after them (σησαμῆ, σησάμιον, σησαμίς, σησαμοῦς, etc.): in Hippon. 26a = 37 Degani the σήσαμα seem to be a sauce or ground sesame-seeds with which one dressed pancakes, and Alcm. *PMGF* 19 speaks of tables crowned with "poppy bread" (μακωνιᾶν ἄρτων: cf. Solonian ἄρτον, in 32.2 G.-P.² = 38.2 W.²) and other desserts (χρυσοκόλλα) with linseed and sesame. We can gather with certainty that these were also ingredients of the "second tables" foods from e.g. Philox. *PMG.* 836e.10–20, a passage which repeatedly speaks of food (cakes and cheeses) flavored with sesame: cf. also Vetta 1999, 85; Antignano 2002.

36 G.-P.[2] = 41 W.[2]

Sumach, which was obtained from the plant of the same name, was used for its astringent qualities in the production of leather (ῥοῦς βυρσοδεψική), although different usages are sometimes cited, e.g., in Galen where it is "sprinkled on his food" or "used for food": cf. e.g. 12.463.8, 12.928.1 and 19.135.16 K. Otherwise its fruit figures into flavor lists in both Alexis and Antiphanes: cf. *PCG* 132.6 and 140.2 respectively.

It is advisable to keep the accusative case in which the word appears in the testimony, as it may represent a trace of the original Solonian text (e.g. as the object of a verb like "they crush" *vel similia*).

The phrase became proverbial, although it is never repeated verbatim in its other occurrences. The theme of the *gnome* remains the same but its terms are replaced by synonyms. Lardinois 1997, 215–217 has shown that this happens in the case of most Homeric sayings. For proverbs in Solon see also ad 25 G.-P.² = 29 W.² and 45 W.² The *gnome* here constitutes a second person saying because it applies to the addressee. As Lardinois 1997 has shown for Homer's *Iliad*, the use of second person sayings seems to be restricted to speakers who are in a position of authority over the addressee.

The thought behind this saying, however, does not entirely cohere to Solon's ideology, within which the problem of the people's obedience to their leaders seems to have been much more nuanced: see, in particular, 8 G.-P.² = 6 W.² The fragment's authenticity is therefore doubtful, especially because Apostolius 4.3 and Diogenianus 2.99, who both attribute it to Solon, erroneously ascribe it to the elegies. This may indicate that their source was already mistaken or corrupted.

ἀρχῶν ἄκουε κἂν δίκῃ κἂν μὴ δίκῃ: For this idea cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 75–81, in which the text is uncertain, but the Chorus of war-prisoners seem to lament the present situation where they must put up with whatever commands their masters give to them (Garvie 1986 ad loc.) ἐμοὶ δ', ἀνάγκαν γὰρ ἀμφίπτολιν / θεοὶ προσήνεγκαν, ἐκ γὰρ οἴκων / πατρῴων δούλιόν ⟨μ'⟩ ἐσᾶγον αἶσαν, / δίκαια † καὶ μὴ δίκαια † πρέποντ' ἀπ' ἀρχᾶς βίου / βίαι φρενῶν αἰνέσαι, πικρὸν στύγος / κρατούσαι; Soph. *Ant.* 666 f. ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν / καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἀναντία, *El.* 340 τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ' ἀκουστέα; adesp. *TrGF* F436 δεσποτῶν ἄκουε καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα. The principle becomes a paroemiographic motif: cf. gnomol. Oxy. 3006 i.10 ἄρχοντι π(ε)ίθου καὶ δικαίως κἀδίκως, *Append. Prov.* 1.100 = *Paroem. Gr.* 1.394 κρεισσόνων γὰρ καὶ δίκαια κἄδικ' ἔστ' ἀκούειν ~ Macarius 3.36 = *Paroem. Gr.* 2.157 δεσποτῶν ἄκουε καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα.

The lesser attested variant κἂν δίκῃ κἂν μὴ δίκῃ (with an ellipsis of the verb "to be") is preferable for metrical reasons to the variant καὶ δικαίως κἀδίκως, which does not conform to Porson's law: cf. Morelli 1961, 149 n. 16. Knox 1932, 26 n. 1 suggested that we should adopt καὶ δίκαια

κἄδικα from adesp. *TrGF* F436 = *Append. Prov.* 1.100 (~ Macarius 3.36; emended by Nauck to κἂν δοκῆι κἂν μὴ δοκῆι). For the repetition with negation of a single word see Garvie 1986 ad Aesch. *Cho.* 78–81.

37 G.-P.^{2} = 43 W.^{2}

According to the witness Choricius of Gaza, Solon used these two epithets for the earth: the fragment either deals with the personified goddess Gaia (cf. ad 30.4 f. G.-P.^{2} = 36.4 f. W.^{2}) or the Attic soil. On the attention which Solon pays to the fertility of land elsewhere, see 1.21, 23 G.-P.^{2} = 13.21, 23 W.^{2}; also 18.2 G.-P.^{2} = 24.2 W.^{2} where the "wheat-bearing" land is considered to be among the riches one can possess.

λιπαρός is an epithet of the soil as the fertile bearer of abundance: see, e.g., Aristoph. *PCG* 112.2 and Ap. Rhod. 1.868. The second epithet, κουροτρόφος, appears in various personifications of regions: Ithaca (Hom. *Od.* 9.27), Greece (Eur. *Tro.* 566), Delos (Callim. *Hymn* 4, 2 and 276) etc.

The divinity Kourotrophos is often mentioned in Attic inscriptions of the fifth to third centuries BC, mainly *leges sacrae* concerned with the religious calendar of the sacrifices (reviewed by Hadzisteliou-Price 1978, 105 f. and Pirenne-Delforge 2004, 175–181), but it is never accompanied by the name of a specific goddess. Also, in its only mention in literature, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 298–300, Kourotrophos seems to be an autonomous theonym, although the scholiast interprets it as referring to Gaia or Hestia. Cf. also Paus. 1.22.3 and *Suid.* κ 2193 Adler (Pausanias mentions a sanctuary of hers near the entrance to the Athenian Acropolis); see Hadzisteliou-Price 1978, 101–132. Among the Olympian goddesses Gaia best qualifies for the *epiklesis* κουροτρόφος in having given birth to Erichthonios (on which see Loraux 1993, 58 f.) and being the nurturer of all human beings in tragedy (e.g. Aesch. *Cho.* 66, 128). In any case, the adjective can also apply to other goddesses who have nourishing aspects: especially Demeter (*HHom.Dem.* 225–245), but also Aphrodite (called *kourotrophos* in *Anth.Pal.* 6.318 cf. also Archil. 112.6), Athena, or the Nymphs who are associated with the τροφεῖα of infants (*HHom.Aphr.* 256–273, Eur. *El.* 626); for the goddess of childbirth Artemis, who receives the epithets *kourotrophos* and *paidotrophos*: cf. Hadzisteliou-Price 1978, 189 f. Therefore, some scholars (most recently Pirenne-Delforge 2004, 184 f.) have suggested that Kourotrophos should not be reduced to any of these goddesses, but rather that she was an autonomous entity venerated both in the Attic countryside and in Athens, one responsible for human beings from conception to maturity. Even if we do not accept this interpretation, in principle

Kourotrophos, when it is an epithet substituting for a name, should not be identified with Ge alone, but also with Ge, Demeter, Athena or Artemis (Hadzistelou-Price 1978, 107–111). However, in our context, in light of the religious nature of Ge which seems to surface in 30 G.-P.[2] = 36 W.[2], and the frequent focus on the earth which can be found in other fragments of Solon, we are able to assume rather confidently that Solon uses the epithets λιπαρή and κουροτρόφος to refer to the goddess Ge or to a divine "earth".

38 G.-P.²

According to the most ancient testimony, the *Συναγωγὴ λέξεων χρησίμων*, Solon would have used the word ἀγρεύματα in the sense "landholdings in the country" (τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγροικίας κτήματα). Phot. *Lex.* α 257 Theodoridis confirms this information; cf. also Hesych. *Lex.* α 768 Latte and *Etym.magn./Etym.gen.* 190 Lasserre-Livadaras.

In classical Greece, words beginning with ἀγρευ- almost always refer to hunting (cf. also 17.2 G.-P.² = 23.2 W.² κύνες ἀγρευταί) and not to agricultural activity, and thus they have a meaning linked to ἄγρα/ἀγρεύω "prey"/"hunt" rather than to ἀγρός "field". But in a few words—e.g. ἀγρώστης, which is sometimes "farmer" and sometimes "hunter"—there is a certain oscillation between these two categories: cf. Chantraine, *DELG s.v.* ἀγρός. Solon's term might also be explained as being an archaism, if it is true that ἀγρεύς, from which we get ἄγρευμα, did not originally mean "hunter", as it did in the classical period, but was instead a formation in -εύς of ἀγρός, and thus would mean "of the field, pertaining to the fields": cf. McKenzie 1921, 186.

39 G.-P.^{2} = 30a W.^{2}

John the Deacon in his commentary to Hermogenes' *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* (H. Rabe, *RhM* 63, 1908, 150) maintains that according to Solon, Arion of Methymna εἰσήγαγεν τῆς … τραγωιδίας πρῶτον δρᾶμα.

Against the scepticism of Else 1965, 17, Kleingünther 1933, 23 and Gentili 1984 argue for the validity of the report (also according to Patzer 1962, 15 it is possibile that Solon spoke of Arion, since he also referred to Mimnermus in his poetry: cf. 26 G–P^2. = 20 W.^{2}). The testimony specifies Σόλων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Ἐλεγείαις. On one hand, this expression seems to point to an edition of Solon, which also collected poems that were not elegiac. But on the other hand, τῆς τραγωιδίας δρᾶμα cannot fit into an elegiac distich (cf. Patzer 1962, 15 and Gentili 1984, 24 with further bibliography) and is thus not a verbatim quotation. The fact that John the Deacon does not cite a precise phrase of Solon raises doubts about whether he drew directly from texts of Solon. This probably indirect knowledge of the archaic poet (in addition to the chronological difficulties of bringing Solon and tragedy together) contribute to diminishing our trust in the value of his testimony. Furthermore, the idea of "the first inventor" belongs predominantly to the classical/Hellenistic age (on this motif, see Kleingünther 1933). Finally, as remarked by Patzer 1962, 15, Solon cannot have spoken of the "first" tragedy because it is very unlikely that he knew other tragedies in their more mature form, and in particular he cannot have used the word τραγωιδία which probably did not become an established term until later in Athens. On Solon's literary-critical interests, cf. also 25 G.-P.^{2} = 29 W.^{2}

Usually Arion is attributed with the founding of the dithyramb (Herod. 1.23; Σ Aristoph. *Av.* 1403; Procl. ap. Phot. *Bibl.* 239, p. 320.30 Bekker; Tzetzes ad *Lyc.* p. 252 Maass). The statement of Solon, according to John the Deacon, would be in reference to Arion's production of tragedy, and, as is noted by Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 135, δρᾶμα never seems to apply to a dithyramb. There is, however, at least one other testimony which calls Arion the inventor of the tragic style, λέγεται καὶ τραγικοῦ τρόπου εὑρετὴς γενέσθαι (*Suid.* α 3886 Adler).

The only thing we can say is that Solon must have spoken of Arion in such a way that the ancients could ascribe to him what we find in

John the Deacon (Patzer 1962, 15). In the words of Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 135 we can thus infer that Solon would have maintained that Arion "produced something which was sufficiently on the lines of the tragic choruses of later days to be called by the same name by later writers … There is no need to suppose that Arion's work was dramatic in the sense that it included actors impersonating gods or heroes; it was probably purely lyric; the chorus may have impersonated some group of characters and been so far dramatic". It may be the case that all Solon did was to refer to Arion in language similar to Archil. 120, mentioning the dithyramb and speaking of Διωνύσου ἄνακτος καλὸν *ἐξάρξαι* μέλος. The rest would have been inference or confusion favoring the most famous theatrical genre of classical Athens. The confusion of dithyramb and tragedy in late sources can be paralled by *Suidas*' entry (σ 439 Adler) on Simonides, who is credited with "tragedies" which must be dithyrambs.

More adventurously, we can speculate that here Solon pointed perhaps not to the "first tragedy", but to Arion's dithyramb as a sort of prototype/forerunner of the dramatic action of tragedy. In fact, τῆς … τραγωιδίας πρῶτον δρᾶμα may have (awkwardly) involved this sense, rather than being a strange, or at least unparalleled periphrasis for "first tragedy". This would be in tune with Aristotle's well known definition of the origins of tragedy ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον "from those who led the dithyramb" (*Poet.* 1449a10 f.), which probably focuses on the dithyramb as the model for the responsive collaboration between the individual and the chorus which was to become an important feature of the future tragic drama *stricto sensu* (Lord 1974, 213).

εἰσάγειν "to bring in on the stage" became a technicism in the language of drama. Compare, e.g., Aristoph. *Ach.* 11 εἴσαγ(ε) … τὸν χορόν, on which Olson 2002 ad loc. notes that it is possible that the verb came to mean the *didaskalos* of a play. If we accept the idea that Solon may have pointed here to Arion's dithyramb as a forerunner of tragedy, in tune with the later views of Aristotle, then here εἰσάγειν should be a sort of synonym for ἐξάρχειν (τὸν διθύραμβον) in Aristotle's *Poet.* 1449a10 f. quoted above. In fact, in that passage of Aristotle the "leaders" of the dithyramb were possibly its poets-composers (cf. also Archil. 120), who taught the song and the dance to the chorus, and led the performance in person, as the early tragedians did (see most recently Janko 1987, 77 ad loc., at the end of an interpretive tradition which includes, e.g., Bywater, Butcher, and Dupont-Roc/Lallot).

°40 G.-P.^{2} = 31 W.^{2}

Around the second half of the seventh century laws started to be recorded and publicly displayed in many Greek cities (the earliest ones on stone come from Dreros in Crete and date back roughly to 650–600 BC): see Whitley 1998 and most recently Papakonstantinou 2008, 51–57 and Gagarin 2008, 45–50 with previous bibliography.

Plut. *Sol.* 3.5 καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχείρησεν ἐντείνας εἰς ἔπος ἐξ-ενεγκεῖν, καὶ διαμνημονεύουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἔχουσαν maintains that Solon used the hexameter for his ϑεσμοί before moving on to prose. The validity of Plutarch's testimony is, however, highly doubtful, since Plutarch himself refers to it as the opinion of others (ἔνιοι δέ φασιν). Thus, there are real reasons for suspecting that our fragment is spurious and drawn up by someone who played on the tradition of Thaletas, the propagandist-poet of Lycurgus' *rhetra* which set out the structure of the government in Sparta, or Charondas' verse-laws. The tradition which ascribed to Charondas the habit of writing laws in hexameters which were also sung at the symposia is documented in Hermippus' treatise *περὶ νομοϑετῶν* fr. 88 Wehrli; the treatise can also be one of the possible sources for Plutarch's testimony concerning Solon (on Lycurgan legislation see MacDowell 1986; Gagarin 1986; Millender 2001; on the relationship between poetry and archaic legislation, cf. Thomas 1995, 63 f. and n. 15; Camassa 1988; Piccirilli 1981). Ruzé 2001 thinks it would have been impossible to set the texts of the early laws to metrical rhythm word for word. He suggests that the young Greeks may have learnt to sing the *prooimia*, the preludes of the laws, i.e. statements expressing the general spirit which prompted the laws, but not their rather grim details. In any case, and independently of its truth or falseness, this tradition of verse laws might have facilitated the apocryphal attribution of our text to Solon, since both the conventionality of the expressive form, and in particular the imitative character of l. 2 do not favor the idea of the distich's authenticity.

In the early archaic period hexameter was treated as "an all-purpose verse form" (Bowie 1993, 5) and until the late sixth century it was used in the case of oracles, epitaphs, dedications and other early inscribed texts. Loraux 1988, 116 f., who seems to believe in the authenticity of these verses ascribed to Solon, also finds a parallel in what Tyrtaeus had done

for the non-written *rhetra* of Lycurgus. According to her, Solon used the epic language and meter to gain the superior authority of inspired epic poetry for his legislation: on the *ethos* of the hexameter according to Aristot. *Poet.* 1459b31–36 and the possibilities that such a notion already existed in Solon's time, see Introd. ad 29, 29a, 29b G.-P.[2] = 32, 33, 34 W.[2] More specifically, Solon's use of hexameter might be parallel to Hesiod's didactic use of the same line in the *Works and Days*. For Dalby 1998, 210 n. 39 "Hesiod's use of hexameter in the *Works and Days* was appropriate—a series of facts, rules and injunctions, already proverbial, largely unarguable in the context in which they were intended, and not intended for arguing but for stating. To this extent hexameter (though not epic) certainly does seem to have been the medium of the 'tribal encyclopaedia' for which Havelock used to argue. What is said in hexameter is said, uncomplicatedly, as a fact (Hes. *Op.* 10) whether or not it happens to be true (Hes. *Theog.* 27–28)". In any case, as Gagarin 2003, 67 aptly notes, the shift from a body of undifferentiated rules, as in the Hesiodic *Works and Days*, to a collection of (written) laws such as Solon's is a conceptually large step (on the concepts of 'codification' and 'code' in an archaic society, see Hölkeskamp 1992a, 55–60; for Solon's legislation as a codification, see most recently Hölkeskamp 2005 with the qualifications of Gagarin 2008, 74 f.).

The invocation of Zeus was a very common theme in the preludes introducing recitations of poetry unrelated to Zeus, from Terpander (*PMG* 698 = 3 Gostoli) to Alcman (*PMGF* 29); cf. also Pind. *Nem.* 2.1–3 and 5.25 f. For a general discussion of proemial invocations to Zeus in archaic poetry, cf. Fantuzzi 2000. One of the most famous cases is the proem of Hesiod's *Works and Days*: the author begins by inviting the Muses to celebrate their father Zeus, the Muses then respond by dedicating a brief hymn in praise of the power of Zeus (3–8), and as a result, the actual beginning of the poem comes only at l. 8. The invocation of, specifically, Zeus in these texts is, however, just an example among many proems to hexametrical poetry, where according to widespread convention the bard had to connect himself to some divine authority who guided and inspired him at the moment he began his poem. It comes as no surprise that the writing of laws could also beseech the authoritative protection of a god: the case of the divine connection of the lawgiver Zaleucus in Aristot. fr. 555 Gigon, which comes from the *Λοκρῶν πολιτεία*, would be even more direct and passive, since Zaleucus intended to put into writing laws delivered to him in his sleep by the goddess Athena. If Solon's fragment is a forgery, as seems likely,

then it would be a forgery constructed—as expected—according to the convention of the proemial god par excellence, Zeus, combined with the biographical tradition on Zaleucus or other possible similar anecdotes on early legislators: see also Introd. chap. 4.

1. The entire phrase εὐχώμεσθα Διὶ … βασιλῆι is strongly epicizing in form: cf. Hom. *Il.* 7.194 εὔχεσθε Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι ~ 7.200 and *Theb. PEG* 3.3 εὖκτο Διὶ βασιλῆι. For the second hemistich, see Hes. *Op.* 69 Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι (at the end of the hexameter). The subjunctive is used frequently in proems to express resolve: cf. Hes. *Theog.* 1, 36; *HHom.Ap.* 1 and *HHom.* 25.1; Aratus, *Phaen.* 1; Theocr. 17.1 f.

βασιλεύς: the title is not documented for Zeus (or any other deity) in Homer, but it is common in Hesiod (*Theog.* 486, 886, 897, 923; *Op.* 668; fr. 308); cf. Drews 1983, 104–107, and still Wackernagel 1916, 210; for the epigraphic evidence, Cook 1914–1940, (Index I, s.v. Zeus' Epithets). See also *Cypr. PEG* 9.3, *HHom.Dem.* 358; Alcae. 296a3, 308.3 f., 387; Theogn. 285 f., 376, 1120, 1346.

The first person plural may simply be a plural *maiestatis*. But it may also (more probably) respond to Solon's desire to include his intended audience in this authorial self-reference, as is probably also the case in the proem of the *Odyssey* where, after ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε (1), there follows εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν at l. 10. In fact, it would make more sense if the operation of the legislation is now imagined to be concluded and the result is to be shared by the whole community (so that the legislator would operate by himself for the community). In all the other points in his poetry about his legislation (θεσμοί), Solon had clearly referred to himself in the first person singular, but used the third person singular when examining the case of an alternative legislator in Athens: cf. 30.20–22 G.-P.^{2} = 36.20–22 W.^{2}

2. **θεσμοῖς τοῖσδε … ὀπάσσαι**: Cf. 30.18 θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κἀγαθῶι … ἔγραψα and the commentary ad loc.

τύχην … καὶ κῦδος ὀπάσσαι: besides 11.5 = 19.5 W.^{2} χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι, cf. above all 1.2–4 G.-P.^{2} = 13.2–4 W.^{2}

The success that Solon(?) would hope for his laws to achieve focuses here on the same two points which he had requested of himself in the proem of the elegy *To the Muses*: the τύχη ἀγαθή, "good lot"/"fate" of this fragment corresponds to the ὄλβος "blessedness" of 1 G.-P.^{2} = 13 W.^{2}, and κῦδος "prestige" corresponds to δόξα ἀγαθή "good reputation". But Solon(?) here, as opposed to the elegy *To the Muses*, chooses a more

conventional addressee, since Zeus was indeed the usual dispenser of κῦδος "prestige": cf., e.g., Hom. *Il.* 8.141, 12.255, 15.327, 16.730, 17.251, 566, 21.570, *Od.* 15.320, 19.161 (*v.l.*); Hes. *Theog.* 438; Aristoph. *Eq.* 200 etc. (for the Muses as Solon's addressee in his elegy to them, see Introd. ad 1 G.-P.[2] = 13 W.[2]). Comparing the predictable choice of the addressee in this fragment with the thoughtful unconventionality of the invocation to the Muses leads us to suppose that this verse is more likely a patchwork imitation based upon Solon's text, rather than a variation made by Solon himself.

45 W.²

Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1177b31 cites the *gnome*: "nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts (ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν)", which Michael, *Comm. in Arist. Graeca* 20.591.14 assigns to either Theognis or Solon.

ἀνθρώπειος, Ionic ἀνθρωπήϊος is the only form of the adjective we find in classical literature, starting with Heraclit. *VS* 22B78 (if the quotation of the fragment is verbatim), where the ἦθος of human thinking—as "destitute of insights" γνῶμαι—is opposed to divine thinking. The *gnome* ascribed to Solon likewise seems to have reminded one of the limits inherent to human thinking. The epithet was often used in the same context, e.g., by Herodotus (in particular 1.5.16, 1.32.6, 1.207.10; 3.65.10; 7.47.2; 8.60.34) and Eur. *TrGF* (32)F418.1.

Although, in light of this linguistic evidence, ἀνθρώπινα would hardly have been a verbatim quotation of Solon's (the word is not attested before Thucydides and Plato, who both also use the form ἀνθρώπειον), the *paraenesis* to ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν (= "to have man's = moderate thoughts"?) does not seem foreign to Solon: cf. 5, and 15.4 G.-P.² = 4c.3, and 6.4 W.² After all, at least in Herodotus the characters who mimic the divine too closely and thus incur divine envy are most often tyrants, and tyrants themselves share with the gods a typical divine behavior, namely envy: Harrison 2000, 163 f. It is appealing to conjecture that Solon may have expressed a similar idea, e.g., within the criticism of the hyper-exhaltation of the μόναρχος (12 G.-P.² = 9 W.²).

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